JUDGMENT K. Jagannatha Shetty, Actg. C.J.—These references are under section 256(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal has referred the following question of law for the opinion of this court : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in refusing permission to the Revenue to raise the ground of applicability of section 147(b) ?" 2. The assessee is a partnership firm. For the assessment year 1973-74 corresponding to the previous year ending November 5, 1972, the assessee filed a return on August 28, 1973, and the assessment was completed on December 7, 1973. For the assessment year 1974-75 corresponding to the previous year ending October 25, 1973, the return was filed on September 28, 1974, and the assessment was completed on March 15, 1975. The Income Tax Officer, while completing the assessment of another firm by name M/s. Sukhani & Co., found that the partners of the assessee (firm) were either the same or very closely related to the partners of M/s. Sukhani & Co., and that one of the partners of the assessee, viz., Srimal Rikabchand, was the manager of M/s. Sukhani & Co. Since the transaction between these two firms were so interconnected, the Income Tax Officer came to the conclusion that the income of M/s. Sukhani & Co. was that of the assessee only and that, therefore, it should be assessed in the hands of the assessee only. Accordingly, he reopened the assessments under section 147(a) and issued a notice under section 148 to the assessee. The assessee appealed and pointed out that there being no omission to disclose any material facts, the reassessments were not valid under section 147(a). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted that contention and held that the reassessments were invalid under section 147(a). 3. The Revenue appealed to the Tribunal. In the memorandum of appeal, there was no contention raised that the reassessments could be sustained also under section 147(b). But, in the course of the arguments, the Revenue wanted to raise that contention and permission was sought as required under rule 11 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963. The Tribunal, for the reasons stated, refused to accede to the request of the Revenue to raise that additional ground. But, in the course of the arguments, the Revenue wanted to raise that contention and permission was sought as required under rule 11 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963. The Tribunal, for the reasons stated, refused to accede to the request of the Revenue to raise that additional ground. The Tribunal found that the Income Tax Officer himself had categorically stated before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the assessments were reopened only under section 147(a) and it was only on that basis the arguments proceeded throughout and the matter was decided by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal, however, found that the reassessments could not be sustained under section 147(a). 4. The short question for our consideration is, whether the tribunal was justified in refusing permission to the Revenue to raise the additional ground as to the applicability of section 147(b). 5. We are not concerned here with regard to the applicability of section 147(b) of the Income Tax Act. We are concerned only with the discretion exercised by the Tribunal in refusing permission to the Revenue to raise an additional ground to sustain the reassessments under section 147(B). 6. In Manji Dana Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh Bhandara and Nagpur, (1966) 60 ITR 582 SC, the Supreme Court has observed that the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal in rule 12 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946, which is analogous to rule 11 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, to allow or not to allow a question not set forth in the memorandum of appeal to be raised would not generally be a question of law. 7. In the instance case, the Tribunal, in our opinion, has given cogent reason why it should refuse permission to raise an additional ground not set forth in the memorandum of appeal. It will be seen from the records that a specific question was put by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the Income Tax Officer while disposing of the appeal and the Income Tax Officer firmly stated that he reopened the assessments only under section 147(a). The arguments of the Revenue also proceeded on that basis. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in refusing permission to the Revenue to raise the additional ground not set forth in the memorandum of appeal. The arguments of the Revenue also proceeded on that basis. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in refusing permission to the Revenue to raise the additional ground not set forth in the memorandum of appeal. We do not think that the discretion exercised by the Tribunal in refusing permission to the Revenue is arbitrary or unjustified. 8. In the circumstances, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue.