Judgment :- 1. The petitioner retired from the services of the Calicut University as Professor, on 1-2-1981. Taking into account his qualifying service and the last pay drawn, he was entitled to get more than Rs. 36,000/- by way of death-cum-retirement gratuity; but he was paid only Rs. 28,000/- as that was the maximum payable under the rules and orders as they then stood. Subsequently, by Ext.P1 order dated 17-9-82 the ceiling was raised to Rs. 36,000/-, but effective only from 1-4-82. The petitioner contends that the fixation of such a date for the commencement of the revised scheme (for maximum gratuity) is arbitrary and illegal, and that when this illegal part of Ext. P1 is struck down and severed, he too, like other pensioners retiring after 1-4-82, could claim Rs. 36,000/- as gratuity. 2. The contention is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in the well-known case of D. S. Nakara v. Union of India (AIR. 1983 SC. 130). In May, 1979 the Central Government issued an order whereby the formula for computation of pension was liberalised, but the liberalised scheme was to apply only to Central Government servants in service on 31-3-79 and retiring on or after that date ("specified date"). The result was to create two classes of pensioners with different rules for computation of pension, those who had retired before the specified date, and those who had or were to retire afterwards. It was argued before the Supreme Court that the specified date was fixed arbitrarily, that its result was to create inequality among members of a homogeneous class of pensioners and that the specification of the date could be struck down and severed, as violative of Art.14. so that even those who had retired before 31-3-79 could claim the benefit of the liberalised rules. The court accepted these arguments in Nakara. What the Supreme Court said with regard to the "specified date" in that case in the context of the pension scheme, it is suggested by counsel, should apply to the date specified in Ext. PI (1-4-82) also, in the context of the scheme for revising the ceiling on gratuity. 3. Such an approach, I am afraid, involves an attempt to over-simplify the issues raised and decided in Nakara, and also to overlook the distinction between gratuity and pension in some vital respects, though both could generally be characterised as retirement benefits. 4. PI (1-4-82) also, in the context of the scheme for revising the ceiling on gratuity. 3. Such an approach, I am afraid, involves an attempt to over-simplify the issues raised and decided in Nakara, and also to overlook the distinction between gratuity and pension in some vital respects, though both could generally be characterised as retirement benefits. 4. At the very threshold of the decision in Nakara, their lordships had formulated the questions arising for their decision, in the following terms: "Do pensioners entitled to receive superannuation or retiring pension under Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 ('1972 Rules' for short) form a class as a whole? Is the date of retirement a relevant consideration for eligibility when a revised formula for computation of pension is ushered in and made effective from a specified date? Would differential treatment to pensioners related to the date of retirement qua the revised formula for computation of pension attract Art.14 of the Constitution and the element of discrimination liable to be declared unconstitutional as being violative of Art.14?" As the questions so formulated related to the scope of Art.14 and classification of pensioners for eligibility based on dates of retirement, the Court first addressed itself to the limits of classification permissible under Art.14. It was observed, on the authority of earlier decision, that reasonable classification was permissible, provided it was based on intelligible differential distinguishing persons grouped together from those left out, and provided further that such differentia had a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be attained. It was also noticed, as a connected procedural question, that the burden of proving that the twin tests were satisfied in a given case, was on the state making and seeking to support the classification. It was also noticed, as a connected procedural question, that the burden of proving that the twin tests were satisfied in a given case, was on the state making and seeking to support the classification. The object, goal, character and nature of pension payments were next considered, and it was noted that "(i) pension is a term applied to periodic money payments to a person who retires at a certain age of disability; (ii) the payments usually continue for the rest of the recipient's life; (iii) though there are various theories justifying such payments, pension to civil employees of the Government and the defence personnel in India is generally considered as a compensation for past service; and (iv) it is "closely akin to wages in that it consists of payments provided by an employer, is paid in consideration of past service and serves the purpose of helping the recipient meet the expenses of living" It was also noted that pension was not a bounty but a reward or a quid pro quo an employee could expect as a matter of right, for past meritorious service, that its quantum was correlated to the average emoluments drawn during the last few years of his service and that the right to receive it depended on good behaviour even after the cessation of employer-employee relationship. 5. Having answered two of the relevant questions as above, their lordships turned to the circumstances under which the pension scheme was liberalised in 1979. According to the State, the new scheme was devised to meet the persistent demands of Central Government employees, demands arising from inflation, high cost of living and a fall in the purchasing power of the rupee. Admittedly therefore the object sought to be achieved was to compensate the pensioners for the loss of their "real earnings", and to maintain the level of social security they were enjoying. And the only other question which required consideration was whether in the context of achieving such an object, there was any relevance for classifying the pensioners into two groups depending on the date of retirement. And the only other question which required consideration was whether in the context of achieving such an object, there was any relevance for classifying the pensioners into two groups depending on the date of retirement. In other words, what fell to be examined was the "rationale behind the eligibility qualification"; and the court said: "If this be the underlying intendment of liberalisation of pension scheme, can any one be bold enough to assert that it was good enough only for those who would retire subsequent to the specified date but those who had already retired did not suffer the pangs of rising prices and falling purchasing power of the rupee? What is the sum total of picture? Earlier the scheme was not that liberal keeping in view the definition of average emoluments and the absence of slab system and a lower ceiling. Those who rendered the same service earned less pension and are exposed to the vagary of rising prices consequent upon the inflationary inputs. If, therefore, those who are to retire subsequent to the specified date would feel the pangs in their old age, of lack of adequate security, by what stretch of imagination the same can be denied to those who retired earlier with lower emoluments and yet are exposed to the vagaries of the rising prices and the falling purchasing power of the rupee And the greater misfortune is that they are becoming older and older compared to those who would be retiring subsequent to the specified date. The Government was perfectly justified in liberalising the pension scheme. In fact it was overdue. But we find no justification for arbitrarily selecting the criteria for eligibility for the benefits of the scheme dividing the pensioners all of whom would be retirees but falling on one or the other side of the specified date." It was also noticed that except asserting that the specified date was selected "on the basis of relevant and valid considerations", no material at all was placed before the court to support the assertion. 6. What remains to be seen therefore is whether an approach like the above is possible in relation to a scheme whereby the ceiling on gratuity is raised from a specified date. Gratuity, pension, provident fund (contributory) and retrenchment compensation are all social security measures designed to assist persons deprived of their earnings or earning capacity. 6. What remains to be seen therefore is whether an approach like the above is possible in relation to a scheme whereby the ceiling on gratuity is raised from a specified date. Gratuity, pension, provident fund (contributory) and retrenchment compensation are all social security measures designed to assist persons deprived of their earnings or earning capacity. All of them include an element of "reward" for past services, and the length of such service is an important element in determining the size of the benefit. But these measures are all not similar in their character or nature. Compensation for retrenchment is a solatium for premature and involuntary termination of employment. Provident fund encourages saving habits and, thrift, though the savings are also intended for use during old age and incapacity. Gratuity is a one-time payment in lump while pension is a periodic payment lasting for life. But the essential difference between pension on the one hand and gratuity, provident fund and retrenchment compensation on the other, is that while the first is in the nature of a continuing obligation on the employer despite the expiry of the contract of employment, the other three involve full settlement of accounts and a complete cessation of the relationship once that is done. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Nakara, pension "is closely akin to wages", because the periodic payments are made by the employer in consideration of service rendered in the past. The object of the payment is to help the ex-employee to meet the expenses of living. It is not a bounty, but something payable as part of the original employment bargain. The right for continued receipt of pension depends on good behaviour even after retirement; under the Service Rules, the pension can be reduced or withheld for certain types of improper conduct. This similarity between pension and wages was brought out more fully by the Supreme Court in Nakara's case, while over-ruling the Central Government's contention that by striking down the eligibility criterion alone, and by allowing the remaining part of the scheme to operate, the Court would be making the scheme retroactive. Mark the following passage: "Recall at this stage the method adopted when pay-scales are revised. Revised pay-scales are introduced from a certain date. All existing employees are brought on to the revised scales by adopting a theory of fitments and increments for past service. Mark the following passage: "Recall at this stage the method adopted when pay-scales are revised. Revised pay-scales are introduced from a certain date. All existing employees are brought on to the revised scales by adopting a theory of fitments and increments for past service. In other words, benefit of revised scale is not limited to those who enter service subsequent to the date fixed for introducing revised scales but the benefit is extended to all those in service prior to that date. This is just and fair. Now if pension as we view it, is some kind of retirement wages for past service, can it be denied to those who retired earlier, revised retirement benefits being available to future retirees only. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the Court by its approach would be making the scheme retroactive, because it is implicit in theory of wages." 7. Gratuity is a retirement benefit, but it is not analogous to "retirement wages" with a continuing obligation on the employer and a corresponding right on the employee. An existing benefit such as wages or pension can be revised, but there can be no revision of that which has not survived. In the present case, the petitioner's right to receive gratuity was fully and completely settled when he retired in 1981 and the maximum amount then payable under the rules was paid. There was nothing left for revision so far as he was concerned. As a matter of fact Ext. P1 did not create two classes of gratuity claimants, to be dealt with under different rules in the matter of ceiling, after 1-4-82. Those who retired on or after 1-4-82 formed a single class governed by the same limit with regard to maximum gratuity claimable. In as much as the claims of those who had retired prior to the aforesaid date were covered by the ceiling limit then in force, there could be no question of postulating two classes of gratuity claimants surviving after 1-4-82. In fact, to uphold the petitioner's contention that his gratuity should be refixed in terms of the 1982 order, notwithstanding his retirement in 1981, one will have to make Ext. P1 retroactive-a course the Supreme Court was not prepared to follow in Nakara, even in respect of a continuing obligation. 8. In Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works (AIR. 1974 SC. P1 retroactive-a course the Supreme Court was not prepared to follow in Nakara, even in respect of a continuing obligation. 8. In Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works (AIR. 1974 SC. 2349) the Supreme Court had said that in matters where a line had to be drawn or a point to be placed in a legislative or executive scheme, without offering a logical and mathematical explanation for doing so, such drawing or placing cannot be dubbed as arbitrary unless it was shown to be capricious or whimsical. Nakara's case was an exception to the said rule because the eligibility criteria was selected with reference to a measure which had "the pernicious tendency of dividing an otherwise homogeneous class"; classification based on such criteria had also no relation at all to the object sought to be achieved. In my opinion, these considerations do not arise at all where a scheme of revision is allowed to operate prospectively only, without creating two classes of beneficiaries to be separately governed by the old and the new. I am therefore unable to strike down Ext. P1 in so far as it specifies 1-4-82 as the date from which ceiling on gratuity should stand revised. The Original Petition is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Dismissed.