KADAR ISMAIL VORA v. STATE — 1986 DIGILAW 165 (GUJ)

S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) IN both these petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution the respective petitioners who are the detenu under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 (COFEPOSA for short) and his son respectively have challenged the orders of detention on diverse grounds. Both the orders are of even date viz. 29-4-1985 and they are based on the very same material. The orders are also identical and as a common question of law has been raised in support of these petitions both these petitions were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE detaining authority viz State of Gujarat on being satisfied with respect to the legacy that with a view to preventing them from dealing in smuggled goods it is necessary to so do has passed the impugned orders ic exercise of powers conferred by sec. 3 (1) of the COFEPOSA. Both the detenus were supplied Gujarat translations of the detention orders and also grounds of detentions of even date along with their Gujarati translations. . . . ( 3 ) MR. Karmali learned counsel for the petitioners contended amongst others that the orders of detention are so worded that it is difficult for the detenus to visualise as to whether appropriate Government has invoked its power under sec. 3 (1) being satisfied on the head of detention mentioned in sec. 3 (1) (iii) or on the head of detention mentioned in sec. 3 (1) (iv) of COFEPOSA. Consequently the orders of detention show total non-application of mind or vacillating state of mind of the detaining authority and have thus kept detenus guessing. That effective right of representation against the detention orders as guaranteed by Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution has stood violated and on that ground these detention orders are liable to be set aside. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 4 ) SO far as the aforesaid solitary ground is concerned it is necessary to reproduce one of the orders of detention which is of identical nature in both the cases. It reads as under :whereas the Government of Gujarat is satisfied with respect to the person known as Shri Kadar Ismail vora residing at Hathipaga Sheri Jaher Pir Road Porbander that with a view to preventing him from dealing in smuggled goods it is necessary so to do. It was submitted that sec. 3 (1) of the COFEPOSA empowers the appropriate Government to preventively detain the concerned person if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from. acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange of with a view to preventing him from (I) smuggling goods or (ii) abetting the smuggling of goods or (iii) engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods or (iv) dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods or (v) harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting the smuggling of goodsit is necessary so to do. In the present cases on reading the detention orders it was difficult to find out as to whether third and/or fourth heads old detention was invoked by the detaining authority. It was submitted that it is not even the case of the detaining authority that it was seeking detention of the detenus on the ground that the detenus were carrying on any prejudicial activities qua conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange and that there is no such material on the record of these cases. It was submitted that it is not even the case of the detaining authority that it was seeking detention of the detenus on the ground that the detenus were carrying on any prejudicial activities qua conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange and that there is no such material on the record of these cases. That the material if at all pointed to the third and fourth heads of detention and it was an overlapping material Consequently by merely using the words dealing in smuggled goods and by omitting to mention further otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods it vas difficult to visualise whether the detaining authority was satisfied about the need to detain the detenus with a view to preventing them from either engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods or it was satisfied about the need to detain the detenus with a view to preventing them from dealing in smuggled goods independently of being engaged in keeping or concealing the smuggled goods It was therefore submitted that satisfaction was equivocal or confused satisfaction which in law amounts to no satisfaction at all. In order to support this contention strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitions on the decision of the Supreme Court in Narendra v. B. B. Gujral reported in AIR 1979 SC 420 . The question before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case was as to whether the detention order passed with a view to preventing the detenu from smuggling goods could be sustained when the material supporting the detention order showed that the detenu was involved in abetting the smuggling of goods. This contention was examined by the Supreme Court speaking through Sen J. In the aforesaid decision on facts the Supreme Court found that the material was sufficient to show that the detenu was also engaged in apart from the act of abetting the smuggling of goods also and therefore that contention was rejected. In this connection having reproduced in para 26 of the report relevant clauses of sec. 3 (1) of the Act the following pertinent observations are made by the Supreme Court in para 27 of the report:there is no doubt a distinction between an act of smuggling and abetting the smuggling of goods for purposes of preventive detention under sec. 3 (1) of the Act. 3 (1) of the Act the following pertinent observations are made by the Supreme Court in para 27 of the report:there is no doubt a distinction between an act of smuggling and abetting the smuggling of goods for purposes of preventive detention under sec. 3 (1) of the Act. Nonetheless the term smuggling as defined in sec. 2 (e) of the Act has the same meaning as in sec. 2 (35) of the Customs Act 1962 which when read with sec. 111 of that 24ct is wide enough to include and make liable not only the actual smuggler but also persons abetting the smuggling of contraband goods as well as all persons dealing in such goods etc. Though the provisions of clause (i) and (ii) of sub-sec (1) of sec. 3 of the Act may operate on different fields which may sometimes as here overlap still a wider meaning is given to the term smuggling in sec. 2 (e) of the Act with a view to broaden the scope of preventive detention. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 of the Act provides for the different grounds of deten. Clause (i) relates to smuggling of goods Clause (ii) relates to abetting the smuggling of goods. Clause (iii) relates to engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. Clause (iv) relates to harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting the smuggling of goods. It must therefore be assumed that the intention of the legislature was to treat the smuggling of goods and abetting the smuggling of goods as grounds separate and distinct and both are separate grounds for detention i. e. to take in all such activities which results in accomplishment of smuggling of contraband goods. ( 5 ) THERE is considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The aforesaid decision clearly shows that there are separate and distinct heads or grounds of detention as contemplated by the legislature in section 3 (1 ). ( 5 ) THERE is considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The aforesaid decision clearly shows that there are separate and distinct heads or grounds of detention as contemplated by the legislature in section 3 (1 ). Therefore it is obvious that when the subjective satisfaction is reached by the appropriate Government about the need to detain the detenu with a view to preventing him from indulging in one or more of the activities listed in heads (i) to (v) of the provisions of section 3 (1) a clear cut satisfaction has not only to be reached by the detaining authority but the same has to be conveyed to the detenu so that he can effectively represent against the detention order based on such satisfaction and if this is not done the subjective satisfaction permeating the order would be found to be equivocal confused and no genuine satisfaction at all as contemplated by the Act and it would ultimately impinge upon the constitutional right guaranteed to the detenu under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of making an effective representation against such detention order based on such confused and equivocal satisfaction. It is obvious that when the legislature has contemplated separate heads of detention in section 3 (1) (iii) and (iv) as aforesaid merely by conveying to the detenu that the detaining authority was satisfied that he is required to be detained with a view to preventing him from dealing in smuggled goods simpliciter it would not convey to him whether he was being detained for dealing in smuggled goods simpliciter viz. as arm-chair dealer who merely purchases and sells smuggled good without even seeing them or whether he was sought to be preventively detained with a view to preventing him from dealing in smuggled goods by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. It was nearly submitted that the words dealing in smuggled goods are of general import and they in their turn include the following four types of dealings : (I) dealing by engaging in transporting smuggled goods (ii) dealing in smuggled goods by engaging in concealing them; (iii) dealing in smuggled goods by engaging in keeping them; and (iv) dealing in smuggled goods simpliciter independent of the first three types of dealings. In a given case the material against the detenu may indicate the need to preventively detain him because he is concerned with one or more of the aforesaid four types of dealings in smuggled goods. It is therefore necessary for the detaining authority to come to a specific satisfaction and convey the same to the detenu as to on what ground against him and for what nefarious activities indulged by him that the detaining authority was satisfied about the need to preventively detain him so that he may not commit the same in future. As seen above in smuggled goods is a phrase of wide import. It can take with in its sweep one or more of the aforesaid four categories of dealing as contemplated by the Legislature while enacting heads (ii) and (iii) in section 3 (1 ). A mere look at the fourth head of detention manifests the legislative postulate namely that the phase dealing in smuggled goods would by itself include within its sweep activities of a person who might be dealing in smuggled goods by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods or even in engaging in more than one such activities as contemplated by head (iii ). That is exactly the reason why for simpliciter dealing otherwise than by way of engaging in activities mentioned in head (iii) excluding clause has been enacted in later part of head (iv) which would therefore and thereby include all residuary types of dealings de hors the dealings mentioned in head (iii ). In this connection we may refer to a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jayantibhai v. Government of W. B. 1976 Criminal Law Journal 783 The question that came up before the Calcutta High Court was as to whether the Director of a company which was doing business of giving lockers on hire to lessees can be detained under sec. 3 (1) (iv) on the ground that he was dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. ( 6 ) IT was found from the material on record of the detaining authority that the lessee of such lockers had used them to keep smuggled goods. While upholding the detention of the detenu under sec. ( 6 ) IT was found from the material on record of the detaining authority that the lessee of such lockers had used them to keep smuggled goods. While upholding the detention of the detenu under sec. 3 (1) (iv) the Calcutta High Court speaking through Bimal Chandra Basak J. made the following pertinent observations:the word dealing has not been defined by the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act and its dictionary meaning has to be looked to. Although there are other meanings of the word dealing it also includes concerned one self to have to do in any way. The natural meaning of the word has not been curtailed by the Act. It is a word of wide import and its meaning cannot be qualified. The language of sec 3 also makes it clear. In sec. 3 (1) (iii) the expression used is engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. Thereafter in clause (iv) the expression used is dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. Therefore from the said Act itself it is clear that clause (iv) is in the nature of a residuary clause. Certain cases of dealing have been referred to specifically in the earlier part and by clause (iv) all other kinds of dealing in smuggled goods are being provided for. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid observations of the Calcutta High Court have been based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Asstt. Collector of Customs Calcutta p. Sitaram AIR 1966 SC 955 . It is therefore clear that when the detaining authority is satisfied on the given available material against the detenu that he was to be detained with a view to preventing him from dealing in smuggled goods as simpliciter arm-chair dealer who was not involved in continuous activities of transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods he had to invoke clause (iv) of sec. 3 (1) and if that clause was to be invoked it was to be categorically conveyed to the detenu that the satisfaction was based on the ground that the detenu was dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. 3 (1) and if that clause was to be invoked it was to be categorically conveyed to the detenu that the satisfaction was based on the ground that the detenu was dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. If on the other hand the detaining authority was satisfied that the material against the detenu was such that the detenu could be said to be engaged in transporting or concealing or keeping the smuggled goods or engaged in more than one such activities than the satisfaction had to be clearly indicated under third head of detention. If however the material was such which overlapped then both these clauses had to be invoked and a clear cut satisfaction had to be arrived at in that connection and had to be conveyed to the detenu. In order to highlight this position emanating from sec 3 (1) and its relevant clauses (iii) and (iv) we may take the following three illustrations: (I) If the material against the detenu shows that detenu is engaging in transporting smuggled goods from one place to another and/or he is engaged in concealing the smuggled goods and/or in keeping smuggled goods and nothing more then the satisfaction has to be under head (iii) and can never be based on head (II); The material may show that the detenu is not only engaged in keeping and concealing smuggled goods but he also purchases and sells smuggled goods. This material would be equivocal or overlapping material. In such a case it would be open to the detaining authority to be satisfied about the need to detain him with a view to preventing him from engaging in such activities in future as contemplated by head (iii) or head (iv) or both. It is for him to be so satisfied and to convey the satisfaction to the detenu. (III) If the material shows that the detenu concerned is purely an arm-chair dealer who only purchases and sells smuggled goods on telephone or by correspondences there would never arise any occasion or doubt qua that material that the detenu apart from doing the aforesaid activities could have over any occasion to be engaged in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. For such type of material it is only head (iv which would. For such type of material it is only head (iv which would. if at all be invoked and never head (iii) eventhough the detention order falls short of mentioning that the detaining authority was satisfied about the need to preventively detain the detenu with a view to preventing him from dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. In the light of such clear cut material pointing out the activities of the detenu only as a purchaser or seller of smuggled goods the detention order cannot be considered to be equivocal or confusing It is axiomatic that detention order is always backed up by grounds of detention which are supplied to the detenu and the detenu has to make representation in the light of the grounds supplied to him against the detention order save and except in cases where privilege under Art. 22 (6) of the Constitution is invoked. The satisfaction underlying the detention order can therefore be culled out not only from the wordings of the order but also from the grounds of detention and material supporting them. We have therefore to see whether the material supplied to the detenu in the present cases falls within first or second or the third category of cases. It goes without saying that if the material falls in the third category then the only conclusion to which we can reach is that while conveying to the petitioners the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority only head (iv) was invoked but by some inadvertence the second part of the head viz. otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods was omitted to be mentioned and that omission would not affect the constitutional right under Aft. 22 as the material supplied to the detenu would unequivocally point out that the detenu was projected as simpliciter dealer viz. purchaser and seller of the smuggled goods and nothing else. However on the contrary if the material fall within the first or second category of cases then the satisfaction tried to be conveyed to the petitioners by way of impugned detention orders would obviously have to be treated to be not genuine and confused or equivocal satisfaction and would import a fatal infirmity in the detention orders. However on the contrary if the material fall within the first or second category of cases then the satisfaction tried to be conveyed to the petitioners by way of impugned detention orders would obviously have to be treated to be not genuine and confused or equivocal satisfaction and would import a fatal infirmity in the detention orders. ( 8 ) IT is therefore necessary for us to turn to the grounds of detention which are identical in nature and which were supplied to both the detenus. before we do so we may mention the contentions canvassed by the learned advocate for the respondents in support of the detention orders. Mr. Vaidya as well as Mr. Bhagat for the respective respondents vehemently submitted that it is not necessary to mention all the grounds of detention in the detention order itself and that what was weighing with the detaining authority can be culled out from the grounds of detention supplied alongwith the detention order to the detenu. It is no doubt true that the detention order has to be seen not in isolation but in the light of the grounds of detention supplied to the detenu in support of the detention order and comprehensive reading is to be made of both the detention order as well as grounds of detention to cull out the exact nature of subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority. This of course will be subject to a rider that in a case in which the detaining authority exercises privilege under Art. 22 (6) of the Constitution of withholding relevant material the grounds which may be supplied to the detenu de hors such material which is validly held back may not give a clear indication to the detenu about the satisfaction of the detaining authority concerning the relevant head under which he is detained and in such a case even the detention order has to specifically mention in clearest terms as to under which head the power of detention was being invoked against the detenu. But when full grounds are supplied to the detenu and no material is kept back under Art. 22 (6) of the Constitution the detaining authority can validly submit that for deciding whether its subjective satisfaction was properly arrived at under the relevant heads of detention the order of detention however incomplete by itself can be read in the light of the material supporting the detention order and if the grounds fill up the lacuna in the detention order it cannot be said that the detenu would lose his effective right of representation under Art. 22 (5) only because of the defective and in complete drafting of the detention order itself meaning thereby lacuna if any in the drafting of the detention order which is conveyed to the detenu can be made good by the grounds of detention supplied to him in support of the detention order alongwith the detention order. We may also note at this stage sec. 9 of the COFEPOSA which enables the Central Government in connection with the detention order passed by the appropriate Government may be the State Government regarding detenus who are detained with a view to preventing them from indulging in any of the first three categories mentioned in sec. 3 (1) of the Act to be satisfied about the need to make a declaration under sec. 9 (1) if the aforesaid first three types of activities have been carried out in an area highly vulnerable to smuggling. Relevant provisions of sec. 9 (1) deserve to be noted at this stage. They read as under:9 (A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act any person (including a foreigner) in respect of whom an order of detention is made under this Act at any time before the 31st day of July 1987 may be detained without obtaining in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4) of Article 22 of the Constitution the opinion of an Advisory Board for a period longer than three months but not exceeding six months from the date of his detention where the order of detention has been made against such person with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods or abetting the smuggling of goods or engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods and the Central Government or any officer of the Central Government not below the rank of an Additional Secretary to that Government. specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government is satisfied that such person (a) smuggles or is likely to smuggle goods into out of or through any area highly vulnerable to smuggling; or (b) abets or is likely to abet the smuggling of goods into out of or through any area highly vulnerable to smuggling: or (c) engages or is likely to engage in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods in any area highly vulnerable to smuggling and makes a declaration to that effect within five weeks of the detention of such person. ( 9 ) A conjoint reading of sec. 3 (1) and sec. 9 (1) leaves no room for doubt that if the detenu is detained under sec. 3 (1) with a view to preventing him from dealing ill smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting concealing or keeping of smuggled goods meaning thereby if he is detained for the activities alleged to have been committed by him under the 4th head of detention provisions of sec. 3 (1) will not be available to the Central Government. It is only if his activities as a dealer fall under the third head of cases contemplated by sec. 3 (1) that the provisions of sec. 9 (1) can be validly invoked if such activities are committed in areas highly vulnerable to smuggling. It is also to be kept in view that powers under sec. 3 (1) can be exercised by the State Government while the declaration under sec. 9 (1) is to be issued by the Central Government which is an independent authority Consequently the need to pass clear cut order under sec. 3 (1) on the relevant head and to convey the same to the detenu in the light of the material supporting the detention order in cases where the detenus activities as a dealer in smuggled goods partake of different types of activities as a dealer cannot be over-emphasised. ( 10 ) IT is now time for us to turn to the grounds of detention which have been supplied to the petitioners in support of the detention order. It cannot be disputed for a moment that the recitals in the detention order which we have mentioned earlier have stopped short by mentioning that the detenus are detained with a view to preventing them from dealing in smuggled goods. Nothing more is mentioned. It cannot be disputed for a moment that the recitals in the detention order which we have mentioned earlier have stopped short by mentioning that the detenus are detained with a view to preventing them from dealing in smuggled goods. Nothing more is mentioned. Therefore a doubt can legitimately arise whether the detaining authority was satisfied that the detenus were merely dealers in smuggled goods simpliciter viz. they were purchasing and selling smuggled or whether they were also engaged in transporting or concealing or keeping the smuggled goods. As the detention orders are equivocal and not clear cut we have got to see the supporting material by way of grounds of detention and other material forming the basis for these grounds supplied to the detenus with a view to finding out whether these are cases in which only bead (iv) is invoked but in an incohate manner or whether the third head is also invoked and therefore the satisfaction is equivocal confusing and therefore no real satisfaction at all. ( 11 ) WHEN we turn to the grounds of detention which are identical it is found that so far as the petitioner in Special Criminal Application No. 708 of 1986 is concerned it is alleged against him on the basis of the statements of witnesses recorded by the sponsoring authority and which were relied upon by the detaining authority that the detenu is alleged to have sold 3 foreign marl gold biscuits on 10-2-1986 at Rajkot to one Prabhudas alias Bhikhabhai Lalji Lodhia for Rs. 35 0 and that the detenu who belonged to Porbandar had entered into the said transaction at Rajkot. The material also shows that the detenu had sold on that very day at Rajkot two gold biscuits to one Chandulal Jethalal Bhindi who is the detenu in the next petition for Rs 46 0 The detenu in his statement has denied to have sold these biscuits on 10-2-1986. However he has stated that earlier he had dealt in foreign mark gold on commission basis and used to bring foreign mark gold from one Chandrakant alias Baba of Jamnagar. It is also seen from the statement of Chandrakant Varia that he know the detenu for the last five years. However he has stated that earlier he had dealt in foreign mark gold on commission basis and used to bring foreign mark gold from one Chandrakant alias Baba of Jamnagar. It is also seen from the statement of Chandrakant Varia that he know the detenu for the last five years. That about two months earlier one Fazal had come from Bombay and he had purchased 2 foreign mark gold biscuits from Fazal and sold to the detenu for Rs 45 0 on commission of Rs. 100. 00 per biscuit and that he knew that the petitioner- detenu used to sell foreign mark gold in market of Rajkot. The grounds further recite that from the evidence on record it was evident that the petitioner was dealing in foreign mark gold. He had delivered three and two gold biscuits of foreign markings to Prabhudas alias Bhikhabhai Lalji and Chandulal Jethalal Bhindi respectively on 1-2-1986 at Rajkot. That the detaining authority was satisfied that the detenu was engaged in dealing in smuggled goods and there was sufficient cause to pass an order of detention against him under the COFEPOSA with a view to preventing him from dealing in smuggled goods. ( 12 ) THE aforesaid materials relied upon by the detaining authority against the petitioner in Special Criminal Application No. 708 of 1986 and the nature of satisfaction recorded therein leave no room for doubt that the petitioner was alleged to be a dealer in smuggled goods as specifically mentioned in the detention order was purchasing and selling foreign mark gold and he used to sell them to customers at places outside the detenus usual place of residence at Porbandar. That would obviously mean that till the detenu found out the concerned customer he would he engaged in keeping the smuggled goods with him or atleast at some place. Thus he can broadly be said to be not only dealing in smuggled goods by way of purchase and sale but also dealing in smuggled goods by way of engaging in keeping them atleast for some time. However for being engaged in concealment there is no material. Thus he can broadly be said to be not only dealing in smuggled goods by way of purchase and sale but also dealing in smuggled goods by way of engaging in keeping them atleast for some time. However for being engaged in concealment there is no material. Thus the material placing realiance on which the impugned detention order has been passed against the petitioner in Special Criminal Application No. 708 of 1986 can be said to be of equivocal type and the nature of his dealing in smuggled goods would clearly fall not only under head (iv) of sec. 3 (1) but also would fall under head (iii) of sec. 3 (1) to the extent that the detenu can be said to be engaged in keeping the smuggled goods. As this is an equivocal and overlapping type of material on which heads (iii) and (iv) can both be attracted as aforesaid it can be said to be falling within the second category of cases of dealers of smuggled goods as indicated earlier. In such cases unless satisfaction is clearly recorded by the detaining authority it would be impossible to predicate as to that was passing in the mind of the detaining authority at the relevant time when it decided to preventively detain the petitioner with a view to keeping him out of harms way and with a view to preventing him from indulging in such nefarious activities in future. Even the satisfaction recorded against the detenu in the grounds of detention also does not clearly indicate whether the detaining authority was satisfied regarding the need to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from purchasing and selling foreign mark gold in future or with a view to preventing him from engaging in keeping such smuggled goods in future. It must therefore be held that the satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority both in the order of detention as well as in the supporting grounds of detention is equivocal in nature and being of confusing nature cannot be said to have furnished adequate opportunity to the detenu to represent against the detention order based on such equivocal material and to that extent it must be stated that the provisions of Art. 22 (5) have stood infracted. As it is an incohate satisfaction it would also fall on the touch-stone of sec. As it is an incohate satisfaction it would also fall on the touch-stone of sec. 3 (1) and would fall short of being treated as a complete genuine satisfaction on the relevant head. ( 13 ) WE may now turn to the material against the detenu in Special Criminal Application No. 721 of 1986. In that case the petitioner is the son of the detenu. Detenu is one Chandulal Jethalal. The common grounds of detention against the present detenu show that the detenu himself has stated before the customs authority that on 10-2-1986 he had purchased two gold biscuits from Kadar Vora detenu in Special Criminal Application No. 708 of 1986 and that on 11-2-1986 the customs officers recovered two biscuits of foreign mark gold of the value of Rs. 46 0 from his person. Earlier he was detained under the provisions of COFEPOSA for his alleged involvement in the year 1977 and was released by the Advisory Board. In another case penalty of Rs. 1 0 0. 00- was imposed upon him by the customs officers under the Gold Control Act 1968 The material further discloses that shop premises of one Chimanlal Laljibhai situated at Mandvi Chowk Dera Sheri Rajkot were raided on 11-2-1986. At that time the detenu amongst others was present at the premises. That so far as the detenu is concerned from his personal search two foreign mark gold biscuits wrapped on his left leg by handkerchief were found. It also transpires from the evidence that at the relevant lime detenu had attended the shop of Chimanlal Lalji and was inquiring about the market price meaning thereby he was out to sell these smuggled biscuits of gold which he had secreted on his person. Therefore this material also projects the picture of the detenu not only as a dealer in foreign mark gold both as a purchaser and seller of such contraband articles but also as a person who was engaged in concealing smuggled goes and he was caught redhanded while doing so. This material also therefore is equivocal in nature and it is to be found as to how the detaining authority was satisfied in connection with this detenu. This material also therefore is equivocal in nature and it is to be found as to how the detaining authority was satisfied in connection with this detenu. If we turn to the later part of the grounds of detention served on the detenu we find that the detenu was doing business in foreign mark gold and therefore the detaining authority was satisfied that the detenu was engaged in the business of smuggled goods. This satisfaction also therefore does not clearly indicate whether the detaining authority was satisfied regarding the alleged clandestine activities of the petitioner as habitual purchaser and seller of smuggled goods or whether he was satisfied that the concealing smuggled goods and keeping them during the course of his aforesaid business. Consequently the material against the detenu of Special Criminal Application No. 721 of 1986 also is of overlapping nature and does attract sec. 3 (1) (iii) and 3 (1) (iv) meaning thereby the detenu is alleged to be engaged in concealing and keeping smuggled goods as well as found to be dealing in smuggled goods by way of purchasing and selling them. Consequently even this material falls under category II of cases as indicated earlier. As already discussed earlier for such type of material unless the detention order is very specific as to what was the satisfaction reached by the detaining authority and is conveyed to the detenu it would be impossible for the detenu to predicate as to which type of satisfaction was reached by the detaining authority against him namely whether under sec. 3 (1) (iii) or 3 (1) (iv) or both. None of the materials supporting the detention orders is of that unequivocal type which is contemplated by category III cases as indicated earlier and therefore it is not possible to agree with the learned advocate for the respondents that the detention orders at the highest can be treated to be incomplete but necessarily falling under head 3 (1) (iv ). At this stage we must refer to one submission put forward by the learned advocate for the respondents placing reliance on P. L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India and Another AIR 1967 SC 908 . It was submitted that the satisfaction of the detaining authority was purely subjective and the Court cannot go behind the same. At this stage we must refer to one submission put forward by the learned advocate for the respondents placing reliance on P. L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India and Another AIR 1967 SC 908 . It was submitted that the satisfaction of the detaining authority was purely subjective and the Court cannot go behind the same. Placing reliance also on Jaichand Lal v. State of W. B. AIR 1967 SC 483 it was also submitted that sufficiency of the material to support the detention order cannot be gone into by the Court and that accuracy of recitals in the detention order even if not established would not have vitiating effect on the detention order if there is material to support such order. Placing reliance also on Khudiram Das v. State of W. B. 1975 (2) SCC 81 it was contended that only in limited categories of cases subjective satisfaction underlying detention order can be examined by the Court. There cannot be any dispute about the aforesaid settled legal position. However on the facts of the present cases it is found that the satisfaction which was required to be arrived at by the detaining authority as per provisions of sec. 3 (1) was not in fact arrived at and there was no clear cut genuine and complete satisfaction on the relevant heads of detention envisaged to under sec. 3 (1) (iii) and/or 3 (1) (iv ). It is on this limited ground that the detention orders are liable to fail and not on the ground that the material was sufficient or not to support the relevant satisfactions qua the concerned heads. That obviously would be beyond the domain of this Court and we do not and cannot go into that domain of the inquiry. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that in any case Gujarati versions of the detention orders have been supplied to both the detenus and these Gujarati versions read that the State of Gujarat was satisfied that it is necessary to detain the detenus with a view to preventing them from purchasing and selling the smuggled goods. Gujarati version uses the following words : meaning thereby that it is necessary so to do to prevent the detenus from giving and taking smuggled goods. Gujarati version uses the following words : meaning thereby that it is necessary so to do to prevent the detenus from giving and taking smuggled goods. This phrase obviously rules out any satisfaction about the need to detain the detenus on the basis of the materials in question with view to preventing them from either being engaged in keeping or concealing smuggled goods and to that extent it can be said that the Gujarati version of the satisfaction found in the orders served on the petitioners does indicate that it was a satisfaction only under head (iv) of sec. 3 (1 ). However if this Gujarati version was duly authenticated version reflecting satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority on that basis the matter would have stood on entirely as a different footing and we would have unhesitatingly rejected the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner that the satisfaction was in any way equivocal or confusing With that end in view we requested the learned counsel for the respondents to point out to us whether Gujarati versions of the detention orders as served on the detenus were mere translations or whether Gujarati versions reflected the original orders passed by the detaining authority being so satisfied. The learned counsel for the State of Gujarat frankly stated on perusal of the relevant files that Gujarati versions of the detention orders supplied to the detenus were mere free translations and were not authenticated by the detaining authority. Therefore the Gujarati versions must be treated to be translations and that too free translations and that cannot be considered to be the repository of the original satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority about the need to detain the concerned detenus on the basis of such satisfaction. At the highest it can be said to be satisfaction of the translator but not of the detaining authority. Under these circumstances reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on Binod Bihari v. State of Bihar AIR 1974 SC 2125 wherein the Supreme Court had upheld the detention order when English version deferred from the Hindi version and when Hindi version was found to be accurate and could sustain the detention order will be of no avail to the respondents. Consequently even the last attempt made by the learned advocate for the respondents to sustain the orders of detention is found to be abortive. Consequently even the last attempt made by the learned advocate for the respondents to sustain the orders of detention is found to be abortive. (The rest of the Judgment is not material for the reports.) rule made absolute. .