JUDGMENT - B.A. MASODKAR, J.:---This appeal has been placed before us by reason of the order made by the learned Single Judge (Couto, J.) sitting at Goa, Panaji Bench, on September 13, 1985. By that order, the learned Single Judge felt that the matter should be heard by a Division Bench, for the Court was competent to convert the order of acquittal and convict the appellant-accused under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code by reason of the evidence which indicated the complicity of the appellant-accused for having committed such an offence. In the view of the learned Judge, the conviction of the accused under section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 2. Briefly stated, that order came to be made in the appeal filed by the present appellant-accused, Kusta Balsu Kandnekar, being Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1985. That appeal was filed through jail questioning his conviction by the Sessions Judge, Margao, for the offence under section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code and awarding the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for four years. While hearing that appeal, the learned Single Judge felt that the judgment under appeal prima facie indicated that there was miscarriage of justice, inasmuch as the offence with which the appellant-accused should have been convicted was under section 302 and not section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code. Having so found, the learned Single Judge felt that such a result could be reached even in the appeal filed by the accused by reason of the power conferred upon the High Court under section 401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973. 3. We have carefully gone through the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The said judgment indicates that the learned Single Judge was of the view that revisional powers are available to the High Court so as to substitute the conviction in place of the acquittal which is recorded by the trial Judge. For that, reliance was placed mainly on two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in the cases of (Ramesh Chandra v. A.P. Jhaveri)1, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 84 and (Delhi Municipality v. Girdharilal Sapuru)2, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1169. 4. Reading of those two judgments does not indicate that such a course if permissible. For that, reliance was placed mainly on two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in the cases of (Ramesh Chandra v. A.P. Jhaveri)1, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 84 and (Delhi Municipality v. Girdharilal Sapuru)2, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1169. 4. Reading of those two judgments does not indicate that such a course if permissible. The latter judgment Delhi Municipality v. Girdharilal Sapuru, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1169 dealt with the case of an order of discharge, while the 1973 judgment Ramesh Chandra v. A.P. Jhaveri, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 84 dealt with the case where the High Court set aside acquittal based on compounding of a non-compoundable offence in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and directed retrial of the accused in accordance with law. The ratio as well as the principles of both these cases are not attracted in the present case. If we were to go by the reasoning available in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, then the acquittal under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code will have to be set aside and the accused will have to be convicted for that offence instead of for the offence under section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code. Such a course is impermissible in view of the express statutory bar available in sub-section (3) of section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though negatively drafted, it prohibits the High Court positively from converting the finding of acquittal into one of conviction. 5. However wide may be the phraseology of the main part of section 401, sub-section (3) of section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure operates as an exception to it. It can be viewed as a proviso operating upon the generality of the wide powers conferred upon the Court. It is implicit that full effect will have to be given to such a provision. The impact thereof is clear and explicit. It enjoins that power is not available so as to convert the ordered acquittal into a conviction in exercise of revisional powers. The statute being plain, it is unnecessary to refer to the authorities on this aspect. We must, however, add that excepting this, the Court exercising the powers under section 401 of the Code can pass any other order when miscarriage of justice is made out. The statute being plain, it is unnecessary to refer to the authorities on this aspect. We must, however, add that excepting this, the Court exercising the powers under section 401 of the Code can pass any other order when miscarriage of justice is made out. It follows from this that the judgment of acquittal under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be converted into one that of conviction with the aid of the provisions of section 401 of the Code. 6. In the case of (Chinnaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh)3, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1788, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had directed, while exercising the powers of revision, the re-trial and the same order was upheld by the Supreme Court. The High Court by itself had not converted the order of acquittal into that of conviction. While considering this aspect, the decision of the Supreme Court makes it clear that sub-section (4) of section 439 of the Code forbids a High Court from converting the finding of acquittal into one of conviction. After making this position clear, the Supreme Court further considered whether the order of retrial was sustainable. The earlier decision of the Supreme Court with regard to exercise of revisional powers were properly exercised. The ratio of the holding of the Supreme Court in that case too, does not indicate that the High Court is empowered to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. On the other hand, the implicit holding is otherwise. Similarly, in the case of (Logendranath Jha v. Polal Lal)4, (1951)52 Criminal Law Journal 1248, the Supreme Court pointed out that although sub-section (1) of section 439 authorises the High Court to exercise, in its direction, any of the powers conferred on a Court of appeal by section 423, sub-section (4) of section 439 of the Code specifically excludes the power to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. 7. The position of law, thus, in this regard appears to us to be well-settled. The only method by which it is possible to alter the judgment of acquittal into one of conviction is by filing an appeal against the acquittal and exercising appellate powers therein. See (Kishan Singh v. Emperor)5, A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 254 and (Satyendra Nath v. Ram Narain)6, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 580. The only method by which it is possible to alter the judgment of acquittal into one of conviction is by filing an appeal against the acquittal and exercising appellate powers therein. See (Kishan Singh v. Emperor)5, A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 254 and (Satyendra Nath v. Ram Narain)6, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 580. In Kishan Singh's case, the Privy Council treated the order of the High Court, resulting in altering a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, as without jurisdiction. If an appeal against acquittal were to be entertained, the High Court would be exercising appellate jurisdiction and would be clothed with power to alter acquittal into conviction. That is distinct and different from revisional jurisdiction. Section 401 of the Code is a repository of the revisional powers and advisedly that itself makes the position clear that the revisional power would not be available so as to alter the finding of acquittal into one of conviction. 8. Having held so, we would have ordinarily directed placement of this appeal before the learned Single Judge for deciding the same on merits, but at the hearing, the accused, who has practically undergone the whole sentence, has filed a pursis that he does not press the appeal itself. The accused is represented by Mr. N.V. Walawalkar, the appointed Counsel. He has given the pursis in English, which was explained to the accused in Court in Konkani language, and the accused has stated before us that in view of the term of sentence coming to an end, he does not wish to proceed with the appeal filed by him. 9. Even otherwise also, we cannot say, after going through the record, that the complicity of the accused under section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code has been in any manner improperly or illegally recorded by the Sessions Judge. A possible view of the evidence appears to have been taken. When two views concerning the complicity of an accused person are reasonably possible, the one tending to indicate graver and higher liability and the other of a lesser type, and the Court has preferred to place it on lower side, we should be slow to interfere and the benefit of such a situation should be extended to the accused, unless the order ex facie is perverse one. It is only when demonstrably a position is reached as to the complicity being fixed which no reasonable person would have so fixed that the same could be said to be perverse. We are unable to find perversity of such a kind in the judgment under appeal. The principles that govern the matters of appeals against acquittal in this regard should, with all force, apply while exercising the revisional powers. These principles are no more in doubt. If on evidence two views are reasonably possible, one supporting acquittal and the other indicating conviction, even in appeal this Court would not be entitled to interfere merely because the Court fees that it would sitting as a trial Judge, have taken the other view of convicting the accused instead of acquitting him. See (Labh Singh v. State of Punjab)7, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 83; (J.H. Bharucha v. State of Maharashtra)8, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1213; (Dinanath Singh v. State of Bihar)10, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1199; (Ajit Singh v. State of Gujarat)11, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 733; and (Tara Singh v. State of M.P.)12, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 950. 10. With the assistance of the learned Counsel of both sides, we have ourselves gone through the evidence of Dr. Madhukar Usgaonkar (P.W. 20) and that shows that the deceased Habib Khan met with a homicidal death as a result of a single stab injury. That stab injury was located on the backside and it is no doubt that it was a fatal one. The injury could be given by a weapon like the knife. Further evidence shows that it was not as if on pre-meditation that the accused, who was the neighbour of the deceased Habib Khan, perpetrated the crime. On the one hand, the incident developed at about 8 p.m. on April 30, 1983 which led to a quarrel; and the direct evidence of Kesarbai Gaonkar (P.W. 1), Dashrath Kandnekar (P.W. 6), Miss Vaijayanti Kandnekar (P.W. 7), Sagun Madkar (P.W. 8), Jivan Bhandari (P.W. 9) and Joaquim Pereira (P.W. 10) shows as to how the incident developed initially, there was a quarrel and a fight between the deceased and the accused. There was exchange of abuses and during the course of this quarrel, the accused took out the knife and dealt a single blow. There was exchange of abuses and during the course of this quarrel, the accused took out the knife and dealt a single blow. Although we find in the trial Court judgment some observation seeking to search the motive for the offence, that by itself would not render the judgment perverse. The position must be made clear that the motive is not, nor can be treated, as constituent ingredient of the offence. Motive may, in a given case, if proved, be the circumstance for establishing the complicity of the accused. The direct as well as the medical evidence shows that the stab injury, which proved fatal, was given during the course of the quarrel and that too after initial fight wherein no weapon was used. The surrounding facts leading to the commission of the offence are indicative of a position that would reasonably be answered by convicting the accused under section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code and not under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code with which he has charged. 11. Although, therefore, the accused had denied his complicity, the evidence clearly shows that the same is proved beyond doubt. The appeal of the accused, even apart from the pursis filed by him, is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. -----