K. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dhenkanal, confirming the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Talcher, against the petitioners under Ss. 143 and 379 of the Penal Code ('i. P. C. ' for short ). ( 2 ) THE prosecution case lies within a short compass. The occurrence took place at about mid-night between 9-3-1973 and 10-3-1973 when the Fertilizer Corporation of India, Talcher (hereinafter referred to as 'f. C. I. ') was under the process of construction and installation. Within its premises there was a steel yard inside which steel rods of different sizes and other steel materials were stored. The steel yard did not have a complete boundary and a road run through it in order to facilitate vehicles to bring in and take out steel materials. The steel yard was guarded by Security Guards belonging to the Central Industrial Security Force. At about mid-night when the occurrence took place, P. W. 2, a Security Guard, was on guard duty in the steel yard. He found that a truck bearing registration No. ORC 3815 came inside the steel yard and stopped. The head lights were switched off. When he went near the truck, he found that the petitioners had removed a bundle of iron rods kept inside the steel yard and had loaded the same in the truck. They had removed another such bundle and were carrying the same to be kept in the truck. When P. W. 2 challenged their action, petitioner 1 offered a bribe of Rs. 50/- to him which he refused. P. W. 2 blew his whistle, hearing which, P. W. 6, the Inspector of Central Industrial Security Force, who was on night patrol duty arrived at the scene of occurrence along with other security guards. They surrounded the petitioners, detained the truck and escorted them to the office of the F. C. I. Petitioner 1 offered a bribe of Rs. 3,490/- to P. W. 6 in order to escape the consequences of his action, but the offer of the bribe was refused. P. W. 6 lodged F. I. R. at the police station in the morning of 10-3-1973. After investigation charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioners for offences under Ss. 3,490/- to P. W. 6 in order to escape the consequences of his action, but the offer of the bribe was refused. P. W. 6 lodged F. I. R. at the police station in the morning of 10-3-1973. After investigation charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioners for offences under Ss. 143 and 379 read with S. 109, I. P. C. ( 3 ) THE defence of the petitioners was denial of the occurrence, as well as, their participation. They stated that they had stopped the vehicle in order to take tea in a nearby hotel. At that time the security guards demanded bribe, but as they denied to pay the same, they were taken to the office of the F. C. I. , detained there, cash was taken away from petitioner 1 and the false case was foisted against them. ( 4 ) THE learned trial Court believed the prosecution evidence, disbelieved the defence version and convicted the petitioners for offences under Ss. 143 and 379, I. P. C. It sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months on each count. On appeal the learned Sessions Judge upheld the order of conviction and sentence. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioners raised the following contentions : - (1) The conviction of the petitioners was based on no evidence or insufficient evidence. (2) Petitioner No. 1 having been convicted under S. 165-A, I. P. C. on the self-same facts, cannot be convicted for the second time on the principle of S. 300 of the Cr. P. C. ('code for short ). ( 6 ) THE learned Courts below took into consideration the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4, 6 and 8 who were eye-witnesses to the occurrence and accepted their version of the prosecution case. These witnesses were present when the offence of theft of iron rods was detected at mid-night. All of them saw the petitioners inside the steel yard. They also saw that a bundle of iron rods belonging to the F. C. I. had been kept in the truck and P. W. 2, in particular, saw another bundle in the process of being removed so as to be kept in the truck. These iron rod bundles (marked M. Os. I and II) had obviously been purchased for construction purposes as has been proved by P. Ws. 5 and 7. These iron rod bundles (marked M. Os. I and II) had obviously been purchased for construction purposes as has been proved by P. Ws. 5 and 7. The evidence of these witnesses goes to show that the petitioners had no business to be present inside the steel yard of the F. C. I. at dead of night with a truck. Moreover, one bundle of iron rods was seized from inside the truck. The petitioners did not claim that the iron rods belonged to them. There is positive evidence that the iron rods had been purchased for construction purposes of the F. C. I. There is no doubt that the petitioners were caught red-handed in the act of stealing iron rods. The defence of stoppage of the truck for taking tea at mid-night appears to be palpably false. There is no ground to disturb the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the learned Courts below. I would accordingly uphold the findings recorded by them to the effect that the prosecution case against the petitioners under Ss. 143 and 379, I. P. C. had been established beyond reasonable doubt. The first contention is, therefore, not tenable. ( 7 ) WHILE stating the facts of the case, reference has been made to the fact that petitioner I offered a bribe of Rs. 50/- to P. W. 1 and then offered another bribe of Rs. 3,490/- to P. W. 6. So far as the offer of bribe was concerned, it came within the purview of S. 165-A, I. P. C. and so the charge was split up. This charge came up for trial before the learned Special Judge, Cuttack, in Special Judge Case No. 2 of 1973 in which petitioner I alone was the accused. On trial he was convicted under S. 165-A, I. P. C. and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. In Criminal Appeal No. 91 of 1974 this Court upheld the order of conviction, but reduced the sentence of imprisonment to a term of three months. On trial he was convicted under S. 165-A, I. P. C. and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. In Criminal Appeal No. 91 of 1974 this Court upheld the order of conviction, but reduced the sentence of imprisonment to a term of three months. Basing his arguments on the aforesaid facts learned counsel for the petitioners urged that petitioner 1 could have been tried for the offence under S. 379 along with the offence under S. 165-A, I. P. C. and as the above procedure was not followed, the order of conviction and sentence so far as he is concerned is barred by S. 300 of the Code. ( 8 ) SECTION 403 of the old Code which is identical to S. 300 of the new Code, except slight change in sub-s. (2) and addition of sub-s. (5), came up for consideration in AIR 1956 SC 415 , Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, and the observations of Lord Mac Dermott at page 479 in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federal of Malaya, 1950 AC 458 (A) was relied upon. The observation was to the following effect : -"the effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent Court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication. The maxim 'res judicata pro veritate accipitur' is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings. Here, the appellant having been acquitted at the first trial on the charge of having ammunition in his possession, the prosecution was bound to accept the correctness of that verdict and was precluded from taking any steps to challenge it at the second trial. "this section embodies the ancient maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa (no person should be twice disturbed for the same cause), and provides that where a person has once been tried and convicted or acquitted of an offence he cannot again be tried for the same offence or for any other offence which is not distinct from the one previously tried. AIR 1960 Andh Pra 1, Thadi Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh. AIR 1960 Andh Pra 1, Thadi Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh. Relying on the case of Pritam Singh, (1956 Cri LJ 805) (SC) (supra) it was held in AIR 1965 SC 83 , Kharkan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, that a plea of autrefois acquit which is statutorily recognised in India under S. 403 arises when a person is tried again for the same offence or on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under S. 236 or for which he might have been convicted under S. 237 (the sections referred to are of the old Code ). In AIR 1965 SC 87 , Manipur Administration v. Thokchom Bira Singh, S. 403 again came up for consideration and it was held that the rule of issue estoppel in a criminal trial is that where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent Court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of S. 403 (2 ). The rule is not the same as the plea of double jeopardy or autrefois acquit. The rule does not introduce any variation in Cr. P. C. either in investigation, enquiry or trial. It also does not prevent the trial of any offence as does autrefois acquit but only precludes evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding recorded at an earlier criminal trial before a Court of competent jurisdiction. The rule thus relates only to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent Court at a previous trial. Further, S. 403 does not preclude the applicability of this rule of issue estoppel. The rule thus relates only to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent Court at a previous trial. Further, S. 403 does not preclude the applicability of this rule of issue estoppel. The rule being one which is in accord with sound principle and supported by high authority and there being a decision of the supreme Court which has accepted it as a proper one to be adopted, there is no reason for discarding it. The aforesaid principle was followed in AIR 1969 SC 961 , Piar Singh v. State of Punjab. The rule being one which is in accord with sound principle and supported by high authority and there being a decision of the supreme Court which has accepted it as a proper one to be adopted, there is no reason for discarding it. The aforesaid principle was followed in AIR 1969 SC 961 , Piar Singh v. State of Punjab. The governing principles in regard to the plea of autrefois acquit according to English Jurisprudence are as follows : - (1) That a man cannot be tried for a crime in respect of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted; (2) that a man cannot be tried for a crime in respect of which he could on some previous indictment have been convicted; (3) that the same rule applies if the crime in respect of which he is being charged is in effect the same, or is substantially the same, as either the principal or different crime in respect of which he has been acquitted or could have been convicted or has been convicted; (4) that one test as to whether the rule applies is whether the evidence which is necessary to support the second indictment or whether the facts which constitute the second offence, would have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the first indictment either as to the offence charged or as to an offence of which, on the indictment, the accused could have been found guilty; (5) that this test must be subject to the proviso that the offence charged in the second indictment had in fact been committed at the time of the first charge; thus if there is an assault and a prosecution and conviction in respect of it there is no bar to a charge of murder if the assaulted person later dies; (6) that on a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict, a man is not restricted to a comparison between the later indictment and some previous indictment or to the records of the Court, but that he may prove by evidence all such questions as to the identity of persons, dates and facts as are necessary to enable him to show that he is being charged with an offence which is either the same, or is substantially the same, as one in respect of which he has been acquitted or convicted or as one in respect of which he could have been convicted; (7) that what has to be considered is whether the crime or offence charged in the later indictment the same or is in effect or is substantially the same as the crime charged (or in respect of which there could have been conviction) in a former indictment and that it is immaterial that the facts under examination or the witnesses being called in the later proceedings are the same as those in same earlier proceedings; (8) that, apart from circumstances under which there may be a plea of autrefois acquit a man may be able to show that a matter has been decided by a Court competent to decide it, so that the principle of res judicata applies; (9) that, apart from cases where indictments are preferred and where pleas in bar may therefore be entered, the fundamental principle applies that a man is not to be prosecuted twice for the same crime. (1964) 2 All ER 401, Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions. ( 9 ) THE aforesaid settled principle regarding S. 403 of the old Code is applicable to S. 300 of the new Code. But it is not applicable to the facts of the present case which may be analysed as follows : - the offence of unlawful assembly and theft were complete after detection thereof. The offer of bribe came subsequently. They were two distinct offences, the former triable by the Court of a Judicial Magistrate and the latter triable by a Special Judge under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. The evidence for proof of both offences were different. The evidence in the case under S. 165-A had not been relied upon in the case under Ss. 143 and 379, I. P. C. Both the cases were tried by different forums and both have ended in conviction. It cannot, therefore, by any stretch of imagination be said that petitioner 1 was tried and convicted for the same offence on two occasions. Therefore, it is not at all a case of issue estoppel and the principle of S. 300 of the Code is not applicable. The second contention of the learned counsel has also no merit. ( 10 ) ON consideration of the points raised before me, I do not think that any of the petitioners can be acquitted of the charges. The offences were committed in 1973 and more than a decade has passed in the meanwhile. In this context, ends of justice will be served if the substantive sentence is reduced to three months. The petitioners are, therefore, sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months each on each count. The sentences shall, however, run concurrently and subject to set off under S. 428 of the Code. ( 11 ) IN the result, the criminal revision is dismissed subject to the modification of sentence. Order accordingly. .