JUDGMENT 1. The Committee of Management of Jan Sahyogi Intermediate College, Modhi, Bharthana, district Etawah, has filed the present writ petition challenging the order dated 31-12-1984 of the District Inspector of Schools contained in Annexure 13 by which the Petitioner, Committee of Management (was) informed that as the disciplinary proceedings against Respondent No. 2 were not decided with in sixty days of his suspension, the suspension order would not remain in force, as provided by Sub-section (7) of Section 16G of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. 2. The facts necessary for appreciating the points lie in a narrow campus. Kailash Nath Gupta, Respondent No. 2, was a teacher in the Jan Sahyogi Intermediate College, Modhi, Bharthana District Etawah when he was suspended by a resolution passed by the Committee of Management of the College concerned on 26th October, 1984. Respondent No. 2, Kailash Nath Gupta, was served with the suspension order on 30th October, 1984. It was followed by the disciplinary proceedings in respect of the charges of embezzlement etc. against Respondent No. 2. For the purpose of enquiry, the Committee of Management appointed U. P. Prabandhak for holding of enquiry. The enquiry was not terminated within 60 days of the passing of the suspension order. Consequently the District Inspector of Schools passed the impugned order intimating the Committee of Management that the order of suspension had lapsed and no approval in respect of the suspension could be accorded. 3. Challenging the aforesaid order, the counsel for the Petitioner urged that as the College was closed in the last week of December, 1984, the District Inspector of Schools committed an error in holding that 60 days having expired from the date of suspension; it would not remain in force after 31st December, 1984. Sub-section (7) of Section 16G reads as under: No such order of suspension shall, unless approved in writing by the Inspector, remain in force for more than sixty days from the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, or as the case may be, from the date of such order, and the order of the Inspector shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court. 4. Before we decided the aforesaid controversy, we wish to note that on 1st June, 1985, the Committee of Management had passed another order suspending the Petitioner u/s 16G. 4. Before we decided the aforesaid controversy, we wish to note that on 1st June, 1985, the Committee of Management had passed another order suspending the Petitioner u/s 16G. It was urged on behalf of Respondent No. 2, Kailash Nath Gupta, that since the earlier order suspending him passed by the resolution dated 26th October, 1984 vanished not only on account of the expiry of sixty days which was the duration of its life but also due to the passing to subsequent order on 1st June, 1985, therefore, the writ petition has become in fructuous. The objections raised by Respondent No. 2, appears to us to be well founded. The earlier suspension order dated 26th October, 1985 whether got lapsed due to its life being limited to sixty days or not, the passing of the subsequent order on 1st June, 1985 would have the effect of wiping it of. There can be no two suspension orders in respect of a teacher or employee operating at the same time. On account of passing of the subsequent order, the first would lapse or automatically vanish. The argument of Respondent No. 2, is, therefore, well founded. 5. Sri Dixit, counsel for the Petitioner, urged that as the subsequent suspension order had been challenged by Respondent No. 2 by means of a writ petition in this Court, Respondent No. 2 was not entitled in law to take this plea. We are not concerned with the validity of the subsequent suspension order passed on 1st June, 1985. With what we are concerned solely is about the factual aspect of the passing of the suspension order and the effect on the first. The Petitioner's contention would no doubt be in other writ petition of Respondent No. 2 that subsequent suspension order is valid. That being so, we are not impressed by the aforesaid argument of the Petitioner's counsel. 6. Coming to the second argument, Petitioner's learned Counsel urged that 25th and 31st December, 1984 were holidays. In calculating the period of sixty days, the whole of the holidays or at least these two days would have to be ignored. The submission is not acceptable. Sub-section (7) of Section 16G lays down the life of the suspension order to be sixty days unless approved in writing by the District Inspector of Schools. The District Inspector of Schools had not approved this suspension order. The submission is not acceptable. Sub-section (7) of Section 16G lays down the life of the suspension order to be sixty days unless approved in writing by the District Inspector of Schools. The District Inspector of Schools had not approved this suspension order. When the Legislature has provided that a suspension order would be valid only for sixty days, it would not be possible to hold that it would remain operative even after sixty days on the grounds suggested by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. The Legislature has purposely not done so, inasmuch as within the period of sixty days, the Committee of Management is expected to conclude the termination proceedings. The Legislature thought that not to do so would amount to misuse the power to keep a teacher under suspension for period which may be unjust to him. Moreover, for concluding the suspension proceedings, whether the College was closed or not could not be material. The Committee of Management could function even during winter vacations. The plea, therefore, that on account of closure of the School, the Committee could not conclude the disciplinary proceedings against Respondent No. 2, cannot be accepted. 7. It was also argued by the Petitioner's counsel that Respondent No. 2 himself was guilty of prolonging the disciplinary proceedings by taking resort to frivolous grounds for adjournment. Be that as it may, since we are not called upon to decide that aspect of matter, we do not wish to pronounce our judgment on the same. 8. Counsel had also relied upon Section 10 of the General Clauses Act for the purposes of submitting that since 60th day expired on a day when there was a holiday, the District Inspector of Schools could not held that the suspension order became ineffective after sixty days. As a matter of fact, the period of sixty days had to be calculated with effect from the date when the suspension order was passed. If that is done, sixty days would expire on 24th December, 1984. As a matter of fact, the period of sixty days had to be calculated with effect from the date when the suspension order was passed. If that is done, sixty days would expire on 24th December, 1984. Moreover, the argument relating to the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act is not applicable to the Petitioner inasmuch as the general principle is that no party should suffer on account of the act of a Court and, therefore, if the Court or its office is closed, the party would be entitled to file or take necessary legal aspect on the next opening day. This is not the position in the instant case. Committee of Management was neither a Court nor office. Even if the word ' Office ' is given a wider meaning, it would be other than a Court. 9. In Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande AIR 1942 All. 429 a Full Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with the interpretation of Section 10. It held: Section 4, Limitation Act, and Section 10, General Clauses Act, give expression to the general principle of law enunciated by the maxim " lex non cog it ad impossibly " the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform, and " actus curiae neminem gravebit" an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. These sections do not in any way extend the period of limitation, nor do they furnish any data for computation of time, they merely embody a rule of elementary justice that if the time allowed by statute to do an act or to take a proceeding expires on a day when the Court is closed, it may be done on the next sitting of the Court. 10. The Supreme Court also found in H.H. Raja Harinder Singh Vs. S. Karnail Singh, AIR 1957 SC 271 that where a period is prescribed for the performance oi an act in a Court or office, and that period expires on a holiday, then according to the section, the act should be considered to have been done within that period, if it is done on the next day on which the Court or office is open. 11. 11. Counsel for the Petitioner referred to an unreported judgment in Ram Kumar Tripathi v. District Inspector of Schools, decided on July 26, h b5 in support of his contention that the order suspending Respondent No. 2 would not lapse on account of expiry of sixty days. There is nothing in this judgment which supports or advances his contention. This case was decided on different facts. In that case, the court had given a direction and on account of the direction given by the Court, the Division bench held that the period of sixty days was not material. This argument, therefore, also fails. 12. We have pointed out earlier that the Committee of Management could neither be considered as Court nor office. Consequently the writ petition is dismissed with costs to Respondent No. 2.