Judgment :- 1. This criminal revision petition came up before us since it was referred by a single judge doubting the correctness of Abdu v. State of Kerala (979 KLT 189) wherein it was held that confiscation under S.6A of the Essential Commodities Act could only be of essential commodity and not its equivalent in money after it has been sold. 2. On 12-5-1979 the Sub Inspector of Police seized 336 bags of cement stocked by the petitioner since he did not produce the necessary records authorising procurement and stocking. He registered a case and reported the matter to the District Collector who authorised the Asst. Collector to proceed. The Asst. Collector in turn authorised the Tahsildar to dispose of the cement through licensed stockists at controlled rate pending final orders since cement was likely to be damaged if retained for long. The cement was sold and the proceeds remitted under revenue deposit. Pursuant to notice the revision petitioner produced three bills of purchase in the names of three different persons and contended that they entrusted the cement to him for being used for constructions on their behalf as contractor. By proceedings dated 18-7-1979 the Asst. Collector rejected the contention and found that the cement was illegally procured and stored for sale in black market in violation of Clause.3 and 4 of the Kerala Cement Distribution (Licensing and Regulation) Order, 1978. The cement was ordered to be confiscated. Tahsildar was directed to transfer and credit the amount to the revenue deposit. Against that order the petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No. 127 of 1979 before the Sessions Judge, Trichur and it was dismissed on 11-2-1980. The Criminal Revision Petition is directed against the said dismissal. 3. The first ground urged was that the Asst. Collector did not apply his mind to the materials placed before him and he did not proceed to give any valid reasons for confiscating the cement or its equivalent in money. We are not in a position to agree with that argument for reasons more than one. We do not think it necessary to enter into the controversy whether the provision for confiscation is penal in nature or not. Anyhow the pecuniary loss that the offender or somebody else suffers on account of the confiscation cannot be said to be a punishment for the offence. We do not think it necessary to enter into the controversy whether the provision for confiscation is penal in nature or not. Anyhow the pecuniary loss that the offender or somebody else suffers on account of the confiscation cannot be said to be a punishment for the offence. It is an exercise of a State power, the eminent domain, which is exercised in different ways. Contravention of any Order under S.3 of the Essential Commodities Act is made punishable under S.7 which provides for various penalties. Confiscation is not one of the penalties provided under S.7. Confiscation under S.6A is independent of prosecution. Even without a prosecution for contravention of the Order confiscation could be resorted to. But the satisfaction that there was contravention of the Order is a condition precedent to confiscation. Such a satisfaction by itself is not sufficient to order confiscation. Something more is required. The words used in S.6A are "may order confiscation" if he is satisfied that there has been a contravention of the Order. Under S.6B the owner or the person from whom it is seized will have to be served with a notice informing the grounds of the proposed confiscation. He must be given an opportunity to make a representation against the grounds of confiscation and finally he will have to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. It must be after observing all these formalities that the order for confiscation has to be passed. 4. S.6A is only an enabling provision and confiscation is not a must in all cases of contravention. Satisfaction under S.6A taken along with S.6B is not a mere formality. A full enquiry as cotemplated under S.6B is necessary. On the basis of the materials collected in the enquiry, over and above the satisfaction of the contravention of the order, there must be the further satisfaction that it is a fit case for confiscation. In other words over and above contravention there must be proper and justifiable grounds for confiscation. The discretion will have to be exercised judiciously and properly. The order is justiciable under S.6(C) and therefore the order must be supported by reasons also. (See Sathish and Co. V. State of Kerala, 1983 K.L.T. 240). What S.6A says is that the Collector may, if he thinks it expedient so to do and 'may order' if be is satisfied. The discretion will have to be exercised judiciously and properly. The order is justiciable under S.6(C) and therefore the order must be supported by reasons also. (See Sathish and Co. V. State of Kerala, 1983 K.L.T. 240). What S.6A says is that the Collector may, if he thinks it expedient so to do and 'may order' if be is satisfied. That means something more than mere contravention is required and it is for the Collector to decide on such additional grounds whether it is expedient to confiscate. 5. The petitioner was given notice setting forth grounds of the proposed confiscation. He was permitted to file a written objection and was allowed to be examined. The evidence produced by him was considered on the merits. He was represented by a counsel and a reasonable opportunity for hearing was also given. His contention that the cement was entrusted to him by three persons to execute contract works was considered in detail on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence and found incorrect. It was also found that the cement was illegally procured and stored for sale in black market. These findings were considered on the merits by the Sessions Judge in appeal and confirmed. After having heard both sides and perused the records we are not in a position to say that there is anything for interference by this court in revision. We are of opinion that the discretion in ordering confiscation was properly and judiciously exercised for valid reasons. The finding that the cement was illegally procured for selling in black market is evidently a justifiable ground for ordering confiscation. 6. That takes us to the only other contention that the order of confiscation is unlawful in as much as what is confiscated is the sale produce of the cement where as what is allowed to be confiscated, so far as the case in hand is concerned, is only the essential commodity namely the cement. What is allowed to be confiscated under S.6A (1) (a) is the "essential commodity so seized". In this connection the learned counsel for the revision petitioner sought support from Abdu v. State of Kerala (1979 K.L.T. 189). It was the correctness of this decision that was doubted by the learned single Judge. What is allowed to be confiscated under S.6A (1) (a) is the "essential commodity so seized". In this connection the learned counsel for the revision petitioner sought support from Abdu v. State of Kerala (1979 K.L.T. 189). It was the correctness of this decision that was doubted by the learned single Judge. That was a case in which a person was prosecuted for having contravened the provisions of an order under S.3 of the Essential Commodities Act. The Magistrate convicted and sentenced him. The contravention in that case was in respect of paddy. During the pendency of the case before the magistrate the paddy was sold and money deposited in treasury. As part of the sentence the magistrate ordered the money so deposited to be forfeited to the Government. This part of the order alone was the subject matter of challenge in that case. The penal provisions contained in S.7 read: 7. Penalties (1) If any person contravenes any order made under S.3 (a) he shall be punishable, (i) in the case of an order made with reference to clause (h) or clause (i) of subsection (2) of that section, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and shall also be liable to fine, and (ii) in the case of any other order, with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine (b) any property in respect of which the order has been contravened shall be forfeited to the Government; (c) any packing, covering or receptacle in which the property is found and any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance used in carrying the property shall, if the Court so orders, be forfeited to the Government. (2) If any person to whom a direction is given under clause (b) of sub-section (4) of S.3 fails to comply with the direction, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine; (2-A) If any person convicted of an offence under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2) is again convicted of an offence under the same provision, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for the second and for every subsequent offence for a term which shall not be less than six months but winch may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine:" S. 7 (1) (b) is part of the penal provision which could have been enforced only by a competent court, and not by the District Collector, in case the offender is prosecuted. Under that provision if any person who has contravened any order made under S.3 is prosecuted, over and above the other penalties that could be imposed, the court could also order that any property in respect of which the order has been contravened shall be forfeited to the Government. That is a provision independent of S.6A or B. Whether the offender is prosecuted before a court or not the Collector is having the jurisdiction under S.6 A to order confiscation if he thinks it expedient so to do for valid reasons to be recorded. That order is appealable under S.6 C before the Sessions Judge. When an order for confiscation under S.6 A has been made that is final subject to the result of appeal or revision as the case may be. In such a case an order under S.7 (1) (b) will be superfluous and may be even beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate because the property has already vested in the Government by an order of confiscation made by a competent authority. 1979 K..L.T.189 has not considered a case of confiscation under S.6 A but only a case of forfeiture ordered by way of penalty under S.7 (1) (b) without an order for confiscation under S.6A. 7. 1979 K..L.T.189 has not considered a case of confiscation under S.6 A but only a case of forfeiture ordered by way of penalty under S.7 (1) (b) without an order for confiscation under S.6A. 7. Under S.6A the words used are "essential commodity so seized" whereas S.7 (1) (b) mentions "any property in respect of which the order has been contravened." The difference in words may not carry any difference in the substance. That decision has not accepted confiscation under S.6A and forfeiture under S.7(1) (b) as identical. This is clear when that decision says "Even assuming the order of confiscation is to be read as one of forfeiture". But this difference is not material for our purpose. That decision was making a distinction between S.452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the relevant provisions in the Essential Commodities Act. S.452 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has made provision for disposal of property at the conclusion of trial. S.452 (5) says that the term 'property' used in the section includes any property into or for which the same may have been converted or exchanged and anything acquired by such conversion or exchange. No such provision is there either in S.6 A or S.7 (1) (b) of the Essential Commodities Act. It is in this context that 1979 K.L.T. 189 held that the special provision in the Essential Commodities Act which is a special enactment will override the general provisions in S.452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provision in the Essential Commodities Act must have overriding application unless it be that the circumstances point to the need for application of the provisions of the general enactment in the particular case. In that view it was held that the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act permit confiscation or forfeiture of only the property or commodity and not any money realised by the sale of the property seized. There cannot be any dispute regarding the proposition of law that the provisions of a special enactment will override the general provision subject to the limitations mentioned in that decision. But we do not think that the decision laid down the law correctly when it said that property will not include any money realised by the sale of property seized and consequently confiscation or forfeiture of the money is not justified. 8. But we do not think that the decision laid down the law correctly when it said that property will not include any money realised by the sale of property seized and consequently confiscation or forfeiture of the money is not justified. 8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner took us to the provisions of S.58(2) of the Kerala Forest Act, S.120 of the Customs Act, S.71(3) of the Gold Control Act and the last proviso to S.66 of the Abkari Act. Similar or identical clarificatory notes as in S.452(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are there in these statutes while dealing with concerned properties. Such clarificatory notes are not there either in S.6 A or S.7 (1)(b) of the Essential Commodities Act. Therefore the argument was that confiscation or forfeiture, as the case may be, could only be of the essential commodity or the property and not their conversions. We are not in a position to agree with that argument. Regarding interpretation of provisions the counsel took us to M.V. Joshi v. M.U. Shimpi and another (AIR 1961 S.C.1494) wherein it was observed at para 11: "(11) Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the rule being a part of a penal statute, it should be construed in favour of the accused. When it is said that all penal statutes are to be construed strictly it only means that the court must see that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words. To put it in other words, the rule of strict construction requires that the language of a statute should be so construed that no case shall be held to fall within it which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute. It has also been held that in construing a penal statute it is a cardinal principle that in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject should be preferred. But these rules do not in any way affect the fundamental principles of interpretation, namely, that the primary, test is the language employed in the Act and when the words are clear and plain the court is bound to accept the expressed intention of the legislature." 9. The said observations are not in any way helpful to the revision petitioner in the matter of interpreting the relevant provisions. The said observations are not in any way helpful to the revision petitioner in the matter of interpreting the relevant provisions. The provisions of the Special Statutes and S.452(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure relied on by the counsel include only clarificatory devices Those devices may be by way of abundant caution intended to avoid disputes. Absence of a clarificatory device cannot operate to curtail the normal meaning of a word or a term. Construction to be adopted in a socio economic drive is a construction which must be consistent with the legislative intent and object. In an advanced economy like ours any property which is a commercial product has a money equivalent. Reference to property or object should always be understood as comprehending its money value equivalent. We may not be justified in going back to ages when barter system alone was in vogue for understanding the meaning of property or commodity. We cannot forget the fact that Essential Commodities Act is an emergency legislation made in a war footing with a socio economic purpose in order to eradicate certain evils rampant in society. In socio economic offences at least in the matter of interpretation of terms as those we are dealing with, legislative intent cannot be given a narrow interpretation. 1979 K.L.T. 189 can only defeat the legislative intent and make a mockery of the laudable objects for which the Essential Commodities Act was enacted. It will only defeat the object of law. Many of the essential commodities may be subject to speedy and natural decay or it may be even otherwise expedient in public interest that they be sold and converted into money. S.6 itself made provision for that. Those provisions are intended for preservation of properties or commodities to be dealt with at the appropriate time. The perishable nature or the expediency in public interest which necessitates the sale cannot be taken as circumstances entitling the offender or other concerned person to claim any preference not warranted by the provisions. S.6 itself made provision for that. Those provisions are intended for preservation of properties or commodities to be dealt with at the appropriate time. The perishable nature or the expediency in public interest which necessitates the sale cannot be taken as circumstances entitling the offender or other concerned person to claim any preference not warranted by the provisions. S.6 A(3) provides that when the essential commodity is sold, as aforesaid, the sale proceeds, after deduction of expenses, shall (a) where no order of confiscation is ultimately passed by the Collector or (b) where an order passed on appeal under sub S. (1) of S.6-C so requires or (c) where the person is acquitted in the prosecution, be paid to the owner or the person from whom it is seized. These are the three contingencies under which the money value of the essential commodity which was sold as authorised by the provisions will have to be returned. A reading of S.6 A(3) (a) shows that it contemplates confiscation even after the essential commodity is sold. Procedures for confiscation require certain formalities for which time will be needed. Before completion of those formalities the commodity or property may perish and become useless. Therefore even in genuine cases where confiscation is warranted the property may have to be sold before ordering confiscation. Such a situation could never be intended to arm the person with any undue preference. That is the only interpretation possible when the words "where any essential commodity is sold" occurring in S.6A(3) are read along with the subsequent words in S.6 A (3) (a) "where no order of confiscation is ultimately passed". The word 'ultimately' could only be after the sale of the commodity. That means confiscation of the money equivalent is also contemplated. When S.6 A(3) is read along with S.6 A(3) (a) what follows is that even where sale of the essential commodity is succeeded by an order of confiscation the sale proceeds need not be returned. 10. In Ahmed G.H. Ariff etc. v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta (AIR 1971 SC 1691) it was observed: "8. Now "property" is a term of the widest import and subject to any limitation which the context may require, it signifies every possible interest which a person can clearly hold or enjoy. 10. In Ahmed G.H. Ariff etc. v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta (AIR 1971 SC 1691) it was observed: "8. Now "property" is a term of the widest import and subject to any limitation which the context may require, it signifies every possible interest which a person can clearly hold or enjoy. The meaning of the word 'property' has come up for examination before this Court in a number of cases. Reference may be made to one of them in which the question arose whether Mahantship or Shebaitsbip which combines elements of office and property would fall within the ambit of the word "property" as used in Art.19 (1 ((f) of the Constitution. It was observed in the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt. 1954 SCR 1005 at p 1019 (AIR 1954 SC 282 at p. 288) that there was no reason why that word should not be given a liberal and wide connotation and should not be extended to those well-recognised types of interests which had the insignia or characteristic of proprietary right. Although Mahantship was not heritable like the ordinary property, it was still held that the Mahant was entitled to claim protection of Art.19(1) (0 of the Constitution. It is stated in the Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 32, 3rd Edn. page 534 that an annuity (which is a certain sum of money payable yearly either as a personal obligation of the grantor or out of property not consisting exclusively of land) can be an item of property separate and distinct from the beneficial interests therein and from the funds and other property producing it. It is property capable of passing on a death and can be separately valued for the purpose of estate duty." Property, as a legal concept, is the sum of a bundle of rights and in the case of tangible property would include the right of possession, the right to enjoy, the right to destroy, the right to retain, the right to alienate and so on. (Guru Datta Sharma v. State of Bihar and another, AIR 1961 SC. 1684). (Guru Datta Sharma v. State of Bihar and another, AIR 1961 SC. 1684). Property within the meaning or Art.19(1) (f) and clause (2) of Art.31 of the Constitution comprises every form of property, tangible or intangible including debts and chooses in action, such as unpaid accumulation of wages, pension, cash grant and constitutionally protected privy purse (Madan Mohan Pathak and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1978 S.C. 803). Payment of money equivalent of property will be compensation (AIR 1965 S.C.190). When one refers to property its essential comprehension includes its money value. Principles of damages and restitution recognised by law also will suffer if property and money are held unrelated. 11. 'Property is everything which is the subject of ownership; everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate' '(Blacks' Law Dictionary Fourth Edition 1951). 'Property is a generic term for all that a person has dominion over' (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition). Costs covered in an action is property. 'Property includes the proceeds of sale thereof and also includes any property converted from one species into another by any method' (Biswas Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary). 'Property shall include any movable property, money or valuable security' Mitra's Legal and Commercial Dictionary). Therefore money equivalent of cement also must be considered synonymous with property of cement. It is meaningless to say that property which is legally liable to confiscation or forfeiture for violation of some statutory provisions ceases to be so for the simple reason that due to its perishable nature or in public interest it has to be sold and converted into money. Such an interpretation is not warranted by the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act and it is against the spirit of the legislation and it is not reasonable also. Surest way to mislead is to read too literally. 12. The socio economic crimes are such a class that their target is the entire community. They affect the morality, health and material well being of the people as a whole and have a tendency to undermine the economic fabric. In a welfare State like ours preservation of vital assets of the community from neglect and abuse by individuals must be emphasised. In such an attempt we feel that the interpretation given in 1979 K.L.T. 189 is not in line with the legislative intent and meaning of the relevant provisions. In a welfare State like ours preservation of vital assets of the community from neglect and abuse by individuals must be emphasised. In such an attempt we feel that the interpretation given in 1979 K.L.T. 189 is not in line with the legislative intent and meaning of the relevant provisions. The money equivalent of the essential commodity or property is also liable to confiscation or forfeiture. There is no merit in the criminal revision petition and it is hereby dismissed. Dismissed.