JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner was selected by M. P. Public Service Commission for appointment to one of the posts of Assistant Surgeons in 1958. The post was a class II post in the M. P. Health Services and carried a pay scale of Rs. 275-700. The petitioner joined the post at Lady Elgin Hospital, Jabalpur on 14-3-1959. It is not in dispute that she was confirmed on it with effect from 1-1-1965 vide order dated 20-2-1975 of the stale Government. ( 2. ) IT appears that in 1962 the family planning clinic functioning at Lady Elgin hospital, Jabalpur was converted into a Regional Family Planning Training Centre and the petitioner was put in charge of the said centre with effect from 1-9-1962. But, then, it is clear that she did the work as a part of her duties as Assistant Surgeon. It was in 1966 that the State Government took a decision to create separate posts of Medical officer Incharge of Regional Family Planning Training Centres in the scale of pay of rs. 550-950/ -. It is noteworthy that this scale of pay of Rs. 550-950 was equivalent to that of Assistant Directors of Health Services working in class I post ( 3. ) AS mentioned above, the petitioner had been working as Incharge of a family Planning Training Centre while discharging her duties in the class II post of assistant Surgeon at Lady Elgin Hospital, Jabalpur. It is perhaps for the said reason that till the newly created class I posts of Medical Officer Incharge of Regional Family planning Training Centres were filled up on a regular basis by direct recruitment through selection by the Public Service Commission, she was appointed to officiate temporarily until further orders on one of the said posts at Lady Elgin Hospital, jabalpur with effect from 1-3-1966 vide order dated 27-8-1966 of the State government. ( 4. ) THEREAFTER, in 1967, the posts of Medical Officers Incharge of regional Family Planning Training Centres were advertised by the State Government for being filled up on a regular basis by direct recruitment through selection by the public Service Commission. It appears that the petitioner was in doubt whether she was required to apply for the said post. ( 4. ) THEREAFTER, in 1967, the posts of Medical Officers Incharge of regional Family Planning Training Centres were advertised by the State Government for being filled up on a regular basis by direct recruitment through selection by the public Service Commission. It appears that the petitioner was in doubt whether she was required to apply for the said post. But, then, it was very clearly explained to her by the State Government vide a copy of letter dated 1-7-1967 endorsed to her that under her appointment order dated 27-8-1966 she had not been a promotee to the post of Medical Officer Incharge of Regional Family Planning Training Centre" and that her appointment to the said post under the said order had been only on an ad hoc basis. She was informed in unequivocal terms that for being appointed to the said post on a regular basis she was required to apply for the posts that were advertised. ( 5. ) AS a matter of fact, after receiving the above said clarification from the State ,government, the petitioner did apply for one of the posts that had been advertised for being filled up by direct recruitment If is clear from the document dated 25-4-1968 addressed by the State Government to the Director of Health Services that the petitioner and one Dr. Smt. M. S. Harmalkar were selected by the Public Service commission for the two posts at Jabalpur and Indore respectively. It is also clear from the said document that the fact of the said two candidates already working on the said posts was taken note of in it and as such the Director was merely asked to inform them about their selection. In the circumstances, though the document dated 25-4-1968 was not very happily worded, there can be little doubt that it constituted an order of appointment of the two candidates on a regular basis by direct recruitment through selection by the Public Service Commission. ( 6. ) IT appears that in due course of time the class I posts of Assistant Directors of health Services were upgraded and came to be designated as Deputy Registrar, director of Health Services. It also appears that the class I posts of Medical Officers incharge of Regional Family Planning Training Centres were similarly "upgraded and treated equivalent to those of Deputy Directors of Health Services. It also appears that the class I posts of Medical Officers incharge of Regional Family Planning Training Centres were similarly "upgraded and treated equivalent to those of Deputy Directors of Health Services. It was after the abovesaid changes were made that a provisional combined seniority list of Civil surgeons, Deputy Directors of Health Services, Superintendents of Major Hospitals, medical Officers Incharge of Regional Family Planning Training Centres etc. working on equivalent posts as on 1-4-1983 was published by the State Government on 6-2-1984 The said list was in two parts. The first part was in respect of those who were permanent. The second part was in respect of those who were working in officiating or* temporary capacity. The petitioner was included in the first part and was at serial No. 5 in the said part. As per other details, she was shown as working on her present post since 1-3-1966 and was also shown as having been confirmed on it on the same date. ( 7. ) BUT, then, thereafter, after considering the objections and representations against the provisional seniority list published on 6-2-1984, the State Government made certain corrections in the said list and published the revised final seniority list on 27-6-1985. In the said list, the name of the petitioner was included in the part relating to permanent incumbents as before. But, then, her seniority was lowered from serial No. 5 to serial No. 15. As a result of the said-change quite a few persons, namely Drs. R. C. Saxena, R. N. Tiwari, V. K. Gupta, T. P. Sharma, K. S. Hardia, R. S. Shukla, N. K. Sharma, V. K. Dube, A. K. Handa and S. L. Singhai who had been shown as junior to her in the provisional seniority list became senior to her in the final seniority list The basis for making the said change was the realisation by the State Government of the fact that the petitioner had been appointed to the class I post of Medical Officer incharge of Regional Family Planning Training Centre on regular basis by direct recruitment through selection by the Public Service Commission only in 1968 and was as such not entitled to count her seniority as against other permanent incumbents of class I posts with effect from any date prior to 1968. ( 8. ( 8. ) IN the meanwhile, the petitioner had been promoted to one of the posts of joint Directors of Health Services on ad hoc basis and until further orders vide order dated 28-11-1983 of the State Government. The Doctors mentioned in the previous para i. e. R. C. Saxena and others had also been promoted to the posts of Joint directors of Health Services. In fact, one of them i. e. Dr. K. S. Hardia was promoted to the post of Director of Health Services. ( 9. ) IT is urged by the petitioner in the present petition filed on 29-11-1984 that the provisional seniority list of Civil Surgeons, Deputy Directors of Health Services etc. as on 1-4-1983 published by the State Government on 6-2-1984 was correct and that the doctors mentioned above i. e. R. C. Saxena and others were incorrectly shown as senior to her in the revised final seniority list published on 27-6- 1985. It is claimed by her that she was senior to Dr. K. S. Hardia and was as such entitled to be promoted to the post of Director of Health Services in preference to him. It is further claimed by her that even on the post of Joint Director of Health Services she was entitled to be treated as working on regular basis and senior to Dr. R. C. Saxena and others. It may be stated that during the pendency of the petition Dr. Hardia retired as Director, Health services and Dr. T. P. Sharma was appointed on the said post in an officiating capacity until further orders vide order dated 26-10-1985 of the State Government. ( 10. ) NOW, it is not in dispute that all the above mentioned Doctors namely R. C. Saxena and others had been senior to the petitioner in the class II posts of Assistant surgeons. It is also not in dispute that in the class Imposts of Civil Surgeons, Deputy directors of Health Services etc. the petitioner could be treated as senior to the said other Doctors only in case her continuance on the post of Medical Officer Incharge regional Family Planning Training Centre at Lady Elgin Hospital, Jabalpur in an officiating and temporary capacity until further orders from 1-3-1966 till 25-4-1968 was taken into account while determining her seniority as against them. the petitioner could be treated as senior to the said other Doctors only in case her continuance on the post of Medical Officer Incharge regional Family Planning Training Centre at Lady Elgin Hospital, Jabalpur in an officiating and temporary capacity until further orders from 1-3-1966 till 25-4-1968 was taken into account while determining her seniority as against them. It is agreed that in case the said period was excluded while determining her seniority she had no claim for being treated as senior to the said other doctors either in the class I posts of Deputy directors of Health Services or on the next higher class I posts of Joint Directors of health Services. ( 11. ) IN the opinion of this Court, there is hardly any reason to doubt that the previous appointment of the petitioner to the newly Created class I post of Medical officer Incharge of Regional Family Planning Training Centre at Jabalpur with effect from 1-3-1966 vide order dated 27-8-1966 was made by way of a stop-gap arrangement and on ad hoc basis and not in any substantive capacity. Prior to the said appointment, the petitioner was looking after the work of Incharge of Regional Family Planning training Centre while discharging her duties in the class II post of Assistant Surgeon. As pointed out earlier, all the above mentioned doctors namely R. C. Saxena and others were senior to her in the said class II post. Needless to say, they too were entitled to their cases being considered for appointment to the newly created class I posts of medical officer Incharge of Regional Family Planning Training Centre. It is apparent that the appointment of the petitioner on the said post with effect from 1-3-1966 vide order dated 27-8-1966 without considering the claim of other eligible persons who like her had been working on the class II posts of Assistant Surgeons, and some of whom were in fact senior to her in the said, post, was made by way of an emergent measure and was intended to continue till the post in question was filled up in the normal way by direct recruitment through selection by the Public Service Commission. The petitioner came to be appointed during the intervening period because of the fortuitous circumstance that she happened to be working as Incharge of the Family planning Training Centre at Jabalpur. The petitioner came to be appointed during the intervening period because of the fortuitous circumstance that she happened to be working as Incharge of the Family planning Training Centre at Jabalpur. It was made clear to her by the State government vide a copy of letter dated 10-7-1967 endorsed to her that under her appointment order dated 27-8-1966 she had not been promoted to the post of Medical officer Incharge of Regional Family Planning Training centre and that her appointment to the said post had been made only on ad hoc basis. She was informed in unequivocal terms that for being appointed to the said post on regular basis it was essential for her to apply for the post that had been advertised. ( 12. ) IT is no doubt true that in several of its decisions the Supreme Court has held the rule of determining seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation as a fair rule under Article 16 of the Constitution. The rule has been held applicable in such cases where there is absence of Service Rules validly governing the subject.- (See rs. Mahal and others vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1984 SC 1291 and G. P. Doval and others vs. Chief Secretary, Govt. of U. P. and others, AIR 1984 SC 1527 ). But, then, in the opinion of this Court, the said decisions are no authority for the proposition that the rule of length of continuous officiation is a fair rule to apply under Article 16 in all cases. The said rule though described as normal has one important exception. ( 13. ) THE exception to the normal rule of determining seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation is provided by those cases in which the continuous officiation has its beginning in an appointment which was not made in a regular manner but was made to fill a purely stop-gap or fortuitous vacuum or to tide over ah emergent situation without considering the claims of other eligible persons. In such cases, there is no justification for counting the seniority of the person concerned vis-a-vis others from the date of his initial appointment unless it was a case in which the said others were appointed in the same manner. In such cases, there is no justification for counting the seniority of the person concerned vis-a-vis others from the date of his initial appointment unless it was a case in which the said others were appointed in the same manner. The said exception to the normal rule has been recognised by the Supreme Court in A. P. M. Mayankutty vs. The Secretary and another, 1977 (5) SCC 360. ( 14. ) A. P. M. Mayankuttys case (supra) was a case in which three appellants before the Supreme Court had been appointed as temporary Junior Engineers in the madras Highway Subordinate Service under Rule 19 (a) (i) (1) of the Madras State and subordinate Services Rules. The said rule was as follows : "10. Temporary appointments - (a) (i) (1) Where it is necessary in the public interest owing to an emergency which has arisen to fill immediately a vacancy in a post borne on the cadre of a service, class or category and there would be undue delay in making such appointment in accordance with these rules and the Special Rules, the appointing authority may temporarily appoint a person otherwise than in accordance with the said rules. " A few years later, the appellants were appointed to the very same post after selection by the Public Service Commission. Thereafter, on 1-11-1956, on the reorganisation of States, they were allotted as Junior Engineers to the Kerala State and it became necessary to fix rules of seniority governing employees drawn from different states. The question that arose for decision was whether the services rendered by appointments under Rule 10 (a) (i) (1) of the Madras State and Subordinate Services rules must be taken into account for the purpose of fixation of their seniority. ( 15. ) IT was held by the Supreme Court that the provision in question contemplated the making of temporary appointments when it was necessary in the public interest to do so owing to an emergency which has arisen for filling a vacancy immediately. All such appointments, in terms were permitted to be made otherwise than in accordance with the rules. ) IT was held by the Supreme Court that the provision in question contemplated the making of temporary appointments when it was necessary in the public interest to do so owing to an emergency which has arisen for filling a vacancy immediately. All such appointments, in terms were permitted to be made otherwise than in accordance with the rules. The letters of appointments issued to the appellants mentioned expressly that they were appointed under Rule 10 (a) (i) (1) and that the appointments were purely temporary necessitated on account of non-availability of regularly selected candidates conferring no claim for future appointment as Junior engineers and further that the appointment was liable to be terminated at any time without previous notice. It was held by the Supreme Court that in face of the provisions of the rule and the terms of the appointment it seemed to it clear that the appointments were purely temporary as a matter of stop-gap or emergency arrangement and since such service could not be taken into account for purposes of seniority, the appellants could not contend that the entire service must count for purposes of their seniority. It was also held by it that the fact that the appellants were qualified to hold the posts could not entitle them to count for the purposes of seniority the period during which they served in a stop-gap or emergency appointment In fact it was observed that such tenures hardly ever counted for seniority in any system of service jurisprudence. ( 16. ) AS has been elaborated by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in manvirsingh, Nagpur vs. Union of India and others, 1984 Lab. I. C. 934, the reason for the abovesaid proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in A. P. M. Mayankuttys case (supra) is not far to seek. As is well known, ad hoc or fortuitous appointments by way of a stop-gap arrangement or otherwise are made to tide over an emergent situation without considering the claims of other eligible persons. I. C. 934, the reason for the abovesaid proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in A. P. M. Mayankuttys case (supra) is not far to seek. As is well known, ad hoc or fortuitous appointments by way of a stop-gap arrangement or otherwise are made to tide over an emergent situation without considering the claims of other eligible persons. If the service rendered by such ad hoc appointees in the higher post is counted for the purposes of determining their seniority in that post vis-a-vis others senior to them in the lower cadre, they would gain advantage over the latter purely because of the fortuitous circumstances that the choice for ad hoc promotion or appointment fell on them, without any fault on the part of the seniors who could also have been appointed regularly or on ad hoc basis at the time when such ad hoe appointees are so appointed or promoted. ( 17. ) THE proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in A. P. M. Mayankuttys case (supra) has been followed by the Division Bench of this Court in B. K. Shrivastava and others vs. State of M. P. and others, M. P. No. 670 of 1979 decided on 24-11-1980. The petitioners in the said case were all Assistant, Engineering Department of the state. Their selection had not been made by the Public Service Commission. They had been appointed on the basis of an interview conducted by a committee consisting of the Chief Engineer and Secretary of the department, It was understood that the posts would later be advertised by the Public Service Commission and the petitioners would have to apply as fresh entrants for selection by the Public Service Commission. It was for the said reason that it was specifically mentioned in the orders appointing the petitioners that their appointments were temporary until further orders for a period of six months or till the expiry of 15 days from the date of selection of candidates by the public Service Commission. After the posts were advertised by the Public Service commission, the petitioners applied for the posts and were selected by it along with others. After selection by the Public Service Commission, the petitioners were appointed as Asstt. Engineers in the M. P. Public Health Engineering Service Class II temporarily until further orders. After the posts were advertised by the Public Service commission, the petitioners applied for the posts and were selected by it along with others. After selection by the Public Service Commission, the petitioners were appointed as Asstt. Engineers in the M. P. Public Health Engineering Service Class II temporarily until further orders. The claim made by the petitioners in the said petition was that they were entitled to count their seniority in the cadre of Asstt. Engineers from their initial appointments made in 1969/1972 and that there was no justification for counting the same from 1977 when they were appointed on selection by the Public service Commission. ( 18. ) AFTER making a reference to the relevant provisions Of the M. P. Public health Engineering (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 1969 it was held as follows by the Division Bench of this Court: a perusal of the rules goes to show that direct recruitment to the service can only be made by selection by the Public Service Commission. The rules do not contemplate a selection by any Committee or even by the government for purposes of direct recruitment. The appointments of petitioners made in 1969/1972 were outside the rules. They can be justified only as ad hoc appointments or emergency appointments under Regulation 5 of the Public Service Commission (Limitation of Functions) Regulations. " ". . . . But the proviso to Regulation 5 makes it clear that in all such cases intimation of appointment has to be sent to the Commission and action to fill up the posts in the normal way has to be initiated as early as possible. It is clear on the reading of Regulation 5 that the appointments permitted by it are not made in the "normal way" and they are no substitute for the appointments which have to be made as early as possible in the normal way, i. e. by following the normal rules of recruitment. The post on which a person is appointed under Regulation 5 remains vacant to be filled in by following the normal rules of recruitment and the person appointed must apply afresh for selection when the post is advertised by the Public Service Commission. The post on which a person is appointed under Regulation 5 remains vacant to be filled in by following the normal rules of recruitment and the person appointed must apply afresh for selection when the post is advertised by the Public Service Commission. Such a person will have to compete with others who, may not be in service at all; if selected his seniority will be determined by his position in the merit list approved by the Commission and he may be placed in that list below any fresh entrant depending upon the assessment of merit by the Commission; and if not selected, he will have to leave the post to make room for the person selected by the Commission. It is obvious that such a person cannot contend that his seniority should be counted from the date of his initial appointment and not from the date from which he was appointed in the normal way. " Again, placing reliance on A. P. M. Mayankuttys case (supra) it was further held as follows : "the petitioners appointments were in the nature of emergency appointments and were to continue till the appointments were made in the normal way by the Public Service Commission. The orders of appointment of the petitioners expressly mentioned that their appointments were to last till the expiry of fifteen days from the date of selection of candidates by the commission. The appointments were clearly stop-gap arrangements. The petitioners cannot, therefore, count seniority from their initial appointments. Their seniority can be counted only after they were appointed on being selected by the Commission in 1977. We have already stated that respondent no. 12 was appointed after selection by the Commission in the regular way in 1973 and respondents 2 to 11 were also promoted in the regular way in 197-1-1973 after the concurrence of the Commission. As the appointments of promotions of the respondents, 2 to 11 were made in the normal way prior to the appointment of the petitioners in the normal way, the petitioners cannot claim seniority against the respondents in the cadre of Assistant Engineers. It is true that ordinarily seniority has to be counted according to the date of continuous officiation. (See S. P. Patwardhan vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 2051 at page 2068 and Rajendra Narain vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1980 SC 1246 . It is true that ordinarily seniority has to be counted according to the date of continuous officiation. (See S. P. Patwardhan vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 2051 at page 2068 and Rajendra Narain vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1980 SC 1246 . But this rule has no application to the service rendered in a stopgap arrangement or in an emergency in pursuance of an appointment which is not in the normal way. As earlier explained by us, the Supreme Court itself has noted this distinction in Mayankuttys. case (supra ). " ( 19. ) THIS Court does not agree with the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in G. P. Dovals case its earlier decision in Mayankuttys case no longer holds the field and as such the exception to the normal rule of determining seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation laid down in Mayankuttys case (or in this Courts decision in b. K. Shrivastavas case) cannot be applied against the petitioner. There are several flaws in the argument. In the first instance, it is significant that while the decision in mayankuttys case is by 3 Judges of the Supreme Court that in G. P. Dovals case is by 2 judges of the said Court. It is also significant that though Mayankuttys case was decided in 1977 and the Dovals case in 1984, there is no reference to Mayankuttys case in Dovals case. In fact, since in Dovals case the Supreme Court was concerned with such initial appointments as had In fact been made in a substantive way after passing of qualifying tests and interviews, and as such in the absence of any binding service rule to the contrary the normal rule of determining seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation was undoubtedly attracted in respect of the said appointments, there was no reason to think that while making certain observations in para 15 of its decision the Supreme Court intended to do away with the exception to the said normal rule laid down in Mayankuttys case without even making a reference to the said case. ( 20. ) IN Dovals case (supra), the Supreme Court was concerned with the question relating to inter se seniority of Khandsari Inspectors working in the U. P. Government. ( 20. ) IN Dovals case (supra), the Supreme Court was concerned with the question relating to inter se seniority of Khandsari Inspectors working in the U. P. Government. The cadre of Khandsari Inspectors had been formed in 1959. It appeared that the said cadre was not within the purview of the Public Service Commission at the relevant time. The petitioners therein were temporarily appointed as Licensing Officers (later on named as Khandsari Inspectors) during the period 1960-61. It was clear from their appointment orders and other material placed on the record that it was on the basis of the results of some qualifying tests and interviews held for the purpose, that the petitioners were temporarily appointed on the abovesaid posts. The appointment orders did not state that the appointments were pending, selection of regular candidates by the Public Service Commission. On the contrary, the recitals clearly indicated that the appointees would have to face only the approval test by the Public service Commission. The respondents in the said case had also been similarly appointed. It was in the said circumstances that after the approval/confirmation of the appointments of the petitioners and the respondents by the Public Service commission the question arose as regards the inter se seniority of the petitioners and the respondents as Khandsari Inspectors. ( 21. ) IT is apparent that in the facts and circumstances mentioned above, the dovals case was a case in which the initial appointments of the petitioners had not been made to fill a purely stop-gap or fortuitous vacuum or to tide over an emergent situation without considering the claims of other eligible persons. Moreover, it was a case in which the initial appointments of the petitioners and the respondents had been similarly made. It is in the said context that the applicability of the normal rule for determining the seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation was upheld by the Supreme Court in the said case. Again, it is in the said context that while upholding the applicability of the normal rule, it was observed thus by the learned judges in para 15 of their decision : "now if there was no binding rule of seniority it is well-settled that length of continuous officiation prescribes a valid principle of seniority. The question is : from what date the service is to be reckoned ? The question is : from what date the service is to be reckoned ? It was urged that any appointment of a stop-gap nature or pending the selection by Public Service commission cannot be taken into account for reckoning seniority. In other words, it was urged that to be in the cadre and to enjoy place in the seniority list, the service rendered in a substantive capacity can alone be taken into consideration. We find it difficult to accept this bald and wide submission each case will depend upon its facts and circumstances. If a stop-gap appointment is made and the appointee appears before the Public Service commission when the latter proceeds to select the candidate and is selected, we see no justification for ignoring his past service. At any rate, there is no justification for two persons selected in the same manner being differently treated. . . . . In fact if once a person appointed in a stop-gap arrangment is confirmed in his post by proper selection, his past service has to be given credit and has to be, assigned seniority accordingly unless a rule to the contrary is made. That has not been done in the case of all the petitioners. . . . " it is again in the same context that it was further observed as follows :-"this view which we are taking is borne out by the decision of this Court in baleshwar Doss vs. State of U. P. , (1981)1 SCR 499= air 1981 SC 41 , wherein this Court observed that the principle which has received the sanction of this Courts pronouncement is that "officiating service in a post for all practical purposes of seniority is as good as service on a regular basis. It may be permissible within limits for Government to ignore officiating service and count only regular service when claims of seniority come before it, provided the rules in that regard, are clear and categorical and do not admit of any ambiguity and cruelly arbitrary cut-off of long years of service does not take place or there is functionally and qualitatively, substantial. difference in the service rendered in the two types of posts. " It was said that service rules will have to be reasonable, fair and not grossly unjust if they are to survive the test of Articles 14 and 16. difference in the service rendered in the two types of posts. " It was said that service rules will have to be reasonable, fair and not grossly unjust if they are to survive the test of Articles 14 and 16. It is thus well settled that where officiating appointment is followed by confirmation unless a contrary rule is shown, the service rendered as officiating appointment cannot be ignored for reckoning length of continuous officiation determining the place in the seniority list. Admittedly, that has not been done and the seniority list is drawn up from the date on which the approval/selection was made by the public Service Commission in respect of each member of the service, which is clearly violative of Art. 16 and any seniority list drawn up on this invalid basis must be quashed. " -In the opinion of this Court, it is apparent that the observation in italics was made by the Court in the context of initial appointments which did not suffer from the vice of adhocism or fortuitousness and were as such governed by the normal rule. There is no reason to think that the said observation was intended to apply to such ad hoc or fortuitous appointments as were under consideration in Mayankuttys case and were held to be an exception to the normal rule. ( 22. ) AS already discussed above, in the present case, the previous appointment of the petitioner to the newly created post of Medical Officer Incharge of Regional family Planning Training Centre at Jabalpur with effect from 1-3-1966 vide order, dated 27-8-1966 of the State Government had not been made in a regular manner but had been made only to fill a purely stop-gap or fortuitous vacuum or to tide overman emergent situation, without considering the claims of other eligible persons. At the relevant time, like the petitioner the other eligible persons had also been working in the Class II post of Assistant Surgeons. In fact, some of them including the persons with whom we are concerned in the present case i. e. Dr. R. C Saxena and others were senior to her in the said class II post. At the relevant time, like the petitioner the other eligible persons had also been working in the Class II post of Assistant Surgeons. In fact, some of them including the persons with whom we are concerned in the present case i. e. Dr. R. C Saxena and others were senior to her in the said class II post. It was apparent that it was not the normal rule of determining seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation but the exception to the said rule recognised in Mayankuttys case which was attracted in the matter relating to determination of inter se seniority of the petitioner and the said other doctors in the Class I posts of Deputy Directors of Health Services or in the next higher class I posts of Joint Directors of Health Services and the petitioner was not entitled to count the period from 1-3-1966 till 25-4-1968 during which she had worked in an officiating and temporary capacity until further orders as against them. As stated earlier, it was an agreed position in the case that if the said period was excluded from consideration while determining her seniority she had no claim for being treated as senior to the said doctors either in class I post of Deputy Director of Health Services or on the next higher class I post of Joint Director of Health Services. The petition filed by her is accordingly without any merit and she is not entitled to any relief. ( 23. ) FOR the reasons stated above, the petition is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 1 50/ -. The balance amount of security shall be refunded to the petitioner. ( 24. ) IT is clarified that in view of the dismissal of the petition, the interim direction given by this Court to the State Government and other respondents vide its order dated 22-4-1985 shall stand vacated. Petition dismissed.