Judgment :- 1. In this third round of challenge, Excise duty, levied and sought to be collected as a cess under the Rubber Act, 1947, confirmed in appeal by the District Judge and affirmed by a learned single judge of this Court, is still in challenge in this Writ Appeal. The assessee is the Madras Rubber Factory, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act and engaged in the manufacture of tyres. The assessments and demands cover the period from 1-4-1975 to 30-9-1979. 2. The Company purchased scrap rubber from owners of rubber estates. The scrap was sent to the millers. The millers converted scrap rubber into a more purified and dried form of rubber, the crepe. This crepe was used in the manufacturing process by the Company. The Rubber Board assessed the Company on the total quantity of the scrap rubber purchased by the Company and not on the crepe rubber which alone, according to them, was used in their manufacturing process. The Board took the view that scrap rubber is rubber as defined under the Act and excise duty is levied on the rubber produced by an owner of an estate or used by the manufacturer. It is their case that the acquisition of scrap rubber was for its use in the manufacture of tyre and conversion into crepe is only a preparatory process for manufacture. It is also their stand that scrap rubber and crepe rubber are both included in the definition of rubber under the Act and when the Company converts scrap into crepe, it cannot restrict its liability on the lesser weight of crepe but has to pay duty on the entire quantity of scrap which it purchased. The Company, on the other hand, contends that their liability is only to pay duty on the rubber used by them in the manufacture of tyre and when crepe rubber is used for this purpose, the quantity of crepe so used alone can attract duty. Alternatively it is contended that scrap rubber contains moisture, dirt and other impurities and crepe is only dried, purified rubber. Thus the rubber content in scrap alone is exigible to duty and this content of rubber in scrap is measured by the quantity of crepe obtained. We shall advert in detail to these contentions with reference to the scheme and object of the legislation and the relevant decisions on the subject. 3. Thus the rubber content in scrap alone is exigible to duty and this content of rubber in scrap is measured by the quantity of crepe obtained. We shall advert in detail to these contentions with reference to the scheme and object of the legislation and the relevant decisions on the subject. 3. Natural rubber is a product recovered from the latex of a rubber plant. Latex is a "colloidal aqueous dispersion of rubber" as per the "Indian Standard of Glossary of Terms used in the Rubber Industry". Latex is a "milky white dispersion of rubber in water", so described by the Board itself in its publication "Rubber and its cultivation 1984". 4. By a process of controlled wounding, latex is obtained from the bark of the rubber tree by tapping. Tapping generates the flow of latex from the rubber tree; it is collected in a container, generally coconut shell cups, attached to the bark of the tree. Latex is thus "harvested" by the process of tapping. 5. Latex also gets dried up on the tapping panel (tree lace) and the collection cups (shell scrap). Latex spilt or overflowed on the ground also gets dried (earth scrap). Normally 10 to 20 per cent of the total crop constitute the tree lace, shell scrap and earth scrap. 6. The crops harvested from rubber estates are susceptible to bacterial action and processing is therefore essential to allow safe storage and marketing. According to the Rubber Board publication; "The important forms in which the crop from rubber plantations can be stored and marketed are the following: 1. Preserved latex and latex concentrates. 2. Dry ribbed sheet rubber. 3. Dry crepe rubbers. 4. Dry technically specified block rubbers. The crop collected in the form of liquid latex can be processed into any of the above forms. But the crop collected in the form of tree lace, shell scrap and earth scrap can be processed only into crepe or block rubbers." 7. The Rubber Act of 1947 (for short, the Act) imposes a rubber cess on the rubber produced in India. It is a duty of excise levied as a cess for purposes of the Act. But the crop collected in the form of tree lace, shell scrap and earth scrap can be processed only into crepe or block rubbers." 7. The Rubber Act of 1947 (for short, the Act) imposes a rubber cess on the rubber produced in India. It is a duty of excise levied as a cess for purposes of the Act. The proceeds of the duty collected, reduced by the cost of collection as determined by the Central Government have to be first credited to the Consolidated Fund of India and then paid by the Central Government to the Board for being utilised for the purposes of the Act. 8. The charging Section, S.12, as substituted by the amendment Act 21 of 1960, so far as it is relevant for our purpose reads thus: "12. Imposition of rubber cess. (1) With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint, there shall be levied as a cess for the purposes of this Act, a duty of excise on all rubber produced in India at such rate, not exceeding fifty naye paise per kilogram of rubber so produced, as the Central Government may fix. (2) The duty of excise levied under sub-s. (1) shall be collected by the Board in accordance with rules made in this behalf either from the owner of the estate on which the rubber is produced or from the manufacturer by whom such rubber is used. (3) The owner or, as the case may be the manufacturer shall pay to the Board the amount of the duty within one month from the date on which be receives a notice of demand therefor from the Board and, if he fails to do so, the duty may be recovered from the owner or the manufacturer, as the case may be, as an arrear of land revenue. (4) For the purpose of enabling the Board to assess the amount of the duty of excise levied under the section (a) the Board shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix a period in respect of which assessments shall be made; and (b) without prejudice to the provisions of S.20, every owner and every manufacturer shall furnish to the Board a return not later than fifteen days after the expiry of the period to which the return relates, stating (i) in the case of an owner, the total quantity of rubber produced on the estate in each such period; Provided that in respect of an estate situated only partly in India, the owner shall in the said return show separately the quantity of rubber produced within and outside India; (ii) in the case of manufacturer the total quantity of rubber used by him in such period out of the rubber produced in India. (S) If any owner or manufacturer fails to furnish, within the time prescribed, the return referred to in sub-s. (4) or furnishes a return which the Board has reason to believe is incorrect or defective, the Board may assess the amount of the duty of excise in such manner as may be prescribed." 9. The reasons and objects for this amendment read thus: "This method of collection of the cess provided under the Act has led to considerable evasion of cess by the owners of the estates, either by evasion of registration or by failure to submit correct returns or any returns at all. There are about 26,000 estates under production in the country and most of them are small holdings. Many of them do not render returns of production to the Rubber Board and thus evade payment of duty. From October. 1947 to December 1954, it was found that 20,608 tons of rubber escaped assessment and the Board suffered during the period a loss of Rs. 2,30,805. The Rubber Board estimates that under the present system there is no likelihood of more than 65 per cent of the potential revenue being realised each year. With a view to improving the efficiency of collection, it is proposed to amend S.12 of the Act so as to enable the cess to be collected either from the owner or the manufacturer who ultimately consumes the rubber produced in the estates. With a view to improving the efficiency of collection, it is proposed to amend S.12 of the Act so as to enable the cess to be collected either from the owner or the manufacturer who ultimately consumes the rubber produced in the estates. There are at present 347 registered rubber manufacturers in the country. It is felt that it would be far more easy to collect the cess from a small number of manufacturers than from about 26,000 producers whose number will increase year by year. The proposed amendment of S.12 in the amending Bill is an enabling measure for the administrative change in the method of collection being contemplated." 10. Rubber is defined in S.3(h) thus: "(i) crude rubber, that is to say, rubber prepared from the leaves, bark or latex of any rubber plant; (ii) the latex of any rubber plant, whether fluid or coagulated in any stage of the treatment to which it is subjected during the process of conversion into rubber; (iii) latex (dry rubber content) in any state of concentration, and includes scrap rubber, sheet rubber, rubber in powder and all forms and varieties of crepe rubber, but does not include rubber contained in any manufactured article;" 11. S.25 is the rule making power. R.33(a) and (e), empowering the Board to call for information and documents read thus: "33. Power to call information and documents. The Board may serve by post a notice upon-(a) the owner of any estate requiring him to furnish within such period, not being less than 30 days as may be specified in the notice, such information and documents relating to the area planted with rubber or to the production (including the cost of production) and sale of rubber produced on the estate or to the ownership of the estate or to any other matter as it may deem necessary to enable it to discharge its duties under the Act. (e) All manufacturers, whether they hold valid licences issued under R.40 or not, shall submit half-yearly returns in Form M for the periods 1st April to 30th September and 1st October to 31st March of each financial year showing the total quantity in kilograms of all rubber (a) purchased or otherwise acquired during such periods (separately for indigenous and imported rubber) and (b) consumed or used in the process of manufacture during the same periods. xxx 12. xxx 12. R.33-D, on which the major argument was rested and which was inserted in 1961 reads thus: "33-D (1) Every manufacturer shall by demand notice sent through registered post or in such other manner as the Board may direct be intimated of the amount assessed on the quantity of rubber acquired during the periods specified in R.33 (e). On receipt of such notice, the manufacturer shall pay to the Board the amount specified therein either in cash at the Board's Office at Kottayam or by money order or by bank draft or cheque duly crossed and payable at Kottayam to the Secretary of the Board within 30 days from the date of receipt of the said notice. (2) On such demand being made, if a manufacturer fails to pay the amount within the due date, the Board may take steps to report the fact to the Central Government or the State Government concerned for recovery of the outstanding amount as an arrear of land revenue." 13. It is thus necessary to note that while the excise duty under the Act is on "all rubber produced in India", the duty is collected, in accordance with the rules, either from the owner of the estate on which the rubber is produced or from the manufacturer by whom such rubber is used. The Act compels both the owner and the manufacturer to submit returns. The amount of excise duty has to be paid by the owner or manufacturer when a demand is made, within one month of its receipt. But under the rules, R.33-D in particular, there is provision to issue demand notice only on the manufacturer. The owners of estates, who produce rubber in India are thus not compelled by the rules to pay the excise duty. This aspect was adverted to by the Supreme Court as early as 1969 in the decision in J.R.G. Mfg. Asson. v. Union of India (AIR 1970 S.C.1589). In that decision after observing: "Unfortunately the rules relating to furnishing of returns and collection of duties are not properly worded and suffer from lack of clarity." The Supreme Court referred to R.33-D and held thus: "Now the above rule seems to contemplate the filing of return both by the owners of rubber estates and manufacturers. In that decision after observing: "Unfortunately the rules relating to furnishing of returns and collection of duties are not properly worded and suffer from lack of clarity." The Supreme Court referred to R.33-D and held thus: "Now the above rule seems to contemplate the filing of return both by the owners of rubber estates and manufacturers. But under R.33D the demand notice can be sent only to a manufacturer on receipt of which he must make payment to the Board of the amounts specified therein. On his failure to make such payment the Board can take steps for recovery of the amounts due as arrears of land revenue by reporting to the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be. There is no such procedure prescribed with regard to owners of estates. It would follow that under the rules the demand notice is to be sent only to the manufacturers and the amounts of duty are to be realised from them alone. The substantive provisions of sub-ss. (4), (5) and (6) of S.12 also contemplate assessment being made with regard to the returns to be furnished by owners and manufacturers. Any person, aggrieved by an assessment, has been given the right of appeal to the District Judge But as pointed out before, there is no provision either in the statute or in the rules for a demand to be made and a corrective process to be employed in the event of failure to make the payment. That is done by R.33D alone from which it would be reasonable to conclude that under the rules it is only the manufacturers who are liable to pay the amount of duty. The rules can therefore, be said to make a definite provision with regard to the category of persons from whom the collection of the duty is to be made, namely, the manufacturers." 14. Thus, at present the duty has to be collected only from the manufacturer. Admittedly the appellant is a manufacturer from whom the duty can be collected. Duty is charged on the rubber produced in India. There is postponement of the payment of that duty till it is used by the manufacturer. R.33, 33-D etc. are only the measures and mechanics for collection of duty. The demand is now on the lesser number of manufacturers instead of the larger number of growers. 15. Duty is charged on the rubber produced in India. There is postponement of the payment of that duty till it is used by the manufacturer. R.33, 33-D etc. are only the measures and mechanics for collection of duty. The demand is now on the lesser number of manufacturers instead of the larger number of growers. 15. The appellant manufacturer has purchased from the growers scrap rubber. But in the manufacture of tyres, this scrap has to be processed. It is, therefore, sent to the millers. The appellant receives back purified and dried rubber in the form of crepe. This is an admitted fact. The contention that the appellant need pay duty only on the quantity of crepe and not on the quantity of scrap cannot be accepted on any of the grounds advanced before us. 16. The definition of rubber includes scrap rubber. The appellant purchased scrap for manufacturing process. Scrap rubber is thus assessable to excise duty. The fact that it has to be processed before it is put to actual use in the manufacturing process of tyres does not affect the statutory liability with reference to a defined commodity, namely, scrap rubber, in the hands of the manufacturer. 17. The second limb of the argument on behalf of the appellant is that crepe rubber alone is "used" by the manufacturer though he "acquired" scrap rubber and thus only crepe and not scrap is exigible to excise duty. It is vehemently contended that while the Act clearly directs the collection of duty from the manufacturer "by whom such rubber is used", R.33D provides for a demand to be made on the quantity of rubber "acquired" and therefore either R.33D is ultra vires of the Act or has to be read down to make it in conformity with the Act. The mere acquisition, without user, it is contended, cannot attract duty under the Act, so far as the manufacturer is concerned. We are afraid, we cannot accede to this contention, for, we are now concluded by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court rendered as early as 1965 in Ruby Rubber Works v. Rubber Board (1965 K.L.T. 1159). This decision was rendered in appeal from the decision of a learned single judge of this Court in O.P. Nos.1042 etc. We are afraid, we cannot accede to this contention, for, we are now concluded by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court rendered as early as 1965 in Ruby Rubber Works v. Rubber Board (1965 K.L.T. 1159). This decision was rendered in appeal from the decision of a learned single judge of this Court in O.P. Nos.1042 etc. of 1963, wherein it was held thus: "The argument, as I understand it, is that what the section envisages is a collection from the manufacturer who has used such rubber and what the rule envisages is a collection from a manufacturer who has acquired the rubber, whether he has in fact used it or not. The emphasis, it is contended, has been shifted from the use which is insisted by the section, to mere acquisition by the rules. In the context in which the word "used" is employed in S.12 (2), I do not think it means actual consumption. A manufacturer normally purchases or acquires raw-materials it is not even suggested that the petitioners in these cases who are all manufacturers purchased the rubber for any other purpose for the purpose of use in manufacture. The word 'used' in S 12 (2) has to be understood as 'intended to be used'. In Idiots Asylum v. Handysides (1906) 22 T.L.R. 573; with reference to S 9 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1879 which contained the expression 'books used in the ordinary business of the bank' it was held that that expression does not mean that the books must be in use each day, because, if that were so, the moment a book was filled up and placed on the shelf, it would cease to be within the Act. "It means that a book is in use when the authorities of the bank keep the book so that they may have it in case it is desired to refer to it". I feel no doubt that the petitioners manufacturers in these cases have kept the raw-materials they purchased or acquired otherwise, for the purpose of use and that therefore they fall within the section. I see therefore no inconsistency between the rules and the section." 18. I feel no doubt that the petitioners manufacturers in these cases have kept the raw-materials they purchased or acquired otherwise, for the purpose of use and that therefore they fall within the section. I see therefore no inconsistency between the rules and the section." 18. In appeal, the Division Bench affirmed thus: "The contention of the appellant is summarised as follows in the judgment under appeal: "The argument is that what the section envisages is a collection from the manufacturer who has used such rubber and what the rule envisages is a collection from a manufacturer who has acquired the rubber, whether he has in fact used it or not. The emphasis, it is contended, has been shifted from the use which is insisted by the section, to mere acquisition by the rules." The judgment rejects the contention on the ground that the word "used" has a wider significance than actual consumption in the process of manufacture and that the mere possession of the rubber as a necessary raw-material for the purpose of manufacture by a manufacturer will amount to a use of that commodity by that manufacturer." 19. This decision has stood the test of time for over twenty years and we are not inclined to upset this judgment at this distance of time. Moreover, we are also inclined to take the same view that the acquisition of rubber by a manufacturer is presumed to be for its user and it is for the manufacturer to prove that he did not in fact use what he acquired during the relevant period. There is no such case that it was not used. It was in fact used by the manufacturer by processing it and utilising it in the manufacture of tyres. 20. Even though the learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Nariman, contended that the decision in Ruby Rubber works v. Rubber Board (1965 K.L.T. 1159) required reconsideration, we are of the view that the decision was right and requires no reconsideration. 21. It is relevant to refer to Form M prescribed under R.33 (e). The manufacturer has to show the following particulars in this Form M. The manufacturer has to give the "details of the quantity of indigenous rubber purchased/ acquired" and also rubber "imported" separately. But regarding the quantity of rubber consumed by the manufacturer, the total quantity of rubber, (both indigenous and imported) alone need be shown. The manufacturer has to show the following particulars in this Form M. The manufacturer has to give the "details of the quantity of indigenous rubber purchased/ acquired" and also rubber "imported" separately. But regarding the quantity of rubber consumed by the manufacturer, the total quantity of rubber, (both indigenous and imported) alone need be shown. The quantity of indigenous rubber "acquired" by the manufacturer is thus separately shown only for purposes of assessment and collection of duty and this is in accordance with the principle of the earlier Division Bench ruling in Ruby Rubber Works Case, that acquisition by the manufacturer is synonymous with user. The appellant has submitted the M Form and on that basis also, the assessment could be on the scrap rubber (indigenous rubber) which he acquired/ purchased. His M Form did not show separately the quantity of indigenous rubber and imported rubber consumed by the appellant. If therefore the Rubber Board demanded duty on the basis of the particulars furnished in the M Form by the appellant, the appellant can have no legal grievance. 22. R.33 D cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read along with R.33 (e). In fact, R.33D specifically refers to R.33 (e). The return to be submitted by the manufacturer under R.33 (e) has to show the rubber "consumed or used in the process of manufacture". Form M is prescribed under this rule. When R.33D therefore used the word "acquired", it has to take its colour and meaning under the Act and cannot be divorced from the user contemplated under the Act. 23. The next submission by Shri Nariman, the learned counsel for the appellant, is that as scrap rubber contains moisture, dirt and other impurities, only the dry rubber content in scrap can be subject to excise duty. For this purpose, our attention is invited to the definition of rubber in S.3 (h) (iii) which expressly refers to the "dry rubber content" in latex. In the "green book", "International Standards of quality and packing for natural rubber grades" it is stated, "Tree bark scrap, if used must be precleaned to separate the rubber from the bark". For this purpose, our attention is invited to the definition of rubber in S.3 (h) (iii) which expressly refers to the "dry rubber content" in latex. In the "green book", "International Standards of quality and packing for natural rubber grades" it is stated, "Tree bark scrap, if used must be precleaned to separate the rubber from the bark". It is also brought to our notice that in the Form K prescribed under the old rules, groups and grades of rubber have to be shown and scraps are described as either "clean dry" or "clean dry washed." Now after the amendment, there are still the groups and grades of rubber; but regarding scrap, dry weight has to be shown. From this it is strenuously argued that the intention has always been to exclude the moisture and dirt from the scrap to arrive at the quantity of rubber liable to excise duty and it did not make any difference when the words "dry weight" were substituted for "clean dry washed" after the amendment. Thus, in essence, it is the rubber content that alone is charged to duty and thus the quantity of crepe which contains 99 per cent of rubber alone should have been considered for purposes of levying duty. Moreover, it is stressed that scrap is practically the lowest grade of rubber with a larger percentage of moisture and dirt, and it would have been farthest from the legislative intention that dirt and moisture should be treated as rubber for purposes of excise duty. It is also pointed out that if the manufacturer purchased only crepe rubber from the miller, duty would have been collected only on the quantity of crepe. The fact that the manufacturer purchases scrap from the grower should not therefore make any difference, if, after purchase, the manufacturer and not the grower sends it to the millers. This, it is said, is a glaring anomaly. It is also pointed out that rubber is charged to duty at the same rate irrespective of its quality. If scrap, the lowest grade of rubber, is liable to duty at the same rate as higher grades of rubber, there is no uniformity in the incidence of duty. 24. This, it is said, is a glaring anomaly. It is also pointed out that rubber is charged to duty at the same rate irrespective of its quality. If scrap, the lowest grade of rubber, is liable to duty at the same rate as higher grades of rubber, there is no uniformity in the incidence of duty. 24. The learned counsel for the Rubber Board, Shri Joseph Vellapally, however, states that on the evidence accepted by the District Judge, facts binding on us, the price of scrap rubber is lower than that of crepe rubber. The purchase officer of the Company (P.W.1) states while mixed scrap is purchased at Rs. 7. SO per kg., brown crepe is valued at Rs. 11/-. The manufacturer is at liberty to purchase crepe and utilise it for manufacture. He does not do so, as it is in his interest that he makes a substantial profit by buying the inferior variety, the scrap. Thereafter, to say that he need not pay duty on the scrap which also is rubber as defined and that the duty is only on the lesser quantity of crepe received from the mill is to give legal sanction for a clear evasion of duty. It is submitted that as long as the Company purchases from the growers and not from the millers, they cannot rely on some hypothesis and rest its case on anomalies. 25. The return prescribed under the Rules shows the dry weight of scrap. These are the particulars available for assessment and collection of duty. Those particulars are furnished by the Company itself. Dry weight of scrap was the basis for the assessment of duty in the present case. 26. The contention that the rubber content in scrap alone attracts duty cannot be accepted. The definition of rubber specifically mentions 'dry rubber content' of "latex". There is no such specification for scrap. Scrap and crepe are both included in the inclusive definition of rubber. There is no reason to hold that scrap is excluded and crepe alone is included for imposition of duty. The definition of rubber specifically mentions 'dry rubber content' of "latex". There is no such specification for scrap. Scrap and crepe are both included in the inclusive definition of rubber. There is no reason to hold that scrap is excluded and crepe alone is included for imposition of duty. The moisture in the scrap is excluded for purposes of computation of duty under the rules, as, only the dry weight of scrap need be shown in the return in Form K. This return has to show the dry rubber content in latex, the percentage of dry rubber content in "Master batches and oil extended rubber", and only the dry weight of scrap. Thus the definition of rubber in the rules and the form prescribed for submission of the returns do not advance the contention of the appellant that the dry rubber content of scrap alone is dutiable. Scrap rubber is itself rubber under the Act and there is no necessity to find the rubber content in that rubber for levying duty. The Company's own witness, P.W.1 has said that shell scrap will have a purity of 85 to 90 per cent and mixed scrap 80 to 85 per cent. 27. The Board was, therefore, right in its assessment and demand from the appellant on the quantity of scrap rubber acquired by it for its manufacturing purposes. 28. It is true that scrap is one of the lowest grades of rubber. But it is not for this Court to hold that the rate of duty for scrap should be different and a lower rate of duty alone can be imposed on scrap. In fact, Parliament has a wider latitude under the Constitution in "classification for taxation" and to pick and choose persons and objects and to fix rates of tax. 29. In Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. (A.I.R.1984 S.C. 420) referring to the earlier decisions on the incidence and nature of excise duty, it was observed thus: "We think we have shown sufficiently that while the levy is on the manufacture or production of goods, the stage of collection need not in point of time synchronize with the completion of the manufacturing process. While the levy in oar country has the status of a constitutional concept, the point of collection is located where the statute declares it will be." 30. While the levy in oar country has the status of a constitutional concept, the point of collection is located where the statute declares it will be." 30. This Court cannot therefore strike down the levy on the ground that scrap rubber should have been differently treated for purposes of duty in view of its inferior quality. 31. Nine demands were challenged in appeal before the District Judge. The demand which was the subject matter of appeal in O.P. No. 528 of 1976 before the District Judge was sustained on the ground of limitation also, in that, the appeal was filed beyond the three months period fixed under S.12(6) of the Act. It was conceded before us that the said appeal, O.P. No. 528 of 1976, was rightly dismissed as barred by limitation. 32. In the result, this appeal has to fail and is dismissed with costs of the 1st respondent, the Rubber Board. 33. Before parting, however, we wish to make some observations. As early as 1969, the Supreme Court observed that the rules suffer from lack of clarity and are not properly worded. These observations have remained merely on paper with no attention bestowed for over seventeen years to make any significant useful amendment to the rules. S.12 imposes the 'rubber cess' and rubber is defined in S.3(h). Latex of the rubber plant, fluid or coagulated and latex (dry rubber content) in any state of concentration are both included in this definition. It was conceded before us that the dry rubber content in latex alone is dutiable and fluid latex under S.3(h) (ii) is not exigible to duty. If dry rubber content of latex alone attracts duty, the definition as it stands now, requires modification. This definition includes scrap rubber, sheet rubber, rubber in powder and all forms and varieties of crepe rubber. In Form 'K' the manufacturer has to show not only the grades of rubber, but the dry rubber content of master batches, oil extended rubbers etc. If in respect of these, duty is levied only on the percentage of dry rubber content, it is for consideration whether this legislative intent should not be clearly made out in the Act itself by making suitable amendments to the charging section, S.12, also. S.12(2) states that the duty shall be collected from the manufacturer by whom such rubber is used. S.12(2) states that the duty shall be collected from the manufacturer by whom such rubber is used. When acquisition by the manufacturer is synonymous with his user, and when R.33-D uses the word 'acquired', is it not better that the Act itself makes the provision clear to achieve this object? 34. We did note the force in the submission of the counsel for the appellant that no duty is collected from the miller for the scrap purchased by him from the grower. If the miller converts the scrap into crepe and the manufacturer purchases only this crepe, duty is collected from the manufacturer only on the quantity of crepe. But if the manufacturer purchases scrap from the grower, and sends it to the miller, he has to pay duty on the quantity of scrap itself. It was, therefore, pointed out that the Act compels the manufacturer to adopt dishonest practices of financing a miller to purchase the scrap from the grower and eventually receiving the crepe from the miller and thus avoiding the liability to pay duty of the scrap. It is necessary that this practical anomaly is statutorily avoided and if necessary, the scope of the definition of manufacturer also enlarged. 35. Even though under the Act the owner is primarily liable to excise duty on the rubber produced in India, and he has to submit his returns, the rules envisage a demand being made only on the manufacturer. If the collection of duty need only be from the manufacturer who uses the rubber produced in India, is it not better to make provisions in this regard in the Act itself, as otherwise, the object of the Act is sought to be frustrated by the rules when there is nothing in the Act absolving the owner of his liability to pay the duty. These and other allied matters require the serious and urgent attention of the Central Government for appropriate amendment to the Act and the Rules. Dismissed.