JUDGMENT - Dr. G.F. COUTO, J.:---Petitioners challenge by way of this writ petition, the orders dated 24th April, 1985, passed by the Rent Controller and the order dated 24th January, 1986, dismissing the application for condonation of delay, passed by the Administrative Tribunal. 2. The petitioner's case is that the first respondent has filed an application under section 22(a) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 against the late husband of the first petitioner and father of the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, on the grounds that the rent was initially paid at the rate of Rs. 6/-, but later on was increased to Rs. 10/- and was not paid by the tenant. During the pendency of the proceedings the original respondent in the proceedings expired on 3rd June, 1982 and therefore, the first respondent moved an application to bring on record the petitioners and in the same application, it has been prayed that leave be granted to sue the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 through the first petitioner. However, no order was passed by the Rent Controller on the said application. Thereafter, on 11th April, 1983 the respondent No. 1 moved an application to the Rent Controller under section 32(4) of the Act and stated that the original opponent had taken the plea of mundkarship and the said plea had been referred to the Mamlatdar and rejected on the ground that the said original opponent had failed to prove to be a mundkar. An appeal and a revision application had been filed by the original opponent against the said order, but the same had been dismissed. The Rent Controller thereafter gave a notice dated 23rd August, 1983 for the appearance of the petitioners on 12th September, 1983. The said notice was issued to the original opponent, who by that time had already expired. The first petitioner however, filed a reply dated 13th January, 1984, whereby she raised, inter alia, the plea that no arrears of rent were payable and that an inquiry under section 32(3) should be initiated. The said notice was issued to the original opponent, who by that time had already expired. The first petitioner however, filed a reply dated 13th January, 1984, whereby she raised, inter alia, the plea that no arrears of rent were payable and that an inquiry under section 32(3) should be initiated. The Rent Controller heard the matter and brought on record that the first respondent had earlier moved an application under section 32(4) which had been allowed by the Rent Controller; that in appeal to the Administrative Tribunal, the said order had been set aside and the case has been remanded to the Court to decide the question on jurisdiction and thereafter, to proceed according to law. The second respondent held that as the first petitioner had not moved an application within the time stipulated under section 32(3), the application of the first respondent under section 32(4) was to be allowed. This order was passed on 24th April, 1984 and is one of the orders which is impugned in this petition. The said order apparently was not pronounced in open Court and was communicated to the petitioners on 25th June, 1985. Thereafter, the first respondent moved an application to the second respondent stating that the petitioners had not vacated the premises and, as such, to direct them to hand over possession of the suit premises. An order was issued to that effect by the second respondent on 21st October, 1985, which order was served on the petitioners by the Bailiff of the court on 28th October, 1985. 3. It is further the case of the petitioners that on receiving the said order for the vacating the premises, the petitioners approached Advocate S. Marathe, who prepared an application and also an affidavit. The respondent No. 2 extended the time to effect the eviction on the basis of the said application and fixed the date of eviction to 9th December, 1985. The petitioners happened to mention this matter to a leader of the Muslim Youth Federation, who immediately sensed the danger and advised them to approach another Advocate. Petitioner No. 1, accordingly approached another Advocate who advised to file the appeal and actually the appeal was filed along with an application for condonation of delay as it was filed beyond the period of limitation. Petitioner No. 1, accordingly approached another Advocate who advised to file the appeal and actually the appeal was filed along with an application for condonation of delay as it was filed beyond the period of limitation. The Tribunal dismissed the application for condonation of delay by the impugned order dated 24th January, 1986 and accordingly, the appeal was also not admitted. 4. Mr. F. Rebello, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, challenges the impugned orders mainly on the grounds, namely (a) that no order appointing the first petitioners as next friend or guardian of the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 as required by law was made and as such, the order of both courts below are illegal, null and void as against the petitioners 2 and 3; and (b) that considering the special circumstances of this case the Tribunal ought to have condoned the delay in filing the appeal and ought to have heard the appeal on merits and thereafter passed its judgement. 5. As regards the first point, Mr. Rebello invited my attention to the application made by the first respondent to the Tribunal to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased original opponent, as well as to appointing the first petitioner as guardian to the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. Inspite of this application made by the first respondent, the second respondent did not make any order on the said application, particularly, he did not specifically appoint the first petitioner as guardian to the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. The learned Counsel submitted that under the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules, 1969, there is no provision as to the appointment of a guardian or next friend and Rule 12 speaks only to bring on record the legal representative of a deceased applicant or respondent in the proceedings. In the circumstances therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the order passed against the petitioners 2 and 3 is illegal, null and void. 6. Dealing with the above submission of Mr. Rebello, Mr. G. Tamba, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, submitted that an application to bring on record the legal representative of the original opponent and to appoint the present first petitioner as guardian to the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 has been duly moved by the respondent No. 1. Dealing with the above submission of Mr. Rebello, Mr. G. Tamba, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, submitted that an application to bring on record the legal representative of the original opponent and to appoint the present first petitioner as guardian to the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 has been duly moved by the respondent No. 1. There is an order passed by the Rent Controller to bring on record the legal representatives of the original first opponent, though the Rent Controller did not pass any specific order appointing the present first petitioner as guardian to the petitioners No. 2 and 3. However, this circumstance in no manner vitiates the proceedings for the first petitioner has taken active part in the proceedings, filing her apply to show cause notice and defending substantially, not only her interest, but also the interest of the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. In the circumstances therefore, it cannot be held that the interests of the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 were not property defended in the proceedings and on the contrary, it has to be held that a substantial defence was advanced by the first petitioner. This being the case, it also follows that the first petitioner though not formally appointed as guardian to the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, non-the-less has acted as such. Such representation is satisfying the legal requirements and does not vitiate the proceedings. In this connection reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on the decision of a Single Judge of this Court in (Supdabai Badrinarayan Joshi v. Subhash Kashinath Shrawak)1, 1974 Bom.L.R. Vol. LXXVI Pg. 202. 7. As it is apparent from the above submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and for the respondent No. 1 it is a common ground that an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of the original opponent has been made and that in the same application, the first respondent had prayed that the first petitioner be appointed as guardian to her minor children, namely the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. It appears that the Rent Controller passed an order to bring on record the petitioners as legal representatives of the deceased, but he failed to pass a specific order appointing the first petitioner as guardian to the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. 2 and 3. It appears that the Rent Controller passed an order to bring on record the petitioners as legal representatives of the deceased, but he failed to pass a specific order appointing the first petitioner as guardian to the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. It appears also that the petitioner No. 1 has not only prosecuted the appeal filed by her deceased husband against the order of the Mamlatdar holding that he was not a mundkar of the first respondent, but also she filed a reply to the show cause notice given to her by the Rent Controller on the application filed by the first respondent under section 32(4) of the Rent Control Act. This fact would to some extent, justify the inference that, in fact, she has substantially defended the interest of the second and third petitioners and therefore, the absence of a specific order to appoint the first petitioners as guardian was of no consequence as held by this Court in Supdabai Joshi's case. However, I may point out that the material placed by the parties before this Court is not sufficient to enable it to give a positive finding as to whether or not the first petitioner has, actually, substantially defended the interest of the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. Mr. Rebello, in this connection, invited my attention to the fact that the cause was shown by the first petitioner only on her own behalf and not on behalf of the petitioners No. 2 and 3 also. Thus, it would be necessary to investigate this aspect of the case by perusing in detail the record of the trial Court. This being the position; I am unable to answer positively, in either way, the first proposition advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. However, in my view, this circumstance is of no consequence, since this petition succeeds on the second point raised by the petitioners. In fact, it has been contended by Mr. Rebello, that in the circumstances of the case, the stand taken by the Administrative Tribunal is not condoning the delay was not justified. There is a lot of force in this contention of the learned Counsel. In fact, admittedly, the order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controller on 24th April, 1985. The said order was not pronounced in open Court and was communicated to the parities. There is a lot of force in this contention of the learned Counsel. In fact, admittedly, the order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controller on 24th April, 1985. The said order was not pronounced in open Court and was communicated to the parities. It is not disputed that communication of the said order was made to the petitioners only on 25th June, 1985. Thereafter, it appears that only in the month of July 1985, the first respondent moved an application to get executed the said order of eviction, but inspite of that, the Rent Controller did not pass any order on the said application. It was only on 21st October, 1985, that he ordered the execution of the said order of eviction. Then, it appears that the Bailiff of the Court proceeded to the premises occupied by the petitioners in order to execute the order on 28th October, 1985. The petitioners averred in para 9 of the petition, that immediately they approached Advocate S. Marathe, who prepared an application on behalf of the petitioners as well as an affidavit; that petitioner No. 1 is a maid servant and illiterate and she relied on the action that her advocate would take in the matter. On account of the said application, time for execution of the eviction order was extended to 9th December, 1985. In para 10, it is further averred that the petitioner happened to mention the matter to one of the leaders of the Muslim Youth Federation who, advised her to approach another Advocate; that accordingly, she approached another advocate who advised her to prefer an appeal. This appeal was prepared and apparently filed on 13th December, 1985. The respondent No. 1 denies these averments for want of personal knowledge, but the fact remains that though the first respondent move an application under section 32(4) of the Rent Control Act to get the proceedings stopped and the petitioner evicted from the premises and inspite of the fact that an order was passed ordering the eviction on 24th April, 1985 the first respondent did not take action to get the said order executed till somewhere in the month of July 1985. Respondent No. 1 apparently confined himself to file the said application and did not pursue the same, since an order on the same application was passed by the Rent Controller only on 21st October, 1985. Respondent No. 1 apparently confined himself to file the said application and did not pursue the same, since an order on the same application was passed by the Rent Controller only on 21st October, 1985. Then, again, the time for execution of the eviction order was extended to 9th December, 1985. In these circumstances when the first respondent did not take any effective action at least upon 21st October, 1985, considering that the first petitioner is obviously an illiterate person as her putting her thumb imprint on the notice indicates, it would appear to be true that she came to know about the contention of the eviction order only when the Bailiff of the Court came to the premises to execute the order of eviction. It is true that notice of the eviction order was served on the first petitioner, but the said notice apparently bears only the thumbprint of the petitioner and one does not know whether or not the contents of the communicated order were explained to the first petitioner. On the contrary, it would appear from the ulterior conduct of the petitioner that she was not explained the contents of the communication for, otherwise one falls to understand why she did not at all react against the said order, specially when she immediately reacted when the Bailiff of the Court came to execute the order of eviction. 8. Admittedly, the appeal was filed beyond time, but an application for condonation of delay was filed along with the appeal. The Tribunal dismissed the said application on the ground that the petitioner had approached the Court by misrepresentation of facts relating to the service of the eviction order and further, on the ground that the first petitioner had been represented throughout the proceedings by an Advocate. The Tribunal further observed that ignorance is merely an excuse under which the appellant cannot take shelter, specially when the first petitioner had been notified once again of the execution of the eviction order on 28th October, 1985 and she filed an application seeking stay on 29th October, 1985 for approaching the higher Court. Inspite of this, the appeal was filed only on 13th December, 1985. Inspite of this, the appeal was filed only on 13th December, 1985. In my view, the reasoning of the Tribunal has no force, for as I already had occasion to observe, it would appear, in his circumstances of this case, that though notice of the order of eviction was given to the first petitioner, she was not explained the contents of the order dated 24th April, 1985 and it was only when the Bailiff of the Court went to the premises to execute the order of eviction, that she came to know about the contents of the order. The fact that the first petitioner was represented throughout the proceedings by an Advocate has not much force in the light of the circumstance that the order of eviction was not pronounced in open Court and was communicated directly to the petitioners. The petitioners have explained that soon after the Bailiff went to the premises to execute the order of eviction, petitioner No. 1 approached the Advocate Marathe, who filed an application to the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller granted time upon 9th December, 1985 and the appeal was filed on 13th December, 1985. In the context of these facts, when it is apparent that the first petitioner is illiterate and the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are minors, one was bound to liberally approach the case and condone the delay in filling the appeal. The matter after all had been entrusted by an illiterate person to an Advocate and the Advocate perhaps interpreting wrongly, the order of the Rent Controller, filed the appeal with some delay, in the Administrative Tribunal. 9. It is true that Mr. Tamba, despite these facts and circumstances and relying on (Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaquim others)2, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 38, submitted that interference of this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution is not justified, for a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. No doubt, the Supreme Courts observed as aforesaid in Mohd. Mustaquim others)2, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 38, submitted that interference of this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution is not justified, for a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. No doubt, the Supreme Courts observed as aforesaid in Mohd. Yunus' case and that supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority" and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law and though in exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court of Tribunal and therefore, will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which determination of the inferior Court or Tribunal purpose to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision. But, if this is true, it is no less true that it is the duty of the High Court to see that substantial justice is done to the parties. By condoning the delay in filing the appeal, the respondent No. 1 will not loose anything and only an opportunity will be afforded to the petitioners to advance their case before the Appellate Court. The Administrative Tribunal by dismissing the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal filed to appreciate this aspect of the case and thereby failed to administer substantial justice to the parties. In the circumstances therefore, the interference of this Court is fully justified. 10. The result is that the rule is made absolute and consequently the impugned judgment of the Administrative Tribunal dated 24th January, 1986 is set aside and the Tribunal is ordered to admit the appeal and dispose it on merits, after the petitioners depositing in the said Tribunal all the rents in arrears. As the proceedings are pending since 1975, the Tribunal is directed to dispose the appeal as expenditiously as possible. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----