Judgment :- 1. Assistant Commissioner (ULT), T. Nagar, Madras, is the petitioner who has sought for quashing the order of the first respondent, who held even after the Supreme Court having upheld the Urban Land Tax Act in Asst. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. 1, it would not be within the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner to reassess the properties retrospectively, from the date of the enactment of the Act; because the Judgment of the Supreme Court would be operative only from the date of the pronouncement of the Judgment. It is claimed by petitioner that it is not one of retrospective applicability of the Act, but on the Supreme Court upholding the validity of the Act, it has been become operative as and from 1st June, 1963 and, therefore, even though in W.P. No. 1103 of 1967, this Court had issued rule nisi , setting aside the orders of assessment, yet, in view of what has been held in Messrs. Shenoy and Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Bangalore 2, the order of the High Court having become ineffective, the petitioner had the authority and jurisdiction to assess second respondent to urban land tax on and from 1st July, 1963. 2. Mr. K.S. Bakthavatsalam, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that W.P. No. 1103 of 1967 was allowed on 10th April, 1968, based on the order of this court dated 31st March, 1967 in and by which a Full Bench of this Court in Pattabiraman v. The Asst. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax 3 struck down S. 6 of the Act. On 11th April, 1969, Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act in Asst. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. 1. It is, thereafter, under S. 11(1) of the Act, a provisional determination of the market value was fixed at Rs. 10,000 per ground, and petitioner was called upon to make his representations by 19th May, 1975 and this notice was signed on 28th April, 1975. On 12th June, 1975, petitioner gave his representations, drawing the attention of the authority to the earlier notice issued in March, 1967. It is, thereafter, on 13th June, 1975, petitioner passed the order of assessment, calling upon him to pay tax at Rs. 259/20 for fasli year, commencing from 1st July, 1963. On 12th June, 1975, petitioner gave his representations, drawing the attention of the authority to the earlier notice issued in March, 1967. It is, thereafter, on 13th June, 1975, petitioner passed the order of assessment, calling upon him to pay tax at Rs. 259/20 for fasli year, commencing from 1st July, 1963. It is against this order, second respondent preferred an appeal to the first respondent, which passed the impugned order. He submits that on total misconception about the validity and enforceability of the Act right from the date of its commencement, the order of assessment having been set aside, petitioner is entitled to the relief as prayed for. 3. Mr. S.V. Subramaniam, learned counsel for second respondent, submits that once this Court had issued a Writ of certiorari, unless by a process known to law, it is set aside, it cannot be treated as ineffective. He would state that nothing prevented the State from filing appeal to Supreme Court and have it set aside and, thereafter, proceed to assess his property. He would also point out that several petitions filed by the State to the Supreme Court to excuse the delay in filing the appeals in all those matters where writs have been issued, having been rejected, in respect of those assessments in which the High Court issued writs, the State has do authority or jurisdiction to assess those owners of properties even though the Act had become operative on and from 1st July, 1963. In support of this contention, he relies upon the following decisions. A Division Bench of this Court in Rajah V.V. Seetharamayya Bahadur v. The Assistant Commissioner 1, took the view that in respect of a matter arising under Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax, on a writ of prohibition issued by the High Court, and it having been allowed to become final, it is binding between the parties. As the judgement of the Supreme Court setting aside the judgement of the High Court cannot be taken to be retrospective in operation for the period, prior to the decision rendered by it, the binding nature of the writ issued by the High Court has to be taken as still operative and that S. 7A of the Act does not take away the efficacy of the writ issued by the High Court. The Division Bench took note of the fact that even though a batch of 309 writ petitions were disposed of together by the Full Bench of this Court, appeals were preferred to Supreme Court, only in respect of orders passed in four writ petitions, and also about attempts made by the State to get the orders reviewed being dismissed. Then, following the decision in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India 2, and Jiyajee Rao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. I.T.O. Calcutta 3, and taking note of the fact that S. 7A has not been made retrospective and assuming that if it is retrospective, it was yet held that it will not make the writ issued by the High Court ineffective, unless S. 7A contained a non-obstante clause. He would then refer to the decision in Seshasayee Paper & Boards Ltd. v. Insp. Asst. CIT 4, wherein a Division Bench of this Court held:— “Even a wrong order has a finality and unless that finality is disturbed by a process known to law or by a process authorised by law, the rights of the assessee and the Revenue will continue to be governed by the order, of the Tribunal.” It was a case in which an order passed under S. 254(4) of Income-Tax Act had been passed and given effect to and after the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the validity of S. 80J(1A) which came into effect from 1st April, 1972, and the amendment having been given retrospective effect, in respect of notice issued long prior to the said decision, it was held that because of the decision of the Supreme Court, the order cannot be read as automatically being correct, nor is the effect given to that order automatically undone. 4. In Shenoy & Co. 4. In Shenoy & Co. v. C.T.O. Bangalore 5, in upholding the validity of Karnataka Act 13 of 1982, it was held that even though a batch of 1590 writ petitions were filed in Karnataka High Court challenging the validity of the Act, only in respect of the order passed in one writ petition, appeal was filed in Supreme Court by the State impleading only the concerned respondent therein and the Act having been upheld on 25th September, 1980 in Hansa Corporation Case 6, the authorities issued notices under the Act to all the dealers including those who had filed writ petitions earlier and called upon them to register themselves under the Act and file reports, etc. Those are objected to and writ petitions were filed in the Karnataka High Court claiming that in as much as writs of mandamus have been issued in their favour by the High Court in the earlier judgment, and was effective, since the State had not filed appeals against them, the action taken by the State, was illegal. This contention was repelled and ultimately when the matter was taken up to the Supreme Court, it was held:— “When the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal in Hansa Corporations case alone, but all petitions in which the High Court issued mandamus on the non-existent ground that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. It is, therefore, idle to contend that the law laid down by this Court in that Judgment would bind only the Hansa Corporation and not the other petitioners against whom the State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal. To do so, is to ignore the binding nature of a Judgment of this Court under Article-141 of the Constitution. The Act, therefore, was under an eclip se, for a short duration; but with the declaration of the law by this Court, the temporary shadow cast on it by the mandamus disappeared and the act revived with its full vigour, the constitutional invalidity held by the High Court having been removed by the High Court. If the law so declared invalid is held constitutionally valid, effective and binding by the Supreme Court, the mandamus forbearing the authorities from enforcing its provisions would become ineffective and the authorities cannot be compe lled to perfrom a negative duty. If the law so declared invalid is held constitutionally valid, effective and binding by the Supreme Court, the mandamus forbearing the authorities from enforcing its provisions would become ineffective and the authorities cannot be compe lled to perfrom a negative duty. The declaration of the law is binding on everyone and it is, therefore, futile to contend that the mandamus would survive in favour of those parties against whom appeals were not filed.” 5. Therefore, in the light of the said pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the rule nisi issued by this Court in W.P. 1103 of 1967 having become ineffective, the petitioner was well within his jurisdiction in proceeding to assess second respondent under the Act. 6. Mr. Subramanian made a last attempt to claim that issue of a writ of certiorari was quite different from issue of a writ of mandamus, which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. In matters like as to what was the nature of the writ issued, because the law laid down by the Supreme Court is that if the Supreme Court upholds the validity of an Act which had been earlier struck down by a High Court; then the validity on being upheld in one matter it would result in all the orders passed by the High Court being made ineffective, because those writs were issued on the basis that the Act is invalid. Otherwise, what would happen is that in respect of those who have secured relief in the High Court in respect of the Act having been made effective and valid from the date of its commencement, one set of citizens who have secured rule nisi made absolute would be outside the scope of the Act on the premise that the law was invalid in so far as they are concerned, merely because of the wrong decision of the High Court. It is to prevent such an anomalous situation being developed, it was held that, on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, upholding the validity of an Act, all the decisions rendered by the High Court on the basis that the Act was invalid would automatically become ineffective. 7. Therefore, this writ petition is allowed. No costs.