Judgment 1. This revision application is directed against the impugned order dt. 28-7-1982 passed by Shri S.R. Pandey, Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa by which the learned Magistrate ordered that the petitioner be made an accused to face trial in the aforesaid case for the offences under Ss. 420, 465, 468 and 120-B of the Penal Code. 2. A Boring Supervisor, Work Sarkar of Minor Irrigation Department along with a few cultivators had been put on trial for the offences in a case of 1965 giving rise to G.R. Case No. 408 of 1965. The evidence had been adduced and the case was finally fixed for judgment on 28-7-1982. At that stage the learned Magistrate has passed the impugned order purported to be under S.319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be referred to as the Code). 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order at the stage at which it had been passed cannot be said to be in accordance with the true application of S.319 of the Code. 4. I am inclined to agree with this contention and there are valid reasons for the same. It appears from the facts of this case that a warrant trial took about 17 years to be concluded. On the day, when the case was fixed for judgment, the criminal prosecution has got another lease of life and the entire case has been thrown in the state of uncertainty and the process in making inordinate delay which can be said to be such which may amount in itself the abuse of the process of the court. 5. S.319 of the Code reads as follows :- "319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence :- (1) where in the course of any inquiry into( or trial of an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2)Where such person is not attending the Court he may be arrested or summoned as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (2)Where such person is not attending the Court he may be arrested or summoned as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3)Any person attending the Court although not under arrest or upon a summons may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (4)Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (I), then - (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses reheard; (b) subject to the provision of clause (a) the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the enquiry or trial was commenced." 6. Thus it is apparent from the reading of the provisions of S.319 of the Code that there is power to proceed against another person not facing inquiry or trial and that entirely depends upon the factor when it appears from the evidence that such person has committed any offence. Another relevant provision worth consideration is laid to in S.319(4)(a) of the Code. The proceeding in respect of such persons shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses reheard. 7. Therefore in the background of the provisions just highlighted when the section is made applicable on the basis that there appears to be some evidence, that stage must have commenced long long ago when the first evidence would have appeared during the trial. Therefore, the Magistrate ought to have applied his mind and if at all there was any necessity an order under S.319 of the Code ought to have been passed at a proper stage and not at the time of pronouncing the judgment and that too after the trial consumed a period of 17 years. 8. Whenever a discretion or an order is sought to be passed and exercised on the basis of the law as laid down under S.319 of the Code, it ought to be within a reasonable period and more for the sake of justice than apparently to give an impression that injustice would be caused as is in this case and continuation of such trial for an indefinite period can easily be equated with the proposition of the abuse of the process of the court. 9. 9. It is apparent that the case has lingered for about 21 years and thus the period consumed is exceedingly excessive and that will definitely cause great injustice to the other accused persons who have been facing trial and were waiting for judgment in the year 1982 10. Simply because a provision has been laid down, as contemplated under S.319 of the Code, it will not mean that that provision has to be made applicable irrespective of other such considerations which may render the trial as an abuse of the process of the court and cause injustices to the persons involved with the offence. 11. Therefore, I am of the firm opinion that S.319 of the Code, if at all, is sought to be made applicable that has to be done at the earliest at the proper stage and not belated without any justification. 12. On consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order betrays the concept of fair trial and thus on this ground also it is difficult to sustain the impugned order. 13. In the result, this application is allowed. The impugned order is hereby set aside. The judgment must be pronounced within a period of one month from today. Let the lower court records be sent down expeditiously.