Judgment :- 1. The Cochin City Corporation wanted to open a new road, and steps were taken under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 to acquire 0.4625 hectares of land required for the purpose. Notification under S.3 was published on 22-1-1974. There were about 68 persons interested in the land, and individual notices under R.3 were served on most of them. The petitioners are some of the persons concerned. (There is a controversy as to whether petitioners (1) to (3) were entitled to notice, but that is not material, in view of decisions on the scope of S.3, and also in view of the circumstance that none of the petitioners had, at the relevant time, any objection to the proposed acquisition). The declaration under S.6 was published in Gazette dated 20-1-1976, but thereafter, the proceedings appear to have gone into hibernation for quite a long time. Notices under S.9 (3) were issued to the parties only in December, 1981. Ext. P5 and the averments in the Writ Petition disclose that the petitioners had then complained that it was improper to continue the acquisition proceedings after such long lapse of time; all the same, they put forward their claims regarding compensation payable. The award enquiry was completed on 6-1-1982, but the passing of the award was held up, it is suggested on behalf of the respondents, because the present Original Petition came to be filed and admitted in the meanwhile. 2. The original petition is directed against the acquisition proceedings. Many grounds are seen raised, but counsel did not press most of them, in my opinion, advisedly. The only point pressed is based on the lapse of time between the initiation of the acquisition proceedings and issue of notice under S.9. As already seen, the proposal was statutorily mooted under S.3, in January, 1974. Though S.6 declaration was made in January, 1976 notice under S.9 (3) was issued only in December, 1981, and the enquiry itself was proposed to be held in January, 1982. During the eight years between 1974 and 1982, it is said, land value in the locality has been increasing day by day, as a result of inflation and other circumstances; but by reason of S.11,15 and 25 of the Act the petitioners would be given market value of the land only at rates which were prevalent in January, 1974. During the eight years between 1974 and 1982, it is said, land value in the locality has been increasing day by day, as a result of inflation and other circumstances; but by reason of S.11,15 and 25 of the Act the petitioners would be given market value of the land only at rates which were prevalent in January, 1974. The long and unexplained delay deprives the petitioners of valuable rights and unduly enriches the State. On the authority of this Court's rulings in Moideen v. Special Tahsildar (1981 KLT 59) and George v. Spl. Tahsildar (1984 KLT 471), the petitioners contend that the acquisition proceedings have either to be quashed, or the authorities directed to award value for the lands in question at the current market rate. 3. In Moideen's case Bhaskaran, J. (as he then was) noticed that the Act itself prescribed no time limit; but his Lordship thought that "public officers exercising quasi-judicial jurisdiction vested in them are expected to wield their power with due diligence and such expedition as is expected of a reasonable man in the given circumstances." If I understand it correctly, what this Court did in Moideen's case was to apply the well-known principle that every statutory power should be exercised reasonably, and a reasonable exercise implies exercise within reasonable time, where lapse of time is material. The delay noticed in that case was for about nine years, and for that reason, the whole acquisition proceedings, including the award passed therein, were quashed. 4. The facts of George v. Special Tahsildar (1984 KLT 471) were somewhat special. There the Greater Cochin Development Authority negotiated with a landowner in 1978, for purchase of his lands at the agreed rate of Rs. 1,000/- per cent. But after sleeping over the matter for some time, the authorities came out with a notification under S.3, on 2-9-1980. The District Collector exercised his power under S.19(4) of the Act and thereby dispensed with the enquiry required under S.5. Still the acquisition proceedings were not completed with any sense of urgency. Chandrasekhara Menon, J. was of the view that as the petitioners had consented to part with the land in 1978, at a negotiated price, there was no need at all to invoke the emergency clause in S.19 (4). Again, after having invoked it, there was also no justification for protracting the proceedings for long. Chandrasekhara Menon, J. was of the view that as the petitioners had consented to part with the land in 1978, at a negotiated price, there was no need at all to invoke the emergency clause in S.19 (4). Again, after having invoked it, there was also no justification for protracting the proceedings for long. On a consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, including those brought out by the counter-affidavit sworn to on behalf of the authorities, the learned judge held that it was "difficult not to find legal malice in the action or inaction of the authorities." And legal malice, it was explained, could be found in attempts to attain a goal not sanctioned by a statute, by simulations or pretensions that is, when there is colourable exercise of power, or a fraud on power. In this view of the matter, the proceedings initiated on behalf of the G.C.D.A. was liable to be set aside; but an option was given to the authorities to proceed with the matter, if they were willing to accept the fiction that the S.3 notification (the date for fixing market value) would be deemed to have been issued on the date of the judgment (21st November, 1983). 5. The two principles which form the basis of the decisions in Moideen (1981 KLT 59) and George (1984 KLT 471) are not strangers to the field of administrative law: they are but two sides of the same coin-a coin very much in circulation and called want of bona fides. Unreasonable exercise of power, and its exercise for a purpose not recognised by the statute both converge on the question of bona fides. It can also be said that no statute shall be permitted to be used as an instrument of fraud. Difficulty however arises when these principles are sought to be pressed into service as part of a mechanical formula grounded on "delay". For example, the argument of counsel in the case on hand is that as this Court had interfered when the delay was nine years in one case and five years in the other, I should also interfere, because the delay here is from 1974 to 1986, and still the proceedings are not complete. I am unable to make any such generalisation from the two cases noticed. I am unable to make any such generalisation from the two cases noticed. On the other hand, I think this Court should caution itself against a trend, now fast developing, to bring every land acquisition case within the time limits of the above two cases, by getting stays on various grounds, and ultimately giving up all such grounds and pressing only the grievance based on time-lag, so as to claim "present market value". The giving of a blank cheque creates a temptation to overdraw. 6. A closer look at the facts of this case will itself show how unsafe it is to go by any general rule relating to 'delay'. Could the two-year period from the S.3 notification (22-1-74) to the S.6 declaration (20-1-76) be treated as delay, or part of the delay? As S.6 of the Act stood at the material time, the prescription was that the declaration thereunder was to be made within two years of the S.3 notification. That is, the legislature was of the view that normally a two-year period of time was necessary or permissible for reaching the stage of S.6, from the stage of S.3. And the time which the legislature thought was reasonable could not be treated by a court as part of unreasonable delay. If authority is required for this proposition, we find one, in G. S. T. Corporation v. V. M. Sonoji (1979) 3 SCR where their Lordships of the Supreme Court said: "The question then is: when a statute confers power and prescribes time within which it can be exercised, could it ever be said that even though the power is exercised within the statutory period yet the Court can examine the question of delay and record a finding that there was unreasonable delay in exercise of the power and, therefore, the exercise of power is bad? This approach would defeat the very purpose for prescribing a sort of a period of limitation on exercise of power. When a period is prescribed for exercise of power it manifests the legislative intention that the authority exercising the power within the prescribed time could not at least be accused of inaction or dithering and, therefore, such exercise of power could not be said to be bad or invalid on the only ground that there was unreasonable delay in the exercise of the power. The very prescription of time inheres a belief that the nature and quantum of power and the manner in which it is to be exercised would consume at least that much time which the statute prescribes as reasonable and, therefore exercise of power within that time could not be negatived on the only ground of unreasonable delay." 7. Let us then take the period commencing from the filing of this writ petition and ending with its disposal by this judgment. The petition was filed in January, 1982 immediately after receipt of notice under S.9(3), in December, 1981. An interim order restraining dispossession of the petitioners was also obtained. The delay in disposing of this writ petition cannot be placed at the doors of the Land Acquisition authorities. Nor am I prepared to hold that they acted unreasonably in not proceeding with S.9 enquiry and passing the award under S.11, when this matter was pending before this Court. Certiorari goes against the record, and taking into account the practice followed by Government Departments, it will not be improper to assume (though there may be exceptions to the normal rule) that the L. A. Collector concerned had forwarded all the records to the Advocate General's office, on receipt of notice from this Court. That apart, no useful purpose would have been served even if the authorities had proceeded with the acquisition of lands belonging to the owners who had not approached this Court because that would have left the Corporation, if at all, only with parts of a road. The period from 1982 to 1986 cannot also be therefore treated as a period of unreasonable delay. 8. What remains for consideration is the period between the S.6 declaration and the commencement of the proceedings under S.9 stretching from January, 1976 to December 1981. Going by the statute all that was required to be done during this period was the issue of a direction under S.7, and the marking and measuring under S.8, if that had not been done earlier. But the counter-affidavit does not suggest that measuring and marking had not been done earlier, or that the time taken was necessary to perform other obligations under the statute. There is an averment that the valuation statements were approved by the District Collector only on 24-9-81 and that "various formalities and scrutinies have to be complied with and followed" before such approval. There is an averment that the valuation statements were approved by the District Collector only on 24-9-81 and that "various formalities and scrutinies have to be complied with and followed" before such approval. S.17 of the Act however only insists that the valuation statements have to be got approved before the passing of the award under S.11. R.9. and 10 of the Land Acquisition Rules. 1963 do not appear to alter the position. There is also no specific contention that preparation and approval of the valuation statements had to be completed before issue of notices under S.9. Chapter VIII of the Kerala Land Acquisition Manual begins with the following direction: 'Immediately after the publication in the Gazette of the declaration under S.6 of the Act the Collector should compare the published copy with the office copy and if necessary submit a draft erratum to Government or the Board of Revenue as the case may be, for publication. He should then forthwith issue notices under S.9 (1) (in Form 7a-Appendix II) calling on all persons interested in the land to appear before him and state the nature of their interests in the land, their objections, if any, to the measurements made under S.8, and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation. This notice should be published at convenient places on or near the land. There should be a clear interval of 15 days between the date of publication of the notice and the date fixed for the enquiry. In addition to this general notice, special notice prescribed by S.9 (3). (in form 8) should be served on the occupiers of the land and on all persons known or believed to be interested in it, or on their agents authorised to receive service on their behalf. A notice in Form 7B Appendix II, shall be published in the Gazette as directed in S.9(5) of the Act. It is desirable to serve the individual notices under S.9 (3) on the parties interested in the land at least 15 days before the date of the award enquiry. It is not necessary that the notice under S.9 (S) should be published 15 days prior to the date of enquiry. It is desirable to serve the individual notices under S.9 (3) on the parties interested in the land at least 15 days before the date of the award enquiry. It is not necessary that the notice under S.9 (S) should be published 15 days prior to the date of enquiry. It is enough if it is published at any time before the enquiry." The instructions are clear: immediately after the S.6 declaration, the Collector has to see whether there is any mistake in it and take steps to get it corrected. And then he should forthwith issue the notices required under S.9. Even assuming for a moment that for some reason or other, some time was consumed in connection with the scrutiny and approval of the valuation statements, there is nothing to suggest that nearly six years were required for the purpose. Taking into account the way in which Departments of Government usually work, and making the most liberal approach possible, I would say that it should have been possible, for the authorities to commence action under S.9 at least by the end of 1976 or the beginning of 1977. That means that five out of the six years forming part of the period in question (and that alone) could be characterised us a period of unreasonable delay. 9. The prayers in the writ petition are to set aside the acquisition proceedings and to direct the L. A. Collector to award to the petitioners compensation reckoned "at the present market value" of the lands. The two prayers cannot be simultaneously granted; the second can only be an alternative to the first. And where two reliefs in the alternative are involved, the lesser one alone could ordinarily be granted. The question therefore is whether for the delay of about five years noticed in the preceding paragraph, a direction like the one given In George (1984 KLT 471) should be given. There is no specific averment anywhere in the writ petition that the authorities have acted male fide, or misused their powers under the Act. There is no whisper about colourable exercise of power, fraud on power, or any attempt to achieve an illegitimate aim by ostensibly exercising power for a legitimate end. There is no specific averment anywhere in the writ petition that the authorities have acted male fide, or misused their powers under the Act. There is no whisper about colourable exercise of power, fraud on power, or any attempt to achieve an illegitimate aim by ostensibly exercising power for a legitimate end. But counsel is probably right in his submission that on the authority of the two decisions of this Court referred to earlier, these things should be implied in the complaint regarding 'delay'. Even so I am not inclined to direct grant of "present market value" for a delay of five years between 1974 and 1986. Under the Act, the parties could claim land value only at the rates which were prevalent in 1974, and even after taking due note to the five year delay, and the decisions of this Court governing the subject, I am not satisfied that they could bargain for anything more than the average of the values which were prevalent in 1979 and 1980. 10. In the result, the Original Petition is disposed of with the following directions. The respondents can proceed with the L. A. proceedings on the basis that the S.3 notification was made, not in 1974, but some time later, which would enable not only the petitioners herein, but all the other landowners concerned also, to claim compensation on the basis of the average of the market values prevalent during the years 1979 and 1980. If the authorities decide to so proceed, the award should also be passed within six months from today. If the respondents are not disposed to accept the above two conditions, the L. A. proceedings in question would stand quashed. No costs.