JUDGMENT G. N. Ray, J. : This appeal is directed against the decision of the trial court in Matter No. 1693 of 1981 by which the learned trial Judge allowed a writ petition nude under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the appellant Enamelnagar Development Corporation Ltd. challenging the validity of the adjudication made by the Second Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in case No. 4548/IR/III-287/76. 2. It is the case of the appellant that it employed the respondent No. 3, Sri Samir Kumar Bakshi during the period between August 1966 and June 1975. The respondent No. 3 was initially appointed by the appellant as a typist-cum-clerk at a salary of Rs 200/- for a probationary period of two years. After completion of the probationary period, the appointment of the respondent No. 3 was confirmed and he continued to work as a typist-cum-clerk for about seven years. In June 1973 the said respondent No.3 was promoted as an Officer in the management of the appellant with the designation of the Officer-in-Charge and the respondent No.3 was required to serve in mainly managerial and administrative capacity. As an Officer-in-Charge ho was part of the management. The respondent No 3, it is alleged committed certain acts of indiscipline and incited the employees of the appellant to stage an illegal and unjustified slay-in-strike and place the Technical Advisor and the Plant Manager of the company under 'gherao'. A charge-sheet was issued against the respondent No.3 and disciplinary proceeding were initiated. Mr. H. K. Biswas, a retired Labour Commissioner, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. A domestic enquiry was held by the Enquiry Officer who submitted his report and after considering such report, the service of the respondent No.3 was terminated with effect from July 1975. The respondent No. 3, after the termination of his service, approached the office of the labour commissioner for reinstatement in service and before the various officers of the Labour Department, Government of West Bengal, the appellant company took the stand that the said respondent No. 3 was an Officer in Charge and part of the management of the company and as such not a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appellant accordingly contended that the termination of service of the respondent No. 3 could not give rise to any industrial dispute within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant accordingly contended that the termination of service of the respondent No. 3 could not give rise to any industrial dispute within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act. The Government of West Bengal, however, by order No. 4548/LR/IR/III/257/76 dated 17th September, 1976 referred the dispute between the appellant company and the respondent No. 3 to the Second Industrial Tribunal. West Bengal for adjudication on the following issue:–– "Whether the dismissal of Sri Samir Kumar Bakshi with effect from 1st July, 1976 is justified; To what rights is he entitled? 3. In answer to the written statement filed by the respondent No. 3 in the said adjudication proceeding before the learned Industrial Tribunal, the appellant filed a written statement, inter alia, contending therein that the order of reference was, illegal, without jurisdiction and ultra vires the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 inasmuch as the respondent No. 3 was not a workman under the said Act. It was also contended that at all material times the said respondent No. 3 was an Officer employed by the company in managerial and administrative capacity and as such no reference for adjudication by the respondent No. 1 was warranted and the reference was invalid the appellant also made an application before the Tribunal for determination of the question as to whether or not the respondent No. 3 was a workman as a preliminary issue. By its order No. 15 dated 8th September, 1977 the Tribunal held that the question whither the respondent No. 3 was a workman or not was a jurisdictional question and the same should be tried as a preliminary issue before proceeding further with the reference. The Tribunal also held that the respondent No. 3 was required to establish the jurisdictional fact whether he was a workman or not in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal held that as the onus to establish the said jurisdictional fact latter should adduce evidence first. 4. Thereafter oral and documentary evidence were adduced both by the respondent No. 3 and also by the appellant. By its order No. 58 dated the 27th July 1981 the Tribunal held that the respondent No. 3 was a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4. Thereafter oral and documentary evidence were adduced both by the respondent No. 3 and also by the appellant. By its order No. 58 dated the 27th July 1981 the Tribunal held that the respondent No. 3 was a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The preliminary issue was thus disposed of in favour of the respondent No. 3 and the Tribunal thereafter decided to proceed with the reference on merits. 5. The appellant thereafter moved the petition in the original jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the constitution, inter alia, contending that the adjudication of the said jurisdictional fact was unjust and contrary to the records and evidence adduced before the learned Tribuna1 and the said finding was perverse. 6. On the said application a Rule nisi was issued. After contested hearing, the said Rule was disposed of by the learned trial court. The learned Judge was of the view that some portions of the impugned order of the Tribunal were not tenable but the learned Judge did not intend to refer to the offending portions of the said order and/or the relevant evidence because such reference might prejudice either the case of the petitioner or that of the respondent No. 3. The learned Judge felt that the Tribunal should re-examine the entire controversies on the evidence already on record and decide afresh whether the work done by the respondent No. 3 was principally of managerial or supervisory nature and whether other type of work done by him was incidental although not managerial and/or supervisory in nature or vice versa. The Tribunal was directed to give the parties an opportunity of being heard and decide the question within four weeks from the date of communication of the said order of the learned trial court. The impugned order of the Tribunal was set aside by the learned Trial Judge. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the said judgment and order of the learned Trial Court. 7. Mr. Ginwalla, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that where the jurisdiction of the Tribunal depended upon the existence of certain facts, the writ court was entitled to weigh and appreciate the evidence to find out if facts existed to enable the Tribunal to assume jurisdiction in the matter. In support of his contentions, Mr. 7. Mr. Ginwalla, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that where the jurisdiction of the Tribunal depended upon the existence of certain facts, the writ court was entitled to weigh and appreciate the evidence to find out if facts existed to enable the Tribunal to assume jurisdiction in the matter. In support of his contentions, Mr. Ginwalla referred to a decision of this court in Baldev Singh v. Indian Explosives Limited & Ors. reported in 76 CWN 342. Mr. Ginwalla also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors v. Sardar D. K. Jadav, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1186 , where the Supreme Court has laid down that the correctness of facts, the determination of which also determined the jurisdiction of an administrative authority can be determined by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court on its own evaluation can determine whether such finding is correct or not. In this connection, Mr. Ginwalla also referred to another decision of the Supreme Court in The Secretary Madras Gymkhana Club Employee's Union v. The Management of Gymkhana Club reported in AIR 1968 SC 554 . 8. Mr. Ginwalla contended that since the respondent no. 3 had contended that he was a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, the onus lay on him to establish the said contention by leading cogent evidence. The Tribunal had also held that such onus lay on the respondent No. 3, Mr. Ginwalla has contended that the respondent no. 3 had failed to establish that he was a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, Mr. Ginwalla has contended that it was established by the evidence on record that respondent no. 3 was promoted to the post of Officer-in-Charge with added responsibilities. It was further established that the appellant had passed an order that any representation of the employees should come through the respondent no. 3 as an Officer-in-Charge and he was to place their case before the management. There was evidence to show that the respondent no. 3 was required to attend duties connected with Bank, purchases, sales tax, transport and sundry other outdoor jobs. The respondent no. 3 had carried on correspondence with outside parties and had signed letters on behalf of the company. The respondent no. There was evidence to show that the respondent no. 3 was required to attend duties connected with Bank, purchases, sales tax, transport and sundry other outdoor jobs. The respondent no. 3 had carried on correspondence with outside parties and had signed letters on behalf of the company. The respondent no. 3 had asked for delivery orders, issued claim bills for short supply, sent claim bills with supporting documents to parties asking for payment. It also appears from the evidence on record that the respondent no. 3 allowed employees to resume duty after they came to join after sick leave. 9. Mr. Ginwalla has also contended that the respondent no. 1 in his letter dated the 23rd September 1973 in answer to the charge-sheet had admitted that he had discharged administrative and managerial functions and his letter dated 14th November 1974 he had admitted that he belonged to the management. It was contented that the evidence adduced before the learned Tribunal clearly established that the respondent no. 3 was a part of the management discharging mainly administrative and managerial functions. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Tribunal was patently wrong in holding that the respondent no. 3 was a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Ginwalla has submitted further that the learned trial Judge failed to consider such unimpeachable evidence and decide the said jurisdictional fact as to whether the respondent no. 3 was a workman or not, although he was of the view that there were some errors in the decision of the Tribunal. Mr. Ginwalla has also submitted that the learned trial Judge wrongly sent the matter back on remand for re-adjudication by the Tribunal. Unfortunately the trial court did not indicate as to how and where the Tribunal had gone wrong in coming to a finding on the jurisdictional fact. In the absence of such indication by the court, no useful purpose would serve by simply stilting that there were some errors in the decision of the Tribunal and that the said jurisdictional fact was required to be decided afresh. 10. Mr. Ginwalla has, therefore, contended that the appeal court was competent to decide the said jurisdictional fact and should decide the same by holding that the respondent no. 3 was not a workman within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and the reference was, therefore, incompetent and invalid. Mr. 10. Mr. Ginwalla has, therefore, contended that the appeal court was competent to decide the said jurisdictional fact and should decide the same by holding that the respondent no. 3 was not a workman within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and the reference was, therefore, incompetent and invalid. Mr. Ginwalla has contended that such decision by the Appellate Court will be consonant to justice and will avoid multiplication of proceedings and harassment of the parties. 11. Mr. Misra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 has, contended on the other hand that the respondent No. 3 in his evidence has categorically stated before the learned Tribunal that he worked as typist-cum-clerk from 1967 and at the time of dismissal from service his total emoluments was Rs. 485/- including tiffin and typing charges. He has also contended that the respondent No. 3 did not grant leave to any body nor supervise the work of any other employee and he had no authority to take any independent decision. Mr. Misra has also contended that in the disciplinary proceeding the Technical Advisor has stated that the respondent No 3 was not regarded as officer that the word 'not' was subsequently penned through. He has also contended that the respondent No. 3 had no authority to assign business or work to others. He had signed some papers under the direction of others. He has further submitted that the respondent No.3 had signed certain letters at the direction of the Supervisor Officer and such action at the dictate of the superior officer could not constitute him as an officer principally discharging administrative or managerial responsibility. He has contended that as a clerk-cum-typist his duty was mainly clerical and even after giving him the designation of the officer-in-charge he performed similar duties. The respondent No. 3 had to sign attendance register although such signing of attendance register is not required to be made by the Officers holding administrative and managerial post. Mr. Misra has also submitted that the designation by itself could not and did not indicate that the principal job of the respondent No. 3 was in discharge administrative and managerial function. As a matter of fact, there was no promotion in the real sense of the term of the respondent No. 3 because there was no change of emoluments by the change of such designation. Mr. As a matter of fact, there was no promotion in the real sense of the term of the respondent No. 3 because there was no change of emoluments by the change of such designation. Mr. Misra has also submitted the alleged order of promotion was not served on the respondent No. 3 and the said order only contemplated a promotion and until served the same could not take effect and the person on whom the said order was to be served cannot rely on the same unless served on him. In support of such contention Mr. Misra relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Kedarnath v. Punjab reported in AIR 1979 SC 220 . Mr. Misra has also contended that a mere assertion by the respondent No. 3 on some occasions that he was part of the management will not make him an employee discharging mainly managerial and administrative functions. Such fact is required to be established by cogent evidences. In support of this contention he referred to the decision of this court made in the case of Rallis India Limited reported in 1983(2) Labour Law Journal 293. Mr. Misra has contended that at the relevant time the respondent no. 3 had been drawing a total emolument less than Rs. 500/- and if it is held that the said respondent no. 3 had discharged some managerial functions at times, he should still be regarded as a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act unless it can be established that he had been discharging mainly managerial and administrative functions. Mr. Misra has contended that in the instant case, such evidence that the respondent no. 3 had discharged managerial and/or administrative function mainly is manifestly lacking. In this connection, he has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the Ananda Bazar Patrika's case reported in 1970(3) SCC 248 where the Supreme Court held that although the employee involved in that case had some supervisory powers to grant leave and had control over some other employees, he was still a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Mr. Misra has also referred to several Supreme Court decisions where it was held that even a manager of a hotel in the facts can be deemed to be a workman and an Accountant of the Bank can also similarly be held to be a workman and signing of salary bills cannot take the employee outside the definition of workman, a Store Manager without power to appoint, suspend, grant leave should be held to be a workman, a security inspector having control over all security personnel but having no power to appoint or dismiss should be held to be a workman, a Development Officer of Life Insurance Corporation can also be held to be a workman. The aforesaid decisions have been reported in AIR 1958 SC 130 , AIR 1964 SC 1522 , AIR 1975 SC 1898 , AIR 1967 SC 408 , AIR 1984 SC 914 and AIR 1984 SC 1462 . 12. Mr. Misra has contended that the definition of workman should be interpreted liberally so as not to whittle down but to advance the object of the Act. Disputes between labour and management are not to be excluded from the operation of the Act by giving narrow and restricted meaning to the expression 'workman'. The intention of the legislature could not be to keep out of the purview of the legislation small bands of employees who though not on the management side are yet to be denied the ordinary rights of labour for no apparent reasons. In support of this contention, Mr. Misra has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of S. K. Verma, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1462 . 13. Mr. Misra contended further that the Tribunal on appreciation of the evidence adduced before it categorically held that the respondent no. 3 was a workman within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act. It cannot be contented that such finding of fact was without any basis whatsoever or that the Tribunal had taken a perverse view. Mr. Misra hat also contended that the object of the present appeal by the appellant is to delay the adjudication. In any event, the appellant could not feel aggrieved because the adjudication made in favour of the respondent No. 3 that he was a workman was set aside by the learned Trial Court and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal. Mr. In any event, the appellant could not feel aggrieved because the adjudication made in favour of the respondent No. 3 that he was a workman was set aside by the learned Trial Court and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal. Mr. Misra submitted that the writ Court and consequently the Appeal Court has enough power to pass suitable orders to do justice in the facts, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. He has contended that the High Court should not interfere with the preliminary award. The jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court should not be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from court to court for adjudication of peripheral issues. A proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution is not meant to break the resistance of a workman. In support of this contention, Mr. Misra has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of D. P. Maheshwari ( AIR 1984 SC 153 ) and also the decision made in S. K. Verma's case ( AIR 1984 SC 1462 ). He has, therefore, submitted that the appeal should fail and if the Appeal Court feels that since the learned Trial Court having jurisdiction to decide the said jurisdictional facts had not come to any finding of its own, the Appeal Court should taka into consideration the evidence on record and decide for itself whether or not the Tribunal had correctly decided such facts. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appeal Court should uphold the decision of the Tribunal and dispose of the appeal accordingly. 14. After considering the respective contentions of the parties, it appears to us that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not interfere with the finding of fact made by the Tribunal below unless it is manifestly apparent that such finding is perverse and no reasonable man can take such view. In such event, the writ court can proceed on the footing that there was no finding in the case. In such event, the writ court can proceed on the footing that there was no finding in the case. But where the determination of certain facts also decides the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to proceed with the us, such jurisdictional facts go at the root of the functioning of the Tribunal and in such case, the writ court, if satisfied, that the jurisdictional fact has not been decided properly may decide such fact by weighing evidence and the Supreme Court has also held that such jurisdictional facts may be determined by the High Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sardar D. K. Jadav ( AIR 1968 SC 1186 ). The Division Bench of this court has also held to the same effect in Baldev Singh's case (76 CWN 342). In our view Mr. Ginwalla is justified that the learned Trial Court should not have sent the case back on remand without pointing out how and where the Tribunal had gone wrong because unless such error or omission is pointed out no useful purpose will be solved by merely indicating that the Tribunal had gone wrong on some points. In our view, the court should also try to shorten the course of litigation concerning industrial disputes so that the agony of the unfortunate employee is not lingered any further. 15. The evidence relied on by the appellant to show that the respondent no. 3 was not a workman consisted of the following:–– (a) Admissions contained in the letter of the respondent no. 3 dated the 23rd September, 1973 which was written in answer to the charge-sheet it was recorded in the said letter that the respondent no. 3 was conferred the designation of an Officer-in-Charge with added responsibility by an order of the appellant dated the 1st June, 1973. It was further recorded in the letter that representations of the employees were required to come through him as an officer-in-charge to be placed before the management. It was further recorded that the respondent no. 3 was directly concerned with the management and discipline of office and that he had to attend duties connected with banks, purchases, sales tax authorities and transport and other outside jobs; (b) A medical certificate was granted to another workman of the appellant on which the respondent no. It was further recorded that the respondent no. 3 was directly concerned with the management and discipline of office and that he had to attend duties connected with banks, purchases, sales tax authorities and transport and other outside jobs; (b) A medical certificate was granted to another workman of the appellant on which the respondent no. 3 made endorsement allowing the employees to resume duty after sick leave; (c) Letters addressed to suppliers enclosing cheques and calling for delivery orders were signed by the respondent no. 3 in September 1973, August 1974 and also October 1974. The last letter was a claim bill signed by the respondent no. 3 as the Officer-in-charge; (d) A similar claim letter dated 16th October, 1974 was signed by the respondent no. 3; (e) Admission of the respondent no. 3 in a letter dated 14th November 1974 recording that the said respondent belonged to the management; (f) In his oral evidence the respondent no. 3 admitted that he was asked to sign on behalf of the directors; 16. The above evidence has to be weighed against other evidence to the contrary which is also on record. The order by which the respondent no. 3 was promoted was not produced. It is the case of the appellant that the particular document had been removed by the respondent no. 3 from the office records. But even so there should be other supporting evidence that the respondent no. 3 was in fact promoted to the rank of an officer. A decision must have been taken at some stage and recorded by the management to promote the petitioner s an Officer-in-charge if the case of the appellant has to be accepted. No such supporting evidence was produced. 17. It is further evidence of the respondent no. 3 that he continued to serve as a typist-cum-clerk and also as an accounts assistant. The respondent no. 3 deposed that he was receiving typing charges. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the typing charges meant the charges incurred by the respondent no. 3 in having the documents typed. The respondent no. 3 obtained the said charges for reimbursement of his expenses. No vouchers or other documents were produced by the appellant to show that exactly for what the typing charges were being claimed by and paid to the respondent no. 3. 18. 3 in having the documents typed. The respondent no. 3 obtained the said charges for reimbursement of his expenses. No vouchers or other documents were produced by the appellant to show that exactly for what the typing charges were being claimed by and paid to the respondent no. 3. 18. No evidence has been led by the appellant to show as to what were the terms of employment of the respondent no. 3 as an officer including his scale of pay. It is not the case of the appellant that on promotion the respondent no. 3 was given a higher salary than what he was getting earlier. The evidence of the respondent no. 3 on this point that his salary of emoluments was less than Rs. 1600/-. 19. Apart from the few letters relied on by the appellant no evidence was led to show that after his promotion in June 1973, what actual work was being carried on by the respondent no 3. No evidence has been led to show what work was in fact allotted to the respondent no. 3 as an officer and to what extent he performed managerial functions. 20. The duties admittedly performed by the respondent no. 3 in attending banks, purchases, sales tax authorities and transport without further evidence cannot be said to be the function of an officer only. The reason that the respondent no. 3 described himself as an Officer-in-charge may be was to give to himself some importance but mere designation would not govern the nature of the work he had performed. 21. For the reasons above, on weighing and appreciating the evidence for ourselves we are inclined to accept the decision of the Tribunal. The main and substantial part of the work performed by the respondent no. 3 at the material time was not and has not been shown to be that of an officer which coupled with the fact that the respondent no. 3 was receiving low emoluments of a workman and not of an officer leads to the conclusion that the respondent no. 3 at the material time remained a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. 22. For the reasons as above, we allow this appeal. The judgment and order of the trial court is set aside. We however, affirm the findings and the conclusion of the Tribunal on the preliminary issue. 3 at the material time remained a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. 22. For the reasons as above, we allow this appeal. The judgment and order of the trial court is set aside. We however, affirm the findings and the conclusion of the Tribunal on the preliminary issue. We direct the Tribunal to proceed with the reference and dispose of on merits. In the facts and circumstances we do not make any order as to costs. Dipak Kumar Sen, J.–– I agree. Appeal allowed; findings of Tribunal on preliminary issue affirmed, direction given.