JUDGMENT : S.C. Mohapatra, J. - Injured is the appellant in this appeal u/s 110 D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. Grievance of the appellant is that the Tribunal while accepting the injuries sustained by the appellant being dashed by the Scooter registered ORD 1782 by Respondent No. 1 which was insured with Respondent No. 2, rejected the claim u/s 110-A of the Act on the ground of being barred by limitation. Respondent No. 1 who had no occasion to prefer appeal against rejection of the claim challenged the finding of the Tribunal in this appeal about his causing the accident. 3. Appellant was a Head Moharir in the District Police Office at Rourkela on 4-2-1977 when he was injured by an accident. His case is that in the morning at about 8.30 A.M. of 4-2-1977 he was walking on the main road of Uditnagar-Rourkela on the left side of the road, when the Respondent No. 1 coming by the Scooter in the same direction belonging to Anantram Misra (Respondent No. 2) dashed him from the left side while trying to overtake the appellant. As a result of the accident, the appellant fell down and sustained injuries on his left band and hip joint. He saw the Respondent No. 1 when he knew from before driving away with the scooter. Appellant was admitted in the Ispat General Hospital for his treatment where he continued as an indoor patient till 16-4-1977. The result of the injuries sustained is that the appellant was not able to move his left leg and left wrist and developed a deformity on his left hand. Accordingly, he made a claim of Rs. 25,000/- as compensation. 4. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 while not disputing the injuries and their effect on the appellant denied the accident to have been caused by Respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 3 made similar assertion. All the respondents challenged the claim being barred by limitation. 5. Appellant is the only eye-witness to the accident. He knew the respondent No. 1 earlier. Prom the suggestion in cross-examination that the injured was crossing the road at the time of accident, inference can be drawn that the respondent No. 1 was at the spot of accident. No hostility has been suggested and there is no reason way the appellant would falsely allege against Respondent No. 1. He knew the respondent No. 1 earlier. Prom the suggestion in cross-examination that the injured was crossing the road at the time of accident, inference can be drawn that the respondent No. 1 was at the spot of accident. No hostility has been suggested and there is no reason way the appellant would falsely allege against Respondent No. 1. The Tribunal has rightly held that the acquittal in the criminal case would not be a ground to disbelieve the story of accident. Judgment of a criminal court is evidence of the fact that the Respondent No. 1 was charged the defense of rash and negligent driving from which he was acquitted. Negligence in driving the vehicle would make the Respondent No. 1 liable. Rashness is not necessary to be proved in a claim under the Act. The injuries sustained are on the left side of the appellant which corroborate that the vehicle dashed against him from the left side. When the appellant stated on oath that Respondent No. 1 while overtaking the appellant by the left side from behind dashed against him, it can safely be accepted. Overtaking a pedestrian on his left is itself negligent act. Therefore, the Tribunal is justified to hold that the appellant sustained the injuries on account of negligent driving of the scooter by Respondent No. 1. 6. The accident was on the main road. Appellant who is a member of the Police force of the State is supposed to have knowledge that while walking on a road he is to keep to the left. He ought to have kept himself to the extreme left of the road as a pedestrian to allow others to overtake him only on the right. It is a normal phenomenon now-a-days that even pedestrians exercise their fundamental right of movement on the road on the pitched portion leaving the earthen flank unused. Being an employee of the Police Organisation, onerous duty was cast on the appellant not to exercise this supposed fundamental right causing inconvenience to others. The very fact that Respondent No. 1 had an impression that he could overtake the appellant from his left indicates that some space was left for such overtaking. While not justifying the endeavour to overtake from the left, I am of the strong view that the appellant was also negligent in not walking on the extreme left of the road. The very fact that Respondent No. 1 had an impression that he could overtake the appellant from his left indicates that some space was left for such overtaking. While not justifying the endeavour to overtake from the left, I am of the strong view that the appellant was also negligent in not walking on the extreme left of the road. He is guilty of contributory negligence. 7. The Tribunal has not determined the just compensation payable to the appellant. A member of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service (Senior Branch) is the Tribunal. He ought to have answered all issues specially when the order is appealable both on fact and law. This Court would have the advantage of the determination of just compensation while hearing the appeal. Marely because he held that the claim is barred by limitation, he ought not to have omitted to determine the just compensation. 8. The appellant has claimed to have sustained pecuniary loss of Rs. 16,000/- on account of the accident. After recovery he joined the service. Besides the privileges of reimbursement, received towards medical expenses incurred by him, he has spent this amount. This statement has gone unchallenged. However, he being guilty of contributory negligence is not entitled to the entire amount. In the facts and circumstances, he is entitled to Rs. 1,000/- out of Rs. 1600/- spent by him. 9. On account of the injuries sustained, the appellant became an indoor patient for a long period. The evidence of the expert PW 1 is that by the time the appellant was discharged he had partial disability in his left leg on account of the fracture which was permanent in nature. There was also partial deformity. This would be a permanent mental pain to the appellant and he would not be able to have the free company of others on account of the deficiency. The compensation for physical and mental pain taking into consideration the contributory negligence, in the absence of clear evidence can reasonably be determined at Rs. 5000/- (Rupees five thousand only). 10. The claim has been rejected on the ground of delay in preferring the same. The accident occurred on 4-2-1977. u/s 110-A(3) of the Act the application is required to be filed within six months thereof. 5000/- (Rupees five thousand only). 10. The claim has been rejected on the ground of delay in preferring the same. The accident occurred on 4-2-1977. u/s 110-A(3) of the Act the application is required to be filed within six months thereof. In place of filing the application on or before 4-8-1977, it has been filed on 11-11-1977 i.e. with a delay of three months seven days. Under proviso to Section 110-A(3) of the Act, the Tribunal has been vested with power to entertain the application after the period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. 11. Appellant filed an application along with the claim petition explaining the delay. In the said application, he stated that he was not able to walk on account of pain after being discharged from the hospital on 16-4-1977. After being discharged from the hospital he was under treatment of the Police Doctor at Rourkela who advised him not to take strenuous journey. Therefore, he came to Sundargarh on 9-11-1977 and the application was filed on 11-11-1977, the previous day being a Sunday. On 16-1-1978, the application was admitted subject to question of limitation if opposed after appearance of the opposite parties. In his examination-in-chief, however, the appellant stated that after being discharged from hospital he took leave and remained under treatment of Dr. Samantray, a Private Physician. Some time after he went to his home town at Keonjhar where he was under treatment of a Government Doctor. He joined on 20-7-1977. This statement in examination in chief has not been challenged in cross-examination. The Tribunal has disbelieved the explanation of the appellant since he did not state in his deposition that he was treated by the Police doctor till 7-11-1977. On reading the application for condonation of delay and the evidence of the applicant in Court it is clear that since the accident on 4-2-1977, he was an indoor patient in the hospital to be discharged on 16-4-1977. He joined and took leave. During period of his leave, he was under treatment of Dr. Samantray and during that period when he went to his home town at Keonjhar he remained under treatment of the Government doctor. After return from leave, he joined and was under treatment of the Police-doctor at Rourkela till 7-11-1977. There it no inconsistency in such statement. During period of his leave, he was under treatment of Dr. Samantray and during that period when he went to his home town at Keonjhar he remained under treatment of the Government doctor. After return from leave, he joined and was under treatment of the Police-doctor at Rourkela till 7-11-1977. There it no inconsistency in such statement. When the statements are not inconsistent and are not challenged in cross-objection, the Tribunal ought to have been liberal in considering the question of delay. 12. In a recent decision reported in Chief Engineer Electricity-Cum-Electrical Project and Another Vs. Bhanumati Mishra and Others. I have held after following the earlier decisions of this Court that the question of delay in an application u/s 110-A ought not to be considered with the same strictness as in an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and ought to be considered liberally. Thus considered, when the statements of the appellant were not challenged in cross-objection, I am of the view that sufficient cause has been shown for entertainment of the application beyond the period of limitation. 13. The insurer has not raised any objection to its liability except that which has been raised, by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The Policy has not been filed. Accordingly, the insurer is made liable to pay the compensation. 14. In conclusion- (i) Respondent No. 1 drove the scooter negligently causing the accident whereby the appellant was injured. (ii) the appellant is also guilty of contributory negligence. (iii) Out of the pecuniary loss of Rs. 1600/- sustained by the appellant, he is entitled to Rs. 1000/-, the balance Rs. 600/- being deducted on account of his contributory negligence. (iv) The appellant is entitled to Rs. 5000/- towards non-pecuniary loss on account of physical and mental pain on account of injury and permanent partial disability taking into consideration his contributory negligence. (v) Insurer is liable to pay the amount of compensation. 15. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The insurer is directed to pay the compensation of Rs. 6,000/- to the appellant or deposit the same with the Tribunal for payment to the appellant within four months from today, failing which, the amount shall carry simple interest at 6% from the date of application till realisation or payment. No costs.