Judgment :- 1. "Does a river take in the river bed?" that is the question raised in this Original Petition. It has been raised in the context of the construction to be placed on S.82 of the Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960 which reads: "82. Vesting of water course, springs, reservoirs, etc. in Panchayats. (1) All public water courses (other than rivers passing through more areas, than the Panchayat area which the Government may, by notification in the gazette, specify), springs, reservoirs, tanks, cisterns, fountains, wells, kappus, chals, standpipes and other water-works (including those used by the public to such an extent as to give a prescriptive light to their use) whether existing at the commencement of this Act or afterwards made, laid or erected and whether made, laid or erected at the cost of the Panchayat or otherwise, and also any adjacent land (not being private properly) appertaining thereto shall stand transferred to, and vest in, the Panchayat. (The proviso is not material and is therefore omitted.) (emphasis supplied) 2. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary assigned two meanings to the term 'water course'; and the second meaning is: "the bed or channel of a river or stream". Having regard to the statutory scheme and setting it can safely be stated, that the term 'water course' signifies the contour feature in which the river runs. (See Gartner v. Kidsman (1962) 108 C. L. R.12 and Knezoric v. Shire of Swan & Guildford (1969) 118 C. L. R.468). 3. It is evident that the term 'water course' as contained in the section takes in a river. There is no dispute that the Meenachil River involved in this case meanders through the areas of many Panchayats. Not being one notified by the Government as envisaged under the section, the river is not vested in the Government; it vested in the Panchayat. 4. Counsel for the petitioners contends that the term 'river' takes in only the flowing water, and does not take in the river bed or the sand it contains. 5. In a large number of cases, this Court had assumed that river in S.82 took in the bed and the sand beneath the flowing water. This, however, is no reason to summarily reject the contention when it is seriously raised. 6. 5. In a large number of cases, this Court had assumed that river in S.82 took in the bed and the sand beneath the flowing water. This, however, is no reason to summarily reject the contention when it is seriously raised. 6. Counsel for the petitioners was content with citing, and counsel for the respondents was content with distinguishing, the decision of the Supreme Court in S. N. Remade v. Union of India, A.I.R 1964 S. C. 24. That decision does not deal with the precise issue; it deals with a converse case; there is only an observation that the title to the flowing water may not go with the title of the land. That question was examined in the background of the documents of title between the parties, which had to be examined by the Court. The question of interpretation of the term 'river' in a statutory setting similar to the Panchayats Act did not arise in that case. 7. A mere mention of the term 'river', brings home to the mind of the placid waters and a pebbly bed. Rivers in rage may be turbulent; and some may have muddy bottoms. 8. It is difficult to understand the term'river' as confined to the flowing water. When it is said that a person bad a bath in the river, it cannot be imagined that he had it with his limbs dangling in the water and without his feet ever being firm on the bed. When it is stated that a ship had anchored in the river, it could not be imagined that the anchor would be suspended in the waters without touching the bottom. 9. Rivers have been always associated with their beds, in literature and in law. When poet Kalidasa described in Raghuvamsa, the river 'Thamraparni', it was with an integral connection with its beautiful bed of superior pearls. When Kumaran Asan, proclaimed in his poem: "And rivers may change their course, But never, the maiden mind, from the one she loves." the river and river bed were very much inter-connected. 10. Charles Kingsley's tragic music would ring in the ears of many: Where Mary was asked to: ".....go and call the cattle home, And call the cattle home And call the cattle home Across the sands of Dee": When "all alone went she". 10. Charles Kingsley's tragic music would ring in the ears of many: Where Mary was asked to: ".....go and call the cattle home, And call the cattle home And call the cattle home Across the sands of Dee": When "all alone went she". "The western tide crept up along the sand And O'er and O'er the sand, And round and round the sand:" And ultimately she reached her watery grave. The 'sands of Dee' was indeed the River Dee. The river in Tennyson's lines: "On either side of the river lie Long field of barley and of rye," would take in not merely the flowing water but also the bed and banks. 11. Many ancient civilizations bad been built along rivers. That impression is conveyed by the classic books on the topics, 'Men and Rivers' by Humayun Kabir and 'Rivers of History' by Edmund Gill (1970). While referring to the Murray-Darling river system of Australia, Edmund Gill noted that "as recently as 1945, one could walk across its dry shod some distance downstream from Echuca. "(The Rivers of History, page 13). 12. Verse 50 in Canto 4 of Raghuvamsa was quoted in the decision of the Madras High Court while discussing the rights about the beds of pearl fisheries. (vide the decision in A.M.S.S.V.M. & Co. v. State of Madras, I.L.R. (1953) Madras 1175, rendered by Chief Justice Rajamannar and Justice Venkatarama Ayyar.) There is much discussion about the 'wide bed of deep sand' and the digging channels "in the sandy bed of the river (often for a considerable distance) in the hot weather", in the decision in Robert Fischer & Others v. The Secretary of State, I.L.R. 32 Madras 140 when problems connected with the Vaigai River flowing below Madurai were discussed elaborately. 13. It is unnecessary to collect heaps of authorities on this question, in as much as the idea has pointedly and cogently expressed in a decision of the American Supreme Court, Alabama v. Georgia, 64 U. S.556. The passage reads: "Vattel says that the bed belongs to the owner of the river. It is the running water of a river that makes its bed; for it is that, and that only, which leaves its indelible mark to be readily traced by the eye; and wherever that mark is left, there is the river's bed. The passage reads: "Vattel says that the bed belongs to the owner of the river. It is the running water of a river that makes its bed; for it is that, and that only, which leaves its indelible mark to be readily traced by the eye; and wherever that mark is left, there is the river's bed. It may not be there today, but it was there yesterday; and when the occasion comes, it must and will unobstructed again fill its own natural bed Again, he says, the owner of a river is entitled to its whole bed, for the bed is a part of the river." (emphasis supplied) This decision bad commended itself for acceptance to the Court of Appeal in Conservators of the River Thames v. Smeed, Dean & Co, (1897) 2 Q. B. 334. (See the observations of A. L. Smith, L. J. at page 338.) This is in consonance with the principles of law as collected in the classic work Coulson & Forbes on Law of Waters. The idea is implicit when Mr. Angell states that every water course "consists of (1) the bed, (2) the bank or shore, (3) the water," (emphasis supplied) (See Angell on Watercourses, page 40). The right of private property in a water course is derived as a corporeal right and hereditament from or is embraced in the ownership of the soil over which it naturally passes. This is in accordance with the well-known maxim, cojus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum. (See Angell on Watercourses, Page 5.) The idea is clear when Blackstone states: "An action cannot be brought to recover the possession of water by the name of water only, but it must be brought in respect of the land which lies at the bottom, and the description of it must be so much land covered with water." 14. In Howard v. Ingersoll (14 L. Ed. 198) Nelson J. referred to "the line marked by the permanent bed of the river by the flow of water at its usual and accustomed stage, and where the water will be found at all times in the season except when diminished by drought or swollen by freshets.". Many such aspects are discussed in a recent decision of the Australian High Court in Ward v. The Queen, (1980) 142 C.L.R. 308. 15. Many such aspects are discussed in a recent decision of the Australian High Court in Ward v. The Queen, (1980) 142 C.L.R. 308. 15. It is unnecessary to endeavour to support the conclusion by reference to the conduct of the Government or of the Panchayat in preparing the list of rivers as including the river bed and dealing with such properties also. The conduct is consistent with the legislative intent and is in tune with the interpretation placed on the section by this judgment. 16. In the light of the above discussion, I have no hesitation to hold that the term 'river' as contained in S.82 takes in the river bed and the sand, soil or gravel that may constitute the bed. 17. There is a subsidiary contention about the alleged hardship of the petitioners and others residing on the shores of the river, consequent on the removal of the sand. Assuming that there is hardship, that is not a matter which can straightaway be agitated in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. There are no materials to indicate any attempt to raise this grievance before the statutory authorities which are primarily charged with the duty of scrutiny of such complaints, in the first instance at any rate. Even assuming that the removal of sand has caused damage to the petitioners' property, such damages, if any, have to be claimed in a suit where evidence could be adduced on the factual and legal aspects of the claim. Proceedings by way of Art.226 would not be the appropriate forum for ventilation of such grievances. 18. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the petition is a mala fide action; and various circumstances were relied on to buttress that contention. Non-impleadment of other Panchayats is one such circumstance. The 3rd petitioner is himself a dealer in sand. The respondents, particularly respondents 3 and 4, have suffered serious prejudice by the interim orders of this Court which prevented them from collecting the sand during the convenient and favourable season. I am satisfied that the writ petition is one filed without good faith. The petitioners appear to have been motivated more by their own personal interest than the projection of a public cause or grievance. This has got a bearing on the award of costs. I dismiss the writ petition with costs, including Advocate's fee of Rs. 500/-, for each of the respondents.