ORDER The petitioner in April, 1968 was appointed as Sub-Inspector of the Railway Protection Force (hereinafter to be referred to as "R. P. F.") in the South Eastern Railway and on successful completion of training was posted as Sub-Inspector at Muri Junction Station. 2. While he was working as such, the respondent no. 6 issued a memo containing some allegations against him (Annexure A). Thereafter, he was given a warning letter (Annexure B) by the respondent no. 4, the Security Officer. On May 14, 1980 the respondent no. 6 made a false diary against the petitioner alleging his absence from duty. Following this the petitioner's duty was changed. 3. While the petitioner was at Purulia he received a threatening letter dated November 13, 1980 from the respondent no. 5 (Annexure B) and on November 18, 1980 he was charge-sheeted by the same respondent (Annexure F). However, the said charge-sheet was ultimately dropped. 4. On April 30, 1981 the petitioner was on rest duty and went to see his ailing wife. But while he was out of the station, a letter signed on April 29, 1981 by the respondent no. 3, the Chief Security Officer but dated May 2, 1981 along with another letter dated May 2, 1981 issued by the respondent no. 5, with the allegation that the petitioner was absconding were sent to his Railway Quarters for delivery and was handed over to his brother who happened to be present at home at the relevant time. 5. By the letter of the respondent no. 3 the petitioner was informed that his service had been terminated with effect from the date of the service of the notice (Annexure G). 6. The petitioner's appeal against the said order of termination to the respondent no. 2, the appointing authority (Annexure H) having been proved to be abortive (Annexure I) he invoked the Writ Jurisdiction of this Court and obtained the present Rule. 7. According to the petitioner the impugned order of termination is illegal having been passed in contravention of the relevant rules as well as of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and consequently it should be struck down. 8. The respondents opposed the matter by filing an affidavit-in-opposition and an affidavit-in-reply was filed by the petitioner. 9. In view of the contentions raised by Mr. 8. The respondents opposed the matter by filing an affidavit-in-opposition and an affidavit-in-reply was filed by the petitioner. 9. In view of the contentions raised by Mr. Kashi Kanta Maitra, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, the following points arise for consideration in the instant case. (a) Whether the impugned order of termination of the petitioner was a termination simpliciter or was it by way of punishment inviting thereby Article 311(2) of the Constitution; (b) Whether Rule 25(2) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as the R. P. F. Rules) was duly complied in matter of the said termination; and (c) Whether simultaneous payment of pay in lieu of notice was a condition precedent in case the impugned termination was termination simpliciter. 10. Now, in order to appreciate the points involved in this case, it may be useful at the outset to state certain facts which are admitted on both sides. 11. The petitioner on May 4, 1979 was appointed as Sub-Inspector on probation for a period of two years after successful completion of the training as prescribed for the post. Annexure R to the affidavit-in-opposition is the relevant appointment letter. Before this on April 4, 1979 he executed as agreement in favour of the President of India. In terms of Rule 23(1) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, which provides that "Every person shall at the time of his joining the initial training course, execute an agreement in the form in Appendix 'A'." Annexure 'R(1)' to the affidavit-in-opposition is a copy of the said agreement Sub-clause (2) of the agreement it as hereunder:–– "I understand and agree that my service can be terminated––(a) by the Chief Security Officer at any time during the period of initial training or the period of my probation thereafter on issue of notice of one month or tender of one month's pay in lieu of such notice; or (b)...........................". 12. According to the affidavit-in-opposition the petitioner's conduct during the period of his probation was far from satisfactory or unbecoming of an officer on probation. The Security Officer, accordingly on April 19, 1980, issued him a written warning for termination of probation (Annexure 'B' at p. 23 of the writ petition) so that he could improve his service conduct. 13. 12. According to the affidavit-in-opposition the petitioner's conduct during the period of his probation was far from satisfactory or unbecoming of an officer on probation. The Security Officer, accordingly on April 19, 1980, issued him a written warning for termination of probation (Annexure 'B' at p. 23 of the writ petition) so that he could improve his service conduct. 13. Thereafter on certain allegations a charge-sheet dated November 18, 1980 was issued against the petitioner, but it was ultimately dropped (Annexure F). 14. Subsequently, by a notice dated May 2, 1981 the petitioner's service was terminated by the Chief Security Officer The relevant portion of the notice (at page 62 of the writ petition) is as follows : "Please note that your service will no longer be required from the date of receipt of this notice". You are granted one month's pay in lieu of notice of one month" 15. Coming now to the question of termination of a probationer's services, it is more than well settled that a probationer's service can be terminated if on an overall appreciation of his record of service he is found unsuitable for being absorbed in the service. If the order of termination does not contain any stigma or refer to any charge of misconduct on the part of the probationer, there is no obligation to afford him an opportunity of being heard before terminating his services (Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1985) 2 SCC 5 ). 16. Similar view was expressed earlier by the Supreme Court in Union of India & ors. v. P. S. Bhatt, AIR 1981 SC 957 ; State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Saboji, AIR 1980 SC 42 , as well as in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Dr. Md. S. Iskandar Ali, AIR 1980 SC 1242 and Commodore Commanding, Southern Naval Area v. V. N. Rajon, AIR 1981 SC 965 . 17. In the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra) the Supreme Court observed that "As the respondent was a temporary employee on probation, it was open to the employer to terminate his services at any time before he was confirmed, if the employer was satisfied that he was not suitable for being retained in service." 18. 17. In the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra) the Supreme Court observed that "As the respondent was a temporary employee on probation, it was open to the employer to terminate his services at any time before he was confirmed, if the employer was satisfied that he was not suitable for being retained in service." 18. Thus, in the instant case also it was open to the respondents to terminate the services of the petitioner, who at the material time was a probationer yet to be confirmed in service. Apart from anything else the respondents could very well terminate his services in terms of the agreement under Rule 23 of the R. P. F. Rules "on issue of notice of one month or the tender of one month's pay in lieu of such notice…………….", during the period of his probation. 19. It may be recalled in this connection that the petitioner was appointed a probationer on May 4, 1979 for a period of two years and the said period was to expire on May 3, 1979 for a period of two years and the said period was to expire on May 3, 1981. And it was on May 2, 1981 that the Chief Security Officer, who in terms of the agreement could terminate the petitioner's service, issued the impugned termination notice (vide page 62 of the writ petition) to take effect from the date of its receipt. Under the forwarding letter of the Assistant Security Officer (Annexure G) an attested copy of this termination notice was forwarded to the petitioner for his information. It was, however, erroneously mentioned in the forwarding letter that the petitioner's services stood terminated with effect from May 2, 1981, but that is not of much consequence since an attested copy of the termination notice issued by the Chief Security Officer was annexed to the forwarding letter by the Assistant Security Officer which clearly indicated that the notice was to take effect from the date of its receipt. 20. The forwarding letter (Annexure G) shows that at the material time the petitioner was absconding from the place of his duty and from the affidavit-in-opposition it appears that the notice was duly served by affixing a copy of it at a conspicuous place at the Railway quarters of the petitioner. 20. The forwarding letter (Annexure G) shows that at the material time the petitioner was absconding from the place of his duty and from the affidavit-in-opposition it appears that the notice was duly served by affixing a copy of it at a conspicuous place at the Railway quarters of the petitioner. It has further been stated in the affidavit-in-opposition that one Assistant Security Officer of the Railway Protection Force was sent to the village home of the petitioner in district of Bhagalpur, Bihar for personal service of the notice upon the petitioner but since he was found absent, a copy of the notice was handed over to his brother. There is, however, a controversy regarding the actual date of such service. According to the affidavit-in-opposition it was served on May 3, 1981 whereas according to the petitioner it was on May 4, 1981 when he had already completed his probationary period of two years. 21. The controversy thus raised, would have assumed real importance had the petitioner been confirmed automatically on completion of his probationary period of two years on the date of the service of the notice of termination. 22. This leads us to a very significant issue, namely, whether a probationer stands automatically confirmed on the completion of his probationary period unless the said period is further extended by a specific order before its conclusion. 23. In Kedar Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 873 it was held that unless the terms of appointment clearly indicate that confirmation would automatically follow at the end of the specified period or there is a specific service rule to that effect, the expiry of the period of probation does not necessarily lead to confirmation. 24. As a matter of fact it has been held consistently by the Supreme Court and different High Courts that when a first appointment is made on probation for a specific period and the probationer for some reason or other is allowed to continue beyond that period without any specific order of confirmation, he should be deemed to continue as a probationer in the absence of any indication to the contrary either in his original letter of appointment or in the service rules. 25. 25. Incidentally, Rule 25(1) of the R. P. F. Rules provides that all appointments by direct recruitment or promotion shall be on probation for two years subject to the provision that the appointing authority may extend this period in specific cases. It is therefore clear that the period of two years does not represent the maximum period of probation. 26. Under similar circumstances, the Supreme Court in Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of U. P. (supra) held that there was no right in the probationer to be confirmed merely because he had completed the period of probation of two years and has passed the requisite tests and completed the prescribed training. The function of confirmation implies the exercise of judgment by the confirming authority on the overall suitability of the employee for permanent absorption in the service. 27. Applying the legal principle so enunciated there could be no question of the petitioner being automatically confirmed on the expiry of two years of probation even assuming that he had actually completed the said period before the actual service of the termination notice upon his brother. 28. The decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 as referred to by Mr. Maitra, can have no application to the facts of the present case since the relevant rules of service in that case prohibited extension of the period of probation beyond three years. 29. This brings us to another important question raised on behalf of the petitioner, namely, whether in view of the previous written warning for termination of probation on April 19, 1980 (Annexure B) and issue of charge-sheet against the petitioner on certain allegation (Annexure F) it could be said that the impugned termination of the petitioner's services was by way of punishment attracting thereby the provision of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In this connection Mr. Maitra, representing the petitioner, drew my specific attention to Annexure 'J' to the writ petition which is a letter dated December 3, 1981 addressed by the then Union Railway Minister Sri Kedar Pandey to Sri Bhagwat Jha Azad, the then Minister of Supply and Rehabilitation of the Union Government in response to a letter written to him by Sri Azad dated May 21, 1981. 30. 30. Since much of Sri Maitra's argument on the point is biased or this letter, it may be useful to reproduce here the whole of it :–– 31. Annexure 'J' referred to in this petition solemnly affirmed by Sri B. K. Pandey, before me, this the 10th day of August, 1982. Commissioner ----------------- D.O. No. 81-Sec(E)/145/100 Minister for Railways India, New Delhi Dec 3 1981 Dear Shri Azad, Kindly refer to your letter dated 21st May, 1981 regarding reinstatement of Shri B. K. Pandey, Ex. SI/RPF, South Eastern Railway. 2. I have had the matter looked into. I find that during the period of probation itself, Shri Pandey indulged in undesirable activities. Besides availing himself of normal leave, he was on unauthorised absence for as many as 117 days in a period of nearly one year and eight months. The advice given by the Security Officer and Chief Security Officer not to proceed on such unauthorised absence proved to be of no avail. He levelled false, malicious and motivated allegations against the Inspector of Muri Post under whom he was working and miserably failed in substantiating the charges when asked to do so. Surprisingly, he cited one of the office bearers of the RPF Association as a witness to support these charges. Further he was very discourteous and undisciplined in use of language towards his senior officers. In his letter dated 2.11.1980 he wrote to the Asstt. Security Officer that "I am deeply disturbed and grieved with your malicious and illegal letter under reference." Not only that, he sent a copy of his letter to the RPF Association for further action. He developed close contacts with the Divisional Security of the RPF Association of Adra Division during this period and started addressing the RPF Association and was exhorting the staff to stand united against the Railway Administration. 3. The above facts show that he devoted most of his time towards the RPF Association. During the period of nearly one year, he investigated only 4 cases of RP(UP) Act and all these cases were of petty nature. 4. In view of serious lapse, and unsatisfactory conduct as mentioned above, the Chief Security Officer terminated his probation under the existing rules. Since the grounds on which his probation period has been terminated are sound and reasonable, I do not find any justification to interfere in the matter. 4. In view of serious lapse, and unsatisfactory conduct as mentioned above, the Chief Security Officer terminated his probation under the existing rules. Since the grounds on which his probation period has been terminated are sound and reasonable, I do not find any justification to interfere in the matter. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd/- Kedar Pandey Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad, Minister of Supply & Rehabilitation, Govt. of India, New Delhi Copy to : Shri Surendra Mohan Pandey, Village Bath, P. S. Sultanganj, Bhagalpur (Bihar) (C. N. Jha), Private Secretary to the Minster of Supply and Rehabilitation. Tele : 387792/387/25/385754. No. 4216/D/81 32. Paragraph 4 of the letter clearly shows that the petitioner's probation was terminated in view of his serious lapses and unsatisfactory conduct as mentioned in the earlier paragraph. 33. Referring specifically to this paragraph of the letter it was contended by Mr. Maitra that in spite of the innocuous language of the termination notice the impugned termination was not a termination simpliciter but it was by way of punishment attracting thereby the provision of Article 311(2) of the Constitution which was not complied. 34. Now so far the warning letter (Annexure B) is concerned, the petitioner's attention was drawn to certain irregularities committed by him and he was directed to show positive improvement on the points mentioned therein. This letter is dated April 19, 1980 and in my view, it cannot in any way, be linked with the termination notice dated May 2, 1981. The petitioner by his conduct invited the warning letter As a matter of fact, his service could have been terminated then and there in terms of the agreement entitled into by the petitioner under Rule 23 of the RPF Rules. But without doing so he was simply given a warning so that he could amend his ways. It would, in my view, be too wide to link it with the subsequent termination notice. 35. So far the charge-sheet is concerned it was not proceeded with and was dropped. 36. In Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 similar question was considered by a Constitution Bench comprising seven Judges and it was held that an order terminating the services of a temporary servant or a probationer under the Rules of Employment and without anything more will not attract Article 311 of the Constitution. 36. In Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 similar question was considered by a Constitution Bench comprising seven Judges and it was held that an order terminating the services of a temporary servant or a probationer under the Rules of Employment and without anything more will not attract Article 311 of the Constitution. Where a departmental enquiry is contemplated and if an enquiry is not in fact proceeded with, Article 311 will not be attracted unless it can be shown that the order though unexceptionable in form is made following a report based on misconduct. 37. In Union of India & ors. v. P. S. Bhatt (supra), the Supreme Court observed that "even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the authority to terminate the services of the employee on probation, such termination cannot be termed as penalty or punishment". 38. In State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Saboji (supra) the Supreme Court made it clear that : "Ordinarily and generally the rule laid down in most of the cases by this Court is that you have to look to the order on the face of it and find whether it casts any stigma on the Government servant. In such a case there is no presumption that the order is arbitrary or mala fide unless a very strong case is made out and proved by the Government servant who challenges such order." 39. In the instant case the termination order, as already seen, is absolutely innocuous and is prima facie an order of termination simpliciter without involving any stigma. 40. Coming now to the letter (Annexure J) written by the erstwhile Railway Minister Sri Kedar Pandey, no doubt shows that the service of the petitioner was terminated due to his serious lapses and unsatisfactory conduct", but as was held by the Supreme Court in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) that : "Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the petitioner is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any Rule governing the probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude, the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this……………………………………………………….." 41. In the present case also if the authority on overall assessment of the petitioner's conduct during his period of probation, found him unsuitable for the post and terminated his service, it cannot be said that it was by way of punishment. 42. Moreover, the communication (Annexure J) between two Ministers being a departmental matter, it cannot possibly be looked into for the purpose of determining whether it casts a stigma on the petitioner. 43. In I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1264 , the Supreme Court held that "when there is no express words in the impugned order itself which throw a stigma on the Government servant, the Court would not delve into. Secretariat files to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred on such research". 44. Relying on this decision the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Dr. Md. S. Iskandar Ali (supra) held that "the High Court was in error in arriving at the finding that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment by probing into the departmental correspondence that passed between the superiors of the respondent…………………………………..". 45. It was further observed by the Supreme Court in the said case that: "From the undisputed facts…………it is manifest that even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the employer to terminate the services of the employee, a power which the appellants undoubtedly possessed, even so as under the terms of the appointment of the respondent such a power flowed from the contract of service it could not be termed as penalty or punishment." 46. In the instant case, as already seen, the agreement entered into by the petitioner with the Government under Rule 23 of the R. P. F. Rules, clearly provided that the Chief Security Officer at any time during the period of his probation could terminate the petitioner's services on issue of notice of one month or the tender of one month's pay in lieu of such notice. It implies that such termination could be effected even without assigning any reason. 47. On a consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances above and the law on the point as laid down by the Supreme Court I am of the view that the order impugned is prima facie an order of termination simpliciter without involving any stigma. It does not in any way involve any evil consequences and is an order of discharge simpliciter of the petitioner who was a probationer and had no right to the service. 48. In this connection I may refer to the following observation of the Supreme Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 : "if the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or, under the rules, the right to terminate the employment at any time, then such termination in the manner provided by the contract or the rules, is, prima facie per se, not a punishment and does not attract the provisions of Article 311". 49. Mr. Moitra in this connection drew my attention to sub-rule (2) of Rule 25 of the R. P. F. Rules which provides that–– (1) All appointments by direct recruitment or promotion shall be on probation for two years subject to the provision that the appointing authority may extend this period in special cases. (2) The appointing authority shall on the expiry of the period of such probation or such extended period pass an order declaring that the probationer has completed the period of probation satisfactorily and is suitable for confirmation in that rank, if he considers him unsuitable the probationer shall be informed in writing of the reasons for terminating his probation and given an opportunity to submit any representation he may wish to make within a reasonable time and any representation submitted within that time shall also be considered and final orders passed by such authority". 50. But, I do not think that the said rule is attracted to the present case since there is nothing in the impugned order of termination to show that the probation of the petitioner was terminated on the ground of his unsuitability. Thus, non-assignment of the reasons for termination in the impugned order does not make it invalid in law. 51. The last contention raised by Mr. Thus, non-assignment of the reasons for termination in the impugned order does not make it invalid in law. 51. The last contention raised by Mr. Moitra was that the impugned order was bad in law since there was no simultaneous tendering of one month's pay to the petitioner in lieu of notice. This contention, however, does not appeal to me since the agreement itself does not provide for such simultaneous payment. What it provides is that the services of the petitioner were terminable at any time on issue of notice of one month or the tender of one month's pay in lieu of such notice without mentioning how exactly such payment should be made. 52. In the impugned notice of termination it has been mentioned specifically that the petitioner was granted one month's pay in lieu of one month's notice. 53. As already stated that the petitioner was not traceable at the material time and accordingly, in Annexure 'G' issued by the Assistant Security Officer, the following paragraph was added : "As you are absconding from the place of duty, therefore, payment of one month's salary could not be made, which will be made, as and when you present yourself at the R. P. F. post, Purulia, i.e. your erstwhile place of duty". It has been specifically stated in the affidavit-in-opposition that a copy of the impugned notice was affixed at a conspicuous place in the Railway Quarters of the petitioner. This, in my view, was sufficient compliance with the relevant clause in the agreement. As a matter of fact, the authority which was very much conscious of the fact that tender of a month's pay in lieu of a month's notice was required to be made, could have no reason whatsoever to withhold such payment if the petitioner was actually available to receive such payment. I am not inclined to believe that the authority falsely took a stand that the petitioner was absconding and was not available either to receive the impugned notice of termination or a month's pay in lieu of notice. 54. Mr. Maitra in this connection referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court in Senior Superintendent, R. M. S. Cochin v. K. V. Gopinath as reported in AIR 1972 SC 1487 . 54. Mr. Maitra in this connection referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court in Senior Superintendent, R. M. S. Cochin v. K. V. Gopinath as reported in AIR 1972 SC 1487 . There, in view of the relevant Rules of the service it was held that to be effective the termination of service has to be simultaneous with the payment to the employee of whatever is due to him. However, as it appears that the amendment subsequently brought into the Rule with effect from May 1, 1965, escaped the notice of the Bench that decided the case. The error was subsequently corrected by another Bench of the Supreme Court in Rajkumar v. Union of India, (1975) 4 SCC 13 , and this was also noted in Union of India v. Arun Kumar Roy, (1986) 1 SCC 675 . 55. Thus, whether the service of the notice of termination and the payment should be simultaneous or not will depend on the relevant Rules of the service. In the instant case, the prescribed form of agreement under Rule 23 of the R. P. F. Rules does not specifically provide for that and, accordingly, simultaneous non-payment of one month's salary does not make the termination order ineffective, particularly in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. 56. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed on contest. The Rule issued be discharged and interim order, if any, do stand vacated. No order is made for costs. Application dismissed.