Judgment :- 1. This writ petition concerns the election to the Board of Directors of a Co-operative Society, the Nadapuram Service Co-operative Bank Limited. That Society, going by the records in the case would appear to be a hotbed of litigation and not an oasis of co-operation. This litigation is perhaps yet another dying ember in the fire. 2. Elections did not take place on the expiry of the term of office of the previous Board. That resulted in an administrative committee being in office. That committee perhaps behaved just like any other administrative committee or many of such committees. If the allegations of the 4th respondent are correct, they constitute a sad commentary on the functioning of that committee. This Court is not concerned in this writ petition with the allegations about the omissions and commissions of that committee. It is sufficient to say that the petitioner, who was the Chairman of the Administrative Committee, figures in, and spear-heads, many a litigation. 3. Attempts were made earlier to stay, and thus prolong the elections in 1982. That was the main purpose of O.P. No. 7161 of 1982, where an interim order of stay of election had been initially passed. This was opposed by the section favouring election. A writ petition - O.P. No. 9434 of 1982-was filed seeking the intervention of the court to ensure an early election to the Society. A direction was issued by the court for the conduct of such an election. That such an election has been held is not in controversy. In the light of the subsequent events, the newly elected members have assumed charge as such. 4. In the meanwhile, the petitioner had approached this Court for postponding the election scheduled to be held on 28-8-1983, on the ground that the notices had not been duly served on all the members. That writ petition, OP. No. 7245 of 1983 was admitted by this Court. This Court, however, did not find it fit to keep in abeyance the elections. Though initially the results were with-held, that embargo was later lifted. Respondents 4 to 10. according to the declared results, are the successful candidates. The writ petition was disposed of along with another writ petition, O. P. No. 7244 of 1983, by judgment Ext. R4(a) dated 1-8-1984 by a Division Bench. Though initially the results were with-held, that embargo was later lifted. Respondents 4 to 10. according to the declared results, are the successful candidates. The writ petition was disposed of along with another writ petition, O. P. No. 7244 of 1983, by judgment Ext. R4(a) dated 1-8-1984 by a Division Bench. The Division Bench observed that the original petition had become infructuous, "in view of the fact that the election wag held on 28-8-1983" and the fact that "no attempt has been made to challenge the election in the appropriate forum by recourse to the appropriate proceedings provided under the statute" and that "none of the amendment petitions has been ordered by this Court." The amendment petitions alluded to were C.M.P. Nos. 22251, 22330, and 27196 of 1983 and 5269 of 1984, seeking amendment of the original petition to envelope additional prayers for declaration about the invalidity of the election and other reliefs. The Division Bench noted: "No order has been passed is any one of these petitions No notice has been issued by this Court in any one of them." The Division Bench ultimately observed: "Without prejudice to whatever right that the petitioners may have to approach the appropriate forum in terms of the relevant statute to challenge the validity of the election, these original petitions are dismissed. But the dismissal of those petitions will not prejudice the right, if any, of the petitioners to challenge the validity of the rules in appropriate proceedings." (emphasis supplied) 5. The present writ petition was filed on 3-8-1984, challenging the selfsame election and seeking a declaration that R.35(3)(a) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules is ultra vires S.104 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. 6. The first prayer was totally mischievous and frivolous. The challenge to the election had been turned down by the Division Bench, clearly pointing out that such a challenge could be had only in the "appropriate forum in terms of the relevant statute." That judgment has become final and binding on the parties. There is no safety valve in that final verdict, which shuts out an original petition in relation to the relief of invalidating the election. Yet, this contention was persisted in the present writ petition, without fully or fairly indicating the sweep and scope of the above judgment. There is no safety valve in that final verdict, which shuts out an original petition in relation to the relief of invalidating the election. Yet, this contention was persisted in the present writ petition, without fully or fairly indicating the sweep and scope of the above judgment. Much of the above pleadings in the case pertain to the challenge against the election and the alleged procedural illegalities. The petitioner was ill advised in thus totally disregarding the binding direction of the Division Bench of this Court. To that extent, his action really amounts to an abuse of process of court and as such has to be condemned strongly. I have no hesitation whatever to repel the prayer of the petitioner for declaring the election as illegal or invalid on any one of those grounds urged in the original petition. On factual matters, be had only one option: to invoke the statutory remedy for challenging the election. I dismiss the first prayer of the petitioner in the above circumstances. 7. The second prayer, as noted earlier, is for a declaration about the vires and validity of R.35(3)(a). That question is not one which would be within the permitted province of the statutory authorities to consider. The question has to be pronounced upon by this Court. 8. Even in relation to that prayer, there is a technical snag. The rule making authority, the State Government, should have been made a party to the original petition, to obtain a declaration of invalidation about the rule. That has not been done. On that short ground, the prayer of the petitioner, and with that the original petition, would be liable to be dismissed. In the absence of the proper party, namely the State Government, this Court docs not have any effective assistance to have the background in which the rule was framed, and the information relevant for the adjudication of the question, including that relating to the object of the section on the one band and the rule on the other. 9. In as much as the question has been argued, at some length (even by attempting to refer to decisions bringing out the distinction between 'may' and 'shall' in different statutory contexts, and in the course of centuries), the same shall be dealt with herein. 10. 9. In as much as the question has been argued, at some length (even by attempting to refer to decisions bringing out the distinction between 'may' and 'shall' in different statutory contexts, and in the course of centuries), the same shall be dealt with herein. 10. The argument in essence is that a rule cannot go against a section, that R.35(3)(a) has a confrontation with S.104, and that in such confrontation, the rule has necessarily to surrender to the dominance of the section. The confrontation, according to the petitioner, is in relation to the manner of service of notice. The section insists service by registered post. The rule enables the intimation of election being given even by sending such intimation "by post under certificate of posting." The contention has to be inspected deeper than the circumstance and the find. 11. The material provisions of the Act and the Rules, having a bearing on this question are S.104 on the one hand and S.29 and R.35(3)(a) on the other. They are extracted below: '104 Service of notice Every notice or order issued or made under this Act may be served on any person, by properly addressing it to the last known place of residence or business of such person preparing and posting by registered post a letter containing the notice or order and, unless the contrary is proved, such service shall be deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course.' "29. Annual general body meeting.-(1) A general body meeting of a society shall be held once in a year for the purpose of - (a) approval of the budget with reference to the programme of the activities of the society prepared by the committee for the ensuing year; (b) election, if any, in the prescribed manner of the members of the committee other than nominated members; (c) consideration of the audit report and the annual report; (d) disposal of the net profit; and (e) consideration of any other matter which may be brought forward in accordance with the byelaws. x R. 35. Procedure regarding. Conduct of Election to the Committee of Societies.- The election of the members of the committee of a Society shall be conducted in the following manner. x R. 35. Procedure regarding. Conduct of Election to the Committee of Societies.- The election of the members of the committee of a Society shall be conducted in the following manner. x (3)(a) The Returning Officer shall send intimation regarding the details of the election of the members of the Committee to all members included in the final list of the voters to vote at the election of the committee either in person and obtain their full signature in taken of having received the same or by post under certificate of posting. A copy of the intimation shall also be affixed on the notice board of the Head Office and the branches, if any, of the society. The intimation shall contain the following particulars: (i) The number of vacancies to be filled up by election; (ii) Any area or constituency that is specified in the byelaws from which members are to be elected; (iii) The date on which, the place at which and the hours between which nomination paper shall be filed by the contesting candidate or by his proposer or seconder such dates not being less than seven clear days before the dates fixed for the election; (iv) the date and hour when the nomination papers will be scrutinised; (v) the date on which, the place at which and the hours between which, polling will take place." (emphasis supplied) 12. One other section which may have relevance is S.109, relating to the power of the Government to frame rules under the Act. That takes in among other things the manner in which the elections have to be held, (vide cl. (xi) of" S.109). It is in exercise of this power that R.35(3) was enacted. The experience in the working of the rule apparently led to the amendment thereof. 13. It is a well settled canon of construction that a harmonious interpretation has to be given so as to give effect to all the provisions of the statute and the provisions of subordinate legislation. Some of these aspects had been dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court in W. A. Nos. 329,330,336/86 etc. Reference has been made therein to the decision of the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd., v. Commercial Tax Officer, Kota, AIR 1981 SC 1887 and of the Court of Appeal in Institute of Patent Agents v. Joseph Lockwood, 1894 A.C. 347. 14. 329,330,336/86 etc. Reference has been made therein to the decision of the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd., v. Commercial Tax Officer, Kota, AIR 1981 SC 1887 and of the Court of Appeal in Institute of Patent Agents v. Joseph Lockwood, 1894 A.C. 347. 14. The term 'notice', which has received judicial interpretation in diverse contexts, connotes something more concrete than a mere disclosure or intimation. (See the observation of Lord Robortson in Clough v. Samuel, (1905) A.C. 442 at 449). Parke B. stated in Burgh v. Legge, 8 Q. Ex. 258, that'notice' is a direct and definite statement of a thing, as distinguished from supplying materials from which the existence of such thing may be inferred. The case law would indicate that in the background of a serious impact on valuable rights of parties, the term'notice' has been associated with direct, specific and definite intimation effectively given. It is unnecessary to labour upon the generalities in different legal fields and to gather some guiding material, when the enactment in question itself gives internal aides to get at the moorings and directions. 15. A perusal of the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act will show that a notice as such is visualised in contexts where consequences of a serious nature are involved. A notice in writing is to be given to members when a resolution is passed to change the form or extent of liability. (See S.1 H. Notice is required in the context of amalgamation, transfer of assets, liabilities and division of Societies (S.14), appointment of new committee or administrator (S.33), enforcement of charge (S.75) and proceedings before the Tribunal by way of revision or review (S.84 and 85). Reference to notice occurs in R.18 (Expulsion of member), R.35(3)(g) (withdrawal of candidature), R.67 (Reference of disputes). R.71 (application for enforcement of charge), R.74, 76, 78, 79 and 81 (Procedure for execution of decision, award or Order etc), R.129,155,157,167 and 169 (Election of members of the Circle Co-operative Union and allied matters), S.33(b) dealing with appointment of new committee or administrator, R.9 (Procedure regarding amendment of byelaws), R.76 (Intimation of the place, day and hour of sale in execution proceedings) and R.129(e) (Election of members to circle Cooperative Union), employs the term 'intimation'. It is thus evident that in relation to the election, (which no doubt involves a serious matter as regards the exercise of franchise by a member) the legislature has contemplated a less rigorous provision, which combines fairness with practicality. It is in that context that the rule subtly speaks only of intimation and not of notice. Consistent with practicalities, the rules insist only on'intimation' being given. A certificate of posting is insisted upon to ensure that intimation in relation to election has been given. Ordinarily, and in the absence of any foul play or deceitful means, any member to whom the intimation of the election is sent by a letter under certificate of posting, would get such intimation. That would be fair enough procedure. If in relation to such an election, actual service is insisted upon, it may virtually result in an undue delay in, if not altogether a defeat of, the election process. It would therefore appear that the legislature and the rule making authority have consciously made a distinction between notice and intimation, depending upon the context in which information on an aspect has to be disclosed. In that view of the matter, there is no inconsistency between R.35(3)(a) and S.104 of the Act. 16. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sri. Ladulal Jain, AIR 1963 SC 1680, and Narasimhiah v. Singri Gouda, AIR 1966 SC 330, would support the above approach and conclusion. 17. Counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of this Court in Thankappan v. Co-operative Tribunal, 1979 KLT 528 to contend that R.35(3) is mandatory. There is no quarrel with the proposition. Whether there has been an infraction of that rule, is a question of fact. That question of tact would be better agitated before the statutory authorities. 18. Counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision in Ravindranatha Pillai v. Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, 1979 KLT. 486, in support of the contention. That case is clearly distinguishable It concerned proceedings before an arbitrator. No rule dealing with the manner of service of notice in relation to proceedings before the arbitrator had been framed. 18. Counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision in Ravindranatha Pillai v. Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, 1979 KLT. 486, in support of the contention. That case is clearly distinguishable It concerned proceedings before an arbitrator. No rule dealing with the manner of service of notice in relation to proceedings before the arbitrator had been framed. The court therefore observed that it has "necessarily to fall back upon S.104 of the Act..." In the present case, as noted earlier, a separate and distinct rule exists dealing with the specific matter of service of intimation to the members regarding the conduct of an election. 19. It is not as though this Court does not have power in given situations to invalidate an election, without necessarily relegating the party to pursue the statutory remedies. The course of action to be taken by this Court would depend upon the circumstances of each case. In the present case, both the circumstances, and the binding direction of the earlier Division Bench decision would firmly shut out the doors as against the petitioner, when he seeks the aid of extraordinary jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. 20. In the light of the discussion above, this contention also lacks substance or merit. It is accordingly rejected. 21. In the light of the above conclusion, the writ petition has to be dismissed. I do so. The petitioner has caused considerable havoc to the proper functioning of the Society by his repetitive and frivolous writ petitions. The obvious idea has been to cling on to the administrative set up. An administrative set up, could be tolerated, ordinarily, only for a limited and unavoidable duration, when the democratic process, for unavoidable reasons, could not be resorted to. No attempt at prolongation of that undemocratic arrangement can be normally countenanced by a court of law. The lack of good faith on the part of the petitioner cannot be overlooked by the court. I direct the petitioner to pay costs to the respondents, including Advocate fee of Rs. 500/-, separate costs to be paid to respondents 1,3 and 4 to 10 together.