JUDGMENT - G.F. COUTO, J.:---The petitioner challenges in this Writ Petition the judgment dated 22nd January, 1986, passed by the Administrative Tribunal, Panaji. 2. In short, the relevant facts are that a litigation in respect of some commercial premises was existing between the petitioner and respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 herein filed, at one stage, an application under section 35 of the Goa, Daman Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent Eviction) Control Act, 1968, claiming that he is the tenant in respect of the said premises where he is carrying on the business of a bar and restaurant under the name and style of "Silveria Bar Restaurant" since 1972. He further alleged that the petitioner herein had been adopting various means as to pressurize respondent No. 1 and to cause him to vacate the premises and, therefore, on 12th September, 1980, the petitioner forcibly locked the door of the room leading to the toilet. This application was heard by the learned Rent Controller and, ultimately, allowed. The Rent Controller, however, while passing the said order, had committed some mistakes mostly in the nature of clerical mistakes and, therefore, by the order dated 16th August, 1983, he corrected suo moto the said mistakes. Admittedly, no appeal was filed against the said order. Much later, an application was filed by respondent No. 1 to get the said order executed and after hearing the petitioner, the Rent Controller by his order dated 23rd October, 1985, ordered the petitioner to immediately comply with the order dated 27th July, 1983, as amended on 16th August, 1983. Being aggrieved by this order, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal, which was disposed of by the impugned judgment. The said appeal was dismissed mainly on the grounds that the petitioner was seeking to achieve, by filing the appeal a challenge to the order dated 27th July, 1983, by back-door in the garb of challenging the order dated 23rd October, 1985. The Tribunal held that the appeal against the order dated 27th July, 1983, was clearly barred by limitation and, in any case, since there was no challenge to the said order, the same had attained finality and, therefore, there was no reason for interference with the order of the Rent Controller. 3. The Tribunal held that the appeal against the order dated 27th July, 1983, was clearly barred by limitation and, in any case, since there was no challenge to the said order, the same had attained finality and, therefore, there was no reason for interference with the order of the Rent Controller. 3. Shri Talaulikar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, assails the impugned judgment on several grounds, particularly he submits that the appeal against the order dated 27th July, 1983, is not at all barred by limitation, for the said order was amended on 16th August, 1983, and communicated to the petitioner only on 14th September, 1983. The petitioner applied for a certified copy on 24th September, 1983, but upto now no certified copy was issued. This being the situation, the learned Counsel contended that the Tribunal wrongly held that the said order had been served on the parties on 18th August, 1983 and, therefore, the application filed by the petitioner was beyond the period of 30 days for filing the appeal. The learned Counsel further contended, relying on the decision of this Court in (Basawa Chambasawraj v. Somashekhararaj Shivraj)1, 1946(48) Bom.L.R. 557, that the period of limitation starts from the date on which the amended order was communicated to the petitioner. Apart from this, the learned Counsel contended that the principles of res judicate are not at all attracted and, in any event, the Tribunal has not advanced any reasons as to justify the observations that the objections of the petitioner to the execution of the order dated 27th July, 1983, were in the nature of res judicate. He further submitted that the Tribunal had not at all considered on of the relevant grounds for challenging the order of the Rent Controller, viz. that the respondent, after the order of eviction, has ceased to be a tenant within the meaning of section 2(p) of the Rent Control Act and, therefore, he was not entitled to the benefits under section 35 of the said Act. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel, in this connection on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Lakhmi Chand v. Kauran Devi)2, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1003. 4. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel, in this connection on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Lakhmi Chand v. Kauran Devi)2, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1003. 4. It was, however, contended by Shri Lotlikar, the learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, that irrespective of the ground of limitation, the fact remains that, as rightly pointed out by the Tribunal, the petitioner who, admittedly, had not challenged the order dated 27th July, 1983, is now trying to impugn the same by appealing against the order dated 23rd October, 1985. The learned Counsel then contended that the Administrative Tribunal passed the impugned judgment on three grounds, viz. on the grounds that the application for certified copy of the order dated 27th July, 1983, was itself barred by limitation, that the objections of the petitioner against the execution of the aforesaid order were in the nature of res judicate and finally that the petitioner was trying to challenge the order dated 27th July, 1983, which had attained finality for want of appeal in the garb of challenging the order dated 23rd October, 1985. The learned Counsel then submitted that the Administrative Tribunal was entirely correct in dismissing the appeal especially on the last ground. 5. As rightly pointed out by Shri Lotlikar, the Administrative Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order dated 23rd October, 1985, on the aforesaid three grounds. Insofar as the first ground, it has been contended by Shri Talaulikar that the order dated 16th August, 1983, was served on the petitioner only on 14th September, 1983, and not on 18th August, 1983, as observed by the Tribunal. Though it appears that the observation made by the Tribunal was after a perusal of the record of the trial Court, I may say that even if the order was served on the petitioner only on 14th September, 1983, nonetheless, there will be no reason for interference by this Court. In fact, if at all the petitioner was served on 14th September, 1983, the first ground for dismissal of the appeal may not be available. However, it is an admitted fact that no appeal was filed even today against the order dated 27th July, 1983. It is true that Shri Talaulikar submitted that an application for certified copy has been filed by the petitioner, but not certified copy has been given to the petitioner as yet. However, it is an admitted fact that no appeal was filed even today against the order dated 27th July, 1983. It is true that Shri Talaulikar submitted that an application for certified copy has been filed by the petitioner, but not certified copy has been given to the petitioner as yet. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the question of res judicata is not at all arising. Shri Talaulikar contended that no certified copy was issued to him based on the original application filed by the petitioner for that purpose. However, at a later stage, a fresh certified copy was applied for by the petitioner on 23rd October, 1985, and the same was issued on 19th November, 1985. Even if this is true, the fact remains that in spite of the certified copy being issued to the petitioner, he has not filed any appeal against the order dated 27th July, 1983. This being the case, it is obvious that the Tribunal is right in holding that the said order dated 27th July, 1983, has attained finality for want of an appeal. This being so, it necessarily follows that the Tribunal is also correct in observing that the petitioner is trying to challenge the said order dated 27th July, 1983, which has become final, in the appeal filed against the order dated 23rd October, 1985. On this ground alone, the appeal had to be dismissed and as such, there is no reason whatsoever for this Court to interfere with the impugned order. 6. I may also point out that Shri Talaulikar is wrong in this submission that in view of the decree of eviction passed against respondent No,. 1, he has ceased to be a tenant and, therefore, no relief under section 35 of the Rent Control Act could have been granted to him. In fact, it is common ground that an appeal was preferred by respondent No. 1 against the order of eviction and a stay order was granted. If this is so, it is not possible to say that the respondent has ceased to be a tenant. Such situation will arise only if the appeal of respondent No. 1 against the order or eviction is finally dismissed. If this is so, it is not possible to say that the respondent has ceased to be a tenant. Such situation will arise only if the appeal of respondent No. 1 against the order or eviction is finally dismissed. The decision of the Supreme Court in lakhmi Chand's case is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case, for in that case, a decree had become final and the only question was whether such decree could or could not be executed. The observations made be the Supreme Court, in this context of facts, are not at all relevant for the disposal of our case when the decree passed against respondent No. 1 has not yet become final. 7. The result is that this writ petition fails and is, consequently dismissed. The rule is accordingly, discharged. There will be no order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case. Petition dismissed. -----