Judgment :- 1. The appellant was holding office as Manager of the North Malabar District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society Ltd., Calicut. On the ground that he is guilty of certain misconducts, a penalty of reversion to the post of Inspector was imposed on him some time in the year 1970. The appellant raised a dispute in respect thereof under S.69 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 before the Assistant Registrar who entertained the dispute. An objection was raised on behalf of the Society to the effect that the dispute is not maintainable and the Assistant Registrar has no jurisdiction to entertain this dispute under S.69. The parties were heard and a decision was rendered under S.69 (4) of the Act on the 28th of July, 1976. The Assistant Registrar held that the dispute is one which falls under S.2 (i) of the Act and that it can be adjudicated upon under S.69 of the Act. The Society challenged the decision by way of an appeal before the Kerala Cooperative Tribunal, Trivandrum. The said Tribunal allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Assistant Registrar and dismissed the dispute holding that the dispute raised is not one which falls under S.2 (i) of the Act and therefore the Assistant Registrar cannot entertain such a dispute. That dispute was rendered by the Tribunal as per Ext. P12 on the 29th of December, 1978 which came to be challenged in O.P.418 of 1979. The learned single judge dismissed the said original petition by judgment dated 12th January, 1981. The learned single judge accepted the contention of the appellant that the appeal filed by the Society was not competent. Having regard to this finding, ordinarily the learned single judge would have allowed the original petition and quashed the order of the Tribunal. But the learned single judge declined to do so on the ground that the order of the Assistant Registrar was without jurisdiction and hence the order of the Tribunal has not resulted in failure of justice justifying interference under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. The learned single judge came to the conclusion that the order of the Tribunal does not result in failure of justice on the ground that the dispute raised does not fall under S.2 (i) of the Co-operative Societies Act and should not have been entertained by the Assistant Registrar. The learned single judge came to the conclusion that the order of the Tribunal does not result in failure of justice on the ground that the dispute raised does not fall under S.2 (i) of the Co-operative Societies Act and should not have been entertained by the Assistant Registrar. In other words, the learned single judge considered it a futile exercise to remit the case for being disposed of on merits by the Assistant Registrar when he does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. It is the said decision that is challenged in this appeal. 2. The order of the Assistant Registrar dated 28-7-1976 is one rendered under S.69 of the Act. The Assistant Registrar has exercised his jurisdiction under the said section for deciding as to whether the dispute is one falling under S.2(i) of the Act. Sub-s. (4) of S.69 makes it clear that such a decision is final. S.82 of the Act which provides for appeal makes it clear that an order made under S.69 (4) is not appealable. It is therefore clear that the learned single judge rightly held that the appeal of the Society before the Tribunal against the order of the Assistant Registrar under S.69 (4) is not maintainable. It is not possible to take a different view on that question. 3. The only question now to be considered is whether the learned single judge was justified in declining to interfere on the ground that the order of the Tribunal does not result in failure of justice. Learned single judge has come to that conclusion having held that the Assistant Registrar has no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute at all. The reasoning for this conclusion is that a contract of service is not specifically enforceable even in a civil suit and that being the position, a contract of service could not be enforced in proceedings under S.69 of the Act. Even if the contract of service is not specifically enforceable, as held by the learned single judge, it is not as if the party who complains of breach of contract of service is without any remedy. A person who complains of breach of contract of service, though it is not specifically enforceable, can undoubtedly get monitory benefits by way of damages. A person who complains of breach of contract of service, though it is not specifically enforceable, can undoubtedly get monitory benefits by way of damages. It is difficult to take the view that a party who complains of breach of contract of service is not entitled to any relief whatsoever. All that can be said is that such a person cannot insist upon a particular type of relief like enforcement of the contract of service. A person who cannot obtain a decree or order for specific contract of service can be granted other reliefs if he establishes that there has been a breach of contract of service and that the action of the employer is wrongful. That being the position, it is not possible to take the view that the appellant could not have claimed relief at the bands of the Assistant Registrar on the ground that if he could not obtain a decree or order for specific performance from a civil Court, be would also not be entitled to any relief from the Assistant Registrar. He would certainly be entitled to request the Assistant Registrar to grant him monitory benefits to which he would be entitled to. R.67(4) of the Co-operative Societies Rules in terms provides that in the matter of adjudication of a dispute, what is required to be followed is principles of justice, equity and good conscience. In other words, the approach of the Arbitrator or the Assistant Registrar functioning under S.69 of the Act should not be a technical one. Decision has to be rendered taking into consideration the principles of justice, equity and good conscience If the contract of service could not be specifically enforced, any other relief which the appellant would be entitled to could be granted to him. It is the mandate of the law that the Arbitrator or the Assistant Registrar is required to render a decision taking into consideration the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. That being the position, the claim or the dispute raised by the appellant could not be rejected on a technical ground that the contract of service cannot be specifically enforced. As a matter of fact, if the contract of service could not be specifically enforced, relief in any other form could be granted to the appellant. That being the position, the claim or the dispute raised by the appellant could not be rejected on a technical ground that the contract of service cannot be specifically enforced. As a matter of fact, if the contract of service could not be specifically enforced, relief in any other form could be granted to the appellant. That being the position, it is not possible to agree with the view taken by the learned single judge that the order of the Tribunal has not resulted in failure of justice. We have therefore no hesitation to hold that the learned single judge ought to have interfered with the order of the Tribunal and remitted the case for fresh disposal by the Assistant Registrar. It is also necessary to point out that as on the date on which the Tribunal made its order as also on the date on which the learned single judge made the order, the appellant had attained the age of superannuation whether it is 55 years or 58 years. There is material to indicate that he had completed 58 years as on the date on which the original petition was filed. That being the position, the only relief which the Arbitrator could grant if the appellant was able to satisfactorily establish his case, is one of monitory benefits and not reinstatement in service. In other words, having regard to the passage of time, even if the Assistant Registrar had the power to grant the relief of specific enforcement of the contract of service, it could not have been done. The only relief which the Assistant Registrar could have granted is one of monitory benefits. That being the position, we see no reason why the case should not be remitted for disposal by the Assistant Registrar. 4. Counsel for the Society submitted that several subsequent events have taken place which have to be taken into consideration in the matter of adjudication of the dispute and in the matter of determining what would be the precise relief which the appellant would be entitled to in the event of his establishing his case. The parties are entitled to place before the Assistant Registrar all subsequent events and other materials. The parties are entitled to place before the Assistant Registrar all subsequent events and other materials. In the result the appeal in allowed, the judgment of the learned single judge is set aside, the order of the Tribunal is quashed and the case is remitted to the 3rd respondent for disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the above observations. Allowed.