KANTA BHATNAGAR, J.— In this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioners have challenged the legality of the order dated January 24, 1984 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, No. 1, Bikaner by which the learned Magistrate took cognizance against two of them viz. Narsinghlal and Smt. Nirmala under section 494 I.P.C. and against the remaining petitioner u/s. 494 read with Sec. 114 I.P.C. 2. The legality of the order has been challenged on the ground that the Court has taken cognizance against the petitioner on a second complaint while the first complaint was alive. Another ground of attack is that out of the thirteen petitioners except Narsinghlal and Devkishan Devilal all had been discharged by the Court in which the first complaint was filed and that order had become final by the order of the revisional Court and as such the cognizance on the second complaint is illegal. 3. In order to appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties it is necessary to refer to certain relevant proceedings and dates regarding the two complaints. 4. The first complaint was lodged against the thirteen petitioners on November 9, 1981 in the Court of Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Barmer. By the order dated August 2, 1982, the learned Magistrate took cognizance against petitioners Narsinghlal and Devkishan Devilal only for the offence u/s. 494 I.P.C. The learned Magistrate did not find sufficient material to proceed against the remaining eleven petitioners. On October 11, 1982 a revision petition by the complainant was filed in this Court in grievance to the aforesaid order dated August 2, 1982 by which the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Barmer declined to take cognizance against the eleven petitioners. That revision petition was dismissed as withdrawn on December 8, 1982. Meanwhile, a complaint was filed by Smt. Santosh on November 17, 1982 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Bikaner on the same grounds on which the first complaint was lodged but adding that the complainant had started living in her fathers house and had decided to permanently settle at Bikaner and therefore, under the provisions of Sec. 182 (2) Cr.P.C, that Court had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and that the petitioner did not wish to proceed with the complaint filed by the father in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Barmer and that he will get those proceedings quashed there. The Court heard the complainant on the question of jurisdiction of the Court because there was one complaint already pending before some competent Court. As the order sheet dated January 15, 1983 shows the learned counsel for the complainant submitted that he would withdraw the proceedings at the Barmer Court and would file the certified copy of that order. He was granted time for the purpose and it was ordered that the witnesses of the complainant would be examined thereafter. When the proceedings in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Barmer were going on July 28, 1983 the complainant remained absent. The learned counsel for the complainant pleaded no instructions. The learned Magistrate discharged the petitioners Narsinghlal and Devkishan Devilal u/s. 494 I.P.C. and u/s. 494/114 I.P.C. On August 29, 1983, the learned counsel for the complainant filed the copy of the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate Barmer and submitted that the complaint in that Court had been withdrawn. The complainant thereafter, examined her witnesses. By the order dated January 24, 1984, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Bikaner took cognizance against Narsinghlal and Smt. Nirmala u/s. 494 I.P.C. and against the remaining petitioners for that offence with the aid of Sec. 114 I.P.C. It is this order which has been challenged in the present petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. 5. The pertinent question arising in the case is that when one complaint was alive, no court had jurisdiction to entertain the second complaint. It has also been emphasized that once the Court, after applying mind declined to take cognizance against eleven petitioners on August 2, 1982, another Court on the same facts should not have taken, cognizance against those eleven petitioners. It has also been stressed that the two petitioners viz. Narsinghlal and Devkishan Devilal were also discharged by the order dated July 28, 1983 and as such without there being any additional material another Court could not have taken cognizance against them. 6. The factual aspect of the case is that the second complaint is adver-bitim copy of the first complaint but for the two paras which, as stated earlier, pointed the intention of the complainant to permanently settle at Bikaner which vests jurisdiction in the Court of Bikaner and her inclination to get the proceedings in the Court at Barmer quashed. 7. The factual aspect of the case is that the second complaint is adver-bitim copy of the first complaint but for the two paras which, as stated earlier, pointed the intention of the complainant to permanently settle at Bikaner which vests jurisdiction in the Court of Bikaner and her inclination to get the proceedings in the Court at Barmer quashed. 7. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner Smt. Santosh controverting the contentions of the other side submitted that on January 24, 1984 when the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate took cognizance against the thirteen petitioners no complaint was alive because on July 28, 1983 in the absence of the complainant, the two petitioners against whom the Court had taken cognizance were discharged and that the other eleven petitioners had already been discharged on August 2, 1982 and the revision petition filed against them was got dismissed as withdrawn on December 8, 1982. That, as in cases of discharge the right to file fresh complaint survives the order dated January 24, 1984 taking cognizance against the thirteen petitioners suffers from no illegality. 8. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties it would be profitable to refer to certain authorities on the point, that is, regarding the entertain ability of a second complaint in a case. 9. In the case of Hansabai Vs. Ananda Ganuji Payagude (1) it was held as under :- "While there is nothing in law against the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts on which a person has already been discharged after consideration of all the evidence produced by the complainant, the Magistrate cannot be said to have sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint within the meaning of S.203, unless he is satisfied that some additional evidence is forthcoming, of which the complainant was not previously aware or which it was not within his power to produce in the previous trial, or that there has been manifest error apparent on the face of the record or manifest miscarriage of justice." 10. The question of entertainment of second application where the first complaint is dismissed, came for consideration before Honble the Supreme Court in the case of Pramatha Nath vs. Saroj Ranjan (2). The question of entertainment of second application where the first complaint is dismissed, came for consideration before Honble the Supreme Court in the case of Pramatha Nath vs. Saroj Ranjan (2). Dealing with the question of fresh evidence on which a second complaint on the same allegations when a previous complaint had been dismissed, thier Lordships held that it cannot be considered to be the correct view of law that the complainant may first place before the Magistrate some of the facts and evidence in his possession and if he fails he can then adduce some more evidence and so on. 11. Following the principle enunciated in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, it was held in the case of Bindeshwari Prasad Singh Vs. Kali Singh (3) that a second complaint can lie only on new facts or even on previous facts only if a special case is made out. 12. The question of entertaining a second complaint when the first was not dead or time barred, came for consideration before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Joy Krishna Vs. State (4). In that case the question was as to whether the first complaint was alive and the second was filed. There was nothing on record to indicate that the first complaint was dead. It was held that when the first complaint was filed and the Magistrate took cognizance he had no competence or scope to entertain the second one. The complaint is pending all along. 13. From the principles enunciated in the aforesaid cases, it is obvious that there is no absolute bar for entertaining the second complaint if the previous complaint is either dismissed or withdrawn. If the first complaint is alive, it would not be legal for the Court to entertain a second complaint and proceed with it when the first complaint is still alive. Similarly, if the first complaint is not in existence, there is an order of discharge in favour of the persons alleged against in the first complaint and the Court had applied mind to the material brought on record by the complainant in the first complaint, the propriety does not lie in the Court taking cognizance on the same evidence in a second complaint. That does not, however, mean that there is absolute bar for entertaining a second complaint. That does not, however, mean that there is absolute bar for entertaining a second complaint. If the persons alleged against had been discharged by the Court in the first complaint without application of mind or as has been in the present case, on the complainant remaining absent and his counsel pleading no instruction, there would be no illegality in entertaining the second complaint. 14. In the instant case as already observed there was no fresh ground taken in the second complaint. In order to appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner properly it would be convenient and proper to deal with the case of the eleven petitioners discharged on August 2, 1982 separately from the case of Narsinghlal and Devkishan Devilal discharged on August 28, 1983 u/s. 249 Cr.P.C. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioners emphatically argued that the contents of the second complaint were exactly the same and the evidence in support thereof was also the same which was adduced in support of the first complaint and therefore when the learned Judicial Magistrate, Barmer, after application of mind, did not consider it a fit case to take cognizance against the eleven petitioners, the order dated January 24, 3980 of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Bikaner taking cognizance against those eleven petitioners on the same evidence cannot be said to be proper or legal. 16. There is no absolute bar for entertaining a second complaint if there is material before the Court in the second complaint or the evidence adduced in support thereof is different from or in addition to the first complaint.. In that situation there may be justification for entertaining the second complaint. However, if the allegations in the complaint and the material produced in support of both the complaints are the same and the Court dealing with the first complaint, after application of mind and duly considering the matter before it, has declined to take cognizance against the alleged offenders, there would be no propriety or justification in taking cognizance and issuing process in the second complaint. 17. There cannot be any justification for harassing a person already found innocent by filing second complaint without there being just reason for doing so. In the case on hand the learned Magistrate in his detailed order dated August.2, 1982 has given reasons for proceeding against two persons only viz. 17. There cannot be any justification for harassing a person already found innocent by filing second complaint without there being just reason for doing so. In the case on hand the learned Magistrate in his detailed order dated August.2, 1982 has given reasons for proceeding against two persons only viz. Narsinghlal and Devkishan Devilal and has given a categoric finding that there was no material to proceed against the rest. It is not a case where the Court dealing with the first complaint might have proceeded on incomplete record. It is also not a case where despite diligence the complainant could not have been in a position to bring all the material facts before the Court dealing with the first complaint. Hence, there appears to be no circumstance which could have justified the second complaint against the eleven petitioners. 18. In Hansabais case (1) dealing with the remedy for a party aggrieved by an order passed on a first complaint following principle was annunciated : "It cannot be said to be in the interests of justice that a party who has obtained a decision from a Court after a full consideration of his case should be given an opportunity to seek from the same Court or another Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction a different decision on the same facts and on the same evidence. The proper remedy for the complainant, who is dissatisfied with an order of discharge passed under S. 253(1) is to move the superior Court to set it aside and order further enquiry in the case under S. 436 Cr. P.C. or, otherwise it would be open to a complainant to file a series of complaints on the same facts, a new complaint being brought as soon as or shortly after the accused has been discharged in the previous case, and thus continue indefinitely the harassment of the accused." 19. In the present case, the aggrieved party had sought a remedy by approaching this Court by filing a revision petition against the order dated August 2, 1982 by which process was not issued against the eleven petitioners. That revision petition was dismissed as withdrawn on December 8, 1982. 20. In the present case, the aggrieved party had sought a remedy by approaching this Court by filing a revision petition against the order dated August 2, 1982 by which process was not issued against the eleven petitioners. That revision petition was dismissed as withdrawn on December 8, 1982. 20. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that because the second complaint was filed on November 17, 1982, the complainant having a hope of success in the second complaint against the eleven petitioners did not press the revision petition in this Court. The reason for withdrawing is not there in the order. Apart from it whatever might be the reason for the complainant-petitioner for withdrawing the revision petition, all that can be said is that it was dismissed as withdrawn and that has brought finality to the order dated August 2, 1982 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Barmer. 21. Mr. Arora, referred to the case of Dr. S.S. Khanna vs. Chief Secretary (5) in support of his argument that a person who after enquiry u/s. 202 Cr.P.C. is not proceeded against by the Court in a complaint can be summoned at the later stage u/s. 319 to stand trial for the same and connected offence or offences alongwith the other persons against whom process had been issued earlier by the Court. 22. The stage of summoning a person u/s. 319 Cr.P.C. and proceeding against him along with the person already proceeded against is altogether different from the stage of taking cognizance against a person named in the complaint. Sec. 319 empowers the Court to proceed against persons appearing to be guilty of offence on the basis of evidence coming forth during the course of any inquiry or trial. 23. The stage on January 24, 1984, when the Judicial Magistrate, Bikaner took cognizance against the eleven petitioners alongwith two others was exactly the same as it was on August 2, 1982 when the learned Judicial Magistrate, Barmer after taking into consideration the record before him and on application of mind declined to issue process against the eleven petitioners. Hence, the provisions of Sec. 319 Cr.P.C. are not applicable. 24. In view of the above discussion, the order dated January 24, 1984 so far as it relates to the eleven petitioners cannot be allowed to stand. 25. Hence, the provisions of Sec. 319 Cr.P.C. are not applicable. 24. In view of the above discussion, the order dated January 24, 1984 so far as it relates to the eleven petitioners cannot be allowed to stand. 25. The cognizance against Narsinghlal and Devkishan Devilal was taken by the order dated August 2, 1982 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Barmer and process was issued On July 28, 1983 the complainant remained absent and her counsel pleaded no instructions and the order of discharge was passed by the Court. Such an order of discharge does not shut the way for the complainant to lodge fresh complaint. The court has power to entertain the second complaint in such a case and if the circumstances so warrant, cognizance may be taken against the persons so discharged in the first complaint. As is evident from the order dated August: 2, 1982 the learned Magistrate Barmer had taken into consideration the merits of the case and on application of mind found it a case fit for taking cognizance against the two petitioners. In the second complaint it has been mentioned that the complainant had decided to permanently settle at Bikaner and wanted to proceed with the case at Bikaner Court. The second complaint was filed on November 17, 1982. Thereafter, on July 28, 1983 the complainant remained absent in the Court at Barmer where the proceeding against the two petitioners in the first complaint were pending. Her counsel pleaded no instructions and as stated earlier Narsinghlal and Devkishan Devilal were discharged As the order sheet dated August 29. 1983 shows, on the complainant filing the copy of the order of the Barmer Court, the learned Judicial Magistrate Bikaner ordered for registering the complaint. It appears that in pursuance of the averments in the second complaint that the complainant would get the proceeding at Barmer Court quashed, she remained absent at Barmer Court on July 28, 1983. The case of Barmer Court having thus come to end on July 28, 1983 it cannot be said that the first complaint was alive on September 28, 1983 when the second complaint was registered. The learned Magistrate Barmer had considered a primafacie case against the two petitioners as is evident from the order dated August 2, 1983. The case of Barmer Court having thus come to end on July 28, 1983 it cannot be said that the first complaint was alive on September 28, 1983 when the second complaint was registered. The learned Magistrate Barmer had considered a primafacie case against the two petitioners as is evident from the order dated August 2, 1983. As the order dated July 28, 1983 was not passed on merits, there was nothing illegal in the Court entertaining the second complaint on the same facts and taking cognizance against the two petitioners viz. Narsinghlal and Devkishan Devilal. 26. As a result of the above discussion, the petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. so far as it relates to petitioners No. 12 and 13 viz. Narsinghlal and Devkishan Devilal respectively is rejected. The petition of petitioners No. 1 to 11 viz. Kishorilal, Mst. Rupa, Amritlal, Mst. Lahri, Nirmala @ Nimo, Radha, Bharmal Prakash, Bhagwati, Chaturbhuj and Bhanwari is allowed and the order dated January 24, 1984 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Bikaner for taking cognizance against them and issuing process and subsequent proceedings against them in pursuance of that order are quashed.