R. A. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS matter came before the Full Bench on reference from the Division Bench as an important question regarding interpretation of Rule 4 (10) of the Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules 1959 arises as to whether the word shall is mandatory in the context of the provisions of Rule 4 (10) and more particularly its later part or whether the word shall can be construed as may so as to enable the prison authorities to consider the request for furlough of prisoner who has surrendered late after release on furlough or parole. Rule 4 (10) makes the following reading: Rule 4: when prisoners shall not be granted furlough: The following categories of prisoners shall not be considered for release on furlough: (1) xx xx xx xx (10) Prisoners who have at any time escaped or attempted to escape from lawful custody or have defaulted in any way in surrendering themselves at the appropriate time after release on parole or furlough. ( 2 ) THE contention of the petitioner is that although he had surrendered late by 25 days after he was released on parole he is not totally ineligible for being released on furlough and the authorities have the power and duty to consider his application for furlough on merits and thereafter to grant or refuse furlough on merits and in the present case the authorities have refused to consider his request for furlough without going into the merits only at the threshold on the ground that the petitioner-prisoner is not at all eligible to be considered for being released on furlough and the authorities have mechanically considered the provisions of Rule 4 (10) for releasing the petitioner on furlough. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the respondent authorities it is submitted that plain and simple reading of Rule 4 (10) is clear and unambiguous and not permitting any discretion to the authorities; namely that the category of defaulters shall not be considered for being released on furlough. The respondents have also relied upon the Division Bench judgment in the case of Juvansingh L. Jadeja v. State of Gujarat 14 (1973) GLR 104. The respondents have also relied upon the Division Bench judgment in the case of Juvansingh L. Jadeja v. State of Gujarat 14 (1973) GLR 104. In that case while considering the validity of Rule 4 (2) the scheme of Rule 4 (10) was also referred to and the validity of Rule 4 was upheld even while holding the provision to be mandatory in the context of Rule 4 (2 ). Relying on this judgment the respondents authorities have submitted that Rule 4 (10) is also mandatory and can not be construed as directory. ( 4 ) ANOTHER decision relied upon by the respondents-authorities is also a Division Bench judgment in Nanubhai Bhanjibhai v. State of Gujarat in Special Criminal Application No. 496 and 597 of 1981 decided on 5/11/1985 In that case the question was of carrying forward furlough which was not granted for no fault on the part of the prisoner. Statutory note (3) to Rule 3 provided that if at any time a prisoner who could have been granted furlough is either not granted or is refused the same the period for which he could have been granted the furlough shall not be carried forward but shall lapse. By construing this provision reasonably and reading it down to make it reasonable the Division Bench held that:the words on account of any fault or act or misconduct on his part should be read into note 3 after the words is either not granted or is refused the same in order that the note does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness violating Art. 14. The Division Bench further observed that:in our opinion plain reading of Rule 4 makes it clear that the prisoners enumerated in clauses (1) to (3) and (7) to (10) are not eligible to be released on furlough. So far as the prisoners enumerated in clauses (4) 10 (6) of Rule 4 are concerned the authority concerned has power to grant or refuse to release prisoners on furlough. In other words while clauses (1) to (3) and (7) to (10) of Rule 4 deal with eligibility criteria clauses (4) to (6) deal with power of the authority concerned to refuse release of a prisoner on furlough. Prisoners falling within the categories namely clauses (1) to (3) and (7) to (10) do not have right to claim release on furlough. Prisoners falling within the categories namely clauses (1) to (3) and (7) to (10) do not have right to claim release on furlough. ( 5 ) RELYING upon the aforesaid two judgments of the Division Bench it is contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the provisions of Rule 4 (10) are mandatory and imperative and the defaulting prisoners are ineligible for furlough and the authorities were fully and legally justified in refusing to consider the prisoner for release on furlough. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has been convicted for an offence of murder punishable under sec. 302 IPC and he has been sentenced to life imprisonment by the judgment and order of the Sessions Court Junagadh dated 21/03/1978. It appears that the prisoner is in jail since the date of the incident namely 19-6-1977 He his been released on parole from time to time con different occasions. He was granted parole leave upto 12-9-1983 and it appears that during that period on 22 the prisoners father expired. He applied for extension of parole on 17-9-1983. However that extension was refused and the petitioner had surrendered late by 25 days. For this late surrender the petitioner was punished. The petitioner understood the punishment to be combination of three punishments:1 Refusal of extension of parole of 25 days; 2 Cut in remission by 25 days; 3 Refusal of furlough. ( 7 ) AS far as the refusal to extend parole leave is concerned it cannot be said to be a punishment at all. In the affidavit-in-reply it has been clarified that the petitioner was not given three punishments but only one punishment of cut in remission by 25 days was given. As regards furlough the respondents have stated in the affidavit-in-reply that non-release on furlough is not a punishment but is an automatic consequence of operation of Rule 4 (10) and the prisoner is not entitled to furlough because he has made the breach of parole conditions and that this cannot be said to be a punishment awarded by the jail authorities. ( 8 ) IN view of the rival contentions and the observations in the aforesaid two judgments of the Division Benches this matter is referred to Full Bench so that the question if necessary can be reconsidered. ( 8 ) IN view of the rival contentions and the observations in the aforesaid two judgments of the Division Benches this matter is referred to Full Bench so that the question if necessary can be reconsidered. ( 9 ) INTERPRETATION of statutory provisions containing in the word shall has come up before the Courts on earlier occasions and the Courts had to decide when such provisions would be mandatory or directory and when the word shall can be construed as may. ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari and Anr. v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta 1985 (3) SCC 53 dealt with sec. 11 of Bihar Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1947 which provided that the Court:may make an order for deposit of rent at such rate as may be determined month by month and the arrears of rent if any and on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within 15 days of the date of the order or the rent at such rate for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month the Court shall order the defence against rejectment to he struck out. On tenant failing to deposit accordingly the question arose whether the Court shall order or Court may order striking out the defence against ejectment. The High Court had interpreted the word shall as mandatory observing that once a default is found the Court is powerless and statutory consequences are bound to follow. In para 7 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed as follows:ordinarily the use of the word shall prima facie indicates that the provision is imperative in character however by a catena of decisions it is well-established that the Court while considering whether the mere use of the word shall would make the provision imperative it would ascertain the intendment of the legislature and the consequences flowing from its own construction of the word shall. If the use of the. word shall makes the provision imperative the inevitable consequence that flows from it is that the Court would be powerless to grant any relief even where the justice of the ease so demands. If the use of the. word shall makes the provision imperative the inevitable consequence that flows from it is that the Court would be powerless to grant any relief even where the justice of the ease so demands. If the word shall is treated as mandatory the net effect would be that even where the default in complying with the direction given by the Court is technical fortuitous unintended or on account of circumstances beyond the control of the defaulter yet the Court would not be able to grant any relief or assistances to such; person. Once a default is found to be of a very technical nature in complying with the earlier order the Court must have power to relieve against a drastic consequence all the more so if it is satisfied that there was a formal or technical default in complying with its order. To illustrate if the tenant while be was on the way to the Court on the fifteenth day to deposit the rent for the just preceding month as directed by an order under sec. 11-A met with an accident on the road and could not reach the Court before the court hours were over should he be penalised by his defence being struck off. Even if the Court is satisfied that he was on the way to the Court to make the necessary deposit that be had the requisite amount with him and that he started in time to reach the Court within the prescribed Court hours and yet by circumstances beyond his control be met with an accident would the court be powerless to grant him relief? This illustration would suffice to disclose the intendment of the legislature that it never used the word shall to make it so imperative as to render the Court powerless. ( 11 ) IN that case having regard to the legislative intendment and purpose and the beneficent nature of the statute to protect the harassed tenant the word shall was held to be directory and not mandatory and the Supreme Court said that it shall be read as may and such a construction would advance the purpose for which the Act was enacted; namely the protection of tenants. The Supreme Court also observed that it will also not render the Court powerless in the face of harsh facts where striking off the defence would be nothing short of miscarriage of justice. In para 9 of the judgment the Supreme Court has even held that where both the words shall and may are used in the same provision the power of the Court still to ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully examining the scope of the statute to find out whether the provision is directory or mandatory remains unimpaired. ( 12 ) IN view of this guiding and binding principle of interpretation let us have a look at the purposes of the present legislation and furlough system. ( 13 ) THE Parole and Furlough Rules are part of the penal and prison reform with a view to humanise the prison system. These rules enable the prisoner to obtain his release and to return to the outside world for a short prescribed period. The objects of such a release of prisoner can be read from para 101 of the report submitted by the All India Jail Manual Committee as also the objects mentioned in the Model Prison Manual. These objects are: (I) to enable the inmate to maintain continuity with his family life and deal with family matters. (ii) to save the inmate from the evil effects of continuous prison life. (iii) to enable the inmate to maintain constructive hope and active interests in life. ( 14 ) IN the Statement of Objects and Reasons for Bombay (Prisons Amendment) Act No. 27 of 1953 the Jail Reforms Committee had recommended and the Govt. accepted the recommendation that; There should be the system of release of prisoners on furlough under which well behaved prisoners of certain categories should as a matter of right have a spell of freedom occasionally after they undergo a specified period of imprisonment so that they may maintain contact with their near relatives arid friends and may not feel uprooted from society. Government accepted these recommendations and also decided that the furlough period should count towards the prisoners sentence. xxx xxx xxx the experience has shown that the system has worked satisfactorily. The Prisons Act 1894 does not specifically provide for the grant of furlough and the remission of sentence consequent upon it. Government accepted these recommendations and also decided that the furlough period should count towards the prisoners sentence. xxx xxx xxx the experience has shown that the system has worked satisfactorily. The Prisons Act 1894 does not specifically provide for the grant of furlough and the remission of sentence consequent upon it. In order to place the system on a permanent footing and to enable the Government to delegate its powers to the Inspector General of Prisons it is necessary that the Prisons Act 1894 should be amended in its application to the State of Bombay. ( 15 ) THUS the Legislature has put the furlough system in the Act and it is made a matter of right. ( 16 ) IN furtherance of these objects the Parole and Furlough Rules are framed in exercise of powers under secs. 59 (5) and 28 of the Prisons Act 1894 Section 3 defines various terms in the Act and Clauses (5a) and (5b) of sec. 3 define furlough system and parole system. Clause (5a) added by Bombay Act XXVII of 1953 reads as under: (5a): furlough system means the system of releasing prisoners in jail on furlough in accordance with the rules for the time being in force; Section 59 (5) reads as follows: see. 59: power to make rules: The State Government may make rules consistent with this Act- xxx xxx xxx (5) for the award of marks the suspension or remission and consequent shortening of sentences and the grant of release on parole or furlough and determining the conditions on which and the authority by which the. sentences may be suspended or remitted and the prisoners may be released en parole or furlough. Thus the rules have to be consistent with the Act as sec. 59 expressly provides. One more relevant provision is sec. 48a (also added by Act 27 of 1958) which reads as follows:sec 48a: punishment for breach of conditions of suspension or remission of sentence or of grant of furlough :- If any prisoners fails without sufficient cause to observe any of the conditions on which his sentence was suspended or remitted or furlough or release on parole was granted to him he shall be deemed to have committed a prison offence and the Supdt. may after obtaining his explanation punish such offence by: (1) a formal warning as provided in clause (1) of sec. may after obtaining his explanation punish such offence by: (1) a formal warning as provided in clause (1) of sec. 46; (2) reduction in grade if such prisoner has been appointed an officer of prison; (3) loss of privileges admissible under the remission or furlough or parole system; or (4) loss of such other privileges as the State Government may by general or special order direct. ( 17 ) RULE 1287 of the Bombay Jail Manual is also relevant for our present purpose. It reads as under:in each case of late surrender or breach of any of the conditions of furlough or parole the necessary punishment or punishments should be awarded by the Supdt. of Prison with due regard to the circumstances of each case. All the punishments mentioned below or in see. 48-A of the Prisons Act 1894 need not necessarily be awarded in each case but it is left to the discretion of the Supdt. to decide which particular punishment or punishments should be awarded. If in certain cases the Supdt. is satisfied that the overstayal was for good or sufficient reasons he may excuse the prisoner. However before awarding any punishment the Supdt. should invariable obtain a prisoners explanation in each case of overstayal of period or breach of any conditions of furlough or parole. (1) A maximum cut of 5 days remission for each day of overstay; Provided that where the prisoner has not sufficient remission to his credit he shall cease to earn remission in future for such period as the Supdt. may direct; (2) Stoppage of canteen concession for a period of not less than one month and not more than three months (3) Withholding concession of either interviews or letters or both for a maximum period of three months. (4) In cases of furlough the furlough period not to be counted towards sentence. ( 18 ) FROM the aforesaid provisions in the Prisons Act the definition and the creation of furlough system there is no doubt that the prisoners have a privilege admissible to them under the furlough system as mentioned in Rule 2 (17) of the Furlough Rules. Even if furlough is not an absolute right of the prisoner nonetheless it is a right and privilege admissible and regulated under the rules and it can be granted; refused or withdrawn as per rules. Even if furlough is not an absolute right of the prisoner nonetheless it is a right and privilege admissible and regulated under the rules and it can be granted; refused or withdrawn as per rules. ( 19 ) SECTION 48a is the express provision for a case where a prisoner fails without sufficient cause to observe any of the conditions on which furlough or parole was granted to him and he is deemed to have committed a prison offence and the Supdt. may after obtaining his explanation punish for such offence by one or more punishments combination of which is permissible and contemplated Such punishments are:1 a formal warning; 2 reduction in grade; 3 loss of privilege admissible under remission system; 4 loss of privilege admissible under furlough system; 5 loss of privilege admissible under parole system; 6 loss of such other privileges as the State Government may by general or special order direct. ( 20 ) RULE 1287 of the Bombay Jail Manual clearly gives guidelines to the punishing authority and it provides that in case of late surrender necessary punishment or punishments should be awarded with due regard to the circumstances of each case and the all punishments need not necessarily be awarded in each case but it is left to the discretion of the authorities to decide. It also states that in a given case if Supdt. is satisfied that the overstayal was for good or sufficient reasons he may excuse the prisoner. Thus the prisoner may not be awarded any punishment whatsoever. In other cases of insufficient reasons refusal of punishment or punishments may be awarded having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the gravity of the prison offence. One of the punishments is a maximum out of 5 days remission for each day of overstay and other permissible punishment is the forfeiture of privilege furlough or to direct that the furlough period shall not be counted towards sentence. . ( 21 ) IN every case of late surrender the authority has to take a concious decision under sec. 48a after duly applying its mind as to what particular punishment or punishments should be awarded. . ( 21 ) IN every case of late surrender the authority has to take a concious decision under sec. 48a after duly applying its mind as to what particular punishment or punishments should be awarded. It is open to the authority to impose a punishment of forfeiture or furlough or part thereof just as it is open to the authority to impose a cut of remission for a particular number of days and the authority may or may not combine the punishments but whatever punishment the authority ultimately imposes is to he suffered. ( 22 ) IF Rule 4 (10) is construed as mandatory making prisoners automatically disqualified and ineligible for furlough in all cases of late surrender (as is the contention of the State) that provision will be so clearly inconsistent with sec. 48a that both cannot stand together. If there is such ineligibility for furlough in cases of late surrender there would be no point in making a provision in sec. 48a for providing for punishment of loss of privilege of furlough in cases of late surrender. The very fact that the provision under the Act gives discretion to the authorities to forfeit or not to forfeit furlough clearly negatives the contention of the state that Rule 4 (10) provides for mandatory and automatic ineligibility for furlough on account of any late surrender. Therefore the provision in the Rule has to be read down as directory and discretionary so as to make it harmonious and consistent with the statutory provision in the Act. Under sec. 48a the punishing authority has the discretion to impose punishments mentioned in that section for the offences of late surrender The authority may decide to impose any one or more punishments mentioned in sec 48a which includes the punishment of loss of forfeiture or privilege of furlough. Having regard to the facts circumstances and gravity of late surrender the authority may decide to impose punishment other than forfeiture of furlough or impose punishment of part forfeiture of furlough. In such cases furlough will remain due to the prisoner. But according to the contention of the state even that due furlough would stand automatically forfeited by virtue of operation of Rule 4 (10) Such construction canvassed by the state would clearly cut across the substantive provision of sec. 48a and would make Rule 4 (10) latter part repugnant to sec. But according to the contention of the state even that due furlough would stand automatically forfeited by virtue of operation of Rule 4 (10) Such construction canvassed by the state would clearly cut across the substantive provision of sec. 48a and would make Rule 4 (10) latter part repugnant to sec. 48 Therefore the Court has to adopt such construction as is reasonable harmonious and consistent with the provisions in the Act and the provisions in the Rule are required to be read consistently with the provisions in the Act and reading the two provisions together and harmoniously there is no scope for holding that Rule 4 (10) is mandatory. Rule 4 (10) is directory and discretionary and that provision and the word shall in this context is required to be read as may. This is in respect of the latter part of Rule 4 (10) and not in respect of the first part of Rule 4 (10) which has reference to cases having element of escape. ( 23 ) RULE 1316 of the Bombay Jail Manual provides that no prisoner shall be punished twice for the same offence. Therefore once a prisoner is punished for his prison offence of late surrender by the Superintendent the matter of prison offence will rest there and any other punishment thereafter for the same Act or misconduct is barred. In the present case? the authorities called for the explanation for late surrender by 25 days and imposed punishment of cut in remission of 25 days and as stated in the affidavit-in-reply for late surrender by 25 days only the minimum punishment of the cut in remission by 25 days was imposed and that was the only punishment imposed. It is also clearly stated in the affidavit-in-reply that forfeiture of furlough was not a punishment imposed by the jail authorities. It is submitted that forfeiture of furlough is an automatic consequence of operation of Rule 4 (10 ). ( 24 ) A similar question had arisen in the case of Atulji Magaji v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 1984 GLH 139 . In that case Rule 4 (6) was invoked and the authorities had denied furlough to the concerned prisoner on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct. The unsatisfactory conduct was said to he based on two prison offences and two punishmens in August and Sept. 1984 GLH 139 . In that case Rule 4 (6) was invoked and the authorities had denied furlough to the concerned prisoner on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct. The unsatisfactory conduct was said to he based on two prison offences and two punishmens in August and Sept. 1985 In the first incident it was alleged that the prisoner took Khichadi instead of loaves as the prisoner was not feeling well. In the other incident the prisoner had purchased lemons from the Jail Canteen itself and for each of these two offences remission of 5 days was cut. Because of these two jail punishments of cut in remission of 10 days (5 + 5) the prisoner was said to be disentitled to any furlough and was considered ineligible by the jail authorities. The Division Bench held that such trival jail offences and minor lapses could not be said to be such as would enable the Superintendent of Prisons to form an opinion that the conduct of the prisoner was not satisfactory enough to deprive him of his privilege of furlough. Had that been so the furlough would have been forfeited by imposing that punishment and it was therefore held that even though the prisoner had committed minor pr son offences he did not forfeit the privilege of furlough and his request for furlough was required to be considered on merits by the prison authorities. This view clearly supports the view canvassed by the petitioner in the present petition. ( 25 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents has strongly relied upon the observations of the Division Bench in the case of Juvansingh (supra ). In that case the challenge was to the validity of Rule 4 (2) which disentitled prisoners convicted of offences under secs. 392 to 402 (both inclusive) of the I P. C. (robbery dacoity etc.) of furlough leave. The prisoners of that category are totally considered ineligible for furlough and the Rule 4 (2) was challenged as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. It was contended that if prisoners convicted for more serious offences such as murder are not excluded from taking furlough leave why the petitioner prisoner covered by Rule 4 (2) should be denied the right to claim furlough leave. It was contended that if prisoners convicted for more serious offences such as murder are not excluded from taking furlough leave why the petitioner prisoner covered by Rule 4 (2) should be denied the right to claim furlough leave. The Division Bench held as under:but in introducing penal reforms the State which runs the administration on behalf of the society and for the benefit of the society at large cannot be unmindful of safeguarding the legitimate rights of the citizens in regard to their security in the matters of life and liberty. It is for this reason that in introducing such reforms the authorities cannot be oblivious of the obligation to the society to render it immune from those who are prone to criminal tendencies and have prosed their susceptibility to indulge in criminal activities by being found guilty (by a Court) of having perpetrated a criminal act. One of the discernible purposes of imposing the penalty of imprisonment is to render the society immune from the criminal for a specified period. It is therefore understandable that while meting out humane treatment to the convicts care is taken to ensure that kindness to the convicts does not result in cruelty to the society. Naturally. enough the authorities would be anxious to ensure that the convict who is released on furlough does not seize the opportunity to commit another crime when he is at large for the time being under the furlough leave granted to him by way of a measure of penal reform. This appears to be the object underlying Rule 4 which enjoins that prisoners of the specified categories shall not be enlarged on furlough. ( 26 ) THE Division Bench proceeded to consider different clauses of Rule 4 and tried to find a common rationale in all the clauses. Regarding habitual prisoners (Rule 4 (1)) it was held that if committing the offence has become a habit a prisoner is less likely to respond to the corrective treatment aimed at his reform while he is undergoing the sentence and so cannot safely be set at large before the expiration of his term of imprisonment and that prohibition offenders (Rule 4 (3)) also become slaves of the habit or way of life and find it difficult to free themselves from the bondage of habit and a break from the prison life will expose them to the same temptation. Rule 4 (5) was said to disqualify persons having tendency towards crime and it was held that it would not be advisable to expose the society to the risk of their being released. Same purpose is said to be pervading in clause (6) and clause (10 ). It is in the light of this purposeful approach the validity of Rule 4 was examined and it was held that the offenders of robbery and decoity are risky to the society. Robbery has an element of violence alongwith theft or extortion. If 5 or more persons commit robbery it becomes dacoity and when so many persons enter upon a life of crime and form a group it is likely to become an organised gang and there is great danger in letting them loose. It becomes a habit or way of life and there is no guarantee that such prisoner will not indulge into similar activity again if he is set at large Therefore the Division Bench observed that:none of the twin objects of punishments of imprisonment would then be served. Neither would he be reformed nor would the society remain immunized from his criminal activity for the specified period. Moreover the offences of this nature are not directed against particular individual but any individual or against the society at largo and the entire society is exposed to danger. Therefore on the consideration that release of such person would expose the society to the danger emanating from them that category of prisoners excluded from being considered eligible for parole and that has been upheld by the Division Bench. ( 27 ) THE rationale and principle behind Rule 4 is clear. The furlough system has been introduced as a measure of penal reform and to harmonise the penal system. The objects as reported by the Jail Reforms Committee are already quoted above. Would such object be achieved by denying furlough to all such prisoners who may have defaulted by surrendering late after release on parole or furlough? Would it be rational and reasonable to hold them ineligible for being released on furlough because they have defaulted by surrendering late in past ? Are all such prisoners similarly situated and form one class irrespective of the facts and circumstances of lateness in surrendering ? Is the authority powerless to do justice even when the circumstances so require. Would it be rational and reasonable to hold them ineligible for being released on furlough because they have defaulted by surrendering late in past ? Are all such prisoners similarly situated and form one class irrespective of the facts and circumstances of lateness in surrendering ? Is the authority powerless to do justice even when the circumstances so require. As seen earlier similar question was before the Supreme Court in the case of Ganesh Prasad (supra) as to when a tenant who has failed to deposit the rent as directed whether the Court shall order the defence to be struck off having regard to the use of word shall the High Court had answered the question in the affirmative and held that the tenant will have to bear the consequences once the default is found the Courts are powerless and statutory consequences are hound to follow. But the Supreme Court reversed that finding and held that having regard to the legislative intent and object the word shall must mean may and the authority has the discretion to strike off or not to strike off the defence having regard to the facts and circumstances. ( 28 ) THE object of Parole and Furlough Rules is to humanise penal system and to enable the prisoner to maintain continuity with his family life and to deal with the family matters and to save him from evil effects of continuous jail life and to enable him to gain confidence and to maintain constructive hopes and active interest in life. Since these are the clear objects of furlough system could it have been intended that the benefit and privilege of furlough should be denied to a prisoner merely on the ground of lateness in surrendering after release on parole or furlough irrespective of anything and any circumstances justifying or mitigating the default or in any way not showing any tendency to escape or any risk to the society in any manner whatsoever ? It is not possible to hold that irrespective of all these circumstances such a prisoner surrendering late is totally disqualified from the consideration for release on furlough. It is not possible to hold that irrespective of all these circumstances such a prisoner surrendering late is totally disqualified from the consideration for release on furlough. The cases of prisoners who have surrendered late have to be examined on merits and the prison authority will have the power duty and discretion to consider and to grant or refuse furlough and therefore the word shall in the context of Rule 4 (10) latter part will have to be read as may. 28 The mandatory interpretation of Rule 4 (10) sought by the respondents would be inconsistent with the Act and its objects. The furlough system is created by the Act with avowed object of reforming the prisoner and humanising penal system. ( 29 ) AS far as the first part of Rule 4 (10) is concerned in respect of prisoners who have escaped or attempted to escape such prisoners a class by themselves cannot be trusted for being released on furlough and therefore in such cases the prison authority would be justified in not considering their request for furlough. However in cases of late surrender where there is no element of escape but merely there is a delay in surrendering the question will have to be examined on the facts and circumstances aid merits of each case. A given case of a prisoner defaulting in timely surrender who is wanted by the jail authorities and who is not available at the place where ordinarily he should be and who is apprehended by the police or who surrenders because of the chase by the authority may fall under the first part where he cannot be trusted to be released on furlough again. But such cases are at the other extreme. ( 30 ) OTHER cases of late surrender may be of voluntary surrenders and the lateness may not be unduly long and no. without sufficient cause or reason. In such cases sufficiency of causes related to time will certainly have to be considered by the authority. Section 48a itself provides for cases of late surrender. ( 30 ) OTHER cases of late surrender may be of voluntary surrenders and the lateness may not be unduly long and no. without sufficient cause or reason. In such cases sufficiency of causes related to time will certainly have to be considered by the authority. Section 48a itself provides for cases of late surrender. As seen earlier it provides that if any prisoner fails without sufficient cause to observe any of the conditions on which his sentence was suspended or remitted or furlough or release on parole was granted to him he shall be deemed to have committed a prison offence and the Superintendent may after obtaining his explanation punish such offence by different punishments including loss of privilege of furlough. Thus if he show sufficient cause it would Dot be an offence at all. However even if the cause is not sufficient the Superintendent will have to consider his explanation and having regard to the insufficient cause or no cause and the degree of gravity of offence in the facts and circumstances of the case decide about the quantum and nature of punishment. If he does not think it fit to impose the punishment of forfeiture of furlough and to impose higher punishment Rule 4 (10) cannot be read as a total and automatic prohibition in granting furlough to a defaulting and punished prisoner. That would be clearly and directly contrary to see. 48a of the Prisons Act 1894 Rules have to he consistent with the Act and in order to harmonise Rule 4 (10) and make it consistent with the mandate of sec. 48a the only way to read the latter part of Rule 4 (10) is to hold it to be directory and giving discretion to the authority to consider and to grant or refuse furlough in cases of prisoners who have surrendered late. Any other construction to the contrary as is canvassed by the respondent authorities would not only make Rule 4 (10) latter part unreasonable and arbitrary but would also directly against sec. 48a of the Act. Any other construction to the contrary as is canvassed by the respondent authorities would not only make Rule 4 (10) latter part unreasonable and arbitrary but would also directly against sec. 48a of the Act. It is well settled that all the provisions have to be read together and construed harmoniously and this rule can be read harmoniously with the Act so as to achieve the object of the Act and the Rules and the construction which is sought to be placed does not in any way go against any of the objects of the Act or the Rules. ( 31 ) THE respondent authority have also relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench in Special Criminal Application No. 496 of 1981 with Special Criminal Application No. 57 of 1981 (Nanubhai Bhanjibhai v. State of Gujarat) decided on 5/11/1982 In that case the Division Bench was called upon in decide the validity and interpretation of note 3 to Rule 3 of the Furlough Rules and the question of validity or interpretation of Rule 4 (10) was not directly involved. However the Division Bench has observed as follows:in our opinion plain reading of Rule 4 makes it clear that the prisoners enumerated in clauses (1) to (3) and (7) to (10) are not eligible to be released on furlough. So far 25 the prisoners enumerated in clauses (4) to (6) of Rule 4 are concerned the authority concerned has power to grant or refuse to release prisoners on furlough. In other words while clauses (1) to (3) and (7) to (10) of Rule 4 deal with eligibility crititia clauses (4) to (6) deal with power of the authority concerned to refuse lease of a prisoner on furlough. Prisoners falling within the categories namely clauses (1) to (3) and (5) to (10) do not have right to claim release on furlough. ( 32 ) THESE observations of the Division Bench were not called for in that case and were not the subject matter of controversy and they are too wide. In that case the case was concerned with clause 4 (4) only which reads as under:4 When prisoners shall not be granted furlough. ( 32 ) THESE observations of the Division Bench were not called for in that case and were not the subject matter of controversy and they are too wide. In that case the case was concerned with clause 4 (4) only which reads as under:4 When prisoners shall not be granted furlough. The following categories of prisoners shall not be considered for release on furlough xxx xxx xxx (4) Prisoners whose release is not recommended in Greater Bombay by the Commissiener of Police and elsewhere by the District Magistrate on the ground of public peace and tranquillity. ( 33 ) ALL such prisoners were denied furlough under Rule 4 (4) and the question arose whether furlough due to them could be carried forward under Rule 3 note 3 and the Division Bench held that such prisoner though entitled to furlough was denied furlough because of adverse opinion of the Commissioner of Police or the District Magistrate on the ground of public peace and tranquillity and not on account of any fault on the part of the prisoner and therefore the Division Bench read note regarding carrying forward refused furlough with the clarification that the refusal was not on account of any fault or act of misconduct on his part. Rule 4 (10) was not at all attracted in that case and the Division Bench was not called upon to interpret or decide the above question and passing observations too widely made for clauses other than 4 (4) cannot be taken to be the correct ratio of that judgment. ( 34 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the prisoners surrendering late are disqualified for furlough only under Rule 4 (10) and they are not disqualified for parole. If they can be released on parole and if there as no danger to the society emanating from then there is no reason why furlough should be denied to them. It is to be noted that furlough and parole have two different purposes Furlough is a matter of right parole is not so. Furlough is to be granted periodically under Rule 3 irrespective of any particular reason merely with a view to enable the prisoner to have family and social ties and to avoid ill-effects of continous prison life and the period of furlough is treated as remission of sentence. Furlough is to be granted periodically under Rule 3 irrespective of any particular reason merely with a view to enable the prisoner to have family and social ties and to avoid ill-effects of continous prison life and the period of furlough is treated as remission of sentence. Since furlough is to be granted for no particular reason it can be denied in the interest of the Society; whereas parole is to be granted only on a sufficient cause (Rule 19) such as cases of severe illness or death of any member of the prisoners family or of his nearest relative or for other sufficient cause. Therefore parole is not a matter of right and only when there is a sufficient and serious cause the Society and the jail administration may sometime have to take some risk to release the prisoner on parole but that would be no ground for releasing the prisoner on routine furlough irrespective of his past conduct and performance. Even parole may be denied to a prisoner even when he makes out sufficient cause for release on parole if the competent authority is satisfied on valid grounds that release of a prisoner on parole would be against the interest of the society or the prison administration. For example a prisoner who has once escaped or attempted to escape or who is likely to escape or has such means and resource may be denied parole because under Rule 19 the competent authority has discretion (may) to grant or not to grant parole even when cause is shown. Therefore comparison of release on parole and furlough is absolutely uncalled for. This contention of the petitioner deserves to be rejected. ( 35 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion it is clear that in the context of latter part of Rule 4 (10) the word shall will have to be read as may and directory. The prison authorities cannot reject as ineligible the request of due furlough of the prisoners who have surrendered late in past. The authorities have the power and duty to consider grant or refusal of such furlough due to the prisoners having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case including the fact that the prisoner had surrendered late in past. That would be one of the relevant factors to be taken into account. The authorities have the power and duty to consider grant or refusal of such furlough due to the prisoners having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case including the fact that the prisoner had surrendered late in past. That would be one of the relevant factors to be taken into account. Another relevant factor to be taken into account will be the view taken regarding the gravity of the offence while imposing punishment under sec. 48a of the Act read with Rule 1287 of the Jail Manual. ( 36 ) IN the present case since the request of the prisoner for due furlough was refused by the jail authorities only on the technical misconceived legal bar of Rule 4 (10) the refusal of furlough h is clearly illegal and is required to be quashed and set aside and the authorities are required to consider the said request for furlough/furloughs due to the prisoner in accordance with law and in the light of observations made in this judgment. ( 37 ) IN the result the petition succeeds and rule is made absolute by quashing and setting aside the refusal of furlough due to the petitioner-prisoner and by directing the respondents-authorities to consider the grant of furlough/furloughs due to the petitioner in accordance with law within one month from today rule made absolute. .