JUDGMENT - Kolse Patil B.G., J.: - This appeal has been directed against the order of conviction of the appellant (original accused) under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code dated May 19, 1981 passed by the Sessions Judge, Solapur. 2. This appeal lies in a very narrow compass and a brief narration of a few relevant facts would be sufficient to appreciate the point which arises for our consideration in the appeal. The deceased Gojira was the third wife of the appellant-accused (hereinafter referred to as the accused). They were staying in a room at Tamboli Wadi, Akluj. The difference between the age of the accused and the deceased was about 20 years. The accused did not disclose about his two previous marriages to the deceased or to her relations. Only after the marriage of the deceased and the accused, the deceased and her relations came to know about his two wives and the issues from them. The deceased was all the time blaming her parents and the accused for the non-disclosure of his previous marriages. She used to abuse her parents and the accused for the said non-disclosure. All the time she kept saying that her parents had given her in marriage to an old man like the accused. It is alleged that on one occasion the deceased came to the house of her mother when she was found in a very upset mood on account of her marriage with the accused. However, her parents took her back to the house of the accused after convincing her. The deceased was also issue-less. The accused used to drink liquor every day and abuse the deceased under some pretext and beat her. Three months prior to the incident they had come to reside in the room in question. 3. On the day in question i.e. on 27-11-1981 at 9 to 9.30 p.m. the accused came home after consuming liquor. When the deceased asked the accused to take his meals he refused to take meals. Instead he immediately poured kerosene on her and set her on fire by igniting a match stick to her clothes. On account of this she cried loudly and Madhukar (P.W. 1), Khoja (P.W. 2) came on the scene. They noticed that the accused was restless and standing near the deceased. The deceased demanded from him water to drink. The accused gave her water. On account of this she cried loudly and Madhukar (P.W. 1), Khoja (P.W. 2) came on the scene. They noticed that the accused was restless and standing near the deceased. The deceased demanded from him water to drink. The accused gave her water. Thereafter she was taken to the cottage hospital (public health centre) at Akluj. She was examined by Dr. Kazi (P.W. 7) and according to him, the percentage of burns was 60 to 70%. In the case history recorded by Dr. Kazi, the deceased told him that her husband had set her on fire. Dr. Kazi informed to P.S.I. Akluj about the serious condition of the patient. He prepared a memo for transferring the patient to Civil Hospital, Solapur. On the information received from Dr. Kazi, Police Head Constable Suresh (P.W. 9), came to the primary health centre and on the advice of doctor Kazi he recorded the dying declaration of the deceased, which is at Exh. 20. The deceased was then removed to the Civil Hospital, Solapur. Shaikhlal (P.W. 12) recorded the dying declaration of the deceased in the Civil Hospital which is at Exh. 32. 4. On completion of the investigation and on the strength of the three dying declarations referred to above, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused. The defence of the accused was that of a total denial. According to him, the deceased committed suicide and she set herself on fire. 5. The accused was tried and convicted for the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer R.I. for life by the learned Sessions Judge, Solapur. The accused approached this Court in appeal. However, the appeal was dismissed in limine by this Court. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of dismissal, the accused preferred a Special Leave Petition to Appeal to the Supreme Court which was subsequently numbered as Criminal Appeal No. 873 of 1985. The Supreme Court while remanding the matter back to this Court on 17-12-1985 has passed the following order: “We do feel that the High Court should not have dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant against his conviction under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentence of imprisonment for life, without recording reasons. We accordingly set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct the High Court to hear and decide the appeal on merits. We accordingly set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct the High Court to hear and decide the appeal on merits. The appeal is allowed accordingly.” 6. Shri Kerkar, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant submitted that the medical evidence shows that the deceased was not in a position to give answers to the questions put to her at the time of recording her dying declarations. She was also unable to give lengthy answers which are recorded in the dying declaration Exh. 20 by the Police Constable. He further submitted that the dying declaration which is at Exh. 32 recorded by Shaiklal (P.W. 12) clearly states that the accused poured kerosene on her and she herself ignited a match stick to set herself on fire. He, therefore, submitted that the third dying declaration is inconsistent with the first two dying declarations. The third dying declaration also refers to a fact that the accused hit a wooden seat (pat) on the person of the deceased which is not supported by the medical evidence. He, therefore, challenged the truthfulness of the dying declarations. Mr. Suryavanshi, the learned Public Prosecutor, supported the judgment of the lower Court. 7. The prosecution mainly relied on the three dying declarations referred to above. The first dying declaration (Exh. 16) is recorded by Dr. Kazi (P.W. 7) to the effect that the deceased had told him that her husband had burnt her. The second dying declaration is recorded by Suresh (P.W. 9), the Police Head Constable, which is at Ex. 20. And the third dying declaration is recorded by Shaikhlal (P.W. 12) (the Executive Magistrate) which is at Exh. 32. Dr. Kazi in his cross-examination stated that:- “Before the dying declaration was recorded the police did not obtain my permission in writing regarding the state of the patient. The patient had then sustained burn injuries all over her face. She was looking repulsive. She was not in a position to give answers to the questions put to her. As she was having serious burns and was smarting under pain, she was unable to give lengthy answer.” This admission itself casts doubt on the truthfulness of the dying declaration recorded by Dr. Kazi (P.W. 7), and by Suresh (P.W. 9) the Police Head Constable. In the third dying declaration the deceased had stated that her husband threw a wooden seat (pat) on her person. Kazi (P.W. 7), and by Suresh (P.W. 9) the Police Head Constable. In the third dying declaration the deceased had stated that her husband threw a wooden seat (pat) on her person. He poured kerosene on her person and she herself ignited a match stick to set herself on fire. The third dying declaration is thus completely contrary to the first two dying declarations. The deceased has further stated in the third dying declaration that she was hit by the accused by a wooden seat. This fact is not supported by the medical evidence. According to the deceased one Patankar was present at the time of the incident. He has not been examined by the prosecution. Hussein Patel (P.W. 13) P.S.I. who was questioned for the non-examination of Patankar, pleaded his ignorance and went on to the extent of saying:- “I do not remember of the name of one Patankar which was in the dying declaration recorded at Solapur.” This fact itself suggests that the prosecution has suppressed a material witness who could have thrown light on the subject. 8. Sitabai (P.W. 4), the mother of the deceased, admitted that the fact that the deceased was the third wife of the accused, came to their knowledge only after the marriage. The age difference between the two was about 20 years. The deceased was also issue-less. The deceased was blaming her parents as well as the accused for her marriage with the accused and the deceased was always up-set about it. All these admissions coupled with the third dying declaration which is at Exh. 32 suggests that the deceased might have committed suicide. We also feel that the investigation was not thorough and proper. It is thus apparent from the record of the case that the conviction of the accused suffers from a serious infirmity and hence it is impossible to sustain it. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused. 9. After recording this judgment of acquittal we heard the learned Counsel for the accused on the point of compensation since we feel profoundly disturbed at the apparent travail through which the accused had to pass till we recorded his acquittal. Firstly, he has lost his wife. Evidence shows that he himself had sustained burn injuries. 9. After recording this judgment of acquittal we heard the learned Counsel for the accused on the point of compensation since we feel profoundly disturbed at the apparent travail through which the accused had to pass till we recorded his acquittal. Firstly, he has lost his wife. Evidence shows that he himself had sustained burn injuries. Added to it, faulty investigation led to his prosecution and that too he was kept in jail under an unsustainable conviction, notwithstanding the fact that the material produced by the prosecution is inadequate and totally equivocal. The misery of the accused did not end there, for when he appealed to this Court, his appeal was summarily rejected and he was required to move the highest Court in the country. By the eventual order of that Court which apparently was made because the summary dismissal was not backed by reasons, the matter was again referred to us and we made a peremptory order fixing the hearing of this matter and now after going through the record and evidence, we have concluded that there was no clear proof about the complicity of the accused as the perpetrator of the alleged crime. In fact, his say that Gojira might have committed suicide was supported by the prosecution evidence itself, being the dying declaration of Gojira recorded by the Executive Magistrate which is at Exh. 32. But, for the unfortunate circumstance, that he was prosecuted, there was no reason to come to the conclusion that he was guilty of the offence of murder. Right from 1980 till date for 6 years, for all these reasons, the accused had been languishing in jail. 10. This special circumstance in our view requires special consideration. In fact these have added miseries to the misfortunes of the man before us. As is admitted before us, the accused was employed as an artisan and by profession he is a carpenter. He was peacefully living his own life at Akluj. He has lost all that valuable life and all that valuable work. Indeed, in such situation it is difficult to dispense justice except as we think by providing some sort of restitutive measure. He was peacefully living his own life at Akluj. He has lost all that valuable life and all that valuable work. Indeed, in such situation it is difficult to dispense justice except as we think by providing some sort of restitutive measure. In this spirit and because of the facts and circumstances of the case, while recording the judgment of acquittal we have come to the conclusion that the State Government should be directed to make provision for some compensation as a token measure of restitutive justice to the accused. We quantify a sum of Rs. 5000/- as the token amount payable by the State Government to the accused as far as possible at the time of release or within one month after that. For issue of this direction to the State Government we rest on our inherent powers available under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Order accordingly.