Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram, J. We are obliged to interfere in writ appeal accepting a subtle legal submission made by Mr.Suren-dranath, learned Counsel for the appellant in this writ appeal. The first respondent moved the second respondent under section 5 of the Pondicherry Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Conferment of Ownership) Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for a bare and an independent adjudication that the appellant is occupying the land in question only from January, 1974 and he is neither an agriculturist nor an agricultural labourer, but a broker in selling cows and hence he should not be recognised as a Kudiyiruppudar under the Act. The second respondent rejected the plea of the first respondent that the appellant is occupying the land from January, 1974, but, however, the second respondent gave an adjudication and a declaration that the appellant is not an agriculturist within the definition of section 3(3) of the Act and hence the appellant is not entitled to get the benefits of the Act. The appellant preferred an appeal to the third respondent and the third respondent also concurred with the view of the second respondent and dismissed the appeal, challenging the orders of the second and the third respondents. The appellant came to this Court by way of W.P.No.396 of 1980. Mohan, J. who heard the writ petition, found no warrant to interfere with the orders of respondents 2 and 3 and accordingly the writ petition was dismissed. 2. In this appeal, directed against the order of the learned Judge, learned Counsel for the appellant would urge that the second respondent lacked competency and jurisdiction to give an independent and a bare adjudication and declaration that the appellant is not an agriculturist or an agricultural labourer and is not entitled to get the benefits of the Act. In this connection, the learned Counsel drew our attention to the relevant provisions of the Act. In this connection, the learned Counsel drew our attention to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 4 reads as follows: "(1) Any agriculturist or agricultural labourer, who not having a dwelling house or house site or a hut of his own was occupying any kudiyiruppu on the 27th day of March, 1972, either as tenant or as licensee, shall, with effect from the date of commencement of this Act, be the owner of such kudiyiruppu and such kudiyiruppu shall vest in him absolutely free from all encumbrances Provided that the extent which shall so vest in such agriculturist or agricultural labourer shall not exceed three acres in rural areas and two acres in urban areas as may be determined by the Authorised Officer after giving a reasonable opportunity to the occupant of the kudiyiruppu and the person interested of being heard in the matter. 2. Where, in the case of an occupant of kudiyiruppu referred to in sub-section (1) the superstructure belongs to any person other than such occupant, such superstructure shall also with effect from the date of commencement of this Act, vest in such occupant absolutely free from all encumbrances." (Section 5 runs thus: "(1) If any dispute arises w’nether any agriculturist or agricultural! labourer was occupying any kudiyiruppu on the 27th March, 1972 for purpose; of section 4 such dispute shall be decided by the Authorised Officer." (2) In deciding the dispute under subsection (1) the Authorised Officer shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed." The language of the provisions is unambiguous and plain. Section 4 contemplates that an occupant of a Kudiyiruppu on the relevant date, namely, 27th March, 1972 shall be entitled to become the owner of the Kudiyiruppu and the superstructure. Section 5 says that if any dispute arises whether any agriculturist or agricultural labourer was occupying any Kudiyiruppu on the ?7th day of March, 1972 for purposes of section 4 (underlining by us), such dispute shall be decided by the Authorised Officer. The dispute must arise "for purpose of section 4". We have already noted that section 4 confers rights of ownership on the occupant of a Kudiyiruppu on the relevant date, namely 27th March, 1972. It also enables such occupant to have the superstructure vested in him as per sub-section (2) thereof. The dispute must arise "for purpose of section 4". We have already noted that section 4 confers rights of ownership on the occupant of a Kudiyiruppu on the relevant date, namely 27th March, 1972. It also enables such occupant to have the superstructure vested in him as per sub-section (2) thereof. It is not the case before us that the appellant sought for any Kudiyiruppu patta on the basis that he has become the owner of the Kudiyiruppu. No determination of the relevant questions as per section 4 came up before the second respondent in any such proceeding. No dispute seemed to have arisen ‘for purposes of section 4. ‘In such a case, we do not think that the second respondent could indulge in an independent adjudication and give a bare declaration under section 5. Only if a dispute arises for purposes of section 4, there could be a warrant for exercising the power under section 5. When there is no dispute for purposes of section 4, it will not be competent for the second respondent to give an independent and a bare declaration that the appellant is not an agriculturist or agricultural labourer and hence he is not entitled to the benefits of the Act. 3. The Tamil Nadu Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Conferment of Ownership) . Act, 1971, Tamil Nadu Act 40 of 1971, hereinafter referred as ‘Tamil Nadu Act 40 of 1971’ contains a provision, section 4 thereof, identical to section 5 of the Act. By virtue of Tamil Nadu Act 6 of 1976. Section 3-P was introduced into Tamil Nadu Act 40 of 1971 and that provision enables an Authorised Officer in the State of Tamil Nadu to decide, amongst other questions, the question as to whether a person is an agriculturist or an agricultural labourer. We do not find any such provision in the Act. Section 3-P was introduced into Tamil Nadu Act 40 of 1971 and that provision enables an Authorised Officer in the State of Tamil Nadu to decide, amongst other questions, the question as to whether a person is an agriculturist or an agricultural labourer. We do not find any such provision in the Act. The scope of the jurisdiction of the Authorised Officer under section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act 40 of 1971 to decide the question as to whether the site is a Kudiyiruppu or not came up for consideration before N.S.Ramaswami, J. in Ganeshan v. Madurai Achari, (1977) T.L.N. J.4.T7= (1978) 91 L.W.6 and the learned Judge observed as follows: "As already seen, all that section 4 says is that if there is a dispute has to whether an agriculturist or agricultural labourer was occupying a kudiyiruppu on the 19th June, 1971 (if he had so occupied, the ownership of the site would vest in him), this dispute has to be decided by the Authorised Officer. That does not mean that the question whether the site is a kudiyiruppu or not is within his exclusive jurisdiction." In the present case, we are not very much concerned with the scope of the powers as such of the Authorised Officer to adjudicate the relevant questions. We are more concerned with the contingency and jurisdiction upon which such powers could be exercised. In our view, there is no ambiguity in the language of section 5 when it speaks about the adjudication of the dispute as to whether any agriculturist or agricultural labourer was occupying any kudiyiruppu on the 27th day of March, 1972 for purposes of section 4. A dispute should arise for purposes of section 4. Then only the contingency and the jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute under section 5 would arise. Section 5 does not contemplate entertaining an application for a bare adjudication and declaration when no dispute has arisen for purposes of section 4. No process under section A had been admittedly resorted to. Under these circumstances, the second respondent will not be in order to entertain an independent application for a declaration, adjudicate the same and give such a declaration. No process under section A had been admittedly resorted to. Under these circumstances, the second respondent will not be in order to entertain an independent application for a declaration, adjudicate the same and give such a declaration. However, we heard Mr.G.Gopalaswami learned Counsel for the first respondent, to state that such a contention was not at all raised either before respondents 2 and 3 or before the learned single Judge who heard the writ petition and hence the appellant should be precluded from urging that question in this appeal. We are not able to appreciate and sustain this submission because this is a matter of jurisdiction and competency to exercise powers and in our view, we cannot preclude the appellant from raising it on the simple ground that it was not raised early. When a statute confers a power on an authority to exercise the same, there is no gainsaying that such power must be exercised only in the contingency laid down therefor, and strictly within the ambit prescribed for exercise of such power. The authority cannot usurp jurisdiction to exercise that power besides and de hors the provisions which gives him that power. We cannot construe section 5 of the Act as enabling the Authorised Officer to entertain an independent application for a bare adjudication and a declaration that a person is neither an agriculturist nor an agricultural labourer; nor was he occupying any Kudiyiruppu on the relevant date, namely, 27th March, 1972, when no dispute for purposes of section 4 has arisen. The very language of section 5 contemplates that a dispute must have arisen for purposes of section 4. No such contingency for the exercise of the Power has arisen in the present case and hence we have to hold that the application as laid by the first respondent before the second respondent was incompetent and the second respondent was not in order to adjudicate the same and give a bare declaration as asked for. There cannot be a forestalling of the process under section 4 the determination of the same and a dispute arising thereunder and foreclosing the same. 4. We also heard Mr.G.Gopalaswami, learned Counsel for the first respondent, to state that section 25 of the Act will bar the civil court from going into these questions. This is beside the point. There cannot be a forestalling of the process under section 4 the determination of the same and a dispute arising thereunder and foreclosing the same. 4. We also heard Mr.G.Gopalaswami, learned Counsel for the first respondent, to state that section 25 of the Act will bar the civil court from going into these questions. This is beside the point. We are not concerned with the jurisdiction of the civil court to go into the question. We are concerned with the contingency and jurisdiction upon which the power under section 5 could be exercised. 5. For all the above reasons, the writ appeal is allowed and the order of the learned single Judge is set aside and the orders impugned in the writ petition will stand quashed. We make no order as to costs both in the writ petition and in the writ appeal.