JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - Heard counsel for the parties. 2. Against the order of the Vice Chancellor declining to accord approval to the removal of the Principal by order dated 28th May, 1985, the Managing Committee and the Trust made reference to the Chancellor on 6th July, 1984 under Section 68 of the State Universities Act Tire Chancellor has rejected tho same on ground that the person competent to refer is not the Authorised Controller who has taken over the Management with effect from 11th June, 1984 having been appointed in exercise of powers under Section 58 of the Act. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the expression "person aggrieved" appearing in Section 68 of the Act be widely construed and that the trust in any case has sufficient interest in making the reference to the Chancellor against the order of the Vice Chancellor refusing to accord approval to the removal of the Principal. It is pleaded also that the Managing Committee was there in picture when the order of removal was passed and when the same was disapproved by the Vice Chancellor and hence they should be deemed to have sufficient interest in the matter. 4. From the above it manifest that the Authorised Controller has taken over charge with effect from 11th June, 1984 being appointed to manage the Institution in exercise of powers under Section 58 of the Act. As a result the management has been placed in a state of suspended animation. In view of the provisions made under Section 58(1) the charge taken by the Authorised Controller is to the exclusion of the Management which is defined in Section 2 (13) of the Act. The Management is a creation of statute and the order impugned passed of removal of the Principal was by the Management in exercise of powers conferred upon it and exercisable by the Management in its discretion and upon judgment arrived or a consideration of relevant material as contemplated under Section 35 (2) of the Act For so long as the Management remains, in office it is not the Trust but the Managing Committee, which is competent to make the order for removal of the Principal The Authorised Controller by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 58 represents the Management for all practical purposes. He cannot be said to be a stranger. He represents the same body. He cannot be said to be a stranger. He represents the same body. The powers and the authority of management for so as Authorised Controller remains in office are exercisable by him and the management may not function. It is not disputed too that there is no Stay against the functioning of the Authorised Controller. His appointment is under challenge in a separate proceeding but on that account his appointment is not in abeyance. The Chancellor may not therefore, be said to have committed an error apparent on the face of the record in being of the view that the Management for the time being vests in the Authorised Controller, the statutory authority and for so long as he represents the same, the Trust or the Managing Committee may not be considered to be the person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 68 of the Act. 5. For the petitioner reference has been made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed and others, AIR 1976 SC 578 Exception may not be taken to the proposition that the expression "person aggrieved" is to be widely interpreted but in each case this is in the context of the factual situation. Whereas in the present case the order of removal of the Principal may be passed by the Management alone and the Authorised Controller represents the same with the further fact that for the time being the Management is expressly excluded by the statute it may not be claimed that the person aggrieved is not the Authorised Controller but the Management, To put this in other words the locus of the Management to represent to the Chancellor is undenied - but let us not overlook that it is the Authorised Controller who is for the time being the Management. 6. For the above, the petition fails and is dismissed in limine. 7. Immediately on the pronouncement of this judgment the learned counsel for the petitioner made oral prayer for grant of certificate for leave to the Supreme Court. In the absence of and Substantial question of law of general importance requiring decision of the Supreme Court arising the leave asked for is refused.