S. Ranganathan ( 1 ) THE Indian Institute of Technology (I. I. T. , for short) awarded a contract to M/s. Sanyukt Nirmata (hereinafter referred to as the Contractor ) for the construction of certain blocks in the I. I. T. Campus, The contract, valued at Rs. 30,37,580. 00was based on the acceptance, on 29-10 81, of a tender submitted by the Contractor supplemented by the general conditions and specifications covering government contracts and the letters of the Contractor dated 14-9-81, 5-10-81 and 19-10-81. The work under the contract was completed on 7-10 83. ( 2 ) CERTAIN disputes having arisen between the parties as to the payments to be made to the Contractor, they were referred for arbitration under Clause 25 of the contract. The second respondent to the suit, a retired Chief Engineer, was the Arbitrator who, after hearing the parties, made an award on 15-12-84. The award has been filed in the Court and comes up now for consideration in the light of the objections preferred by the Contractor. ( 3 ) THERE were 12 items dealt with by the Arbitrator in the award. In this suit the issues were originally framed so as to cover items 5, 8, 10 and 12. But now item 12 is no longer in controversy. By an order dated 1-11-85, the award in respect of item 12 has been modified to read as Rs. 1,410. 00 instead of Rs. 1,610. 00correcting a clerical mistake. Also, by an order dated 9-12-85 it has been pointed that the petitioner was ready to accept the awarded amount in respect of claims 1, 2, 3, 6, 9 and 12 together with interest thereon calculated upto December 31, 1984 in full and final settlement of the aforesaid claims and the respondent paid the amount to the Contractor by a cheque in the Court itself. Thus the controversy in regard to all these items has been resolved. There is no controversy regardings Item Nos. 4, 7 and 11. The entire controversy, therefore, now centres around the three items 5, 8 and 10. Thus the controversy in regard to all these items has been resolved. There is no controversy regardings Item Nos. 4, 7 and 11. The entire controversy, therefore, now centres around the three items 5, 8 and 10. Before proceeding to deal with these items and the objections thereto, I may dispose of a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the I I. T. , relying on Ramsahai Shednram v. Harissichandra Dull Chandji and another1 that it is not open to the Contractor to accept the pait of the award which is in its favour but to object to other parts of it which are not, This objection may have some validity in cases where there is a single composite award or there are interim and final awards and it is difficult to ascertain either the decision of the Arbitrator on each of the issues or the precise impact of the decision on one of the issues on his decision vis-a-vis the other issues. But I see no force in this objection in respect of the award in the present case. Here the claims before the Arbitrator that arose out of the same contract were different and independent of one another. As required by the contract, the Arbitrator has considered each item separately and given his separate finding on each of them. No decision on any claim objected to now has anything to do with or affected by the decision of a claim which has been accepted by the Contractor. I can see nothing in law in the case of such an award which requires either party to an award to plead either for the acceptance of the award as a whole or its rejection as a whole. It would indeed be curious to suggest that where a party is aggrieved by only some, but not all, of the decisions arrived at by the Arbitrator, he cannot be permitted to challenge only that part of the award by which he is aggrieved but should either take or reject the award as a whole. In the case of a severable award like this, the position is virtually the same as if there are separate awards in respect of the several items in dispute. The principle of severeability of an award is now well settled (vide Mattapalli Chelainayya and another v. Matfapajli Venkataratnam and another2 M/s. Metro Electric. In the case of a severable award like this, the position is virtually the same as if there are separate awards in respect of the several items in dispute. The principle of severeability of an award is now well settled (vide Mattapalli Chelainayya and another v. Matfapajli Venkataratnam and another2 M/s. Metro Electric. Company v. Delhi Development Authority3 and M/s. Mehta Teja Singh and Co. v. Union of India. 4 (para 31) This principle should be liberally and widely implemented so as to facilitate expeditious disposal and substantial justice. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the contention urged on behalf of the I IT has no force and that the Contractor can be permitted to Challenge only the three items of the decision by which he is aggrieved. ( 4 ) TAKING up item No. 5 first, it relates to a claim by the Contractor that he is entitled to a sum of Rs. 18,312. 00 over and above what he has been paid. It is pointed out that under the terms of the contract, the contractor had agreed to give the respondent a rebate of 0. 5 per cent of the gross value of the work done provided fortnightly and monthly payments were regularly made to it and that a further rebate of 0. 25 per cent of the gross work done would be allowed by it if the final bill is paid within four months and the security deposit is released within six months of the physical completion of the work. According to the Contractor, however, the respondents had defaulted in their obligation of making punctual payments as above and, therefore, they were not entitled to the rebate stipulated in the contract. He, therefore, claims that a sum of Rs. 18,312. 00 equal to 0. 75 per cent of the total value of the work executed (namely Rs. 24,41 600. 00) should be paid to him. This claim has been rejected by the Arbitrator. Learned counsel for the petitioners draws my attention to the chronological list of bills and their payments as set out in annexure I to the I. A. and points out that, on several dates, payments had not been made as scheduled. For instance, he points out that after 24-2-82 the next bill was paid only on 24-3-82. Learned counsel for the petitioners draws my attention to the chronological list of bills and their payments as set out in annexure I to the I. A. and points out that, on several dates, payments had not been made as scheduled. For instance, he points out that after 24-2-82 the next bill was paid only on 24-3-82. Similarly it is pointed out that after 10-1-83 the next payment has been made only on 11-3-83. It is also submitted that though the contract was complete on 7-10-83 the final bill was paid only on 29-2-84. In view of these defaults, it is stated that the respondents were not entitled to the rebate to which the contractor had agreed. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents has drawn my attention to the fact that full details regarding the payments had been given before the Arbitrator. In respect of the defaults alleged by the Contractor, the statement filed on behalf of the respondents had stated that no payments could have been made on intermediate dates as the work done during the relevant fortnight was less than the amount of work specified as a condition for the preparation of the bill and making of payments. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the value of the work to be done in order to draw a bill was only Rs. 10,000. 00 and that, having regard the value of the contract and the progress of the work, the fortnightly work done was almost to the extent of a lac of rupees audit is not correct to say that the value in any particular fortnight did not exceed Rs. 10,000. 00. I am afraid it is not possible for this Court to go into thesemeticulous details. The full details of the work done as well as the payments made were before the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator has found that the payments were made as specified in the contract except for three bills which were paid with the delay of one day, the payment on the rest of the total of 34 bills was on schedule and that the contractor had written letters agreeing to the delayed payment without compensation in the case of these three bills. This, therefore, is finding a fact by the Arbitrator with which this Court cannot interfere. This, therefore, is finding a fact by the Arbitrator with which this Court cannot interfere. The grievance of the Contractor in so far as the final payment is concerned is that the Arbitrator has given in separate finding in regard to the delay in the payments of the final bill. But learned counsel for the respondents points out that before the Arbitrator, in the proceedings dated 15-11-84, the respondent had brought to the notice of the Arbitrator that the delay in making the payment on the final bill was due to the fault on the part of the Contractor and that he had given a specific letter dated 6-2-84 by which he had extended the date of the final payment to 29-2-84. This letter has also been placed before me. Learned counsel for the Contractor says that by this letter the Contractor had extended the date of payment to 29-2-84 "without affecting the rebate clause" and that this meant that the contractor did not agree to the rebate in view of the extension of payment. It is true that this Setter is somewhat ambiguously worded but it seems to mean that the contractor had given time for the payment of the final bill without prejudice to the respondents claim to rebate. In any event the Arbitrator has considered this letter also and if he has come to the conclusion that the respondents were entitled to the rebate, this court cannot interfere with his conclusion. ( 5 ) THE claim under item No. 10 can be conveniently considered next. The claim of the contractor under this head was that, instead of Ordinary Portland (Grey) cement, he was supplied only with pozzolona cement and that because of this the concrete shuttering had to be kept in position for a longer time to enable the cement to solidify and the structure to get set. He, therefore, claims that he was entitled to extra shuttering charges which he had to incur as a result of the failure of the respondents to supply the specified brand of cement. In this context, learned counsel for the Contractor points out that under the terms of the contract, the respondents had to supply to him ordinary portland (grey) cement to the extent of 620 metric tonns. In this context, learned counsel for the Contractor points out that under the terms of the contract, the respondents had to supply to him ordinary portland (grey) cement to the extent of 620 metric tonns. On the other hand the case of the respondents was that under the CPWD specifications 1977 (Volume I) applicable to the contract, pozzoloue cement conforming to I. S. 1489 to 1967 could be used for construction including RCC work and that it was not specified in the contract that any extra would be paid in case pozzolone cement was used. The arbitrator has found that CPWD specifications permitted the issue of pozzolona portland cement and indicated that this was in conformity with the contract. That apart he has also given a finding that the contractor had maintained no record for striking the shuttering dates. I am unable to see any error in the conclusion of the Arbitrator that, though the contract specified the supply of portland grey cement, the supply of pozzolona was justified by the terms of the specifications. But that apart, the Arbitrator has also rested his conclusion on the assessee s claim in this regard on the factual position that the assessee had kept no record regarding the striking of shuttering dates. In other words, it had not been established before him that the shuttering had been kept for longer periods than would have been necessary if portland grey cement had been supplied and that extra charges had been incurred by the Contractor for this reason. I, therefore, do not find any ground to interfere with the award on this item as well. ( 6 ) I turn now to item No 8 under which the assessee claims a sum of Rs. 38,500. 00. The assessee s claim in this regard was that the contract which was originally scheduled for completion on 7-5-83 got extended by a period of 5 months till 27-10-83 mainly due to the defaults and delays on the part of the respondents. He claims that he was, therefore, entitled to an extra payment for the work done after the expiry of the contract period. In his claim he evaluated the compensation due to him at 10 per cent of the work done after the due date (Rs 3,58,000. He claims that he was, therefore, entitled to an extra payment for the work done after the expiry of the contract period. In his claim he evaluated the compensation due to him at 10 per cent of the work done after the due date (Rs 3,58,000. 00); this being the difference between the cost of living index at the beginning and at the stipulated date of completion. On this claim the Arbitrator has clearly found that the responsibility for delay rests with the Institute. He proceeds to observe: i would have determined the amount of compensation payable to the claimants but for the reason that the condition 4 of their forwarding letter attached with the tender as stated below was withdrawn by them before the work was awarded to them and this forms part of the agreement" and he proceeds to set out the condition that the contractor had originally stipulated but subsequently withdrawn. In other words, the Arbitrator held that although the contractor had originally asked for the insertion of a clause entitling him to extra payment to the extent of 10 per cent in the event of there being any delay in the completion of the contract, he had subsequently withdrawn the above condition and that, therefore, he could claim no compensation. Learned counsel for the contractor points out that this proceeds on a misapprehension. By para 4 of his letter dated 14-9-81 the contractor had sought the insertion of a clause in the contract to the effect that in the event of delay in the completion of the work for reasons beyond his control, he should be entitled to an extra 10 per cent of the estimated rates for the work done beyond the stipulated date of completion. However, by his letter dated 19-10-81 he stated:" further we withdraw para 4 of our letter dated 14-9-81 without prejudice to our rights under the law/contract. " The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that while it was true that the contractor has given up his insistance on the insertion of a specific clause entitling him to an ad hoc payment of 10 per cent extra in case of delay beyond his control, he had not given up his right to the claim of compensation for delay available to him under general law. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the withdrawal of para 4 of the letter dated 14-9-81 disentitles the contractor to any payment. ( 7 ) I am of the opinion that the claim of the contractor is well founded. By the letter dated 19-10-81 the contractor did not completely give up all his claims to compensation in the event of unreasonable delay. He had originally wanted a specific clause in the contract entitling him to a specific sum in the event of such delay but subsequently he gave up his insistence on that clause but subject to his rights under the general law. In this case, the Arbitrator has given clearly a finding that there was unreasonable delay on the part of the respond vnts in completing the contract and that he would have given compensation to the contractor but for his interpretation of the letter dated 19-10-81. In other words the Arbitrator is prepared to concede that under the general law the contractor would be entitled to compensation for the delayed execution. There is also no substance in the contention urged on behalf of the respondents that his claim is unfounded in view of the claims made under clause 10 (c ). Clause 10 (c) provides for a totally different situation It has been held by this Court in M/s- Metro Electric Co. v. Delhi Development Authority5 and Delhi Development Authority v. M/s. A. L. Karma6 that the said clause applies only where there is a rise in the cost of materials during the the normal tenure of the contract and that it has no application where the period of contract gets extended and the contractor has to incur expenditure and loss because of such extension. That apart, under clause l0 (c) the Contractor is compensated only to a limited extent and only in cases where the rise is more than 10 per cent in the cost of material or labour. It is in order to obviate these restrictions that the contractor wanted a specific clause to be inserted in the letter but because the respondents would not agree to that, he gave up his right to this clause but he did not give up his claim of compensation under the general law, in case there is some delay in the execution of the contract attributable to the respondents. No. doubt he lias made a claim at the same 10 per cent of the work done beyoad the stipulated period as was originally contained in para 4 of the letter dated 14-9-1981 but this, according to the contractor, is a coincidence. He is claimino it at 10% now not us an adhoc rate as originally contemplated but as being the difference in the cost of living index between the date of the commencement of the contract and the date of the completion of the work. In my opinion, in view of the clear finding of the Arbitrator that, but for his interpretation of the letters dated 14-9-1981 and 9-10-1981, he would have given a compensation to the Contractor, be should be asked to go afresh into the question of quantifying the amunot of compensation, since in my view he was in error in thinking that by the letter dated 19-10-1981 the Contractor had totally given up his claim to all compensation even in the case of unreasonable delay on the part of the IIT in the completion of the work. I would, therefore, set aside the finding of the arbitrator on this item and remit the matter back to the arbitrator for quantifying the compensation that the contractor would be entitled to under this heading. ( 8 ) THE result of the above discussion is that the award in respect of claim Nos. 1,2,3,6,9 and 12 have already been acted upon and need no further others. The award in so far as it relates to item Nos. 4,5,7,10 and 11 are confirmed and made a rule of the Court. The award in so far as it relates to item No. 8 is set aside and remitted for reconsideration by the Arbitrator who may given his award thereon within a period of four months from the date he re-enters on the reference. A decree may be drawn up accordingly. IA 2525/85 is allowed in part and the suit is disposed of in the above terms.