J. D. JAIN, J. (ORAL) ( 1 ) THIS is an application under Sections 10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act (in shortthe act ) for committal proceedings against the respondents. The facts germane to the decision of his petition succinctlyare that at the relevant time Shri G. L. Seenik was the soleproprietor of Mjs. Indo Kenyan Industrial Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as the "petitioner ). The said proprietaiy concern of Shri G. L. Seenik is a perpetual lessee of a plot No. B-18, Industrial Area, Phase-1, Mayapuri, New Delhi;. Respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the company ) is a private limited company and is carrying on Metal Forgings Industry. Its plants are situated on Plots No. B-1 and B-17, Mayapuri, Industrial Area, New Delhi which are adjacent" to eachother. The aforesaid plot No. B-18 of the petitioner firm isalso contiguous to the said plots. In November, 1981 thecompany instituted a suit against the petitioner, described asthe sole proprietary concern of Shri G. L. Seenik, for permanent injunction restraining the latter from interferring withpeaceful enjoyment of premises No. B-18, which is in dispute,in any manner except by due process of law. It was averredthat in 1976 Shri G. L. Seenik permitted the Company to usethe front portion of Plot No. B-18 for storage of goods etc. asit was in need of more space on account of its expanding activities. However, Shri Seenik represented that he could notenter into any regular agreement of lease because of the prohibition by his lessor. Accordingly, the Company entered into the possession of suit premises hearing No B-18. Industrialarea. Mava Pnri. New Delhi in the year 1976 and had beenin continuous possession thereof without any let or hinderanceby anyone. However, in August, 1981, the Director Investigation. Income-tax Department conducted a raid on the premises in dispute and put his seal on the godown of the Company in the plot in question pending verification of stocks etc. The Company filed a Civil Writ Petition in this court beingno. 1894 of 1981. In the course of hearing of the writ petition, a Division Bench of this court directed the Income-taxauthorities to stack the seized stocks of the Company in acomer of the godown on the plot in question till the completionof verification vide order dated 5/11/1981. The Company filed a Civil Writ Petition in this court beingno. 1894 of 1981. In the course of hearing of the writ petition, a Division Bench of this court directed the Income-taxauthorities to stack the seized stocks of the Company in acomer of the godown on the plot in question till the completionof verification vide order dated 5/11/1981. However, on 7/11/1981 Shri Seenik assisted by some otherpersons and police officials appeared at the spot and threatenedto dispossess the Company forcibly. The Company thereforeprayed that the petitioner be restrained from dispossessing themexcept in due process of law. ( 2 ) THE parties negotiated a settlement and moved an application dated 27/11/1981 under Order 23 Rule 3read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure lor recording the compromise. It was inter-alia agreed between theparties that the Company would continued to use the frontcourt yard of the plot in question as shown red in the siteplan marked- a as before and that the Company would vacatethe plot in question on the expiry of 19/11/1983 andit gave an undertaking to the court to that effect. The connrecorded a joint statement of Shri R. K. Anand, respondentno. 4, who was then Deputy General Manager and authorisedrepresentative of the Company, Shri Surjit Singh Generalattorney of Shri G. L. Seenik and counsel for the parties whotestified to the correctness of the compromise (Ex. C/1 in thesuit) and agreed to abide by the same. However, the Company did not surrender vacant possession of the plot in question as stipulated in the compromise. Hence the petitioner hasmoved this application for committal of the respondents forcontempt of Court. Shri O. P. Bajai, respondent No. 2, Mrs. Veena Bajaj, respondent No. 3 and Shri R. K. Anand, respondent No. 4 are Managing Director, Director and Deputygeneral Manager respectively of the Company. It is averredthat as a part of a compromise in the aforesaid suit the Company had given an undertaking to the Court that it would surrender vacant possession of the plot in question on the expriryof 19/11/1983, on which date the Company wouldremove all its store etc. therefrom but the Company failed tohonour its commitment and handover vacant possession of theplot in question to the petitioner. ( 3 ) THIS petition is contested by respondents on various grounds. therefrom but the Company failed tohonour its commitment and handover vacant possession of theplot in question to the petitioner. ( 3 ) THIS petition is contested by respondents on various grounds. It is stated by them at the outset that the petitionerhas not come to this court with clean hands and has not statedthe true facts and circumstances. They point out that the petitioner has been described as a sole proprietary concern of Shrigirdhari Lal Seenik but the fact is that even before the compromise decree referred to above Shri Seenik had entered into apartnership with Mrs. Agya Kaur wife of Shri Pritam Singh andsome other persons vide partnership deed dated 10/09/1981,copy of which is annexure- a to the reply. Underthe partnership agreement Shri Seenik had only 10 per centshare in the partnership business whereas Mrs. Agya Kaui andher associates owned the remaining 90 per cent share as specified therein. However, for reasons best known to Shri Seenikthis vital fact was suppressed by him at the time of the compromise and the petitioner firm has been described as the soleproprietary concern of Shri Girdhari Lal Seenik even in thispetition. Thus both Shri Seenik and his attorney Shri Surjitsingh who had sworn affidavits to this effect have indulged inpalpable falsehood. Further the petition as constituted is notmaintainable because M/s. Indo-Keniyan Industrial Enterprisesis no longer a proprietary concern of Shri Seenik as is soughtto be given out. The respondents have also moved separateapplications being Cr. Fs. 183 and 184 of 1984 for prosecuting both Shri G. L. Seenik and Shri Surjit Singh for perjuryunder Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 4 ) ON merits the stand of the respondents is that the Company is a tenant under Shri Seenik who is a perpetual leaseeof the plot in question and had been paving rent for the premises in question to the petitioner (a) Rs. 2. 000 per mensumuptil 31/10/1981. They vehmently deny having givenany undertaking to the Court as such for surrendering peacefuland vacant possession of the premises in Question and assertthat the negotiated settlement culminated in a compromisedecree only. So, the remedy of the petitioner. if any, is toexecute the said decree or take any other appropriate stepsunder law to recover possession of the demised premises. They vehmently deny having givenany undertaking to the Court as such for surrendering peacefuland vacant possession of the premises in Question and assertthat the negotiated settlement culminated in a compromisedecree only. So, the remedy of the petitioner. if any, is toexecute the said decree or take any other appropriate stepsunder law to recover possession of the demised premises. Theyfurther assert that the compromise decree itself stipulated execution thereof in the event of default by any of the parties incomplying with the same and as such the question of the Company or any other respondent committing contempt of thecourt does not arise. ( 5 ) BOTH Shri G. L. Seenik and Shri Surjit Singh have filedrejoinder affidavits. They have not denied the factum of Shrig. L. Seenik entering into partnership with Smt. Agva Kaurand others vide partnership deed Annexure- a . However. they assert that this circumstance is wholly irrelevant for thepurpose of this petition inasmuch as Shri G. L. Seenik is stillthe sole perpeual lessee of the plot in question and as such heis competent to move this petition. However, they have reiterated their contention that the Company had given an undertaking through Shri R. K. Anand, respondent No. 4 to the courtthat it would surrender peaceful and vacant possession of theplot in question on the expiry of 19/11/1983. Theydeny that. the Company was ever inducted as a tenant in theplot in question or that they suppressed any relevant facts fromthe court when the alleged undertaking was given by the Company. ( 6 ) "civil contempt is defined in Section 2 (b) of the Actas wilful disobedient to any judgment, decree, direction, order,writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court". What we are concerned in thiscase is whetherthe respondents gave any undertaking to thecourt or not, it being well settled that the breach of an undertaking is liable to be visited by the same punishment as bieachof an injunction. In Halsbury s Laws of England (4th Edition),vol. 9 at p. 44 it is stated : "an undertaking given to the court by a person or corporation in pending proceedings, on the faith ofwhich the court sanctions a particular course ofaction or inaction, has the same force as an injunction made by the court and a breach of the undertaking is misconduct amounting to contempt". 9 at p. 44 it is stated : "an undertaking given to the court by a person or corporation in pending proceedings, on the faith ofwhich the court sanctions a particular course ofaction or inaction, has the same force as an injunction made by the court and a breach of the undertaking is misconduct amounting to contempt". ( 7 ) IN other words an undertaking entered into with or givento the court by a party has exactly the same force as an ordermade by the court, and accordingly breach of an undertakingamounts to a contempt in the same way as a breach of aninjunction. (Sec Saleemuddin v. Sharfuddin, AIR 1980 Delhip. 39) (l) and Chhaganbhai Norsinbhai v. Soni Chandubhaigordhanbhai and others, AIR 1976 SC 1909 (2 ). ( 8 ) SO, the first and the foremost question for determinationin this case is whether any undertaking was in fact given by becompany to the court or whether it is a case of a mere outof Court settlement culminating in a compromise decree. ( 9 ) THE parties have adverted to a long catena of reporteddecisions on this point. However. I will refer to some of themwhich appear to have a direct bearing on the point in question. In Nisha Kanto v. Saroj Bashini Goho, AIR (35) 1948 Calcutta 294 (3) a suit was brought by the landlord against thelessee on the ground that the latter had installed certain imageon the premises without the landlord s consent. The suit wascompromised. Under the compromise the lessee gave an. undertaking which was incorporated in the compromise asunder :- "the defendant hereby undertakes to remove the saidkali image as also all permanent brick built andother structures in and around the place where theimage of Kali is situate before he gives up possession of the said shop room or at any time priorthereto on demand by the plaintiff or the ownerfor the time being of the said premises No, 1aabboy Goho Road. " ( 10 ) THE compromise was presented to the court and a decreewas passed in terms of the same. The lessee, however, subsequently declined to remove the image on demand by the landlord and, therefore, later applied to commit the lessee for contempt of court on the ground that he had broken an undertaking given to the court. " ( 10 ) THE compromise was presented to the court and a decreewas passed in terms of the same. The lessee, however, subsequently declined to remove the image on demand by the landlord and, therefore, later applied to commit the lessee for contempt of court on the ground that he had broken an undertaking given to the court. This submission was, however, repelledby a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court who held thaton the true construction of the compromise the mere use ofthe word "undertake" did not mean a promise to the Court. Harries C. J. speaking for the court said that "the fact thatthis document was to be submitted to Court cannot, in myview, affect the construction to be given to paragraph 6. Ifon a proper construction of paragraph 6 there is nothing buta promise, possibly solemn, by the defendant to the plaintiff,then it does not become anything more than such a promisewhen the document is put in Court and the Court passes adecree in terms of it. " His Lordship further observe "but as I have stated the mere user of the word "undertake" does not mean a promise to a Court. It merely means a solemn promise to some one and wherethe word appears in an agreement between A andb. it appears to me that if A undertakes. he obviously undertakes to B, and not to a Court". In Sukumar Mitra v. Tarasankar Ghosh, AIR 1952calcutta 591 (4) the defendant had given an undertaking to thecourt to vacate and make over peaceful and vacant possessionof the upper flat in the premises in depute to the plaintiffor before the 2/01/1952. Tt was further stipulatedthat in case the defeadant failed to vacate the said premisesthe plaintiff would be entitled to execute the decree for possession passed by the court and the plaintiff would be furtherentitled to take such proceedings against the defendant as hemay be advised and the defendant would not be entitled to raiseany objection thereto. The joint petition of compromise beingpresented by both the parties, it was made a rule of the courtand the appeal before the High Court was disposed of in termsof the compromise petition. However, on failure on the partof the defendant to surrender possession of the premises theplaintiff moved the High Court for committal proceedings forcontempt. The petition was dismissed. The joint petition of compromise beingpresented by both the parties, it was made a rule of the courtand the appeal before the High Court was disposed of in termsof the compromise petition. However, on failure on the partof the defendant to surrender possession of the premises theplaintiff moved the High Court for committal proceedings forcontempt. The petition was dismissed. Das, J. speaking forthe court said, "in my opinion the first contention of the petitioner must be given effect to. The undertaking said to havebeen given to the court in the circumstances of this case, shouldnot be regarded as an unqualified underfaking and a failureto keep to the terms thereof cannot therefore be regarded asjustifying the exercise of the discretionary powers of this courtto order committal for contempt. " In taking this view hislordship placed reliance on an earlier decision of a Envisionbench of the same court who had proceeded on the footing thatin cases like the one before their Lordships where the consequencies of default are provided for in the order itself, the undertaking should not be construed as being an unqualified one. His Lordship further observed that "in the present case theundertaking to the court was not formally embodied in the orderdirecting the compromise to be recorded, nor was it specificallyset forth in the decree. It may be that the clear implicationof the order was that there was an undertaking to the court tovacate the premises on or before the 2/01/1952. Atthe same time a litigant in the position of the opposite partymight have been under a bona fide misanprehension as to theeffect of the order of this Court and the decree passed therein". ( 11 ) IN Badri Dass v. Labhu Mal, AIR 1959 Pandh 322 (5)it was held that breach of such an undertaking or promise whichflows from a compromise decree does not amount to contemptof Court. ( 12 ) THE question as to how any person appearing betorethe court can gave an undertaking came up for considerationbeforethe Supreme Court in Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasinand another, AIR 1979 SC 1528 (6) In that case a receiverwas apponted by the High Court of Allahabad to take chargeof Laxmi Talkies with the consent of the counsel for both theparties and he was directed to take charge of Laxmi Talkiesforthwith from the appellant Babu Ram Gupta. The Receiverwas directed to subrnu quarterly reports to the Court regardingthe running of the business of the said Cinema and the appellant was directed not to interfere with the Receiver appointed or with the business of the running of the Laxmi Talkies. Thelicence or running the Cinema was also directed to be takenout by the Receiver in the name of Laxmi Talkies. However,the appellant who was in possession of Laxmi Talkies did nothandover its possession to the Receiver. So, action by way ofcontempt of Court was sought to be taken on the ground thatthe appellant had committed a serious breach of the undertaking given to the Court to handover possession to the Reciver and having failed to honour the undertaking, he was liable tobe hauled up for an offence under the Act. The High Courtheld that the conduct of the appellant was unrelenting andinexorable and he had willfully disobeyed the order of the Courlpassed with his consent. However, in appeal by the contemner appellant the Supreme Court noticed that there was no specific direction to the appellant to hand over posessior of thiproperty to the Receiver although impliedly this was done because the order was passed with the consent of the partiestheir Lordship observed that : "our attention has not been drawn by counsel for therespondent to any application or affidavit filed bythe appellant which contains an undertaking givenby the appellant to hand over possession to thereceiver appointed by the High Court by virtueof the impugned order. It is manifest that anyperson appearing before the Court can given anundertaking in two ways : (1) that he filed anapplication or ann affidavit clearly setting out theundertaking given by him to Court, or (2) by aclear and express oral undertaking given by thecontemner and incorporated by the court in itsorder. If any of these conditions are satisfiedthen a wilful breach of the undertaking woulddoubtless amount to an offence under the Act. Although the High Court observed that the consent order extracted above had been passed on thebasis of various undertakings given by the contemner, we are unable to find any material on record which contains such undertakings. It seemsto us that the High Court has construed the consent order itself and the directions contained thereinas an implied undertaking given by the appellant. Here the High Court has undoubtedly committedan error of law. It seemsto us that the High Court has construed the consent order itself and the directions contained thereinas an implied undertaking given by the appellant. Here the High Court has undoubtedly committedan error of law. There is a clear cut distinctionbetween a compromise arrived at between the partyor a consent order passed by the court at the instance of the parties and a clear and categoricalundertaking given by any of the parties. In theformer, if there is violation of the compromise orthe order no question of contempt of court arises,but the party has a right to enforce the order or thecompromise by their executing the order or gettingan injunction from the court. " (emphasis supplied) ( 13 ) THEIR Lordship further observed that "in the instantcase, however, as indicated above, there is no application norany affidavit nor any written undertaking given by the appellant that he would co-operate with the receiver or that he wouldhand over possession of the Cinema to the receiver. Apartfrom this, even the consent order does not corporation expresslyor clearly that any such undertaking had been given eitherby the appellant or by his lawyer before the Court that hewould hand over possession of the property to the receiver. Inthe absence of any express undertaking given by the appellantor any undertaking incorporated in the order impugned, it willbe difficult to hold that the appellant wilfully disobeyed or committed breach of such an undertaking". ( 14 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has also invited my attention to the following further observations of theirlordships. "in fact, the reason why a breach of clear undertakinggiven to the court amounts to contempt of courtis that the contemner by making a false representation to the Court obtains a benefit for himselfand if he fails to honour the undertaking, he playsa serious fraud on the court itself and thereby obstruct" the course of justiceand bringsinto disrepute the judicial institutionthe same cannot, however, he said of consent order or a compromise decree where the fraud, if any, is practised bythe person concerned not on the court but on oneof the parties. Thus the offence committed by theperson concerned is qua the party not qua thecourt, and, therefore, the very foundation for proceeding for contempt of court is completely absentin such cases. Thus the offence committed by theperson concerned is qua the party not qua thecourt, and, therefore, the very foundation for proceeding for contempt of court is completely absentin such cases. In these circumstances, we aresatisfied that unless there is an express underfakinggiven in writing before the court by the contemneror incorporated by the court in its order, there canbe no question of wilful disobedience of such anundertaking". ( 15 ) THE crucial question which falls for determination thusis whether applying the test laid-down in Babu Ram Guptathe respondent Company can be said to have given an undertaking to the Court or not ? As already stated, the parties presented a joint application under Order 23 Rule 3 read withsection 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for certifying thecompromise which had been arrived at between them. Para2 of the said application (Ex. C-l) reads as under :-- (A) That the plaintiff shall continue to use as beforefront courtyard of B. 18, Industrial Area, Phase-1,mayapuri. New Delhi, as shown red in the siteplan marked a forming part of this compromise. (b) That plaintiff agrees and gives an undertaking tothe court that the portion in occupation of theplaintiff shown red in the plan shall be vacatedby it on the expiry of 19/11/1983, whenplaintiff shall remove all its stores, etc. therefromand hand over the vacant possession thereof todefendant and its successors etc. " ( 16 ) IT was further stipulated between the parties that incase the Income-tax Authorities did not clear the stores keptin. the Godown till the said dt. viz. 19/11/1983 thepossession would be delivered to the petitioner immediately onthe Income-tax Authorities vacating the same. However, therespondents further undertook to vacate and deliver possessionof. the remaining portion viz. , the one not occupied by the Income-tax Department on the expiry of 19/11/1983. The said undertaking was not incorporated, either in the jointstatement made by the parties in court on 7/01/1982 orin the order of the court pasted on the same day. However, theparties reaffirmed to be bound by the comoromise Ex. C-l andasked for dismissal of the suit as fully satisfied. Accordinglythe Court paused an order dismissing the suit So it has beencanvassed with great favour by the learned counsel for the pondents that the undertaking, if at all, given by the Companywas to the petitioner and not to the Court. However, theparties reaffirmed to be bound by the comoromise Ex. C-l andasked for dismissal of the suit as fully satisfied. Accordinglythe Court paused an order dismissing the suit So it has beencanvassed with great favour by the learned counsel for the pondents that the undertaking, if at all, given by the Companywas to the petitioner and not to the Court. Therefore, the question of contempt of Court does not at all arise, it bring at besta breach of any solemn promise made to the petitioner and notto the Court. ( 17 ) IT is true that every undertaking given by a party toa litigation is not an undertaking to the court; there is a differencebetween an undertaking given to the other party and anundertaking given to the court. The breach of an undertakinggiven to the other party will not constitute contempt of court. However, whether a particular undertaking is an undertakingto the court of to the opposite party must depend upon the factsand circumstances of each case and the language used. Nodoubt in the instant case the parties negotiated a settlement outside the court and reported the same to the court and the courtpassed a decree in terms of the compromise. However, thiswould not warrant an inference that no undertaking was givento the Court. It is clearly a case falling under the first methodof giving an undertaking as expounded in Babu Ram Gupta,namely that the contemner filed an application or an affidavitclearly setting out the undertaking given by him to Court. As observed by the Supreme Court in the said case that if anyof the two conditions mentioned therein are satisfied then awilful breach of the undertaking would doubtless amount to anoffence under the Act. This aspect of the matter was emphasised by the Supreme Court in para 10 of the Judgment asunder :- "in the instance case, however, as indicated above, thereno application nor any affidavit nor any writtenundertaking given by the appellant that he wouldco-operate with the receiver or that he would handover possession of the Cinema to the receiver. to the absence of any express undertaking given bythe appellant or any undertaking incorporated inthe order impugned, it will be difficult to hold thatthe appellant wilfully disobeyed or committed breachof such an undertaking". to the absence of any express undertaking given bythe appellant or any undertaking incorporated inthe order impugned, it will be difficult to hold thatthe appellant wilfully disobeyed or committed breachof such an undertaking". ( 18 ) THE use of word or which is disjunctive is very significant to note The instant case certainly satisfies one of thetwo methods of awing an undertaking and, therefore. I amnot persuaded to hold that failure/refusal on the part of therespondents to deliver vacant possession of the plot in questionto the petitioner constitutes merely a breach of compromise ananot of the undertaking. It would be pertinent to notice atthis Stage the full Bench decision of this Court in Sardari Lalv. Ram Rakha 26 (1984) Delhi Law Times 20 (7 ). in thatcase too the submission of the counsel for the contemner wasthat the parties had negotiated a settlement outside the courtand then came to the court and reported that they had compromised. The Rent Control Tribunal recorded the compromise. The tenant (contemner)made a statement to the court thathe would be withdrawing his appeal and that would surrender vacant possession of the premises in question within 15days of the judgment of the High Court. He also promisedto pay the arrears of rent etc. and affilmed that in the eventof failure to pay two arrears of rent by the. stiputated date hewould be liable to be evicted forthwith. The counsel for thetenant (coutemner) urged that there was no user of the word undertaking in the statement of the tenant and, therefore, thepromise simply meant a solemn promise to summon else andnot to the Court. It was further urged that the Court had nopart to play but only to record the agreement/between theparties as the appeal was being withdrawn. According to himthe order had no greater sanctity then an agreement simpliciter. Reliance was inter-alia placed by the tenant on Babu Ramgupta (supra ). However, their Lordships repelled the contention observing that the Court was an active participant tothe terms of the compromise and its validity in a case for eviction on permisssion grounds and material. According to himthe order had no greater sanctity then an agreement simpliciter. Reliance was inter-alia placed by the tenant on Babu Ramgupta (supra ). However, their Lordships repelled the contention observing that the Court was an active participant tothe terms of the compromise and its validity in a case for eviction on permisssion grounds and material. Their Lordshipsobserved that : "the fact that the undertaking does not expressly mention that it was given to the Courts is a matter ofno consequence as on the interpretation of the termsof the statement and a long practice understood bythe counsel and Judges of this Court and the Courtssubordinate to it, it is clear to us that the undertaking must have been given to the Court. Anundertaking recorded in Court has come to acquirea technical meaning-that it is always an undertakingto the Court. Stay orders or injunctions prayedfor are not granted when undertakings are givenin Court by the parties or their counsel". Their Lordships further observed that "thus the expression a party undertaking or gives asolemn promise used in the statement of the partiesor their counsel or in the orders and decrees of thecourt, unless the context otherwise suggests, meanan implied undertaking to the Court. The undertaking is always understood to be an underfakingto the Court, which undertaking could be enforcedby committal proceedings". ( 19 ) THE instant casein my view stands en a much betterfooting in that the respondent Company gave a clear undertaking to the Court in the joint compromise petition madeto the Court. The mere fact that it was not specificallyincorporated either in the joint statement made by the partiesin Court or in the order of the Court itself would hardly detractfrom the solemn undertaking. The vital fact is that both theparties expressly undertook to abide by the terms of thecompromise which inter-alia embodied the undertaking givento the Court with regard to the delivery of peaceful andvacant possession of the plot in question to the petitioner. So, by no stretch of reasoning the said undertaking can besaid to have been washed away simply because it was notreiterated in terms in Court. Hence, I hold that the instantis not merely a case of breach of compromise but manifestlya case of breach of an undertaking given to the Court. So, by no stretch of reasoning the said undertaking can besaid to have been washed away simply because it was notreiterated in terms in Court. Hence, I hold that the instantis not merely a case of breach of compromise but manifestlya case of breach of an undertaking given to the Court. ( 20 ) THE question may arise whether breach of the undertaking which is tantamount to disobedience of an order ofcourt is wilful or not ? The ordinary meaning of wilful asdefined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, is that "for whichcompulsion or ignorance or accident cannot be pleaded asan excuse, intentional, deliberate". As tersely said bybramwell, L. J. in Lewis v. The Great Western Railwaycompany, (1877) 3 OBD 195 (8) "wilful misconduct" meansmisconduct to which the will is a party, something opposedto accident or negligence;". ( 21 ) IN Heatons Transport (St. Helens) Ltd. v. Transport andgeneral Workers Union, (1972) 3 All ER 101 (9) the Houseof Lords expressed the view that to prove wilful disobedience-it is not necessary to show that breach was contumacious andit would be sufficient to show that disobedience was notcasual or accidental and unintentional. The same view hasbeen expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Kuldiprastogi and another v. Vishva Nath Khanna. AIR 1979 Del 202 , (10) T. P. S. Chawla, J. , who spoke for the Courton a review of several English decisions including the observations of Bramwell, L. J. (supra) held that : "that accords completely with the quotation frombramwell, L. J. , with which I started. It followsthat wilful has the same meaning in the law ofcontempt as in other branches of the law. I cansee no reason why in the matter of contempt itshould have some special or peculiar meaning,bowen. L. J. , said in re Young and Harston scontract (1855) 31 Ch. D. 168, that it is not aterm of art And, the ordinary meaning of wilful. as defined in Concise Oxford Dictionary, isthat for which compulsion or ignorance or accident cannot be pleaded as an excuse, international. deliberate. . . . . . . . . . . . . ". ( 22 ) HIS Lordship also noticed various Indian decisions inwhich the word contumacious had been used in describingcontempt and pointed out that almost invariably it was useddisjunctively wirh wilful or deliberate . deliberate. . . . . . . . . . . . . ". ( 22 ) HIS Lordship also noticed various Indian decisions inwhich the word contumacious had been used in describingcontempt and pointed out that almost invariably it was useddisjunctively wirh wilful or deliberate . Observed he: "that, in itself, indicates that contumacious is usedas a synonym, and for the purpose of adding something more to the meaning of wilful that it otherwise bears". Obviously the breach of undertaking on the part of therespondents is deliberate and intentional. By no stretch ofreasoning it can be said to be accidental or unintended. Indeedthe respondents have tried to justify breach of the undertakingby taking shelter under the plea that there was only a compromise between the parries and no undertaking was givento the Court as such. There seems to be no intention to purgethe contempt. They have not expressed any contrition orrepentance either; rather their attitude is inexorable. Hence,i am fully satisfied that respondents 1, 2 and 4 to whom rulebisi was issued are guilty of contempt. ( 23 ) BEFORE concluding, however, I may deal with some otherpoints raised by the respondents. Their first contention isthat the compromise itself provides for alternative remedy towhich the recourse can well be had by the petitioner. Myattention in this context has been invited to clauses (d) and (f) of the compromise Ex. C-l. Under clause (d) the petitionerhad agreed not to charge anything in the form of license feeor otherwise from the respondent company during the periodof about two years expiring on 19/11/1983 on orafter which date the respondents were to deliver peaceful andvacant possession of the plot in question to the petitioner. Further it was agreed between the parties that in the eventof failure on the part of the respondents to deliver back thepossession as stipulated the respondents would be liable topay damages w. e. f. the date of this compromise. Further itwas provided in clause (f) that the compromise would havethe force of a decree and either party would be at liberty toexecute the same in cases their rights were infringed. Thusthe precise contention out forth on behalf of the respondentsis that the petitioner can avail of these remedies and proceedagainst the respondents to enforce his right under the compromise. Further itwas provided in clause (f) that the compromise would havethe force of a decree and either party would be at liberty toexecute the same in cases their rights were infringed. Thusthe precise contention out forth on behalf of the respondentsis that the petitioner can avail of these remedies and proceedagainst the respondents to enforce his right under the compromise. Hence, according to the learned counsel for therespondents the question of awarding any punishment for thealleged contempt of court does not arise when alternativeremedy is available. However, this argument too is devoidof any merit. It is lor the simple reason that the contemptof court envisages affornt to the dignity of the courr and themere fact that the aggrieved party can resort to other remedies to enforce its rights would be no ground to absolve theerring party from punishment for contempt of court. ( 24 ) AS observed by the House of Lords in Heatons Transport (St. Helens) Ltd. (supra) "it is also the reasonable view,because the party in whose favour an order has been madeis entitled to have it enforced, and also the effective administration of justice normally requires some penalty for disobedienceto an order of a court if the disobedience is more than casualor accidental and unintentional". In the Aligarh Municipalboard and others v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union and others. AIR 1970 SC 1767 (11), it was held by the Supreme Courtthat "contempt proceedings against a person who has failedto comply with the Court s order serve a dual purpose: (1)Vindication of the public interest by punishment of contamptuous conduct and (2) coercion to compel the contemner to dowhat the law requires of him. The sentence imposed shouldeffectuate both these purposes. To employ a subterfuge toavoid compliance of a court s order about which there couldbe no reasonable doubt may in certain circumstances aggravatethe contempt. " ( 25 ) IT is thus Well settled that the court s jurisdictionin respect of civil contempt is primarly remedial, the basicobject being to coerce the offender into obeying courts judgment or order. Committal is granted mainly for the purposeof enforcing judgments in civil disputes. As has been said"civil contempt of court exists, therefore," to provide theultimate sanction against one who reuses to comply with theorder of a properly constituted court. " (Miller-Contempt ofcourt p. 2 ). Committal is granted mainly for the purposeof enforcing judgments in civil disputes. As has been said"civil contempt of court exists, therefore," to provide theultimate sanction against one who reuses to comply with theorder of a properly constituted court. " (Miller-Contempt ofcourt p. 2 ). The instant case clearly illustrates that the respondents are impeding the course of justice by adopting defiantattitude in not surrendering peaceful and vacant possession ofthe plot despite the undertaking given to the Court. It isnot merely a case of error of judgment or bonafide belief in thecorrectness of their cause. ( 26 ) THAT apart the so-called alternative remedies contemplated in the compromise are absolutely illusory and totallyinefficacious. Stipulation for payment of damages is designedto compensate the petitioner for the loss suffered by him if therespondents persist in the intransigence and contumacy. Thequantum of damages has not been specified. As for cl (f) sufficeit to it say that the suit of the respondents having been dismissed it is not comprehensible where is the decree which maybe executed by the petitioner. So the only course open to thepetitioner is to embark upon an endless voyage. of freshlitigation by instituting a suit for possession and damagesagainst the respondents. The alternative remedies are thus amere moonshine. Indeed cl (d) itself provides that the remedyby way of damages will be in addition to any other actionwhich may be available at law. Hence nothing turns on theseclauses. ( 27 ) LASTLY the learned counsel for the respondents hasmade a valiant attempt to urge that the petitioner has notcome with clean hands. He has. pointed out that even thoughthe firm M/s. Indo-Keniyan Industrial Enterprises was originally a sole proprietary concern of Shri G. L. Seenik, it hadceased to be so even before the institution of the suit forpermanent injunction by the Company as would be manifestfrom the partnership deed dated 10/09/1981 (Annexure a to reply affidavit of the respondents ). However,for reasons best known to Shri Seenik, he supressed this vitalfact from the Company as also from the Court when acompromise was arrived at between the parties and the samewas presented to the Court from necessary orders. Hencs thecompromise affected with M]s. Indo-Kenlyan Industrial Enterprises as a sole proprietary concern of Shri G. L. Seenik whichhad ceased to be so has no legal foundation. Hencs thecompromise affected with M]s. Indo-Kenlyan Industrial Enterprises as a sole proprietary concern of Shri G. L. Seenik whichhad ceased to be so has no legal foundation. In other words,the compromise was vitiated by the patent illegality and asa necessary corollary thereof the order of the Court puttingits seal of approval on the same was devoid of any legalsanctity. In the alternative, he has urged that M/s. Indo-Keniyan Industrial Enterprises has no locus standi to movethis petition for contempt of Court as sole proprietary concernof Shri G. L. Seenik. ( 28 ) ON a consideration of the matter, however, I do notfind any siubstance in this contention. No doubt Shri Seenikwho was atone time the sole proprietor of the concernm/s. Indo-Keniyan Industrial Enterprises entered into partnership with Smt. Agya Kaur and others vide deed of Partnership dated 10/09/1981 and this fact is not deniedby the petitioner. It is also true that the second party viz. Smt. Agya Kaur etc invested a sum of Rs. 1,95,500. 00 in thepartnership business in consideration of G. L. Seenik makingavailable he premises bearing No. B-18, Industrial Area, Mayapuri, for partnership business. It is, however, not clear frompartnership agreement whether the said premises have becomean asset of the partnership firm or not. ft is further contended by the respondents that Shri G. L. Seenik even appliedto the Delhi Development Authority for inclusion of the namesof his partners as co-lessees of plot No. B-18. There is nospecific denial of this ayerment but both ths petitioner andhis attorney Shri Surjit Singh assert that the former is stillthe sole lessee of the plot in question, meaning thereby thatthe said application has not been allowed by the lessor i. e. Delhi Development Authority. If that be so, Shri G. L. Seenik still continuous to be the sole lessee of the plot irrespective of whether it is a part of partnership assets or notbecause there could be no transfer in whole or part of thelease-hold rights in favour of anyone without the concurrenceof the lessor. Needless to say that a lease in the name ofa sole proprietary concern is in law lease in favour of thesole proprietor himself as the firm has no independent existence as a legal entity. ( 29 ) ASSUMING, atguendo, however, that the plat in question is a partnership asset. Shri G L. Seenik has still ashare in it. Needless to say that a lease in the name ofa sole proprietary concern is in law lease in favour of thesole proprietor himself as the firm has no independent existence as a legal entity. ( 29 ) ASSUMING, atguendo, however, that the plat in question is a partnership asset. Shri G L. Seenik has still ashare in it. so, he will have locus standi to move this petition. True that the petitioner has been described to be a sole proprietary concerned of Shri G. L. Seenik but then it is at theworst a case of misdescription and nothing more. As stated inhalsbury s Laws of England Vol. IX (4th Edition) at para 57 "a person not a party to a cause or matter, who obtainsan order or in. whose favour an order is madeis entitled to enforce obedience, to it by the sameprocess as, if he were a party. ; and a person nota party against whom any judgment or order maybe enforced is liable to the same process for enforcing obedience to it as it be were a party". ( 30 ) SO, if a stranger to the litigation can seek enforcementof an order by complaining of civil contempt there is noreason byShri G. L Seenik who still has an interest in theplot in question cannot do so. In my view, he has not lostlocus standi to move this application. Even otherwise, theonly function of a party in contempt proceedings is to alertthe court about contempt. He has no separate and greaterrights, for it is then for the Court to proceed further andpunish the contemner, if it is so satisfied. Hence, this objection is not at all tenable. ( 31 ) AS for the contention of the respondents that the original compromise as also the order of the Court based uponit is vitiated and rendered illegal on account of suppression offactum of partnership by the petitioner, suffice it to say, thatit is totally irrelevant so far contempt proceedings are concerned. It is open to the respondents to challenge the originalorder on this ground and seek appropriate relief from theconcerned court, if so, advised. Surely this Court cannot gointo this question and cannot ignore the fact of the respondents committing breach of the undertaking given to the Court. It is open to the respondents to challenge the originalorder on this ground and seek appropriate relief from theconcerned court, if so, advised. Surely this Court cannot gointo this question and cannot ignore the fact of the respondents committing breach of the undertaking given to the Court. As observed by Tek Chand, J. in Jarain Singh v. S. Hardayalsingh Jarika, AIR 1958 Pandh 180 (12): "so long as the injunction order has not been vacatedor modified by the Court granting it, or has notbeen reversed on appeal, no matter how unreasonable and unjust the injunction may be, the ordermust be obeyed. Violation of the order of injunction cannot be excused on the ground that throughthe Court acted within its jurisdiction but theorder that it passed was erroneous. The order granting injunction might have been erroneous, or granted improvidently, or obtained irregularly. that will not excuse the person violating it. The only questions open for consideration in proceedings for contempt for violating an injunctionare, whether the Court had jurisdiction to awardthe injunction, and whether it had in fact beenviolated. Further inquiry as to its advisabilityor legality is not called for. The Court, in contempt proceedings, will not inquire into the meritsof the case in which the injunction was issued. That is the function of the Court granting the injunctionand if that order is challenged in appeal, then ofthe Court of appeal. If the question has beendetermined wrongly by the trial court, it can bere-examined only on appeal. So long as the Courthas an authority to determine the issue, its orderhas to be obeyed, no matter how clearly it maybe erroneous". ( 32 ) THIS passage was quoted with the approval by adivision Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Kruthiventi Kutumba Rao v. Muthi Venkata Subba Rao and others, air 1969 AP 47 (13 ). The Bench observed : "so long as there is an order by the Court which requires compliance not only, parties but even thirdparties who are not parties to the suit and who havenotice of the same will be liable for contempt forthe disobedience of such orders or for obstructingthe execution of the same. Whether the orderis valid or irregular unless it is vocated, it hasgot to be obeyed. Whether the orderis valid or irregular unless it is vocated, it hasgot to be obeyed. "their Lordships extracted the following passage from thebook "contempt of Court" by Oswald (3rd Edition) at page107: "an order irregularly obtained cannot be treated as anullity, but must be implicitly obeyed, until by aproper application it is discharged, and the caseis the same where the order is alleged to havebeen improvidently made. " ( 33 ) REFERENCE in this context be also made to Shri Subodhgopal Bose v. Dalmia Jain and Co. , Ltd. and others, AIR (38)1951 Patna 266 (14) where it was held that: "right or wrong, the injunction order binds him, andhe disregards it at his peril". Hence, this contention too is devoid of any merit thepresent being at best a case of mis-description of the petitionerfirm, it has locus standi to move this petition. ( 34 ) LASTLY I need hardly say that not only the respondentcompany but also respondent No. 2 who being its Managingdirector was in-charge of and responsible to the Company forthe conduct of the business of the Company at the time thecontempt was committed and respondent No. 4 who was itemanager and authorised representative at the relevant timeare liable for contempt of Court. I was informed that respondent No. 4 has since left the services of: respondent No. 1but that is hardly relevant because it was he, who gave the undertaking on behalf of the Company and he was very much inservice till this application was made Subsequent resignationis hardly of any consequence ( 35 ) TO sum up therefore, I find that respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are guilty of contempt of Court and they deserve severepunishment. As stated above, they have not expressed anyrepentance or contrition, much less willingness to purge thecontempt. Hence, I impose a fine of Rs. 2. 000. 00 each onall these respondents and I also direct that respondents 2 and4 be committed to civil prison for three months each. Incase; however, the respondents 2 and 4 purge the contempt andsurrender peaceful and vacant possession of the plot in question within one month from today. the sentence of imprisonment shall stand remitted and they will not be sent to civilprison : however, the sentence of fine shall stand.