P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 337b of 1979 the petitioner has come forward for directing the respondents to rectify the date of birth of the petitioner and other particulars in the Service record of the petitioner in conformity with the school leaving certificate at Annexure B of this petition and also for directing the respondents to treat the date of retirement of the petitioner to be 31/03/1994 and enter the said date in the service records of the petitioner maintained by the respondents. The petition further prays for declaring that the provisions of sub-regulation (2) (with note appended to the said sub-regulation) of Regulation 8 of the Oil and Natural Gas commission (Terms and Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations. 1975 are unconstitutional ultra vires and void. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is Special Civil Application No. 3378 of 1979 joined the service of the 1st respondent-Commission as a Road Roller Driver on 19/02/1963 According to Regulation 25 of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (Terms and Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations 1975 (hereinafter referred to as The Regulations) the petitioner can serve in the Commission upto the age of 58. The petitioner left the school when he was in Standard III in the year 1947 and later joined the service of the respondent-Commission as a Driver of the Road Roller. His father got the certificate from the Padana Primary School in Dhandhuka Taluka showing the date of birth of the petitioner. The said certificate was tendered in the office of the 2nd respondent herein by the petitioner A copy of the said certificate is marked as Annexure A to the aforesaid Special Civil Application. In the first quarter of 1977 one Rasul Adam informed the petitioner that the petitioner has taken Rasul Adams school leaving certificate and on that representation the petitioner made equiries through his father and on that enquiry it was revealed that through inadvertence the school leaving certificate was wrongly issued to the petitioner which really related to Rasul Adam a person having the same name as that of the petitioner. According to the petitioner the certificate originally produced before the respondent actually belongs to some other person having the same name as that of the petitioner and that the certificate subsequently produced which is marked as Annexure B is the true copy of the school leaving certificate relating to the petitioner. The certificate originally produced which is Annexure A mentions the date of birth as 10-5-1928 and the correct date of birth of the petitioner as per Annexure B is 5-3-1936. According to the petitioner the mistake in producing the wrong school leaving certificate was because of the sameness of the names for two persons. Hence the petitioner requested the respondent-Commission to correct the date of birth. According to the petitioner in as much as Regulation 8 (2) and the Note appended thereon leaves no discretion in a suitable case to the competent authority to alter the birth date recorded for reasons other than clerical error are arbitrary discriminatory and gives absolute and unjust power to the respondents and to the competent authority. Hence according to the petitioner it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. With these allegations the petitioner has come forward with the present Special Civil Application. ( 3 ) THE respondents inter alia have contended that the date of birth as 10-5-1928 was recorded in the service book of the petitioner and in support of such information the petitioner has also produced his school leaving certificate. The petitioner has also signed in the service record and as such he is estopped from changing his stand after the lapse of 15 years. It is further contended that from the original school leaving certificate it is very clear that the school authorities have issued the same on 16-8-1962 i. e. prior to six months of joining the Commission by the petitioner and thus it is clear that the father of the petitioner got suet a certificate much earlier to the petitioner joining the service of the respondent-Commission. It is further contended by the respondents that the petitioner was examined by the Commissions doctor on 14-2-1963 and the doctor has certified that the petitioner by appearance was 36 years old. As regards this certificate by Doctor the respondent-commissions in its affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder states:the petitioner was examined by the Commissions Doctor on 14-2-1963 wherein the petitioners age appears to be mentioned as 36. As regards this certificate by Doctor the respondent-commissions in its affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder states:the petitioner was examined by the Commissions Doctor on 14-2-1963 wherein the petitioners age appears to be mentioned as 36. However this medical certificate is tampered with and there is over-writing and additions made in this certificate by which it shows that the petitioners age at that time was 3t) years. If the age of the petitioner is taken to be 36 years as on 14-2-1963 it coincides with the petitioners birth date 1928. However if the petitioner is assumed to be born on 1936 as contended by him then the petitioners age should have been mentioned in the certificate to be 27 and not 30. However reliance could not be placed on this medical certificate as it has been tampered with except what has been submitted by me hereinabove. The respondents have also denied the other factual allegations in the petition as regards the identity of names etc. on the ground that they have to be established on proper evidence. As regards the averments In the petition regarding Regulation 8 and the Note thereon the respondents have submitted that the time limit prescribed for the alteration of the birth date is just proper and reasonable that the Regulations are framed so that an employee is required to be vigilant regarding his date of birth and should apply for the alteration of his date of birth prior to the completion of his probation period that records and other evidence can be evaluated and just and proper decision can be arrieved at an early stage than at a later stage after a number of years and that it is not correct to state that sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 8 is arbitrary discriminatory or gives an absolute or unjust power to the respondents or to the competent authority in the respondent- Commission. Further that records and other evidence can be evaluated and just and proper decision can be arrived at an earlier stage than at a later stage after number of years because as per Taylors Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence the estimation of age becomes difficult in the later years and the approximation could be only to the decade to which a person may belong. Finally the respondents contended that the powers under Regulation 8 (2) and the Note thereon are well within the constitutional limit and do not offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 3536 of 1986 the petitioner has come forward for declaring Regulation 8 (2) of the O. N. G. C. (Terms and Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations 1975 as unconstitutional and void and for directing the respondents to correct the date of birth as 10/05/1930 ( 5 ) THE short facts of this case are that the petitioner joined the services of the 1st respondent on 17/11/1961 as Khalasi. As at present the petitioner is working as a Crane Operator Grade II. He has given his date of birth in the Service Register as 18/07/1928 According to the petitioner his date of birth as per the Register of Birth and Death is 10/05/1930 and not 18/07/1928 The petitioner has further contended that his maternal uncle who put him at the school was illiterate and he has approximately given the date of birth as 18/07/1928 while in fact his date of birth as per the Register of Birth and Death is 10/05/1930 In order to substantiate his contention the petitioner has also filed a copy of the extract of Register of Birth and Death and also an affidavit from one Pandya who is aged about 85 years swearing that the year of birth of the petitioner is 1930. With these averments the petitioner has come forward with the present Special Civil Application. The respondents in their reply have stated more or less the same averments that they have mentioned in the reply filed in Special Civil Application No. 3378 of 1979 and hence they need not be repeated again here. ( 6 ) MR. Tanna the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 3378 of 1979 submitted that the certificate originally submitted as regards his age does not belong to him that the first certificate has been produced by mistake in as much as the name fathers name the school the caste and the place of birth were the same for the person who ought to have had the original school leaving certificate which has been produced before the respondents. Hence such a mistake which is patent should be corrected by the respondents and if the Regulation does not permit the same the said regulation has to be considered as arbitrary and unreasonable. Mr. Tanna further submitted that the Note below Regulation 8 cannot take away what has been provided for in sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 8 or other sub-regulations of Regulation 8. Hence the Note is ultra vires to the parent Regulation 8. Alternatively Mr. Tanna contended that if the Note is construed as part of the regulation it is arbitrary and unreasonable and has no nexus for the object sought to be achieved and as such offends Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is further contended by Mr. Tanna that Regulation 8 and the Note have to be harmoniously read and if it is read like that bonafide clerical mistake occurring in the Note must be read as clerical error as is mentioned in Regulation 8 proper. The time limit provided for in the Note cannot be taken as sacrosanct since in the Note itself at its later part the rigour of time limit is watered down by stating:the date of birth may however be altered at a later stage by a competent authority if that authority is satisfied that a bona fide clerical mistake has been committed and that it should be rectified. If it is read like that clerical error occurring in Regulation 8 can be given a wider meaning. If such a wider meaning is given the clerical mistake will include the clerical mistake committed at the respondents level and also clerical mistake committed by the school authority in giving a wrong certificate to the petitioner herein. If such an interpretation is not followed Mr. Tanna says that error committed by the respondents clerk alone can be rectified and not the error committed by the clerk of the school which gave the wrong certificate. If that be so such a clause will be arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Mr. Tanna reading Regulation 8 as a whole points out Regulation 8 (6) which reads; ( 7 ) DATE of birth: xxx xxx xxx (6) In the case of illiterate employee the date of birth declared by him shall be recorded by an officer not lower in rank than a Head of office under his dated signature. Thus according to Mr. Tanna reading Regulation 8 as a whole points out Regulation 8 (6) which reads; ( 7 ) DATE of birth: xxx xxx xxx (6) In the case of illiterate employee the date of birth declared by him shall be recorded by an officer not lower in rank than a Head of office under his dated signature. Thus according to Mr. Tanna Regulation 8 as a whole is intended to see that mistake committed by an illiterate person should be rectified and that no mistake should creep in due to the illiteracy of the person concerned. As regards the time limit for the purpose of correcting such mistakes Mr. Tanna says it is ex facie unreasonable. According to the learned Counsel if a probationer is asked to submit that that he has stated originally is a mistake before his probation period is over it may even lead to losing the job itself by not extending the probation Hence such a time limit fixed is ex facie unreasonable. ( 8 ) MR. N. J Mehta the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 3536 of 1986 submitted that Regulation 8 is arbitrary and ultra vires Articles 14 16 and 21 of the Constitution. Mr. N. J. Mehta also contended that Regulation 8 (2) visualises correction of clerical mistake only and not non-clerical mistake. Such a restriction according to the learned Counsel if it were to be held as an inflexible rule of limitation will violate Articles 14 16 and 21 of the Constitution. Mr. N. J. Mehta further contended that in any event such a provision in Regulation 8 (2) has to be considered as only directory and not mandatory and as such a bona fide error must be allowed to be corrected or otherwise irreparable loss will be caused to the party concerned. The learned Counsel further submitted that there is absolutely no rationale in fixing the period within which the correction has to be made that such a period fixed is very inadequate and that as such Regulation 8 (2) which is arbitrary should be struck down as ultra vires the Constitution. ( 9 ) IT is the contention of Mr. The learned Counsel further submitted that there is absolutely no rationale in fixing the period within which the correction has to be made that such a period fixed is very inadequate and that as such Regulation 8 (2) which is arbitrary should be struck down as ultra vires the Constitution. ( 9 ) IT is the contention of Mr. N. J. Mehta that this Regulation 8 will apply only to the newly appointed employee in service subsequent to the passing of the Regulation which is December 1975 and will not apply to those employees who have been recruited much prior to the passing of the said Regulation. In respect of the limitation contained in the said Regulation 8 (2) and the Note thereof Mr. N. J. Mehta submitted the following points : (1) If the rule of limitation contained in the Note to Regulation 8 (2) is construed as only directory the petitioner must be allowed to correct the error occurred due to bona fide mistake; (2) If the period of limitation envisaged in the Note gives inadequate period to make necessary correction it will be against all propriety and as such will offend Article 14 of the Constitution. and if it is not so the same will be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 3 For this proposition Mr. N. J. Mehta referred to section 17 of the Limitation Act which states that the period of limitation was not to begin to run until the plaintiff or the applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it or in the case of a concealed document untill the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production. According to Mr. N. J. Mehta it is only now the petitioner came to know the mistake committed in giving the date of birth and as such the period of limitation must be allowed to run from the date of discovery as regards the mistake committed. Hence Mr. Mehta stated that a rule of limitation which has no connection with the date of discovery of the mistake is arbitrary irrational and violative of Articles 14 16 and 21 of the Constitution; (4) Quoting the American Jurisprudence Mr. Hence Mr. Mehta stated that a rule of limitation which has no connection with the date of discovery of the mistake is arbitrary irrational and violative of Articles 14 16 and 21 of the Constitution; (4) Quoting the American Jurisprudence Mr. Mehta submitted that if a short period only is given or if there is no adequate time afforded to assert a legal right the rule of limitation will be termed as unreasonable and arbitrary. Mr. Mehta has also submitted that if it is considered that the Resolution 8 (2) and the Note thereof is not applicable to the petitioner with equal force it can be said that no other Financial Rules or executive instructions can be made applicable to fix the period of limitation within which the correction as regards age has to be made ( 10 ) MR. Girish Patel intervened in these cases and submitted that Regulation 8 (2) offends Article 21 of the Constitution inasmuch as it affects the right of a person to continue in job till he attains the age of superannuation. The learned Counsel further submitted that inasmuch as the State can correct its mistake at any time the party who is aggrieved must also have an opportunity to correct the bona fide mistakes or otherwise it will be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned Counsel further submitted that the phraseology to the effect that mistake can be corrected itself denotes that such correction can only be made from the date of discovery of mistake and as such limitation must start running from the date of such discovery. If any other period of limitation is prescribed ignoring the fact of the discovery of the mistake it will be contrary to the established principles of fair play and justice. Finally the learned Counsel submitted that this Court must take note of the large number of illiteracy in our country and as such the mistakes are bound to happen and that this Court must in the interests of justice strike down any provisions which are detrimental to the interests of the public. The learned Counsel further submitted that the reasonable period must be relatable to the discovery of the mistake and that administrative consideration may become stronger in the last phase of ones service. ( 11 ) MR. The learned Counsel further submitted that the reasonable period must be relatable to the discovery of the mistake and that administrative consideration may become stronger in the last phase of ones service. ( 11 ) MR. VIN, the learned counsel appearing for certain parties in some other petitioner wherein the question of correction of age has come up intervenes and adopts the arguments submitted by Mr. N. J. Mehta the learned Counsel appearing in Special Civil Application No. 3536 of 1986. ( 12 ) MR. Rajni Mehta the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Commission submitted that the allegations made by the parties herein are disputed questions of fact and that cannot be decided in these Special Civil Applications. The parties cannot come forward for correcting their age after several decades and that too on the verge of retirement. According to the learned Counsel Regulation 8 (2) does not offend any of the provisions of the Constitution but on the other hand it gives sufficient opportunity to the employees concerned to correct any mistake they have committed while giving their date of birth at the time of recruitment. Further it is easy for the Department concerned to ascertain the correct age through medical examination at the early period of ones life and that is why Regulation 8 (2) makes it clear that such corrections have to be finalised within the stipulated period. The learned Counsel pointing out the Taylors Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence 13 Edition (1984) wherein it is stated that:after the age of 25 the estimation of age becomes more uncertain and that it is difficult to achieve an accuracy of even five years in estimating the age after the full permanent dentition and fusion of all centres of ossification which occurs between the age of 23 and 25. states that Regulation 312) is reasonable and workable in the interest of the employee and the employer. As regards the averments in Special Civil Application No. 3378 of 1979 the learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner therein was examined by the Commissions Doctor on 14 and the Doctor has given the age approximately at 36. As regards the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 3536 of 1986 Mr. As regards the averments in Special Civil Application No. 3378 of 1979 the learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner therein was examined by the Commissions Doctor on 14 and the Doctor has given the age approximately at 36. As regards the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 3536 of 1986 Mr. Rajni Mehta submitted that the petitioner himself has given his date of birth as 18-7-1928 and signed the Service Register and that he had various promotions from time to time and during those times also the petitioner signed the Service Register. It is the further submission of Mr. Rajni Mehta that the petitioners herein having made the employer to act upon their declarations as regards their age are estopped from contending that the age originally given by them is not correct and that the must be permitted to correct the age after a lapse of several decades. ( 13 ) IT is further contended by Mr. Rajni Mehta that this regulation though came into force in 1975 will apply to all the employees whether employed before or after the regulation has been made applicable. Regulation 3 states that these Regulations shall apply to all the employees of the Commission except to the category excepted in Regulation 3 (1) (a) and (b ). Hence Mr. Rajni Mehta states that Regulation 8 (2) will apply to all the employees irrespective of their date of appointment. Mr. Rajni Mehta at this stage filed an affidavit stating that as regards the date of birth of the employee of the Commission the Commission used to follow General Financial Rules of the Central Government and in particular Rule 79 thereof. Thus according to the learned Counsel the Commission used to follow consistently Rule 79 of these Financial Rules of the Central Government for the purpose of correcting the birth date of an employee. This affidavit filed at this late stage was objected to by Mr. Tanna stating that it should not be entertained. Mr. N. J. Mehta the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 3536 of 1986 stated that he is not objecting to the filing of the affidavit but he will argue even on the basis of such averment made in the affidavit now sought to be produced. Tanna stating that it should not be entertained. Mr. N. J. Mehta the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 3536 of 1986 stated that he is not objecting to the filing of the affidavit but he will argue even on the basis of such averment made in the affidavit now sought to be produced. As regards the filing of the affidavit putting forth the contention in respect of the practice followed by the Commission for correcting the date of birth of the employees we do not think it is extraneous to the matter in issue but on the other hand it focuses the method and manner in which the correction in the date of birth was allowed prior to the passing of the Regulation in question. It is always open to the counsels appearing for the respective parties to file any affidavit and argue the matter on its merits in given circumstances. Hence we overrule the objection raised by Mr. Tanna and permit Mr. Rajni Mehta to file the aforesaid affidavit. At this stage Mr. Tanna wants to put forth his argument on the contention raised in the affidavit filed as at present. We have permitted him to advance his arguments. ( 14 ) WE will presently consider the relief asked for by the petitioners in the light of the arguments advanced by the respective counsel. the admitted facts of Special Civil Application No. 3378 of 1979 are that it is the petitioner who gave his date of birth as 10-5-1928 and tendered the school leaving certificate which is Annexure A to the aforesaid Special Civil Application. On the basis of this certificate the date of birth was entered in the Service Register. The respondents also state that the petitioner was examined by the Commissions Doctor on 14 and at that time the petitioner stated that his age is 30. The Doctor certificated that the petitioner by appearance was 36 years old. On the basis of this certificate the date of birth was entered in the Service Register. The respondents also state that the petitioner was examined by the Commissions Doctor on 14 and at that time the petitioner stated that his age is 30. The Doctor certificated that the petitioner by appearance was 36 years old. As far as Special Civil Application No. 3536 of 1986 is concerned the petitioner therein gave his date of birth as 18/07/1928 ( 15 ) REGULATION 8 deals with date of birth and reads as follows: ate of Birth: (1) Every employee newly appointed to a service or post under the Commission shall at the time of appointment declare the date of his birth by the Christian Era with confirmatory documentary evidence such as Matriculation Certificate or Municipal birth certificate. If the exact date is not known an approximate date duly supported by confirmatory evidence to the satisfaction of the appointing authority shall be given. (2) The actual date or the assumed date determined under sub-regulation (3) shall be recorded in the history of service service book or any other record that may be kept in respect of the employees service under the Commission and once recorded it cannot be altered except in the case of a clerical error without the previous orders of the appointing authority. the preparation of service books of the employees concerned and in any event not later than the completion of the probation period. The date of birth may. however be altered at a later stage by a competent authority if that authority is satisfied that a bona fide clerical mistake has been committed and that it should be rectified. Efforts should however be made to settle the matter within the period stated above. (3) If an employee is unable to state his exact date of birth but can state the year or year any month of birth that July or 16th of a month respectively shall be treated as the date of birth. (4) If an employee is only able to state his approximate age his date of birth shall be assumed to b: the corresponding date after deducting the number of years representing his age from his date of appointment. (4) If an employee is only able to state his approximate age his date of birth shall be assumed to b: the corresponding date after deducting the number of years representing his age from his date of appointment. (5) When a person who first entered in military service is subsequently employed in the Commission the date of birth for the purpose of the employment in the Commission shall be the date stated by him at the time of attestation or if at the time of attestation he stated only his age the date of birth shall be deduced with reference to that age according to sub-regulation (4 ). (6) In the case of illiterate employee the date of birth declared by him shall be recorded by an officer not lower in rank than a Head of office under his dated signature. Regulation 25 deals with retirement and Regulation 25 (1) states: 25 Retirement: (1) Every employee other than those referred to in sub-regulation (2) below shall retire from the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 58 years. These Regulations are framed by virtue of the power conferred by sec. 32 of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act 1959 (43 of 1959 ). In the interests of the administration service records are opened and the employee concerned put on probation in order to watch his performance. The correction of date of birth if any according to the regulation has to be made before it is recorded in the service book or in any other regard kept for that purpose. The Note of the said Regulation however gives indulges to the employee to alter the date of birth before the completion of his probation period. Hence we cannot hold that the Note to Regulation 8 (2) in any way restricts or conflicts with the main Regulation 8 (2 ). Reading sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 8 which states that the date of birth once recorded it cannot be altered except in the case of a clerical error and the Note which states that such date of birth may however be altered at a later stage by a competent authority if that authority is satisfied that a bona fide clerical mistake has been committed and that it should be rectified we do not find any contradiction between these two phraseologies. If we homogeneously read the whole Regulation 8 clerical error and bona fide clerical mistake connote only such mistakes that have crept in bona fide which can be rectified without any further investigation. If the alleged mistake has to depend upon certain investigation as to the correctness of the subsequent material finished however much it is insignificant or easy of investigation that cannot come under the category either of clerical error or bona file clerical mistake. In the light of the above discussion we can just test whether regulation 8 or the Note thereof offends Articles 14 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. ( 16 ) THE procedure set up for the correction of the date of birth is intended for the smooth administration and for settling certain basic matters once for all for the purpose of giving various benefits accruing therefrom. The question of date of birth has to be settled at one stage or the other. It cannot be kept open for the employee concerned to alter it at any point of time. A reasonable time limit can be prescribed such as the correction can be made either before the age is entered in the Service Register or before the period of probation is completed. So far as clerical error and bona fide clerical mistake are concerned since they do not require any investigation it can be done at any time. If the correction of the date of birth is permitted at any time before the retirement age there may be cases wherein an employee may come forward at the verge of retirement or somewhere after the period of probation. The averment made by him as if the subsequent date of birth is correct is a matter for investigation which may be genuine or may not be so. In order to put an end to such an investigation and to once for all settle the question of age in the Service Records as far as the employee is concerned for the purpose of deciding the other consequences that flow from the date of birth given there must be finality at some stage or other. In these Regulations such a finality is spelt out in Regulation 8 (2) and the Note thereon. We do not find anything irrational in the same nor any arbitrariness in fixing such a period. In these Regulations such a finality is spelt out in Regulation 8 (2) and the Note thereon. We do not find anything irrational in the same nor any arbitrariness in fixing such a period. It is equally applicable to any employee and we are of the opinion that such a clause put in has nexus to the object sought to be achieved. ( 17 ) AS far as the Note is concerned we have seen that it is part of the Regulation 8 and not an independent Note issued de hors the Regulations framed under section 32 of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act 1959 Firstly the Note does not come into conflict with Regulation 8 (2 ). On the other hand it gives wider scope to the employee concerned to have his date of birth corrected. ( 18 ) IN the decision in Baba Visram v. Divisional Railway Manager and Others reported in 1983 GLH 600 ( 1983 (2) GLR 1162 ) our High Court had occasion to consider a case where a Sweeper in the Railway wanted to change his date of birth on the verge of his retirement. The Railway Administration in that case relied upon certain general circular which prescribed that the correction in the birth dates should be made within a prescribed time. Neither this Circular nor the time limit mentioned therein adverted to in this decision nor the effect of such Circular discussed. Further the learned Counsel appearing for the Railways was constrained to admit that the date of birth in the school leaving certificate cannot be opposed by the Railway Administration. In those circumstances the learned Judge after holding that the Sweeper did not make any fraudulent representation allowed the petition for correcting the date of birth. This case of our opinion cannot have any bearing to the facts of the present case. In the present case we are directly on the interpretation of Regulation 8 and the Note thereof which has statutory force. ( 19 ) MR. Tanna cited the decision in B. K. Suthar v. State of Gujarat and Another reported in 1983 GLH 428 ( 1983 (2) GLR 932 ) for the proposition that the date of birth can be corrected at any stage before the date of superannuation. ( 19 ) MR. Tanna cited the decision in B. K. Suthar v. State of Gujarat and Another reported in 1983 GLH 428 ( 1983 (2) GLR 932 ) for the proposition that the date of birth can be corrected at any stage before the date of superannuation. In this decision our High Court had occasion to consider Rule 171 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules 1959 On the plain reading of this rule it is manifestly clear that the Government servant has a right to the correction of entry either on the ground of apparent clerical error or any other ground including the ground of want of care on the part of the person responsible for making the entry. The rule nowhere provides for any limitation for making such an application for correction of entry. In those circumstances our High Court held that:it is therefore beyond the powers and the authority of Government to introduce a rule of limitation by an executive direction contained in the Government resolu tion since the Bombay Civil Services Rules are Rules enacted in exercise of powers conferred by proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution of India. pressing this decision into service Mr. Tanna the learned Counsel submitted that Note to Regulation 8 (2) prescribing the period of limitation has to be struck down and that there cannot be any question of limitation for the correction of bona fide mistakes. This decision in our opinion cannot be strictly applied to the case on hand. In this decision the High Court held that the Government has no powers to introduce a rule of limitation by an executive direction contained in the Government resolution in order to change the right conferred by the Bombay Civil Services Rules which are enacted in exercise of powers conferred by proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. As far as the present Regulation 8 (2) and the Note thereon are concerned they have the statutory force and as such it cannot be said that such rules are in pari materia with the executive directions given by the Government in the aforesaid reported decision. As far as the present Regulation 8 (2) and the Note thereon are concerned they have the statutory force and as such it cannot be said that such rules are in pari materia with the executive directions given by the Government in the aforesaid reported decision. ( 20 ) THE decision in Jiwan Kishore v. Delhi Transport Corporation reported in AIR 1980 SC 1251 is a case where the Supreme Court on the agreement arrived at by both sides accepted the Medical Boards determination of the age after specifically observing that it is not going into the vires in this case. . ( 21 ) THE decision in Ramamurthy v. Director of Public Instruction reported in AIR (31) 1944 Madras 187 is a case where a student through his parent wanted to correct the date of birth in school register according to the date of birth in register of birth. In this case there was a rule providing that the application for alteration will not be entertained after the student has completed the school course. Factually it was found that the students name was in the register of the school when application was first made viz. on 23/06/1942 Further in this case there was an order which stated: Such corrections should be made only the orders of the Director of Public Instruction and should be attested by an officer of the Educational department not lower in rank than a District Educational Officer or Inspectress of Schools. In these circumstances the learned single Judge of the Madras High. Court held:to have on a school certificate a date which does not correspond with the certificate of the register of births is not only absurd but is one which should not be permitted to remain by any public authority. If the register of births is maintained under the public authority. then it Is proper that all Government documents should bear the date as shown in those registers and that information given to them by muddled or ignorant parents should not be finally and irrevocably relied upon. (The Director of public Instruction was directed to correct the mistake in the school certificate and bring it in consonance with birth register.) ( 22 ) MR. (The Director of public Instruction was directed to correct the mistake in the school certificate and bring it in consonance with birth register.) ( 22 ) MR. Tanna brought to our notice the judgment rendered by a Bench of our High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1142 of 1976 dated 30/11/1976 In this case the Engineer of the Gujarat Electricity Board challenged his premature retirement before his reaching the age of superannuation namely 58 years. In Regulation 72 there is a provision to the effect that the appointing authority may without assigning any reasons retire an employee by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months salary in lieu of such notice. The Regulation further states that if such a person is not coming under the definition of workman under the Industrial Disputes Act such an official can be retired compulsorily on or after the date on which he attains the age of 50 years. The Note appended to this Regulation inter alia. states that certain criteria and procedure should be observed to ensure uniform and equitable application of the said provision. It states:six months before an employee of the Board attains the age of 50/55 years his record should be carefully examined by the authority competent to make appointment to the post which he is holding whether in an officiating or substantive capacity and a decision should be taken as to whether he would be retired on attaining the age of 50/55 years. The learned Counsel for the Officer concerned on this Note contended that if the procedure set up in this Note is followed the Officer cannot be retired until he reaches either the age of 55 or 58 years. Construing this Note the Bench held that what the Note provides is only the procedural aspect to facilitate the implementation of the main provision which clothes the appointing authority with a power to retire an Officer either on his attaining the age of 50 years or any time thereafter. Hence according to the Bench the Note No. 1 cannot in any way limit the scope of the proviso (b) which clothes in clear terms the appointing authority with a power to retire an employee on or after the date on which he attains the age of 50 years. Pressing this into service Mr. Hence according to the Bench the Note No. 1 cannot in any way limit the scope of the proviso (b) which clothes in clear terms the appointing authority with a power to retire an employee on or after the date on which he attains the age of 50 years. Pressing this into service Mr. Tanna stated that the Note in the present case cannot in any way restrict the right given in the main regulation for the purpose of correcting the age. We are not able to appreciate this argument in as much as the Note is a substantive provision if read along with the main Regulation and it cannot be said that the Note deals with only the procedural aspect of it. As we have already observed the Note and the Regulation must b construed as a whole each portion throwing light if need be on the rest. ( 23 ) THUS from the foregoing discussion it is clear that if a period of limitation has been put in by a validly enacted law the same cannot be construed as without authority. From the foregoing discussion it is also further clear that if the employee concerned on his own volition gives the date of birth and fails to correct the same within the period mentioned in Regulation 8 (2) and the Note thereon he cannot have unlimited period to correct the age already given The expression clerical error denotes such error which does not require any investigation as such and the mistake has occurred in copying the date already given by the concerned employee. The argument of Mr. Tanna that the clerical error committed by the school authorities or that of Mr. Mehta that the error committed by the relation of the party concerned should also come under clerical error and as such can be corrected cannot be accepted since such errors alleged depend upon investigation as to the genuineness of the same. The argument of the learned Counsels appearing for the petitioners to the effect that the party should be allowed to correct the mistakes and such correction can be made by the parties concerned only from the date on which they come to know of the same and that as such the period of limitation must run from the date of knowledge cannot be appreciated. There must be finality with regard to the date of birth given by an employee concerned and a reasonable opportunity must be given to the employee to have the date of birth corrected In order to give such a reasonable opportunity the employee is permitted to give his date of birth supported by valid documents and that if he is able to find any mistakes. the employee is also given time up till his probation period is completed or the service record is prepared for the purpose of correcting any mistake. Regulation 10 gives the period of probation for a given employee. As per this Regulation the probation can be for a maximum period of three years in a given post. During that period the employee concerned can have ample opportunity to have his date of birth corrected provided there is same mistake in it. After having given the date of birth and after having made the employer concerned to act upon the same it is too much for at employee to demand that he must have a right to correct the same at any time before his retirement. The reasonable period agitated by the learned Counsels appearing for the petitioners is not wanting in the present regulations. The Regulations provide for such reasonable period as stated above and in our opinion this period given by the Regulation can be taken as a reasonable period. Mr. N. J. Mehta no doubt submitted that if the rule provides an unreasonably short period or denies adequate time to assert legal rights such a rule must be considered as unreasonable and arbitrary. For this proposition the learned Counsel read 51 American Jurisprudence 611 wherein it is stated. However all statutes of limitation must proceed on the theory that the party has full opportunity accorded to him to try his rights in the Courts and where a statute of limitations would operate so as to bar all recovery without any allowance of time for the commencement thereof in future it is usually deemed to be unconstitutional in its operation on vested rights. It is not within the power of the legislature under the guise of a limitation provision to cut off an existing remedy entirely since this would amount to a denial of justice and manifestly an existing right of action cannot be taken away by legislation which shortens the period of limitation to a time that has already run. Accordingly it is a common practice for legislatures in adopting new statutes of limitation to expressly provide for the enforcement of existing rights of action although such a provision is not essential to the validity of limitation statutes if a reasonable time is given for the enforcement of the right before the bar takes effect. In American Jurisprudence it has been made clear that the only restriction upon the legislature on the enactment of statutes of limitation is that a reasonable time be allowed for suits upon causes of action theretofore existing. In is also clear from the said Jurisprudence that a time not unreasonably short for the beginning of actions may be fixed by the legislature having in view particular conditions without violating the due process clause of the Federal Constitution The above said observation in the American Jurisprudence in our opinion does not restrict a legislation fixing the period of limitation if it is found reasonable. As we have already observed the regulation which has a statutory effect give a reasonable period for correcting the date of birth and as such it cannot be construed that it offends Arts. 14 16 or 21 of the Constitution. The argument that the party should be allowed to correct the mistakes reckoning the limitation period from the date of his knowledge cannot have any substance since the party himself for the purpose of opening of service record on his own volition gives the date of birth by substantiating the same with documents. Having done so and having made the authorities concerned to act on the basis of such assertion it is too much to assert that the party gets knowledge of the mistake at a later date. Even for such contingencies a reasonable period of limitation is fixed as per the provision of Regulation 8 (2 ). Thus in our opinion the regulation as such which has a statutory effect is valid and it has to the considered as mandatory. The argument of Mr. Even for such contingencies a reasonable period of limitation is fixed as per the provision of Regulation 8 (2 ). Thus in our opinion the regulation as such which has a statutory effect is valid and it has to the considered as mandatory. The argument of Mr. Girish Patel as if the limitation visualised offends Article 21 of the Constitution since the right of person to continue in job up till he attains the age of superannuation Is also not tenable. It is the party concerned that has given the date of birth with necessary documents and opted for having the said date entered in the Service Register. Having made the authorities concerned to act upon such a statement it is too much on the part of the party concerned to contend that his date of birth is different and on the basis of such a date of birth his superannuation date will be extended and that any curtailment in such a superannuation date will be offending Article 21 of the Constitution. ( 24 ) WE have already held that Regulation 8 (2) and the Note thereon do not conflict with each other. Reading homogeneously Regulation 8 (2) with the Note Regulation 8 (2) restricts the correction of the age which has been entered into the service record white the Note gives the period of limitation within which the same can be corrected. Instead of restricting the scope of correction the Note to Regulation 8 (2) gives latitude to the party concerned to have his age corrected. Further the expression without the previous orders of the appointing authority occurring in Regulation 8 (2) in our opinion qualifies only cases where there are clerical errors. If that be so it is not correct on the part of the petitioners to contended that errors which are non-clerical errors can be corrected by the previous orders of the appointing authority. Thus the Note confirms what is stated in Regulation 8 (2) and enlarges the scope of correction either before the preparation of the Service Book and in any event before the completion of the probation period. Repeating further we hold that as regards the correction of clerical mistake the Note recommends to have such correction of clerical error preferably within a period before the preparation of the Service Book or before the completion of the probation period. Repeating further we hold that as regards the correction of clerical mistake the Note recommends to have such correction of clerical error preferably within a period before the preparation of the Service Book or before the completion of the probation period. Thus we do not find any conflict between Regulation 8 (2) and the Note appended to the same. In view of the above said observation there is no need for referring to the interpretation of statutes except referring to the decision in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf reported in AIR 1975 SC 1758 for the completion of the arguments submitted by the respective Counsels. In this decision the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the interpretation of statutes and the effect of the proviso to statutes. In that case the Supreme Court observed:if on a fair construction the principal provision is clear a proviso cannot expand or limit it. A proviso must be limited to the subject matter of the enacting clause. A proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. In is not a separate or independent enactment. Continuing the Supreme Court held:to expand the enacting clause inflated by the proviso sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso although the golden rule is to read the would section inclusive of the proviso in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious constructionsthe proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole each portion throwing light if need be on the rest. The true principle undoubtedly is that the should interpretation and meaning of the statute on a view of the enacting clause saving clause and proviso taken and construed together is to prevail. The true principle undoubtedly is that the should interpretation and meaning of the statute on a view of the enacting clause saving clause and proviso taken and construed together is to prevail. Even as per the Supreme Court decision it is necessary that the whole Regulation 8 including the Note which is in the nature of a proviso has to be read harmoniously and if so read we do not find any conflict between Regulation 822) and the Note thereon ( 25 ) FINALLY we would like to discuss the right or the petitioners in these two applications to have the date of birth corrected. The main thrust of the argument in respect of this contention is that the petitioners herein were recruited much earlier to the passing of the Regulations in question and as such they are not bound by the Regulation. If that be so according to the learned Counsels appearing for the petitioners the authorities concerned must examine the contention of the petitioners and pass orders regarding the correct date of birth. In this connection Mr. Rajni Mehta filed an additional affidavit which we have adverted to in paragraph supra. According to Mr. Rajni Mehta Financial Rule 79 and the decision of the Government of India on the said rule governed the employees who were inducted into service prior to the passing of the present Regulations. Rule 79 of the General Financial Rules reads as follows:79 Date of Birth.- (1) Every person newly appointed to a service or a post under Government shall at the lime of the appointment declare the date of birth by the Christian era with as far as possible confirmatory documentary evidence - such as a matriculation certificate municipal birth certificate and so on. If the exact date is not known an approximate date shall be given. (2) the actual date or the assumed date determined under Rule 80 shall be recorded in the history of service service book or any other record that may be kept in respect of the Government servants service under Government and once recorded it cannot be altered except in the case of a clerical error without the previous orders of a Department of the Central Government or an administrator. Government of Indias decision on Financial Rule 79 reads as follows: government OF INDIAS DECISION (1) Procedure for alteration of date of birth in service records. Government of Indias decision on Financial Rule 79 reads as follows: government OF INDIAS DECISION (1) Procedure for alteration of date of birth in service records. Requests for alteration of date of birth should not be entertained after the preparation of the Service Books of the Government servants concerned and in any event not later than the completion of the probation period or declaration of quasi-permanency whichever is earlier. The date of birth may however be altered at a later stage by a competent authority it that authority is satisfied that a bona fide clerical mistake has been committed and that it should be rectified. Efforts should however be made to settle the matter within the period stated above. Pressing into service the Financial Rule and the Government of Indias decision Mr. Rajni Mehta submitted that even as per this Financial Rule and the Government of Indias decision which were made applicable to the employees of the Commission the petitioners even though employed prior to the passing of the present Regulations are bound to correct the mistake if any either before the preparation of the Service Register or before their probation period comes to an end. No doubt Mr. Rajni Mehta fairly states that these rules have not been adopted as such by the Commission. In the decision in Manak Chand v. State of H. P. reported in 1976 (1) SLR 402 the High Court of Himachal Pradesh observed that the Financial Rule cannot limit the exercise of the right of the Government Servant to show that the recorded entry is erroneous. After referring to the Financial Rule 79 of the General Financial Rules and the decision of the Government of India under this Rule 79 the Himachal Pradesh High Court observed: A provision determining when the application should be entertained has the effect of limiting the exercise of the right of the Government servant to show that the recorded entry is erroneous. Such limit can be imposed only by a provision having the force of law. If it does not have the force of law and is merely an executive direction without sanction of law it cannot affect the exercise of the Government servants right to show that the recorded entry is erroneous. Such limit can be imposed only by a provision having the force of law. If it does not have the force of law and is merely an executive direction without sanction of law it cannot affect the exercise of the Government servants right to show that the recorded entry is erroneous. Now the Government of India decision on which the respondents rely does not have the status of a statutory rule and therefore cannot defeat the legal right of the Government servant mentioned above. So far as it affects the determination of the true date of birth it must be considered ultra vires for the reasons set out above. This observation is in respect of the right of a Government Servant to correct his date of birth. The Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court considered this right in relation to Art. 311 (2) and held that if any limit for correcting the age of a Government Servant is contemplated it can be made by a provision having the force of law but not by a decision of the Government. Thus from the above said decision it is clear that if any rule is made which has a statutory effect the period of limitation can be imposed for making necessary correction regarding the age of an employee. If we were to hold that Regulation 8 cannot apply to the employees recruited before the coming into force of the regulation as per the ratio of the above said decision such of those employees who have been recruited before the regulation coming into force can have the age corrected without adhering to the period of limitation mentioned in Regulation 8 (2) and the Financial Rule 79. Even in the decision in B. K Suthar v. State of Gujarat and Anr. reported in 1983 GLH 428 ( 1983 (2) GLR 932 ) our High Court has held that it is beyond the powers and the authority of the Government to introduce a rule of limitation by an executive direction. Thus from the above proposition of law and in view of the admitted fact that Financial Rule 79 has not been made applicable to the O. N. G. C. it is too much on the part of Mr. Thus from the above proposition of law and in view of the admitted fact that Financial Rule 79 has not been made applicable to the O. N. G. C. it is too much on the part of Mr. Rajni Mehta to contend that if Regulation 8 (2) is not applicable to the employees who were inducted into service prior to the coming into force of such regulation then Financial Rule 79 is applicable. ( 26 ) THE next contention of Mr. Rajni Mehta to the effect that Regulation 8 will apply both to the employees recruited prior to and after the passing of the Regulation. We are afraid we cannot appreciate this argument. As we have disclosed already Regulation 8 (2) clearly mentions every employee newly appointed to a service. Reading the regulation as a whole the legislation clearly emphasises such of those regulation which will apply to the newly appointed persons in contra-distinction to such of those employees which will apply equally to all the employees who were recruited before or after the coming into force of the Regulations. The argument of Mr. Rajni Mehta to the effect that the to laws of limitation are only procedural laws and as such they will have a retrospective effect can be answered easily through the principle laid down in the decision in B. K. Suthar v. State of Gujarat and Anr. reported in 1983 GLH 428 ( 1983 (2) GLR 932 ). In the case where law prescribes certain procedure no person can have any vested right. But this rule has an exception In a case where such law of limitation destroys a cause of action which has accrued to a party and does not merely curtail the period of limitation within which he must enforce that cause of action. In this connection Mr. N. J. Mehta also cited a decision reported in Narayan v. State of Kerala (1973 (1) SLR 528) In this case the Kerala High Court examined the G. O. which is Ex. P-19 in that case which ran as follows:government have examined the matter and are pleased to order that except in the exceptional cases where it has been adequately made out that the concerned Officer did not and could not have an opportunity to make his request. P-19 in that case which ran as follows:government have examined the matter and are pleased to order that except in the exceptional cases where it has been adequately made out that the concerned Officer did not and could not have an opportunity to make his request. requests for correction or alteration of dates of birth of Government servants will not be allowed within two years of date of their retirement. The learned Judge correctly observed that such a rule in the G. O. as clearly exhibited in that case as to how it will not apply to the petitioner therein and is taken it cannot come in the way correcting the age. On those circumstances the petition was allowed with a direction to the Government to consider the application of the petitioner therein for correction of age in accordance with law Further in the decision in P. Nagamuni v. Government of A. P reported in AIR 1981 SC 864 cited by Mr. N. J. Mehta the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the rule which states that application for correction of age should be filed within 90 days of 10/02/1976. This rule was issued in G. O. Ms. No. 50 Finance and planning (F. R I.) Department dated 10/02/1976 In that case the Supreme Court observed that the aforesaid rule will govern those cases only in which the cause of action for applying for rectification of the date of birth arose prior to 10/02/1976 This case by analogy may be applied to the present case for the proposition that the regulation which came into force in December 1975 cannot be made applicable to the employees who entered into service prior to that date. In yet another case cited by Mr. N. J. Mehta reported in State of J. and K. v. T. N. Khosa ( AIR 1974 SC 1 ) the Supreme Court observed that A rule which classifies such employees for promotional purposes undoubtedly operates on those who entered service before the framing of the rule but it operates in future in the sense that it governs the future right of promotion of those who are already in service. The impugned rules do not recall a promotion already made or reduce a pay-scale already granted. Mr. The impugned rules do not recall a promotion already made or reduce a pay-scale already granted. Mr. Tanna also cited the decision in K. S. Nair v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission reported in 1974 GLR 7 for the proposition that whatever circulars are issued by the Central Government for information and guidance are not binding on the O. N. G. C. as such Thus the authorities have laid down that where a party is deprived of his right of action or his cause of action is destroyed by a statute of limitation then the Court would hesitate before giving such a statute a retrospective effect. Thus the legal position is that if the new law of limitation destroys cause of action which was vested in a party or makes it impossible for that party for the exercise of its vested right of action then Courts would not read legislative intent of giving retrospectively to the new provision. This principle is reasonable and can be tested by the following examples if the party has already completed his probation and his service records are opened and if the regulation which comes much later restricts such a party to have his age corrected either before the probation period is over or his service record is opened it will completely shut down the gate for such a party to have his age corrected which he otherwise would have had but for this regulation. That is why in our opinion Regulation 8 clearly states every employee newly appointed. These words in our opinion clearly indicate that Regulation 8 (2) applies only to such of those employee who have been inducted into service subsequent to the passing of the Regulations. ( 27 ) THUS from the foregoing discussion we hold that Regulation 8 and the Note thereon do not offend any of the provisions of the Constitution and the same is valid and enforceable. As regards the petitioners in these petitions are concerned. Regulation 8 (2) cannot be made applicable to them since they were inducted into service prior to the coming into force of these Regulations. ( 28 ) HENCE the competent authority in these cases is directed to examine the question regarding the correction of date of birth alleged by the petitioners herein and to dispose of the petitioners prayers by reasoned orders expeditiously and preferably before 31-10-1986. ( 28 ) HENCE the competent authority in these cases is directed to examine the question regarding the correction of date of birth alleged by the petitioners herein and to dispose of the petitioners prayers by reasoned orders expeditiously and preferably before 31-10-1986. The petitioners in these petitions are directed to put in their applications making their request for correction of date of birth to the competent authority within two weeks from this date with supporting and corroborating proof such as birth dates of their brothers sisters from their school registers and other corroborating material. ( 29 ) UNLESS and until it is found that the recorded birth date is required to be corrected the recorded birth date has to be acted upon. But as and when the birth date is corrected it is to be given full effect by reinstating and continuing such employees till his age of superannuation according to the corrected birth date including continuing of service wages and consequential benefit for the interim period. This is not only in accordance with the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam v. Daksha Prasad Deka reported in AIR 1971 SC 173 paragraph 4 but will also discourage such requests in the last years before retirement not leaving reasonable time to investigate and ascertain the truth. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case observed as follows:the date of compulsory retirement under F. R. 56 (a) must in oar judgment be determined on the basis of the service record and not on what the respondent claimed to be his date of birth unless the service record is first corrected consistent with the appropriate procedure. A public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in the service record and may apply for correction of the record. But until the record is corrected he cannot claim that he has been deprived of the guarantee under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution by being compulsorily retired on attaining the age of superannuation on the footing of the date of birth entered in the service record. But until the record is corrected he cannot claim that he has been deprived of the guarantee under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution by being compulsorily retired on attaining the age of superannuation on the footing of the date of birth entered in the service record. ( 30 ) IN the result these petitions are partly allowed and rule is made absolute in each of these petitions by directing the respondent- Commission to examine the question regarding correction of date of birth as alleged by the petitioners herein and to dispose of the petitioners prayers for correction of date of birth by reasoned orders as expeditiously as possible and preferably before 31-10-1986 and the petitioners shall make their applications with proof and corroborative material within two weeks from this date and in case of such petitioner where the case for correction of birth date is established the Commission shall give effect to such corrected birth date of the petitioner concerned by reinstating and continuing such employee till his superannuation according to the corrected date of birth including continuity of service and wages for the intervening period. There will be no order as to costs. Mr. Tanna the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 3378 of 1979 states that in as much as pursuance of the directions given by this Court time upto 31/10/1986 is made available to parties for disposal of the representation his client should be continued in service at least upto 31/10/1986 since on the date of the judgment he is in service. He further requests that 15 days time should be granted thereafter so that if a decision is delivered against his client he can approach the appropriate forum against the decision of Q. N G. C. Mr. Tanna further submits that if the Court is not inclined to grant the first prayer Mr. Tannas client would like to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court even otherwise on merits and the usual time required to move the Supreme Court is four to six weeks and hence the status quo as in force today may be continued for six weeks from today. In substance in both these prayers. Mr. Tanna wants this his client may be continued in service until he prefers an appeal to the Supreme Court or until the Commission decides the correct date of birth. In substance in both these prayers. Mr. Tanna wants this his client may be continued in service until he prefers an appeal to the Supreme Court or until the Commission decides the correct date of birth. We have in paragraph supra clearly stated. quoting the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Daksha Prasad Deka reported in AIR 1971 SC 173 that the party cannot be allowed to continue once the superannuation is much of according to the original recorded date of birth in the Service Register. Whatever right that accures subsequent to the investigation and decision by the authorities concerned that can always be given to the party concerned. No doubt the client of Mr. Tanna is continued in service up till the date of this j udgment. This is because of the fact that originally a stay was granted and that was being continued in spite of the fact that the Service Records will show that the petitioner has exceeded the period of superannuation on the basis of the date of birth given originally. That cannot be the ground for continuing the petitioner in service any further. Hence both these prayers by which in effect the petitioner wants to continue in service are rejected. Rule made absolute .