ORDER Dr. T.N. Singh, J. 1. The forensic fight in this case has exposed written laws vulnerability to succumb to unforeseen situations throwing up momentous issues. 2. An application purporting to invoke Court's jurisdiction under section 151 CPC was filed in an execution proceeding by third party (here non-petitioner No.6) claiming ownership of, and delivery to him of certain articles which had been taken possession of by Court's Nazir in the course of execution of writ of possession issued against the judgment-debtor/tenant, the revisionist in this Court. Admittedly, vacant possession of the suit premises had to be given to the decree-holder/landlord by breaking open doors of the suit premises in the absence of the judgment• debtor/tenant and by removing all articles which were found in the premises. Shri Lahoti appearing for non-petitioner No.6, who had made the application on which the impugned order was passed, has fairly conceded that the moveable property in question was not attached and, therefore the provision of rule 43 et al of order 21 CPC do not in terms apply to this case. As such counsel concede the impugned order directing an enquiry into the application may not sustainable in terms of the relevant provisions of rule 58 of order 21. That, however submits learned counsel, would not disentitle the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under section 151 CPC for the ends of justice in the absence of any specific provision in the Code to meet the exigencies of the situation. Counsel has placed reliance on the celebrated decision in Manohar Lal [ AIR 1962 SC 527 ] as also on a decision of this Court in Ramkrishna Parashar [ 1977 JLJ 184 ] in which Manohar Lal (supra) was applied. 3. On behalf of the revisionist-petitioner, learned counsel Shri Ramji Sharma, has very forcefully and vehemently argued that the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application in as much as the applicant (non-petitioner No.6) was third party to the proceedings and be had remedy only by way of suit to establish his title to the property which was taken possession of in the course of execution of the writ of possession. According to him the Executing Court was bound to deliver to the revisionist (judgment debtor) all moveable property removed from the suit premises in execution of the decree; other claimants must establish the title in separate suits before chiming possession of any specific item of the property removed. Counsel had relied on the Full Bench decision of this in Usha Jain [ 1980 JLJ 678 ] to submit boldly that the decision has settled the legal position and the question is no longer res integra. 4. I have given my anxious consideration to Shri Sharma's contention and I have taken pains to carefully scan and analyse the ratio of the decision to decide whether the contention pressed by him must prevail. I have no doubt at all that the facts, as also the law which was declared in Usha Jain (supra) in relation thereto have no relevance to the instant lis. Patently and very clearly the decision is not at all concerned with any moveable property of which possession was taken by Court's baillif in the execution of a writ of possession. It concerns only the question of title or possession of immoveable property in respect of which the writ of possession was executed or sought to be executed. This position appears very clear from the fact that reference to rules 35 and 36 as also 95 and 96 of order 21 CPC is made in the decision and on the construction of these provisions only the decision solidly rests. 5. I have no hesitation to let it be recorded to the eternal glory of this Court that if section 151 CPC must retain a place of pride in the Code its ambit or expanse can never be cribbed or cabined by any consideration except that the power thereunder cannot be exercised to over ride an express provision of the Code. I have no hesitation to let it be recorded to the eternal glory of this Court that if section 151 CPC must retain a place of pride in the Code its ambit or expanse can never be cribbed or cabined by any consideration except that the power thereunder cannot be exercised to over ride an express provision of the Code. See, Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank [ AIR 1983 SC 1272 ] The scope of "inherent powers of the Court" acting in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure is limited and inhibited only implied as the language and by the legislature in clear and express terms indicate that the provision is meant to invest positively jurisdiction in civil Courts to ensure that in facts and circumstances any particular case ends of justice are not defeated and abuse of the process of the Court does not take place on account of procedural hitch or hiatus. If I have to say anything more on the scope of the powers under section 151 only a reference to what their Lordships said in following terms in Manohar Lal (supra) would suffice: "Section 151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Cede control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court: it is a power inherent it the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. Further, when the Code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code" Indeed, in Periyakkal [AIR 1983 SC 429] their Lordships considered it meet and proper to exercise powers under section 151 CPC to enlarge the time stipulated in the compromise decree "in the interest of justice" to give relief to the aggrieved party against a forefeiture clause in the compromise. The decision firmly establishes Court's duty to act positively "in the interest of justice" overcoming gaps and silences in jurisdictional law. 6. The decision firmly establishes Court's duty to act positively "in the interest of justice" overcoming gaps and silences in jurisdictional law. 6. The question, therefore, is by entertaining the application of non-petitioner No.6 what the Executing Court did. Whether the Court did consider that gross injustice would be caused to the applicant or even the process of the Court would be abused, if he was not heard on his claim? Indeed, there is great merit in Shri Lahoti"s submission that the moveable property in question of which possession was taken by Courts baillif had become cusodia legis and as such it become the incumbent duty of the Court to ensure that the property was delivered to proper person, the rightful claimant. I am inclined to agree with him that merely because the property was taken possession from the premises which was in occupation of the judgment debtor, others were not precluded from laying claim to any specific item which belonged to them. Let us take a practical view of the situation because exigencies of the situation ex-hypothesis form the basic norm when the Court is required to involve its "inherent powers" under section 151 CPC. Take the case of a repair-shop in respect of which writ of possession is issued and its possession delivered to the landlord in the absence of the shop owner/tenant. In such a case there would be occasion for articles owned by different persons to be found in the shop. By no stretch of imagination it can be said in such a case that all articles found in the shop belonged to the shop-owner. In such a case if the rightful owner of such article is driven to a separate suit to prove his title to claim delivery to him of the article removed from the shop in executing the writ of possession, it would be travesty of justice. True, when disputed questions of title are raised in such matters, a summary inquiry, as is settled law, would be ex-hypothesis, excluded. But, to deny Court jurisdiction to entertain application to make summary inquiry into the claim laid would be doing great injustice to the provision of section 151 CPC. It would indeed be a blatant affront to the clear and positive legislative mandate. 7. But, to deny Court jurisdiction to entertain application to make summary inquiry into the claim laid would be doing great injustice to the provision of section 151 CPC. It would indeed be a blatant affront to the clear and positive legislative mandate. 7. For the foregoing reasons I have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order does not merit any interference in my hands because at this stage what has been ordered is only that there shall be an enquiry into the application by which claim was laid to certain specific items of moveable properties of which Court's baillif had taken possession. Still, I like to make it clear that if in the course of enquiry it transpires that title to the claimed property is disputed the question could not and would not be fit for adjudication in the summary inquiry. The Executing Court, in such circumstances, shall be competent to refer the applicant to a regular civil Suit to establish his title. 8. In the result, the petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs.