RAM PAL SINGH, J. ( 1 ) AFTER obtaining the requisite leave, the appellant, Municipal Council, Morena, has preferred this appeal against the judgment of acquittal of the respondent recorded by Shri R. S. Maurya, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Morena in Criminal Case No. 2524 of 1981 dated 20-5-1982. ( 2 ) THE short facts of the case are that in Morena town there is a shop of sweetmeat named Bihari Misthan Bhandar, which carries on the business of preparing and selling sweetmeats. On 13-8-1981 Food Inspector P. W. Narwariya (P. W. 1) visited this shop of the respondent, disclosed his identity that he was Food Inspector and inspected the licence issued to the respondent for the year 1981-82. The shop was being attended by the, respondent at that time. The Food Inspector P. D. Narwariya wanted to take the sample of 'boondi Ka Laddu' and, hence, issued a notice in form No. 9 (Ext. P1 ). This notice (Ext. P- 1) was signed by him. It is alleged that the respondent refused to accept the notice, closed his shop and left the place. Thus, he prevented P. D. Narwariya, Food Inspector, from taking the sample from his shop. This act, according to the prosecution, is punishable under S. 16 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short, hereinafter called 'the Act' ). Upon this, P. D. Narwariya, Food Inspector, prepared a memo (Ext. P-2) writing all the details therein and signed it. The respondent did not sign this memo. This document, the Panchayatnama (Ext. P-2) was witnessed by Srikrishna (P. W. 2) and Nathikhan (P. W. 3 ). The notice (Ext. Pl ) was not only signed by P. D. Narwariya but also sealed by him, which indicates that he was the Food Inspector, and he wanted to take the sample of 'boondi Ka Laddu' for being analysed by the Public Analyst, which was professed to have been prepared by means of pure 'deshi ghee'. The 'panchanama' (Ext. P-2) was signed and sealed by Narwariya, the Food Inspector, and witnessed by Nathi Khan and Srikrishna. Similarly, when the respondent refused to accept the notice (Ext. P-1), the fact of refusal was endorsed on the back, and Nathi Khan and Srikrishna signed it. ( 3 ) DURING the trial, P. W. Narwariya, Food Inspector was examined as P. W. 1 and he was cross-examined by the respondent. Similarly, when the respondent refused to accept the notice (Ext. P-1), the fact of refusal was endorsed on the back, and Nathi Khan and Srikrishna signed it. ( 3 ) DURING the trial, P. W. Narwariya, Food Inspector was examined as P. W. 1 and he was cross-examined by the respondent. Nothing was brought out in the cross-examination to show that P. D. Narwariya, Food inspector, had a motive to falsely implicate the respondent in this case. Srikrishna (P. W. 2) who is a carpenter by profession, stated at the trial that when the sample of 'boondi Ka Laddu' was demanded by the Food Inspector from the respondent, the respondent refused to give, and he also refused to accept the notice (Ext. P-1 ). He admits signing Ext. P-1 as well as the Panchanama (Ext. P-2 ). He admits in cross-examination that he lives in the Mohalla where the Food Inspector resides. Natthi Khan (P. W. 3) corroborates fully the testimony of P. D. Narwariya as well as Srikrishna. ( 4 ) THE trial Court has given a very short judgment. In para. 1 the trial Judge has narrated the facts. In para. 2 he has discussed the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and arrived at the conclusion that Srikrishna (P. W. 2) and Natthi Khan (P. W. 3) are not independent witnesses and that P. D. Narwariya (P. W. 1) did not try to secure independent witnesses and, thus, he contravened the provisions of S. 10 (7) of the Act. In para. 3 of the impugned judgment, the trial Judge has, without any basis or evidence on record or without even a plea from the accused, arrived at the conclusion :"badi SARLATA SE INSPECTOR YADI CHAHE TO GHAR BAITTE IS PRAKAR KI AROPON KI KARYAWAHI KAR NYAYALAYA MAIN ABHIYOG PATRA PESH KAR SAKTA HAI. " ( 5 ) SHRI B. R. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, has vehemently attacked this finding of the trial Court and branded this observation of the trial Court as not only assumptive but also baseless. ( 6 ) SHRI Madanlal Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, has strenuously contended that this is an appeal against acquittal, and the finding of fact howsoever erroneous it may be, cannot be disturbed in appeal by this Court. ( 7 ) I am aware of the law with regard to appeal against acquittal. ( 6 ) SHRI Madanlal Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, has strenuously contended that this is an appeal against acquittal, and the finding of fact howsoever erroneous it may be, cannot be disturbed in appeal by this Court. ( 7 ) I am aware of the law with regard to appeal against acquittal. I am also aware of the ratio in Ganesh Bhavan Patel, AIR 1979 SC 135 in which Hon'ble the Supreme Court observed :"although in an appeal from an order of acquittal the powers of the High Court to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions are as extensive as in an appeal against an order of conviction, yet, as a rule of prudence, it should "always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing the finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. " Where two reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the High Court should as a matter of judicial caution, refrain from interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the Court below. In other words, if the main grounds on which the Court below has based its order acquitting the accused, are reasonable and plausible, and cannot be entirely and effectively dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the acquittal. "i am also aware of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Babu, AIR 1983 SC 308 and Ramji Surjya, AIR 1983 SC 810 . But in the case of Narayan Singh, AIR 1985 SC 1678 the Supreme Court has observed that where the judgment of the trial Court is absolutely perverse, illegal and erroneous and based on wrong assumptions, then that is a fit and proper case for interference by the High Court in appeal. But in the case of Narayan Singh, AIR 1985 SC 1678 the Supreme Court has observed that where the judgment of the trial Court is absolutely perverse, illegal and erroneous and based on wrong assumptions, then that is a fit and proper case for interference by the High Court in appeal. ( 8 ) THE trial Court seems to be of the view that if a Food Inspector acts and performs his duties, then he needs to be corroborated by independent witnesses of the locality where he has performed such duties. This view of the trial Court itself is against the provisions of S. 10 (7) of the Act, which is being reproduced for convenience :"10 (7 ). Where the Food Inspector takes any action under clause (a) of sub-section (1), sub-section (2), sub-section (4), or subsection (6), he shall call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures. '' This provision indicates that what is necessary for the Food Inspector is to call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures. Nowhere in this provision. as the trial Court has wrongly assumed, it is mentioned that one or more persons of the locality are required to be present. The obligation which S. 10 (7) of the Act casts on the Food Inspector, is to call one or more persons to be present, where he takes the action, and if the Food Inspector has done so, then the prosecution is relieved of its obligation, as is required by the law. Assuming that public witnesses are not willing to co-operate with the Food Inspector, then what the Food Inspector is required to do? In such a contingency it can only be said that the provisions of S. 10 (7) of the Act are directory, simply for assuring that there is no fabrication on the part of the prosecution. Assuming that Srikrishna (P. W. 2) and Natthi Khan (P. W. 3) were not present, then would the trial vitiate and could not the trial Court convict the respondent merely on the testimony of the Food Inspector? Non-compliance of the provisions of sub-section (7) of S. 10 of the Act, does not per se vitiate the trial. Assuming that Srikrishna (P. W. 2) and Natthi Khan (P. W. 3) were not present, then would the trial vitiate and could not the trial Court convict the respondent merely on the testimony of the Food Inspector? Non-compliance of the provisions of sub-section (7) of S. 10 of the Act, does not per se vitiate the trial. It is not a rule of law that the evidence of the Food Inspector cannot be accepted without corroboration. Food Inspector is not an accomplice, nor he comes to the category of an attesting witness to a seizure memo. The evidence of the Food Inspector, if believed, can be relied upon for proving the fact that he has acted in a particular case in a particular way. " ( 9 ) IN the case of Prem Ballab, AIR 1977 SC 56 Hon'ble the Supreme Court observed :"there is no rule of law that conviction cannot be based on the sole testimony of a Food Inspector. It is only out of a sense of caution that the Courts insist that the testimony of a Food Inspector should be corroborated by some independent witness. This is a necessary caution which has to be borne in mind because the Food Inspector may in a sense be regarded as an interested witness but this caution is a rule of prudence and nor a rule of law : if it were otherwise, it would be possible for any guilty person to escape punishment by resorting to the device of bringing 'panch' witnesses. "similarly, in the case of Babulal Hargovindas, AIR 1971 SC 1277 , Hon'ble the Supreme Court observed : "it is not a rule of law that the evidence of the Food Inspector cannot be accepted without corroboration. He is not an accomplice nor is it similar to the one as in the case of wills where the law makes it imperative to examine an attesting witness under S. 68 of the Evidence Act to prove the execution of the will. The evidence of the Food Inspector alone if believed can be relied on for proving that the samples were taken as required by law. " In the light of the above discussion, it is apparent that the trial Court has completely abdicated its duty and wandered in an area where it was prohibited to go. The evidence of the Food Inspector alone if believed can be relied on for proving that the samples were taken as required by law. " In the light of the above discussion, it is apparent that the trial Court has completely abdicated its duty and wandered in an area where it was prohibited to go. ( 10 ) CONSEQUENTLY, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of acquittal is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial Court for rewriting a judgment afresh on the evidence already on record after hearing the arguments of the parties within three months from today. Parties are directed to remain present before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Morena, on 3-3-1986. Appeal allowed. .