JUDGMENT : K.P. Mohapatra, J. - This civil revision is directed against the order passed by the learned Additional District judge, Berhampur, restraining the petitioners from construction of a wall and directing maintenance of status quo during the pendency of the suit for partition. 2. The subject-matter of partition is the house and homestead of three brandies represented by the two petitioners and the opposite party who are brothers. Each of them has 1/3rd share therein. During pendency of the suit for partition by metes and bounds filed by the opposite party, the petitioners made preparation for construction of a pucca wall, whereupon the opposite party filed a petition for temporary injunction before the learned Subordinate Judge, Aska, who passed an order of ad interim injunction against the petitioners. But after hearing both parties, he vacated the said order. The opposite party appealed before the learned Additional District judge, Berhampur, who accepted the appeal and directed issuance of temporary injunction and maintenance of status quo. 3. Mr. Deepak Misra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, contended that by virtue of a deed of partition dated 12-10-1960, the parties amicably partitioned the house and homestead and, as the suit for partition is not maintainable on account of the .previous partition, the impugned order was not in accordance with law and so it should be set aside. Mr. Y. S. N. Murty, appearing for the opposite party, on the other hand, urged that there was no previous partition by metes and bounds amongst the parties by specific definition of 1/3rd share each by the deed of partition dated 12-10-1960. The deed of partition was executed for a specific purpose, i. e., to raise co-operative loans, but was not meant to be acted upon as a complete partition of joint family property. Therefore, until disposal of the suit for partition and definition of shares, status quo should not be disturbed and no construction should be permitted on the suit land. Accordingly, he supported the impugned order. 4. The house and homestead shall be treated as joint family property until and unless it is proved that by the deed of partition dated 12-10-1960 there was a complete partition thereof by metes and bounds which has to be decided in the suit. Accordingly, he supported the impugned order. 4. The house and homestead shall be treated as joint family property until and unless it is proved that by the deed of partition dated 12-10-1960 there was a complete partition thereof by metes and bounds which has to be decided in the suit. So, at this stage it cannot be pre-judged that there was a complete partition and the parties are in separate possession of their respective 1/3rd share each. Accordingly there appears to be a 'prima facie case for partition. With regard to irreparable injury and balance of convenience, it Is sufficient to observe that during the pendency of a suit for partition, it is desirable that the parties should maintain status quo Unless this is done and in case a preliminary decree for partition is passed, difficulty is bound to arise for adjustments and equities during the final decree proceeding. A party who makes valuable construction by spending a huge amount naturally claims the constructed portion to his share and, thereby, the other co-sharers are put to difficulties* in the sense that either their shares are truncated or they have to remain satisfied by getting some compensation which may not be adequate.. Such a situation is best illustrated by a decision 'reported in AIR 1914 Cal. 362 Israil and Ors. v. Samset Rahman and others) in which a Division Bench consisting of Sir Asutosh Mookajee and Benchcreft, JJ, held as follows : "...Where does the balance of convenience lie; is it desirable that the status quo should be maintained or is it right that the defendants should be allowed to continue to alter the character of the land ? It is well settled that the Court will not refuse an injunction in a case of this description so as to give the defendants an undue advantage over the plaintiffs. If the defendants in the case before us were allowed to proceed to the completion of the building which has been erected by them on the land, it is indisputable that they will be placed in a position of undue advantage over the plaintiffs. In this connexion, reference may be made to the judgment of Sir George jessef in the case of Aynsfey v. Glover: (1874) 18 Eq. In this connexion, reference may be made to the judgment of Sir George jessef in the case of Aynsfey v. Glover: (1874) 18 Eq. 544 : 43 L.J C 777 : 31 L T. 219 : 33 W. R. 147 where that learned judge observed-as follows : At all events, this being an interlocutory application, let me continue my building, and I will under-take to pu!l down if the Court shall so think fit'. That is a very specious argument to address to the Court, but one must have regard to the effect of allowing such a proceeding. Supposing a defendant erects a building at great cost, when he comes to the hearing he will say to this Court, : 'Compare the injury to me, in pulting down the building, with the injury to the plaintiff in allowing the building to remain'. Ought or ought not the Court to give weight to such a representation ? I think upon this point the observations of Vice-Chancellor Kindersley, in the case of Carriers' Company v. Corbett : (1860) 2 Dr. Em. 355 : 12 L. T. 169 : 13 W. R. 1056 : 62 Ex. R. 656 are very important. The Vice-Chancelior says : 'If the defendant's new buildings had not been completed, there would have been ground for interference by injunction : but as they have been completed, the question is, whether the Court ought to or would order the pulling down of the buildings or give compensation in damages." Of course, Mr. Deepak Misra made reference to Soumendra Kumar Dutta and Another Vs. Sree Sridhar Jew and Others, in which a learned single judge made reference to A.IR. 1914 Cal. 362 (supra), but did not refer to the important observation quoted above. The facts of this case were also different, because, by virtue of a lease for a period of fifty years, defendant 9 was in exclusive possession of house and premises in Calcutta and so it was found that balance of convenience was against granting injunction. With regard to constructions on the subject-matter of dispute, a decision reported in A. I. R 1983 S. C. 752 (Ganghubai Babiya Choudhary and Ors. v. Sitaram Bhalchandra Sukhtankar and others, etc ) is also important. Desair, J. speking for the Court held : "Having given the matter our. With regard to constructions on the subject-matter of dispute, a decision reported in A. I. R 1983 S. C. 752 (Ganghubai Babiya Choudhary and Ors. v. Sitaram Bhalchandra Sukhtankar and others, etc ) is also important. Desair, J. speking for the Court held : "Having given the matter our. anxious consideration, we are satisfied that this is not a case in which interim injunction could be refused. Similarly we are of the opinion that if respondents are allowed to put up construction by the use of the F. S. I. for the whole of the land including the land involved in dispute, the situation may become irreversible by the time the dispute is decided and would preclude fair and just decision of the matter. If on the contrary injunction is granted as prayed for the respondents are not likely to be inconvenienced because they are in possession of about 9,000 Sq. metres of land on which they can put up construction." 5. In consideration of the facts of the case and the principle of law involved, I am of the view that while the suit for partition is pending, no permanent construction should be made or permitted on the suit homestead land. All the parties should maintain status quo till their shares are defined by the preliminary decree and adjustments and equities are settled in the final decree proceeding. 6. Mr. Y. S. N. Murty relied upon an unreported decision of this Court in Civil, Revision No. 3D7 of 1985, decided on 22-7-1985 in which it was held that the High Court shall not interfere with an order in revision in exercise of its power u/s 115 of the CPC unless it appears that the subordinate Court has decided a case in exercise of jurisdiction not vested in It by Saw or has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The High Court shall not also vary or reverse any order made, or any issue decided by a subordinate Court except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying revision would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion in failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. The impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge does not suffer from any other disqualifications referred to above. Therefore, the revisional jurisdiction of this Court u/s 115 of the CPC cannot be legally exercised. 7. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order legally passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Berhampur, cannot be disturbed in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The civil revision is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee at Rs. 75/-. Final Result : Dismissed