JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - Zahir Ahmad, who is the Petitioner in this petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution, was let into possession of a Phatak by Suraj Narain Rai the second Respondent. The Phatak was part of a property which belonged to one Roop Chand. After the death of Roop Chand his four daughters, namely, Kamla, Bimla, Urmila and Nirmala inherited the property in equal share. Smt. Kamla transferred her l/4th share to one Smt. Raskhe Jahan. She, in her turn, sold it to Suraj Narain Rai on August 24, 1967 according to the case of Suraj Narain Rai in this Court. The remaining 3/4th share in the property was sold to Petitioner Zahir Ahmad by the other three daughters through a sale deed of July 4, 1974. 2. Suraj Narain Rai demanded rent from Petitioner Zahir Ahmad who, according to Suraj Narain Rai, had fallen in arrears in that regard. When Zahir Ahmad did not make the payment, a suit (No. 262 of 1976) was filed by Suraj Narain Rai in the Court of Judge, Small Causes, Meerut for its recovery. The suit was resisted by Zahir Ahmad who said that being a co-sharer of the property he was not liable to pay any amount by way of rent to Suraj Narain Rai. 3. Plaintiff Suraj Narain Rai and the Defendant-Petitioner Zahir Ahmad both entered the witnesses box. Some documentary evidence was also filed by the parties. On February 24, 1977 the Judge, Small Cause Court, Meerut decided the case. He dismissed the suit. The learned Judge observed that it was not disputed by the Plaintiff that he had only l/4th share in the property as 3/4th share was purchased by the Defendant. Further, that the Plaintiff had filed a suit for partition of his l/4th share which had been decreed and a preliminary decree had been passed. The final decree was yet to follow. The learned Judge then proceeded to observe: Due to the fact that rights of the parties have been settled in a regular suit and it has been held that the Plaintiff has got only l/4th share, I do not think it expedient in the interest of justice that the Plaintiff should be allowed to recover rent from the Defendant of any specific portion which has not yet vested in him by final decree. Both parties are co-sharers and their rights have also been decided by the regular court. In view of the decision of the regular court for partition of the property in question the present suit is not maintainable. 4. Plaintiff Suraj Narain Rai challenged the above decision by filing a revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. One of the objections raised by him in the memorandum of revision was that the Defendant was estopped from challenging the right of the Plaintiff to recover rent inasmuch as it was proved from oral and documentary evidence that the disputed Phatak had been let out to him by the Plaintiff. Another ground was that by the purchase of some share by the Defendant no merger of ownership rights took place as far as the Defendant was concerned and that he was liable to pay rent to the Plaintiff as the relationship of tenant and landlord subsisted between them. 5. The Hlrd Additional District Judge, Meerut, who heard the revision, allowed it by an order dated January 7, 1981. After noticing the facts of the case and the conclusion of the learned Judge, Small Causes, the Additional District Judge said that on the pleadings two points had arisen for determination in the case, namely. (1) Whether there was a contract of tenancy between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in respect of the disputed Phatak? (2) If so, what was the effect of purchase of 3/4th share by the Defendant on the rights of the parties under the said contract? He proceeded to notice the submission made before him, interlaid, to the effect that the trial court had not considered the aforesaid two questions in right perspective and had not recorded any specific finding thereon. It had only held the suit to be not maintainable on the basis of the preliminary decree passed on the partition suit. Thereafter the learned Additional District Judge proceeded to consider the evidence on the record. On this consideration he came to the conclusion that it was clear that Plaintiff Suraj Narain Rai had succeeded in proving that there was a contract of tenancy between him and Defendant Zahir Ahmad in respect of the Phatak. Thereafter the learned Additional District Judge proceeded to consider the evidence on the record. On this consideration he came to the conclusion that it was clear that Plaintiff Suraj Narain Rai had succeeded in proving that there was a contract of tenancy between him and Defendant Zahir Ahmad in respect of the Phatak. Further, that as a matter of law, the acquisition by Zahir Ahmad of a share (3/4th) in the property did not result in a merger -of the rights that he had under the contract of tenancy with the ownership rights in its entirety. The learned Judge then decreed the suit for recovery of the amount claimed by the Plaintiff. This amount was specified as Rs. 525/- as arrears of rent for the period between August 21, 1975 and February 28, 1976. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, Zahir Ahmad has come to this Court for redress in the present petition. 7. Sri M.P. Singh, appearing for the Petitioner Zahir Ahmad, urged that the Additional District Judge was in error in undertaking consideration of the evidence on record himself and Coming to the aforesaid conclusion on pure questions of fact, namely, whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted between Suraj Narain Rai and Zahir Ahmad and of the consequence of purchase of 3/4th share in the building by Zahir Ahmad. He has placed reliance on some decisions of this Court for his submission that it was not within the jurisdiction of the revisional Court to have appreciated the evidence on record itself and to have come to a conclusion on pure question of fact. The first of these decisions was in the case of Laxmi Kishore v. Har Prasad Shukla, (decided by a Division Bench of this Court) 1979 AWC 746. The other decisions were in the cases of Jai Shankar Bhatt v. VI Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1985 UP RCC 201, Smt. Indra Mukhi Verma v. Additional District Judge 1985 UP RCC 417 and Kailash Narain Srivastava v. IV Additional District Judge, Jhansi 1985 UP RCC 420. These three decisions are by different learned Single Judges of this Court. 8. The other decisions were in the cases of Jai Shankar Bhatt v. VI Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1985 UP RCC 201, Smt. Indra Mukhi Verma v. Additional District Judge 1985 UP RCC 417 and Kailash Narain Srivastava v. IV Additional District Judge, Jhansi 1985 UP RCC 420. These three decisions are by different learned Single Judges of this Court. 8. The basic question which is to be considered in the present case is whether in doing what the Illrd Additional District Judge, Meerut has done in this case, namely, in going into the evidence and recording conclusions on questions in respect whereof the trial Judge had not recorded any conclusion. The Additional District Judge has committed a manifest error of law which is correctable in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution as a decision suffering from such error. 9. Before considering the decisions cited by Sri M.P. Singh it may be observed that in a recent case, which went from this Court, the Supreme Court had an occasion to go into similar question. That was in the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Smt. Angoori Devi. The decision is reported in 1984 AWC 375 . In this case ejectment of a tenant was sought on the ground that be had sub-let the premises in favour of Pawan Trading Co. The allegation had been denied by the tenant. The trial Judge, after observing that where a non-family member is allowed by a tenant to occupy the accommodation he should be deemed to have sub-let the accommodation and that the burden was on the Defendant to explain the circumstances under which a partner of Pawan Trading Co. was staying in the accommodation, recorded a conclusion in the following words: ...21/C-l a photograph has been proved. Even the Defendant has admitted this photograph during his cross-examination; the person standing in the shop has been identified by the parties to be the son of the proprietor of Pawan Trading Co. 10. The suit was decreed by directing eviction of the tenant on the ground of having sub-let the accommodation. The matter was challenged in a revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and the revisional Court (Additional District Judge) said that: ...The mere presence of a member of the Pawan Trading Co. 10. The suit was decreed by directing eviction of the tenant on the ground of having sub-let the accommodation. The matter was challenged in a revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and the revisional Court (Additional District Judge) said that: ...The mere presence of a member of the Pawan Trading Co. in the shop at a certain time will not be sufficient to say at all that the business is being carried on by Pawan Trading Company in the shop. In these circumstances, it was for the Plaintiff to lead good and positive evidence to prove that the business in fact at that shop was being carried on by the Pawan Trading Company and not by the Defendant himself. 11. Then it looked into the evidence and recorded its conclusion by saying that: ...The evidence of the Plaintiff was not at all sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the Defendant and on consideration of the evidence of the Plaintiff it is not at all possible to say that the Plaintiff has been able to prove the fact of Pawan Trading Co. carrying on the business at the shop which may amount to sub-letting of the shop by the Defendant. It reversed the decision of the trial Judge and dismissed the suit. The landlord then came to the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition was allowed. Amongst the observations made, this Court said that: ...The simple question for determination before both the courts below was whether Defendant had sub-let the shop in dispute to Pawan Trading Co. is question was determined by the trial court on the basis of direct oral and documentary evidence adduced by the Plaintiff It was a pure and simple finding arrived at on the analysis of the evidence on record without reference to the question of burden of proof Whether the tenant has allowed the shop to be occupied by someone not a member of his family is indisputably a pure question of fact That being so, the learned District Judge exceeded his jurisdiction u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act in setting aside the finding of the trial Court on a mere re-appraisal of the evidence on record. 12. 12. The Supreme Court, in appeal by special leave filed by the tenant said that the approach of the trial Judge was totally vitiated because U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 did not require the Court to assume a sub-tenancy merely from the fact of presence of an outsider and that the trial court unwarrantedly drew the presumption of sub-tenancy and looked at the evidence of the tenant to find out whether the presumption had been rebutted. There was no warrant for such situation. And, then proceeded to observe (in paragraph 2 of the Report), that. The Additional District Judge rightly took exception to this approach to the matter by the trial court and since the evidence of the Plaintiff had not been scrutinised under the erroneous impression of the legal position, the same was looked into to find out whether the claim of the sub-tenancy had been established. This was not an attempt to re-assess evidence but to take into Consideration the evidence which had not been looked into by the trial Court. The re visional jurisdiction u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is not as wide as the appellate jurisdiction u/s 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, yet in a case of this type we do not think fault could be found with the revisional court for pointing to the legal error committed by the trial court in its approach to this material aspect. The legal position having bees totally misconceived by the trial court and there being an assumption of the position which the landlord was required to prove by evidence, the revisional authority was entitled to point out the legal error and rectify the defect. This is all that had been done by the Additional District Judge. 13. In the present case the trial Judge had not looked into the evidence on the record in respect of the two crucial questions, upon which depended the fate of the suit, on an erroneous view that the suit was not maintainable as a partition suit in respect of his share filed by the tenant Zahir Ahmad had been decreed. Also, that until a final decree was passed and any specific portion had been allotted to Zahir Ahmad or the Plaintiff Suraj Narain it was not open to Suraj Narain to realise rent from Zahir Ahmad. Also, that until a final decree was passed and any specific portion had been allotted to Zahir Ahmad or the Plaintiff Suraj Narain it was not open to Suraj Narain to realise rent from Zahir Ahmad. The Additional District Judge corrected this erroneous legal approach by taking the view that the mere fact that Zahir Ahmad had become co-sharer with Suraj Narain of the property, which included the Phatak which had been let out to him by Suraj Narain, did not dis-entitle Suraj Narain from recovering rent of that portion of the property in which he had inducted Zahir Ahmad as tenant. The examination of the evidence made by the revisional Court was only with the limited object of finding out whether there was evidence on the record to establish that there was a contract between the Plaintiff Suraj Narain and Defendant Zahir Ahmad in respect of the disputed Phatak as alleged by the Plaintiff On the question whether the fact of being a co-sharer deprived Plaintiff Suraj Narain of his right to recover rent of the Phatak from Zahir Ahmad, the revisional Court only held, on the basis of a decision of this Court in Smt. Sabitri Devi v, Ram Krishna 1980 ALJ 1093, that the right of Suraj Narain to recover rent from Zahir Ahmad in that situation was not affected by the fact that a preliminary decree holding that Zahir Ahmad had 3/4th share in the entire property had been passed. On this aspect of the case, the revisional Court was neither required to nor did it appreciate any evidence. It only proceeded to express the coirect legal position on the basis of facts admitted between the parries. 14. Laxmi Kishore was a case where the following question of law had been referred to a larger Bench for its opinion on account of some apparent conflict in the view taken by some learned Single Judges of this Court: Whether u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act, a revisional court can pass a suitable decree in a case on a consideration of the evidence on record, if it finds that the findings recorded by the trial court were vitiated by an error of law, or can it only remand the case for a fresh trial ? The answer returned by the Division Bench (Speaking through Chief Justice Satish Chandra) was that: ...In the stated circumstances, the Revisional Court has no power to consider the evidence for itself in order to determine an issue of fact. The proper course is to remand the case to the trial Court. The aforesaid answer is to be read in the light of the circumstances in which the relerence was made and, about them, to use the words of the Chief Justice ; ...In these three cases, the trial court recorded certain findings on questions of fact. The trial court's judgment was taken up in revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act. The revisional court found that the findings of the trial court were vitiated by some error of law, or were not quite correct. It then preceded to re-appraise and reassess the evidence for itself and recorded a finding on the same questions of fact. It arrived at a different conclusion. The trial court's decree was reversed.... 15. Sri M.P. Singh has put some emphasis upon the observations contained In paragraph 17 of this judgment where it says that if the revisional court could not dispose of the cause adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guide line. It could not enter into evidence to assess it and determine an issue of fact. Suffice it to say that these observations cannot be torn from the context in which they were made. And, the context was the aforesaid state of facts wherein the revisional court had re-assessed the evidence on record and had come to a conclusion, different from the one recorded by the trial court, on questions of fact. The context would be further clear if one were to see what the Bench said in the earlier part of paragraph 17 and in the paragraph preceding it. The observations are these: If it finds that there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that finding. Same will be the case where the finding is based only on inadmissible evidence. In such cases the Court will be justified in deciding the question of fact itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. Same will be the case where the finding is based only on inadmissible evidence. In such cases the Court will be justified in deciding the question of fact itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. The Court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law viz, validity of notice, is sufficient for its decision. But, if it finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order as the justice of the case requires ; but it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact for itself.... 16. The ratio of this decision of the Division Bench has been followed by this Court. For example, in Smt. Indra Mukhi Verma, a learned Single Judge was dealing with a case where the trial court had, on appraisal of evidence, held that the notice sent by the landlord was served on the tenant and that the tenant had illegally sublet the first floor of the accommodation to another person. The revisional court had, on re-appraisal of evidence, reversed the findings in regard to sub-letting etc. The learned Judge who decided this case took the view that it is not possible for the revisional court to do so. Similarly, in Kailash Narain Srivastava, the trial court had found on consideration of evidence that the Defendant was residing in premises No. 149/4 and not 149/7 as alleged by the Plaintiff. It also found receipts produced by the tenant wherein it was mentioned that there was a tenant of premises No. 149/4. It also held that the tenant was not a defaulter in payment of rent. The revisional court, however, reversed the findings of fact about the Defendant being a tenant in premises No. 194/4 and said that he was a tenant of House No. 149/7 to which U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable. After noticing a large number of decisions, including that of the Division Bench in Laxmi Kishore, the learned Single Judge held that it was not open to the revisional court to re-appraise the evidence and substitute its own findings for those recorded by the trial Court. 17. After noticing a large number of decisions, including that of the Division Bench in Laxmi Kishore, the learned Single Judge held that it was not open to the revisional court to re-appraise the evidence and substitute its own findings for those recorded by the trial Court. 17. In Jai Shanker Bhatt, the precise question that is being canvassed in the present case did not arise. What had happened there was that the trial court had taken the view that all the co-owners of the property had not been imp leaded as parties to the suit and that the tenant was not entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. For, there was no material in support of that plea nor was the point pressed. The revisional court, in a revision filed by the tenant, took the view that the suit was not bad for non-joiner of the necessary parties and further that the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act was available to the tenant. The latter conclusion was arrived at by observing that enough amounts had been deposited by the defendant and he was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. This Court said that a decree for adjustment could not be passed if a person had complied with the conditions and had made necessary deposits as required u/s 20(4) of the Act and further that: ...The revisional Court, therefore could look into the material for finding out as to whether the decree for adjustment could not be passed against the Defendant on the ground However, the revisional court could not give the benefit arbitrarily and had to record a finding on that question after referring to all the requirements laid down in Section 20(4) of the Act, Sri M.P. Singh has urged with some emphasis that in case the course adopted by the revisional Court in the instant case is upheld as correct, in all cases where the suit is decided on a preliminary point, the Defendant or the Plaintiff, against whom the decision of the revisional Court was recorded on issues of fact would be prejudiced because the finding would become unassailable before this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This submission does not need any serious consideration in the circumstances of the instant case. This submission does not need any serious consideration in the circumstances of the instant case. But, it may be observed that even in a revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act findings on questions of fact can be gone into on limited grounds. The findings recorded by the revisional Court on necessary issues of fact, where parties had led evidence in regard thereto and the trial Court had not recorded any finding, would be open to scrutiny by this Court within the ambit of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 18. The decision of the revisional Court in this case cannot be said to suffer from a manifest error of law so as to merit interference by this Court in its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. The petition fails and is dismissed but I leave the parties to bear their own costs.