This is a revision petition against the Judgment and dec­ree dated 19.6.1985 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge (I), Cachar, Silcbar in T.A. No. 37 of 1984, affirming and modifying the judgment and decree passed by the teamed Sadar Munsiff (2); Silchar, in T.S. No. 443 of 1981. 2. It is a case of concurrent findings of facts. The case of (he plaintiff-landlords is that the defendant-tenant had not paid the rents due from him for the period from November 1978 to October 1981 amounting to Rs. 5400/-. The Court be­low have given concurrent findings that the landlords refused to accept the rent for the month of November 1978 offered by the tenant; and that the tenant deposited the rent for November 1973 in time as provided under the law; however, the tenant deposited the rent for the month of December also in advance along with the rent for November; and that the amount of Rs. 5400/- had already been deposited, although some of the deposits have been made in advance. 3. Mr. Acharyya submits that some of the deposits made in advance in the Court after October 1978 will not amount to payment under sub-section 4 of section 5 of the Assam Ur­ban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. His contention is that only when the landlord refused to accept the lawful rent offered by his tenant, the tenant may, within a fortnight of its be­coming due, deposit in Court the amount of such rent toge­ther with process fees for service of notice upon the landlord. Mr. Acharyya further submits that there was DO offer at all by tenant because the rent had already been deposited earlier before it becomes due; and that there was no contract for such advance deposit and the amount deposited in advance would be treated as a loan to the landlord, and not the rent; and that the tenancy was renewable ninth to month. 4. Mr. Acharyya refers me to the decisions in Ramlal 63(1921) 1C 587; Tilok Chand. 4. Mr. Acharyya refers me to the decisions in Ramlal 63(1921) 1C 587; Tilok Chand. AIR 1962 Cal 204; Khatha Bhatt AIR 1960 Raj 19 ; Phukan Chandra, AIR 130 Sau 63, and Pradesh Kumar, AIR 1980 SC 1214 to support his contention that before the rent become due, any thing was paid in advance to the landlord it was a simple loan to the landlord and it could not be taken as a discharging for the rent due as there was no contract for such payment and the tenancy was renewable from month to month. It may be noted that the decision in Ramlal, 63 1C 587; Tilok Chand, AIR 1962 Cal 204, and Khatha Bhatt, AIR 1960 Raj 19 are in connection with section 50 of the T. P. Act and those in Phukan, AIR 1980 Gau 68 ; and Pradesh Kumar, AIR 19SO SC 1214 relate to the application of provisions under section 114 of the T. P. Act to the procee­dings under the rent control laws. 5. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Brahmandand vs. Kaushlya Devi, AIR 1977SC 1198, the interpre­tation of sub-section (4) of section 5 of the Act is to be conditioned by the circumstances prevailing between the pasties. In the case where relation between the parties being very estranged it is an idle ritual to insist on a physical tender of payment of the rent where the circumstances made it impracticable; and a liberal construction of the expression "rent offered by his tenant'' in subsection (4) is necessary. It is also settled that in the absence of special and adequate grounds the tenant cannot drive the landlord to collect his rent every time through the court with all the attendant inconvenience and expense. 6. It is also settled that in the absence of special and adequate grounds the tenant cannot drive the landlord to collect his rent every time through the court with all the attendant inconvenience and expense. 6. There are clear findings of the Courts below that the landlords refused to accept the rent offered by the tenant for the month of November 1978; and that the rents for the pe­riod from November 1978 to October 1981 claimed by the land­lords had been deposited although some of the deposits were made in advance; and that the tenant provided money for the construction of the suit house under an agreement; and that some amount of money which was/is to be adjusted partly to­wards the payment of the rents is still lying with the landlords; and that the deposits were accepted by the Court under the Rent Control Act without any objection; and that the land­lords did not challenge the deposits and also did not withdraw the validly deposited rent for the month of November, and all other subsequent deposits; and that the suit house is/was not bonafide required by the landlords, The first appellate Court has also given findings that the landlords took the plea of bonafide requirement of the suit premises with an ulterior mo­tive as a device to secure the eviction of the tenant. 7. The findings of the Courts below above show that the landlords had decided or planned to evict the tenant some-how or other, or by ore means or another; and that the intention or motive of the landlords was not to receive rents, but to evict the tenant, therefore, the landlords would not receive any rent offered after November 1978. The records also show that the parties had become unfriendly (estranged relationship). In such circumstance?, I am of the view that a physical payment or offer by the tenant for every month and/or to wait for (he rents becoming due, in the context of the present case, will be an idle formality in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Brahmananda (Supra). In this view of the matter, the contentions of the learned counsel must fail. 8. The cases cited by Mr. Acharyya, in the context of the case and in view of the above discussions are not applicable to the present case. Brahmananda (Supra). In this view of the matter, the contentions of the learned counsel must fail. 8. The cases cited by Mr. Acharyya, in the context of the case and in view of the above discussions are not applicable to the present case. However, it is made clear that in making the order, it must not be presumed that I have expressed any opinion on the questions raised by Mr. Acharyya. 9. Apart from the above discussions, it cannot be said that the Courts below have acted arbitrarily while coming to their conclusions. The findings and conclusions are based on mate­rials on record. The decisions of the Courts below may be wrong or may not be in accordance with law. But it is not a case that the Courts below have exercised their jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court cannot invoke its jurisdiction under section 115, CPC. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is rejected. With the above observation, the petition is disposed of. No costs.