JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - This writ petition along with several other writ petitions raising similar questions were heard together. 2. There are 18 petitioners in this case. All of them have claimed that they are engaged in the business of running chit funds in various parts of the Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner No. 14 is an association of the persons engaged in the business of running chit funds. 3. When this writ petition was filed in the year 1977, the U.P. Chit Funds Act, 1975 (U.P. Act No. 53 of 1975) (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the U.P. Act') was in force. The petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of the U.P. Act on various grounds claiming that it interfered with their running of the business. By the time this writ petition came up for hearing an Act of Parliament known as the Chit Funds Act, 1982 (Act No. 40 of 1982) (hereinafter to be referred to as `the Parliament Act') had been enacted by the Parliament. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, in the forefront of his argument urges that by the enactment of the Parliament Act the U.P. Act stood repealed and consequently no restriction could be placed on the petitioners running their business under the provisions of the U.P. Act and the rules framed thereunder. 5. It is necessary to mention here that S. 1(3) of the Parliament Act provides that it shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in ,the Official Gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different States. It is not disputed between the parties that no notification under Section 1(3) of the Parliament Act has as yet been issued. If the argument of Sri S.S. Bhatnagar appearing on behalf of the petitioners were correct, there would be no law governing the operation of chit funds in the State of Uttar Pradesh as the Parliament Act has not been enforced and the U.P. Act stands repealed. 6. Before proceeding further with the case, it is necessary to state here that the subject matter of the U.P. Act and the Parliament Act is the same and they cover the same field. 6. Before proceeding further with the case, it is necessary to state here that the subject matter of the U.P. Act and the Parliament Act is the same and they cover the same field. It is settled law that if there is a repugnancy between an earlier State Act and the law enacted by the Parliament (Sic) would prevail as provided under Article 251 of the Constitution of India. 7. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar has urged that as soon as the President gave his assent to the Parliament Act, it became a statute and it automatically repealed the provisions of the U.P. Act by virtue of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India. 8. He has placed very strong reliance upon a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Chandra Rani v. Vikram Singh, 1979 All LI 401, In that case the question was as to whether the proviso imposing limitations on the power of a Court to grant an injunction under O. 39 R. 1, C.P.C. introduced by the U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 (U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976) are repealed by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No. 104 of 1976) enacted by the Parliament. It was found that both the Central Act and the U.P. Act have been enacted by the competent legislature under Entry 13 of List III of VII Schedule of the Constitution of India. The controversy that was raised in the case was as to whether the U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 should be considered as later Act within the meaning of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. The facts were that the U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 had received the assent of the President on 31-12-1976 while the Central Act No. 104 of 1976 received the assent of the President on 9-9-1976, a date anterior to 31-12-1976. It was held by the Full Bench that since the U.P. Act had received the assent of the President on a date later than the date on which the President gave assent to the Parliament Act, the U.P. Act became the later Act within the meaning of Article 254 of the Constitution of India and would prevail over the Central Act and as such the amendments of the Code of Civil Procedure were effective in Uttar Pradesh. 9. 9. It is necessary to mention here that the date of enforcement of the Central Act was 1-2-1977 and that of the U.P. Act was 1-1-1977. 10. Mr. Justice K. C. Agrawal observed in para 26 of his judgment as follows : "26. As already stated above, the commencement of an Act can be postponed and so long as it is not to be in operation, the Act remains in abeyance. But, even in such a case, through the operation of the substantive provisions of the Act remain in abeyance until the date which is specified by the State Government, it is obvious that the section which empowers the State to appoint the date of commencement of the Act, comes into operation on the passing of the Act. Consequently, an Act shall be deemed to have come into operation in the sense noted above from the date on which the assent is received. This will be a governing factor to decide the question whether that Act is former or later. In the instant case, the assent was given by the President to Central Act 104 of 1976 on 9-9-1976 whereas the U.P. Act 57 of 1976 received -the assent on 21-12-76 that apart, it would be further seen that the Bill of the State law was introduced in the State Legislature on 5-11-1976. It may further be noted that all these details would show that U.P. law is a subsequent law and it will prevail in the State under Article 254(2) despite any inconsistency with the provisions of the Principal Act or with the provisions as amended by Central Act 104 of 1976". 11. In para 29 of the judgment he has further observed as follows :- "29. A decision of Hon. K.N. Goyal. J., in Civil Revn. No. 511 of 1978 Indira Finance Corporation v. Prem Shanker Awasthi, (decided on 15-9-1978) reported in 1979 All LJ 301 was brought to our notice in which he held that although the Central Act had been passed and assented to by the President earlier, but since it was enforced with effect from a later date, the Central Act had to be treated as later in point of time. With great respect to the learned Judge, I am unable to subscribe to the view then in that case. With great respect to the learned Judge, I am unable to subscribe to the view then in that case. It, however, appears that the aforesaid view was-taken by the learned Judge because the decision given by the Supreme Court in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti, AIR 1956 SC 246 (supra) had not been brought to his notice. In my view, the decision of brother K.N. Goyal, holding that the Central Act will prevail over the State Act does not lay down the law correctly. To this extent, I am unable to agree with him." 12. Mr. Justice Yashoda Nandan in his judgment held that- "I can find no ratinal justification for holding that the words 'law occurring in Article 254 with reference to enactments other than existing laws' has a different scope and is confined to enactments when enforced. In view of these provisions in the Constitution itself, I find no difficulty in concluding that the date of enforcement of an enactment is immaterial for the purpose of Article 254 of the Constitution and consequently it must be held that U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 was made on a date later than Act No. 104 of 1976. In this view of the matter assuming that there is an inconsistency between any provision of the Code as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976 and the amendments introduced by U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976, the U.P. Amendments having received the assent of the President shall prevail." 13. The learned Judges deciding the Full Bench case correctly came to the conclusion that a Bill becomes an Act on receiving the assent of the President. The U.P. Act having received the assent of the President after the Central Act was, therefore, a later Act and would by virtue of the provisions of proviso to Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India would prevail in the State of Uttar Pradesh. 14. In the present case, the Parliament Act is undoubtedly later in date to the U.P. Act and would prevail if it was enforced. 15. The question to be decided is as to whether by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution of India, the U.P. Act stands repealed in spite of the fact that no notification has been issued under S. 1(3) of the Parliament Act. 16. 15. The question to be decided is as to whether by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution of India, the U.P. Act stands repealed in spite of the fact that no notification has been issued under S. 1(3) of the Parliament Act. 16. It is settled law that a statute may confer a power on an outside agency to bring into force the provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court in the case of A.K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710 has in paragraph 51 of its judgment referred to various cases where such a power has been upheld and has followed the same. It has noticed a statement of law made by H. M. Searvai in his "Constitutional Law of India" (2nd Edn. at P. 1203) in its judgment as follows : "The making of laws is not an end in itself, but is a means to an end which the legislature desires to secure. That end may be secured directly by the law itself. But there are many subjects of legislation in which the end is better secured by extensive delegation of legislative power." There are practical difficulties in the enforcement of laws contemporaneously with their enactment as also in their uniform extension to different areas. Those difficulties cannot be foreseen at the time when the laws are made. It, therefore, becomes necessary to leave to the judgment of an outside agency the question as to when the law should be brought into force and to which areas it should be extended from time to time. What is permissible to the Legislature by way of conditional legislation cannot be considered impermissible to the Parliament when, in exercise of its constituent power, it takes the view that the question as regards the time of enforcement of a constitutional amendment should be left to the judgment of the executive. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act is not ultra vires the power of amendment conferred upon the Parliament by Article 368(1) of the Constitution." 17. The Privy Council in a well known decision in the case of Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion, and the Distillers and Brewers' Association of Ontario reported in 1896 AC 348 had to consider the provisions of the British North America Act and in particular Sections 91 and 92 thereof. The Privy Council in a well known decision in the case of Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion, and the Distillers and Brewers' Association of Ontario reported in 1896 AC 348 had to consider the provisions of the British North America Act and in particular Sections 91 and 92 thereof. The Privy Council observed at page 366 of its judgment, that- "It has been frequently recognised by the Board, and it may now be regarded as settled law, that according to the scheme of the British North America Act the enactments of the Parliament of Canada, in so far as these are within its competency, must override provincial legislation." 18. After dealing with various other questions, the Privy Council observed that - "The question must next be considered whether the provincial enactments of S. 18 to any, and if so to what, extent come into collision with the provisions of the Canadian Act of 1886. In so far as they do, provincial must yield to Dominion legislation, and must remain in abeyance unless and until the Act of 1886 is repealed by the Parliament which passed it." 19. The Canada Temperance Act of 1878 provides that it will come into force in a particular district of the province after certain percentage of voters adopt for coming under its provisions and an order in Council had been made. In the case before the Privy Council such an order of the Council had not been made. It was, therefore, held that the Provincial Act would continue to govern within that particular district as the Canada Temperance Act was not in force in the District as no order in council had been made. In a crucial para of the judgment their Lordships observed as follows : "It thus appears that, in their local application within the Province of Ontario, there would be considerable difference between the two laws, but it is obvious that their provisions could not be in force within the same district or province at one and the same time. In the opinion of their Lordships the question of conflict between their provisions which arises in this case does not depend upon their identity or non-identity, but upon a feature which is common to both. In the opinion of their Lordships the question of conflict between their provisions which arises in this case does not depend upon their identity or non-identity, but upon a feature which is common to both. Neither statute is imperative, their prohibitions being of no force or effect until they have been voluntarily adopted and applied by the vote of a majority of the electors in a district or municipality. In Russell v. Reg., (1882) 7 AC 829 at p. 841 it was observed by this Board, with reference to the Canada Temperance Act of 1878, The Act as soon as it was passed became a law for the whole Dominion, and the enactments of the first part, relating to the machinery for bringing the second part into force, took effect and might be put in motion at once and every where within it."No fault can be found with the accuracy of that statement. Mutatis mutandis, it is equally true as a description of the provisions of S. 18. But in neither case can the statement mean more than this, that, on the passing of the Act, each district or municipality within the Dominion or the province, as the case might be, became vested with a right to adopt and enforce certain prohibitions if it thought fit to do. But the prohibitions of these Acts, which constitute their object and their essence, cannot with the least degree of accuracy be said to be in force anywhere until they have been locally adopted. If the prohibitions of the Canada Temperance Act had been made imperative throughout the Dominion, their Lordships might have been constrained by previous authority to hold that the jurisdiction of the Legislature of Ontarion to pass S. 18 or any similar law had been superseded. In that -case no provincial prohibitions such as are sanctioned by S. 18 could have been enforced by a municipality without coming into conflict with the paramount law of Canada. For the same reason, provincial prohibitions in force within a particular district will necessarily become inoperative whenever the prohibitory clauses of the Act of 1886 have been adopted by that district. But their Lordships can discover no adequate ground for holding that there exists repugnancy between the two laws in districts of the province of Ontario where the prohibitions of the Canadian Act are not and may never be in force. But their Lordships can discover no adequate ground for holding that there exists repugnancy between the two laws in districts of the province of Ontario where the prohibitions of the Canadian Act are not and may never be in force. In a district which has by the votes of its electors rejected the second part of the Canadian Act, the option is abolished for three years from the date of the poll, and it hardly admits of doubt that there could be no repugnancy whilst the option given by the Canadian Act was suspended. The Parliament of Canada has not, either expressly or by implication, enacted that so long as any district delays or refuses to accept the prohibitions which it has authorised the provincial Parliament is to be debarred from exercising the legislative authority given it by S. 92 for the suppression of the drink traffic as a local evil. Any such legislation would be unexampled and it is a grave question whether it would be lawful. Even if the provisions of S. 18 had been imperative, they would not have taken away or impaired the right of any district in Ontario to adopt, and thereby bring into force, the prohibition of the Canadian Act. Their Lordships, for these reasons, give a general answer to the seventh question in the affirmative. They are of opinion that the Ontario Legislature had jurisdiction to enact S. 18, subject to this necessary qualification, that its provisions are or will become inoperative in any district of the province which has already adopted, or may subsequently adopt the second part of the Canada Temperance Act of 1886." 20. Sri S.S. Bhatnagar argued that the Supreme Court has not accepted the decision of the Privy Council in the above mentioned case and referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752 wherein the above mentioned Privy Council decision was referred to In para 7 of the judgment it was observed as follows :- "(7) This is, in substance, a reproduction of S. 107(2) of the Government of India Act, the concluding portion thereof being incorporated in a proviso with further additions. Discussing the nature of the power of the Dominion Legislature, Canada, in relation to that of the Provincial Legislature in a situation similar to that under S. 107(2) of the Government of India Act, it was observed by Lord Watson in 'Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion, 1896 AC 348 (PC), that though a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada and within its competence would override provincial legislation covering tile same field, the Dominion Parliament had no authority conferred upon it under the Constitution to enact a statute repealing directly any provincial statute. That would appear to have been the position under S. 107 (2) of the Government of India Act with reference to the subjects mentioned in the concurrent list. Now, by the proviso to Article 254 (2) the Constitution has enlarged the powers of Parliament, and under that proviso, Parliament can do what the Central Legislature could not under S. 107(2) of the Government of India Act, and enact a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing a law of the State, when it relates to a matter mentioned in the Concurrent List. The position then is that under the Constitution Parliament can acting under the proviso to Article 254(2), repeal a State law. But where it does not expressly do so, even then, the State law will be void under that provision if it conflicts with a later "law with respect to the same matter" that may be enacted by Parliament." 21. This decision only points out that British North America Act did not give power to the Dominion Legislature to repeal a provincial statute whereas the Constitution, by virtue of Article 254, gives the Parliament such a power. The Supreme Court has not, however, dissented from the Privy Council decision in regard to the other questions decided by the Privy Council. This decision of the Supreme Court is, therefore, of no assistance to Sri S. S. Bhatnagar. 22. As we read the Privy Council decision, we find that unless the Federal Legislation is actually enforced in a particular area, the law made by the provincial legislature will continue to operate. It is only when the Federal Legislation is enforced, the State legislation will give way and ceased to be effective. 23. 22. As we read the Privy Council decision, we find that unless the Federal Legislation is actually enforced in a particular area, the law made by the provincial legislature will continue to operate. It is only when the Federal Legislation is enforced, the State legislation will give way and ceased to be effective. 23. In this view of the matter since the Parliament Act has not been enforced by issuance of a notification under Section 1(3) of the Parliament Act. the U.P. Act continues to govern the field. 24. In T.K. Musaliar v. Venkatachalam, AIR 1956 SC 246 , Travancore legislature had on 7-3-1949 enacted Act 14 of 1124 styled as Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1124, providing for an investigation into matters relating to taxation on income. Section 1(3) of the Act provided that it was to come into force on such date as the Travancore Government may by notification in the Government Gazette appoint. Before any notification could be issued under S. 1(3) there was an integration of the State of Travancore and the State of Cochin. By virtue of Ordinance I of the 1124 promulgated on the same day, called the United States of Travancore and Cochin Administration and Application of Laws Ordinance, 1124 (Ordinance I was later enacted as Act VI of 1125). All existing laws of Travancore were to continue in force till altered, amended or repealed by competent authority. The existing law of Travancore was defined to mean any law in force in the State of Travancore immediately prior to 1-7-1949. On 26-7-1949 a notification was published in the Travancore Cochin Government Gazette. The High Court had held that no notification under S. 1(3) could be issued appointing a Commission as Act No. 14 of 1124 passed by the Travancore legislature was not a law in force in Travancore. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court and it was noticed that S. 1(3) by virtue of which there was a power to issue a notification bringing into force the provisions of the Act was a law in force in the State and consequently the notification was validly issued. This case is of no assistance to either of the parties. 25. This case is of no assistance to either of the parties. 25. The effect of the decision is that even in the absence of a notification being issued by the Central Government under Section 1(3) of the Parliament Act, the Act is on the Statute book and is a law applicable to India. It does not, however, mean that the Act is in force in its entirety. 26. Article 254 sub-cl. (1) of the Constitution provides for a situation where there is an inconsistency between the law made by the Parliament and the law made by the legislature of a State. By virtue of cl. (1) to Article 254 where a law made by a legislature of a State is repugnant by a law made by the Parliament, the law made by the Parliament shall prevail over the law made by the Legislature and the law of the State legislature, in so far as it is repugnant to the law made by the Parliament, shall be void. This Article does not mean that a State law would stand repealed even though a law made by the Parliament is not in force and the law made by the Parliament would, when it is enforced, be repugnant to the law made by a legislature of a State and render the State law void. Article 254 must not be construed to mean that State law would be repealed by an enactment of the Parliament in respect of the same field even though the Parliament has expressly provided that the law made by the Parliament shall come into effect at a future date. Nature ad hors a vacuum and if Mr. S. S. Bhatnagar's argument is accepted a vacuum would be created because the State Act would stand repealed and the Act made by the Parliament would not be in force. Article 254 (1) of the Constitution of India deals with a situation where a law made by the Parliament and another law made by the State Legislature both purport to operate in the same field and the provisions thereof are in conflict. Article 254(1) does not deal with a situation where there is a possibility of conflict on the issuance of a notification bringing the law made by the Parliament in force. 27. Article 254(1) does not deal with a situation where there is a possibility of conflict on the issuance of a notification bringing the law made by the Parliament in force. 27. We are, in the circumstances, satisfied that Sri S.S. Bhatnagar is not correct in his argument that the U.P. Act ceased to be operative in the State consequent upon the enactment of the Parliament Act. 28. Sri S.S. Bhatnagar urges that even in the absence of a notification under Section 1(3) of the Parliament Act the U.P. Act stood repealed by virtue of the provisions of S. 90 of the Parliament Act which repealed the Acts specified in sub-sec. (1) thereof and in the list of the Acts repealed is the U.P. Act the Uttar Pradesh Chit Funds Act, 1975). He submits that the language of S. 90(1) is peremptory and repealed the Acts specified in sub-sec. (1) and applied the provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act to the Acts repealed as if each of such Acts so repealed were Central Act. Section 1(3) specifies that the Parliament Act shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint. It is clear that in the absence of a notification under Section 1(3) of the Parliament Act, Section 90 cannot come into operation and consequently there is no repeal of the U.P. Act by virtue of the provisions of Section 90(1) of the Parliament Act. 29. Sri S.S. Bhatnagar has urged that the U.P. Act was beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature and the legislation could only be enacted under Entry 97 of List I of VII Schedule to the Constitution of India. This argument can also not be accepted. The matter is really covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Srinivasa Enterprises v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 504 In that case the Parliament had enacted the Prize Chits and Money Circulating Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 (Act No. 43 of 1978). It was held by the Supreme Court that the legislative entry under which the Act was made, fell within Entry 77 of List III of the VII Schedule. The State Act, therefore, must be held to be within the legislative competence of the State. 30. It was held by the Supreme Court that the legislative entry under which the Act was made, fell within Entry 77 of List III of the VII Schedule. The State Act, therefore, must be held to be within the legislative competence of the State. 30. We have not to consider the argument advanced by Sri S. S. Bhatnagar that certain provisions of the U.P. Act read with rules made thereunder, are arbitrary and since they are part of the machinery sections of the Act, the whole Act is unworkable and must he so declared. Section 14 requires that every foreman shall before the commencement of a chit fund business provide a security prescribed under S. 14. Rule 17(1) provides that the security referred to in S. 14 shall be either in gold or silver in the form of bullion or manufactured article. Sri S.S. Bhatnagar urges that bullion cannot be given as security as its possession is prohibited by a private citizen by virtue of the Gold Control Act. 31. Section 14 provides for various kind of securities. Under Cl. (a) thereof, it may consist of a bond in favour of or in trust for the other subscribers for the proper conduct of the chit, charging property sufficient to the satisfaction of the Registrar for the realisation of twice the chit amount, or, sub-cl. (b) thereof provides that it may consist of a deposit in an approved bank an amount equal to the chit amount or invest in Government securities of the face value of not less than one and half time the chit amount and transfer the amount so deposited or the Government securities in favour of the Registrar to be held in trust by him as security for the due conduct of the chit. These provisions are for the protection of the subscribers. There are many instances of cheating of subscribers and the legislature was conscious of the need to protect the interest of the subscribers. Where the money in cash was to be deposited, the amount required to be deposited was equal to the chit amount whereas in other forms of securities to be given, the amount of security was higher than the chit amount. This was obviously to cover those cases where the value of the property offered as security would come down or would be difficult to realise. This was obviously to cover those cases where the value of the property offered as security would come down or would be difficult to realise. It may be that the gold bullion cannot be given as security as required under R. 17(1) but silver or gold in form of manufactured articles nevertheless can be offered as security. Merely because a part of R. 17(1) is not capable of compliance, the rule could not be struck down as ultra vires. Even if we strike down R. 17(1) because it prescribed gold bullion as one of the forms of security which can be offered by the foreman, Section 14 of the U.P. Act cannot be struck down because permissible security would be silver in the form of bullion or gold or silver in the form of manufactured article. Security also can be offered, as mentioned earlier, in the form of bond or deposit of money or in the form of Government security. 32. In view of the fact that we have rejected the arguments of Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, we do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the submissions of the Advocate General that even if we assume that the Parliament Act had the effect of repealing the U.P. Act, the petitioners' liability would continue and they would be bound by the U.P. Act because of the provisions of Sections 85 and 90(2) of the Parliament Act. 33. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed with costs. 34. Under the interim order of this court dated 26-9-1977 confirmed on 28-1-1981 it was provided that the respondents would not take steps to enforce any liability against the petitioners for contravention of the provisions of the Act provided the petitioners made a deposit as mentioned in the interim order dated 26-9-1977. We direct that if the deposits have been made as directed by the orders of this Court or security had been furnished to the satisfaction of the Registrar, the Registrar shall determine whether any amount is payable by the petitioners and the petitioners shall pay the same and if the Registrar finds that there is no such liability, he shall direct the return of the amount and the security, if so furnished, shall be discharged. The Registrar should complete this part of the work as soon as possible. The petitioners are directed to co-operate with the Registrar. 35. The Registrar should complete this part of the work as soon as possible. The petitioners are directed to co-operate with the Registrar. 35. We further direct that since the petitioners operated their business under the interim orders of this Court, no penal action should be taken against them unless they have run their business without complying with the interim orders of this Court. The petitioners will, however, not be at liberty to carry on their business any further except in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Chit Funds Act, 1975. 36. We also direct that any ongoing chit funds scheme sponsored by the petitioners which were permitted under the interim orders of this Court, may continue till they come to an end by efflux of time. This direction is being given to protect the interest of the existing subscribers.