B. N. Kirpal, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant is the owner of the House No. 639, Aruna Lane, Shivaji Road, Behind Azad Market, Delhi. He had filed a suit against the respondent for the recovery of Rs. 1440. 00 as damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 40. 00 per month on the ground that the respondent was occupying one room on the second floor with effect from August, 1968 as a trespasser. Before going any further it is necessary to mention a few facts pertaining to an earlier litigation. ( 2 ) IT appears that in respect of the same room the appellant herein had filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 720. 00 against one Suraj Narain. In that suit, filed in the Court of Judge, Small Cause Court, Delhi, it was alleged by the father of the appellant that the room had been let to Suraj Narain at a monthly rent of Rs. 20. 00 and he had not paid the rent from 1-9-1967 to 31-8-1970. Suraj Narain, in his written statement, bad pleaded that he was not a tenant. According to him Ramji Lal, the respondent in this case was the tenant. Ramji Lal was stated to be the brother-in-law of Suraj Narain. The Judge, Small Cause Court, by his judgment dated 22nd December, 1971 came to the conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove that Suraj Narain was his tenant. The finding of fact, recorded by the Judge, Small Cause Court, was that the tenant of that portion of the demised premises was Ramji Lal. ( 3 ) AS already mentioned in the present suit for recovery of Rs. 1440. 00 , the allegation was that the room on the second floor had been illegally occupied by Ramji Lal in August, 1968 In the written statement it was contended by Ramji Lal that he was a tenant of this room. According to Ramji Lal, be was also a tenant of a portion on the ground floor of the house, about which there is no dispute in this case. The rent for the premises was stated to be Rs 10. 00 per month. Reference was also made in the written statement to the suit which had been filed by the appellant herein against Suraj Narain. In the replication, the plaintiff reiterated the contents of the plaint. The rent for the premises was stated to be Rs 10. 00 per month. Reference was also made in the written statement to the suit which had been filed by the appellant herein against Suraj Narain. In the replication, the plaintiff reiterated the contents of the plaint. ( 4 ) THE trial court framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the defendant is a trespasser in the accommodation in suit ? 2. Whether the defendant is a tenant in the premises in suit ? 3. To what amount of damages and other relief if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? ( 5 ) THE trial court considered Issues (1) and (2) together and held that respondent herein was a trespasser. He then assessed the damages at the rate of Rs. 201- p. m. and degreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 720. 00. ( 6 ) BEING aggrieved, the respondent herein filed an appeal. The Addl. District Judge vide his judgment dated 15th January, 1976 came to the conclusion that the respondent was a tenant of the khokha of room on the second floor of the house. He reversed the finding of the trial court and dismissed the suit. ( 7 ) IN the second appeal which has been filed under Section 100 CPC, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is a glaring error in the order of the lower appellate court in as much as that it has been mentioned therein that the house was purchased in 1963 whereas in fact it was purchased in 1953. According to the learned counsel, the lower appellate court did not place any reliance upon the rent note Ex D3/1 which was Stated to have been executed by the respondent on 16-11-1953 inter alia, on the ground that in his statement the father of the appellant had stated that the house was purchased in 1963 The learned counsel contends that in recording of the evidence of Basdev Mal, father of the appellant, the year was wrongly noted as 1963 whereas the correct year should have been 1953 It was further contended by the learned counsel that the house was purchased in the name of the appellant when the Sale Deed dated 18th November, 1953 was registered on 19th November, 1953 At that time rent notes were signed by all the tenants in favour of the appellant It is for this reason that the respondent also signed a rent note in which one room and Dhalan on the ground floor was shown to be in his possession. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel, as well as by the trial court, on the house tax record, copies of which were Exhibits PI and P2. ( 8 ) AS regards the house tax records are concerned, the lower appellate court did not attach must importance to them. He observed that the said record is prepared not for the purpose of keeping a record of the existence of the various tenancies but is kept for the purpose of fixing the liability of the owner regarding the payment of house tax. These records are for the years 1970 and 1971. According to the learned counsel in the year 1953 this khokha or room on the second floor was in existence but one Nidhi Pal is stated to have been the tenant thereof. On the other hand, this contention of Nidhi Pal being the tenant of this khokhas or room on the second floor has never been agitated at any stage Furthermore, if Nidhi Pal had executed a rent note in favour of the petitioner that would have conclusively proved that the respondent was not a tenant of this room in 1953. That rent note which the appellant alleges was given to him ought to have been produced That has not been done. That rent note which the appellant alleges was given to him ought to have been produced That has not been done. There is also no production of the house tax record for the years 1953 to 1970 which might have, if the appellant s story in correct, shown some one other than the respondent as being the tenant of this room on the second floor. In his statement recorded before the trial court, Basdev Mal, father of the appellant, thus stated that prior to Suraj Narain occupying the said room one Puran Mal was the tenant of the premises. Apart from the bald statement of Basdev Mal, there is no documentary evidence to substantiate this. The Ex. PI does not refer to the second floor room and, therefore, much reliance cannot be attached to this document. ( 9 ) THE lower appellate court did not accept the rent note stated to have been executed by the respondent on 16-11-1953 for the following reasons:- (A) There was no explanation why the respondent bad to execute the rent note dated 16-11-1953 when he was admittedly a tenant since 1946. (b) The rent note is dated 16-11-1953 but it purports to create a tenancy from 19-11-1953 This was beyond the comprehension of the lower appellate court when the respondent was admittedly a tenant even on 16-11-1953. (c) The date of 19-11-1953 was mentioned in Ex. DW3/1, the rent note, it is alleged that the date 19-11-1953 was mentioned in the rent note because the month of tenancy was to begin on 19th and end on 18th of each calendar month. The lower appellate court, however, noted that in the counter-foils of the receipts Ex. PW3/3 and PW3/4, the month of tenancy is shown to begin from Ist till the last day of the month. The lower appellate court also noted that it was not the case of the appellant herein that the date of the commencement of the tenancy was never changed. {d) Basdev Mal had stated that the house was purchased in 1963 whereas the rent note is alleged to have been executed in the year 1953 (e) The Judge, Small Cause Court on 22nd December, 1971 had held that the respondent and not Suraj Narain was the tenant of the room in question. {d) Basdev Mal had stated that the house was purchased in 1963 whereas the rent note is alleged to have been executed in the year 1953 (e) The Judge, Small Cause Court on 22nd December, 1971 had held that the respondent and not Suraj Narain was the tenant of the room in question. (f) DWI Des Raj and DW2 Nahar Singh had both stated that they had been seeing the respondent in the said room since 1951-52. (g) The lower appellate court also found that the signatures on the rent note did not appear to be those of the respondent. ( 10 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons the lower appellate court upset the finding of the trial court. ( 11 ) MR. Garg, learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously contended that it was wrongly recorded that the Sale Deed was executed in 1963. In fact the Sale Deed was executed in 1953. This contention is sought to be proved by placing on record the original Sale Deed and other rent notes. Assuming that the Sale Deed was executed in 1953 and not in 1963, nevertheless, the other factors which have been mentioned by the Addl. District Judge arc sufficient to my mind to have enabled him to come to the conclusion that the respondent was a tenant of the room on the second floor. The contention which has now been raised before me that rent notes were executed on 16-11-1953 because the appellant was purchasing the property is not an explanation which was given before the trial court or before the lower appellate court. This is a story which is being put forth for the first time in this second appeal. As far as the record of the case is concerned, no reason has been given as to the necessity of the execution of rent note on 16-11-1953. Furthermore, correctness of contents of the rent notes are also open to doubt. It has been slated in the rent note that the owner of the premises is the appellant. It is an admitted case that on 16-11-1953 when the rent note was executed, the appellant was not the owner The Sale Deed was executed in his favour on 18th November, 1953 and the same was registered on 19th November. 1953. As such on 16th November, 1953 he could not have been described as the owner of the premises in question. 1953. As such on 16th November, 1953 he could not have been described as the owner of the premises in question. ( 12 ) BE that as it may, the Addl. District Judge has after taking all the evidence into consideration given a finding of fact to the effect that respondent is the tenant of the room on the second floor of the house and that he is not a trespssser. This finding of fact is arrived at without ignoring any relevant material on record. The mere fact that, possibly, another conclusion could have been arrived at would not be a ground for interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In my view, there is no question of law which arises in this case. The finding of the lower appellate court cannot be said to be perverse or not based on any evidence whatsoever. ( 13 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is dismissed with costs.