JUDGMENT : S.A. Shah, J. The appellant, who is the original applicant, had filed Misc. Civil Application No. 84 of 1982 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Val-sad at Navsari (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal'), as an indigent person. 2. The appellant had met with an accident and had claimed an amount of Rs. 1 lac as compensation, but on account of his incapacity to pay the Court-fees he filed an application as an indigent person under Order 33, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). The application was opposed by the opponents. The Tribunal, therefore, held an enquiry and framed an issue whether the appellant had proved that he does not possess sufficient means to enable him to pay the Court-fees prescribed by law? The appellant examined himself and also gave a list of moveable properties worth about Rs. 1,300/-. However, the Tribunal rejected the prayer of the appellant to permit him to prosecute his claim as an indigent person by an order dated 31-1-1984. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has filed this appeal. 3. The appellant has made a claim for compensation which he might be in acute need in year 1982 as a pauper. The applicant-appellant has filed this appeal in year 1984, and till today the appellant has remained out of getting the compensation amount for the serious injuries which he received on account of the accident. 4. It appears from the judgment of the Tribunal that the application was rejected mainly on two grounds, viz. (1) The appellant had not disclosed his property correctly, inasmuch as his father was the owner of four acres and 2 gunthas of land and he had got five brothers and two sisters and, therefore, the appellant had a share in the said immoveable property, which is an agricultural land; (2) If the appellant was one of the Co-owners of the said agricultural land, 36 gunthas of land would come to his share and, therefore, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the appellant had sufficient means to pay the required Court-fees. 5. 5. On a perusal of the claim application it appears that admittedly the appellant was a truck-driver and when he was driving his truck, there was collision with another truck due to which the appellant sustained serious injuries - two fractures on legs and other injuries - and that has resulted into his incapacity to drive the truck. The appellant was hospitalised for sometime at Navsari and thereafter at Baroda. According to the averments made in the claim petition, three operations were performed upon him. Thereafter he filed the claim petition as an indigent person. 6. It may not be forgotten that one has to file a claim petition within the statutory period of six months from the date of accident. Air Desai, learned Advocate for the appellant, has stated before me that the accident occurred on 30-1-1982, and the claim petition was filed on 29-6-1982, i.e. Practically on the last day of the limitation. This would suggest the state of mind of the appellant. It is a known fact that considerable amount of money is necessary for engaging an Advocate. The appellant must have passed through physical torture. Thereafter he had to arrange for money for his medical treatment and at least for the part of the fees for the Advocate. In such a state of mind if the appellant had not mentioned that he is the joint owner of the agricultural land, which was not in his possession, can it be said that he has deliberately avoided to mention that fact, especially when in the statement of financial position he has stated that he is receiving Rs. 300/- as agricultural income per year, though subsequently he has tried to say that was not correct? The second question would be whether the appellant can be said to be having sufficient means to pay the Court-fees when he was out of job, had spent considerable amount for medical treatment and some amount towards the Advocates fees, merely because he had a share in the agricultural land in his native place which was in possession of his family members? 7. 7. Before consider the provisions of Order 33 of the Code, it would not be out of place to refer to the provisions of Article 39-A of the Constitution of India which has been inserted by the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, and has come into force with effect from 3-1-1977, i.e. Prior to the institution of the present claim petition. Said Article 39-A reads: "The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities." This article, which falls under Part IV which deals with 'Directive Principles of State Policy', directs the State to secure the operation of the legal system which promotes justice, and also to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. 8. In view of the aforesaid directive policy of the Constitution we shall have to interpret the provisions of Order 33 of the Code with a special stress that economic disability may not prevent a citizen of this country from securing justice. Article 39-A of the Constitution of India has gone to the extent of providing free legal aid, with which we are not concerned at present, but we are surely concerned to see that a person is not denied opportunity to get justice from the Courts of law on account of his poverty; in other words "economic disability". In considering the economic disability, one should not forget that all available resources are to be first made available for securing a living. A citizen is not supposed to spend for securing justice if he cannot maintain himself. First, the money available to him are required to be utilised for the maintenance of himself and his family, and thereafter if there is any surplus the same should be made available for payment of Court-fees. In this background, let us examine the provisions of Order 33 of the Code. 9. Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code permits an indigent person to institute a suit in forma pauperis. Now, the question arises as to who can be said to be an indigent person. In this background, let us examine the provisions of Order 33 of the Code. 9. Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code permits an indigent person to institute a suit in forma pauperis. Now, the question arises as to who can be said to be an indigent person. Clause (a) of Explanation I to Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code, being material, reads: "Explanation I: A person is an indigent person,- (a) if he is not possessed of sufficient means (other than property exempt from attachment in execution of a decree and the subject-matter of the suit) to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit." Pertinent question, therefore, is whether the appellant was possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the prescribed fees? In the instant case the appellant had met with an accident on 30-1-1982. He lost his employment; he was in hospital for several days; and on the last day of limitation lie filed the claim application. There is no allegation that the appellant was receiving any salary during that period. The appellant must have spent size-able amount for his treatment and Advocates fees. He had to maintain himself and his family, if any. He is not alleged to be in possession of the agricultural land referred to above. Assuming for the sake of argument that lie was receiving Rs. 300/- per year as income from the agricultural land, can it be said that he possessed sufficient means to enable him to pay the Court-fees prescribed by law when he had not enough money to maintain himself? 10. The appellant has stepped into the witness-box and has shown that he was indebted. Nothing has been brought out from the evidence on record except that he had a share in the H.U.F. property which comes to 36 gunthas. Can it be said that the appellant who is the owner of 36 gunthas of land in the joint family property which is not in his possession, had sufficient means to pay the Court-fees? He might have tried till the last day, but could not get any amount. Even if he could sell the property of his share, his first duty would be to maintain himself and his family. He has stated in his evidence that the market value of such land is Rs. 1,200 per acre. He might have tried till the last day, but could not get any amount. Even if he could sell the property of his share, his first duty would be to maintain himself and his family. He has stated in his evidence that the market value of such land is Rs. 1,200 per acre. Even assuming that may be a figure on the lower side, and taking the market rate to be Rs. 2,000/- per acre, the amount that the petitioner would get by selling 36 gunthas would hardly come to Rs. 1,800/-, and that too, after separating his interest, fighting litigation, etc. Immediately there would not be any purchaser of such joint ownership land whose possession was with his brothers. In my opinion, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that ownership of interest in 36 gunthas of agricultural land amounts to sufficient means for the appellant to pay the Court-fees. Denying to the appellant the advantage of the provisions of Order 33 of the Code is denying him legal remedy available to him, and is contrary to the policy laid down by the Parliament under Article 39-A of the Constitution of India. 11. It appears that the Tribunal has been much influenced by the fact that the appellant has not come out with clean hands and has not stated in his petition that he was the owner of 36 gunthas of land. It is, no doubt, true that the appellant has not stated this fact in his petition, but can that be said to be a deliberate attempt on his part to mislead the Court? We have to consider the circumstances in which the appellant was placed when he filed the claim petition. The appellant was undergoing physical as id mental torture on account of the accident. However, he must have tried his level best to raise the money to pay the Court-fees, but when he must have failed in doing so, he filed the claim petition on the last day as an indigent person. The appellant belongs to the category of drivers who earn their livelihood every day. In my opinion, the Tribunal has given much more importance to this fact than what was necessary. 12. The appellant belongs to the category of drivers who earn their livelihood every day. In my opinion, the Tribunal has given much more importance to this fact than what was necessary. 12. If we consider the provisions of Rule 5 of Order 33 of the Code which deals with 'Rejection of application for permission', nowhere it is stated therein that permission can be refused on the ground that the person has not disclosed his property fully. It is possible that the appellant being not in possession of the agricultural land and having a very small share therein, might not have mentioned to his Advocate either out of negligence or on account of the stress and strains he was passing through when he filed the application. But for that the application for compensation of the appellant who had received serious injuries cannot be rejected under the provisions of Rule 5 of Order 33 of the Code. The Tribunal has committed a clear error resulting into delay of more than four years to the appellant in getting the compensation permitted by law. 13. Another significant fact which the Tribunal lost sight of is that the claim petition for compensation was not a false or frivolous petition. The appellant is likely to succeed in the claim petition when the accident has actually occurred. Whether he would get Rs. 1 lac or less as compensation was not relevant at that stage. Under Rule 10 of Order 33 of the Code, Court-fees could have been recovered from the amount of compensation ultimately awarded to the appellant. 14. Assuming that the appellant was having an interest in the agricultural land to the extent of 36 gunthas which was in possession of his brothers and was not easily saleable, and even if it was sold, it would have fetched a very low price, and considering the economic position of the appellant, in my opinion, interest in such property cannot be said to be sufficient means to pay the Court-fees as prescribed by law on the claim petition wherein compensation of Rs. 1 lac is claimed. 15. Mr. V.J. Desai, learned Advocate for the appellant, has relied upon the decision of this Court in Rambhai Punjabhai Vinchiya v. The Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad 16 Gujarat Law Reporter 274. That case was a revision application under Section 115 of the Code, wherein similar question arose for decision. 1 lac is claimed. 15. Mr. V.J. Desai, learned Advocate for the appellant, has relied upon the decision of this Court in Rambhai Punjabhai Vinchiya v. The Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad 16 Gujarat Law Reporter 274. That case was a revision application under Section 115 of the Code, wherein similar question arose for decision. In paragraph 2 it is observed as under: ".......The expression 'possessed of sufficient means' has to be construed in its proper context so that it serves the salutary object of enabling the person who are too poor to enable them fight their suits without paying the Court-fees The short question which was posed before the learned Judge was whether the legislature contemplates that while considering the available means to the plaintiff his self means of livelihood should be included in disposable realisable assets even though the legislature had provided the necessary safeguard of 'sufficient mean in this expression in Order 33, Rule 1, Therefore, the available means or resources and their sufficiency would have to be judged in the light of disposable property on the facts of cat: case, for effectuating this purpose it question, so that even such a poor litigant is enabled to fight his litigation without depriving him of his sole means of livelihood." The aforesaid observations clean: support the contention of the appellant. 16. Mr. Desai has then relied upon the decision of this Court in Aminabibi v. Havabibi, 19 Gujarat Law Reporter 339. In that case the facts were to some extent similar to the facts of the present case. The appellant of that case had filed a suit as an indigent person for recovery of her ornament and clothes worth Rs. 50,000/- and in the alternative to recover Rs. 50,000/- as the price of the said ornaments and clothes. Her application for paupers was resisted by the defendant, and mately the learned Judge rejected the said application on two counts. Firstly, the learned Judge found from the evidence of the applicant herself that she had some share in a house at Rander and also in some land on the Surat-Rander road, they being the properties of her father, who had died about two years prior to the date of her deposition. She had also admitted in her cross-examination that those two properties were in all worth Rs. She had also admitted in her cross-examination that those two properties were in all worth Rs. 30,000/- and that her three sisters and two brothers were entitled to the said two properties. She had also clarified that those properties were in possession of her brothers and their wives and that they were not giving any share therefrom to her. The learned Judge took the view that as she was possessed of those properties and as she had failed to disclose those facts in her application, she was not entitled to sue as a pauper. In the appeal before this Court (N.H. Bhatt, J.) it was observed: "Order 33, Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code no doubt enjoins upon the Court to dismiss an application which does not fulfil the requirements of Rule 2 or 3, but it cannot be stretched to mean that any innocent, unintended accidental slip must be visited with the rigours of dismissal of an application. This sort of rigid interpretation strikes at the very root of the provisions relating to pauperism. A person is said to be an indigent person if he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the foes prescribed by law to file a suit. Despite her having that small share in the two properties in possession of her brothers, who are disowning her interest therein, it cannot be said that she is possessed of such properties which would enable her to pay the requisite Court-fees. If she has to wait for realising her share in those properties and defer the filing of the present suit, she would perhaps miss the bus for all time to come. I wish that the Courts below would always take a broad view of such situations and will not deal with these benign provisions with rigidity of the type manifest in this case." I am in full agreement with the aforesaid observations. As stated earlier in view of the directive policy of the Constitution and the changed circumstances, when the State is enjoined to grant free legal aid to the poor litigants, justice should not be refused to a person who has no immediate means to pay the Court-fees; especially in a case of motor accident where a person is without job; has spent heavily for his treatment; is under physical and mental stress; and who is in urgent need of money. 17. In the instant case it can be seen that in spite of acute need and poverty the appellant has been non-suited and the amount of compensation, which might have been available to him long back and which he required immediately on account of the aforesaid circumstances, has been denied to him for a period of at least four years. In my opinion, at least in Motor Accidents Claims cases the Courts should take a very broad view, looking to the fact that on account of the injuries sustained in the accident the claimants may not be able to collect the Court-fees immediately even if they have properties because claim petitions have to be filed within six months, and especially when there is a provision under Rule 10 of Order 33 of the Code whereby the Court can direct the recovery of the amount of Court-fees payable from the decretal amount. Had this view been taken by the Tribunal in the instant case, the appellant would not have been deprived of the amount of compensation which he needed urgently. 18. Unfortunately, Mr. K.T. Dave, learned Assistant Government Pleader, for respondent No. 3-State, objects and states that the appellant having suppressed the aforesaid facts, and he is not an indigent person and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. In my opinion, this is a bureaucratic approach on behalf of the State. Time has come for the State not to raise objections merely for the sake of raising in view of the directive principles contained in Article 39-A of the Constitution of India. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and it is directed that the appellant may be treated as an indigent person and his claim petition may be disposed of within two months of the date of the writ of this Court by giving top priority. Appeal allowed.