JUDGMENT : Hari Lal Agrawal, J. The main question which falls for consideration of the Court in this appeal by decree holder arising out bf an adverse ORDER :passed on an application under ORDER :21 Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure by respondent no. 1, is as to whether the title of respondent no. 1 could be extinguished on taking possession of the building in question in pursuance of a proceeding taken under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in which no award had been made. 2. The relevant facts may be briefly stated as follows. In the year 1963 a decree was passed against respondent no. 2. It may be mentioned that respondent no, 2 is the eldest son of Shri C.P.N. Singh and has two other brothers. In execution of the said decree, in the year 1964, 1/4th share representing the interest in the property in question of the JUDGMENT :-debtor, respondent no, 2, was attached by the decree-holder and a claim case under ORDER :21 Rule 58 of the Code, being Misc. Case No. 79 of 1965, was filed by the father of respondent no. 2, the said Shri C.P.N. Singh, wherein the stand was that the property was his self-acquired property and therefore, respondent no. 2 had no interest in the same till his life time. This claim case was dismissed on the finding that the property belonged to the Hindu undivided family and thus respondent no. 2 was entitled to 1/4th share in the same, vide ORDER :dated 9.12.1976. 3. Much prior to all these events early in the year 1961 proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act had been initiated by the State of Bihar for acquisition of the said property by publication of a notification dated 24.2.1961 under section 4 of the Act and, as was submitted on behalf of the appellant, Shri C.P.N. Singh on account of his influence that he could exercise on the State Government, the acquisition proceeding was hurried up and without, following the prescribed procedure indicated under part II of the Act, within no time an agreement was arrived at between the parties on 27.3.1961 (Ext. 10) regarding payment of compensation for acquisition of the property in question on payment of a sum of Rs. 10) regarding payment of compensation for acquisition of the property in question on payment of a sum of Rs. 2,32,800/- with various other stipulations the details of which are not necessary to be stated for the points which have fallen for our consideration. 4. Even earlier than the agreement, the Government had addressed a letter on the 1st March, 1961, i.e. before the publication of the, notification under section 4 itself, to the Accountant General indicating the administrative approval for the acquisition of the land, but it was mentioned in this document (Ext. 1) : “The property should be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Dy. Director of Agriculture, Tirhut Range, Muzaffarpur is declared to be the drawing and disbursing officer for this purpose. The Land Acquisition Officer, Muzaffarpur will make advance payment upto 75% of the total costs during the current financial year 1960-61, subject to the execution of a mutual agreement between the party and the Collector acting on behalf of the State Government before completion of full formalities under the L.A. Act." In pursuance of the agreement the stipulated sum i.e., Rs. 1,74,600/- representing the 3/4th price of the house was received by respondent no. 2 on behalf of his father on 29.3.1961 (Ext. 4) and it was thereafter that the declaration under section 6 of the Act dated 23.8.1968 was published. 5. Long after all these events claim case was filed on 4.9.1976 by the State of Bihar under ORDER :21 Rule 58 for release of the property claiming title to the same on the basis of the acquisition aforesaid, which was allowed rejecting the stand of the appellant that no title had passed in favour of the State of Bihar under the Act on account of the departure from following the prescribed procedure and the preparation of the award. 6. Various other points were also raised in the rejoinder filed on behalf of the appellant but all were rejected as the learned Subordinate Judge took the view that "the disputed property could not have been attached because at the time of attachment the JUDGMENT : debtor or Shri C.P.N. Sinha had no right title and interest left in it due to the acquisition of the premises in question by the Land Acquisition Dept." 7. Mr. Mr. Shreenath Singh, appearing in Support of this appeal placed strong reliance upon section 16 of the Act which reads as follows : “16, Power to take possession-when the Collector has made an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall there upon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.” He submitted that making of an award was a sine qua non for taking possession of the land and only thereafter the land is to vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. On reference to the various provisions of the Act, be further submitted that according to the scheme of these provisions, title to the land does not pass to the State only on the making of an award under section 11 and on its being filed under section 12 of the Act, but is deferred till possession is taken under section 6. The above proposition cannot be disputed as the acquired property vests in the Government after the possession is taken by the Collector and not either from the date of declaration under section 4 or the notification under section 6. The taking of possession is the immediate consequence of, the award under section 11 as was observed by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Nader Chand Mallick v. State of West Bengal and others (A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 67), and there were no other conditions fastening to this such as payment of compensation. It is only the award which gives the Collector the right to take possession of the property at any time be chooses and when this right has already vested in the Collector the liability to hand over possession is incurred by the persons interested. 8. Section 11 of the Act lays down the procedure for making an award and contemplates issuance of notice to the, interested persons and hearing an inquiry for fixing the compensation. It may will be that the Collector may determine the compensation and complete other procedures in some cases without following the long the long drawn inquiry by negotiations or otherwise sitting in his office, but even in that event he has to give the result of the determination in the shape of an award which has to be made under his hand specifying the various particulars mentioned in section. If and then he has to file the same in his office as required by section 12 to make it final and conclusive evidence, as between him and the persons interested; of the true area and value of the land and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested, although the award can be challenged by any person interested in the land as he is not supposed to be bound by the award made by the Collector is spire of the same having been decided in his presence and he can apply for a reference to the court under section 18 of the Act. 9. Mr. Shreenath Singh has referred to the case of the Judicial Committee in the case of Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253 (2)) in support of his submission that where a power is given to do a certain thing in as certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. Similar observations have been made by a Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Possaia and others v. Secretary of State (A.I.R. 1926 Madras 1099) dealing with section 6 of the Act itself. It has been observed in that case that if the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are not strictly complied with, but are made a clock for attempting to obtain a transfer of an indefeasible title under the guise of a public purpose, the proceedings do not operate towards the creation of a valid title to the land in Government. This principle is well recognised and was laid down long before in the case of Taylor v. Taylor [1876 (1 Ch. D.) 426] and has also been referred by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas and others (A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 634) where in paragraph 54 the following observation was made :- “It is a settled rule of interpretation of statutes that when power is given under a statute to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. In the background of this principle it was vehemently contended by Mr. In the background of this principle it was vehemently contended by Mr. Shreenath Singh that since undisputedly no award was prepared by the Collector in this case, although the amount of compensation was determined, and 3/4th of the same was also paid, it must be held that the acquisition proceeding was not complete and taking of possession in the absence of preparation of the award did not amount to extinguishment of the right, title and interest of the real owner". 10. I find great substance in this submission, but before recording my concluded opinion I may usefully refer to two other cases, namely, (1) Full Bench decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. Dr. G.H. Grant and another (A.I.R. 1960 Patna 382), and (2) M/s. Jetmull Bhojraj v. The State of Bihar and others (A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1363). In the former case the award was made by the Collector on 25.3.1952, but before taking possession on 26.3.1952 the interest of the proprietor itself vested in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act and the possession was taken on 21.8.1952. A question arose as to who was entitled to get the compensation under the award, namely, the State of Bihar to whom the interest had vested before the taking of the possession or the expropriator himself. On a reference to the provisions of section 15 it was held by the Full Bench that on the language of section 16 there was no scope for taking a view that the land must be deemed to have vested in the Government even before taking possession thereof after the award being made by the Collector on the basis thereof. The Court referred to the emergency provisions for taking possession of a land under section 17A when even before the making of an award possession could be taken by the Collector in cases of emergency and in the absence of the different schemes for vesting of the interest of the person interested in the land under section 16 where making of an award and taking of possession was made a condition precedent, it was observed that no support can be taken from the provisions contained in section 17A. The right of taking possession and vesting of the interest in the State under the emergency powers has also been noticed in the latter case by the Supreme Court, namely, in M/s, jetmull Bhojraj's case (supra), wherefrom it appears that 'such' power of taking possession before the making of the award is specially conferred by the statute only in cases of urgency. I find more appropriate observations in a Bench decision of the Assam High Court in Assam Railways and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Union of India and North Eastern Rly. (A.I.R. 1965 Assam 12 in these words :- “.......Section 16 is clear and lays down that after the Collector has taken possession when award is made under section 11 that the property vests in the Government, Before this not only the property cannot vest in Government but before the award is given the Government is not entitled to take possession. The only contingency provided for taking possession before the award is one specified in section 17.........” As already said earlier, I respectfully agree with the view expressed in this authority. 11. From the above discussions I must hold and conclude that vesting in the Government takes place only when (1) the Collector makes the award, and (2) the making of the award is followed up by his actually taking possession of the land under section 16. 12. Learned Government Pleader no. 5 referred to the ORDER :sheet of the proceeding but could not point out anything to show that the Collector had also prepared an awarded in this case. It is all the more curious hat the declaration under section 6 of the Act was also made much after the taking of the possession of the house. The above procedure of the purported acquisition of the house in question is vitiated and not in conformity with the scheme indicated in the Act. 13. I would accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the JUDGMENT : and ORDER :below allowing the claim case filed by the State of Bihar by the impugned ORDER :. The appellant must also get its cost. Hearing fee is, however, fixed at Rs. 250/- only. Nazir Ahmad, J. - I agree.