S.N. BHARGAVA. J.—This is an appeal against the order of District Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur, granting an injunction against the defendant appellants, restraining them from selling the land of Khasra No. 1111 and 1112 and from making any constructions, and further directing to maintain the status quo. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for specific performance on the basis of an agreement by the appellant in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. The first agreement was dated 11.7.75 by which the defendants agreed to sell land measuring 6 Bighas and 12 Biswas out of Khasra No 1111 for a sum of Rs. 1,85,000/- and a sum of Rs. 100/- was given in advance. It was further agreed that as soon as the respondent society paid a sum of Rs. 50,000/-, the possession of the property would be handed over to the Society. The time given in the agreement was of six months. Since the respondent Society could not pay the amount, the time was extended initially upto 31.12.76 and again upto 31.12.78. On 28.12.78, another agreement was executed by which the appellants agreed to sell the land to the respondent Society on the same terms, except the portion of land measuring 56 x 80 on the South-West corner preserved for Satsang Bhawan and the portion on the North-East corner where there was a well and pump set installed. The land was enclosed by barbed wires. A map was also enclosed alongwith the agreement. On 15.4.79, the possession of the land as mentioned in the agreement dated 28.12.78 was also handed over to the Society through another written RUKKA. The defendants also signed the site plan in taken thereof. The total sum of Rs. 1.29,950/- was paid on different dates by the Society to the defendants. On 21 4.80, a notice was sent by the respondent Society to the defendants that it had come to their notice that out of the land the possession whereof has been handed over to the respondent Society, land measuring 2 Bighas 16 Biswas belonged to Khasra No. 1112-A detailed reply to this notice was given by the defendants in which they explained the whole situation as to under what circumstances they have entered into an agreement with the plaintiff society. The present suit was filed by the respondent Society for specific performance on 29.6 83. 3. The present suit was filed by the respondent Society for specific performance on 29.6 83. 3. An application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. read with Section 151 C.P.C. was also filed alongwith the plaint on 29.6 83 and the trial court passed an ad interim order on 30th June, 1983 that the defendants should not sell the property shown by Red colour in the plaint nor they should make any construction thereon. 4. The defendants filed the reply of the stay application on 12.8.83 and thereafter, the trial court after hearing the arguments, passed the impugned order granting an injunction against the appellants from selling any land out of Khasra No. 1112, and directing not to make any constructions and to maintain the status quo. It is against this judgment that the present appeal has been filed. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that in a suit for specific performance, the court should not grant temporary injunction and in this connection, has placed reliance on Krishna Moorthy Kounder Vs. Paramasiva Koundar (1). 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that this view taken by the Madras High Court in Krishna Moorthy Kounders case (supra), is not correct and has been dissented by the Bombay High Court in Venkat Dharmaji Gontalwar Vs. Vishwanath (2). He has further placed reliance on Mahesh Chand Heda vs. Mahesh Prasad(3) in which case this court has held that a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from selling the land can be passed in a suit for specific performance. In that case, the teamed Additional District Judge, dismissed the application for grant of temporary injunction. In appeal, this court set aside the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge and observed as under:- "If the respondent is permitted to sell the plot of land in question to a third party during the pendency of the suit, the effect would be that purchaser may make constructions over the land in dispute which may lead to further complication as well as litigation causing delay in appellants securing possession of the land in dispute". I have carefully gone through these authorities and I am of the view that the view taken by this court in Mahesh Chand Heda Vs. Mahesh Prased, (supra) is correct. I have carefully gone through these authorities and I am of the view that the view taken by this court in Mahesh Chand Heda Vs. Mahesh Prased, (supra) is correct. Bombay High Court in Venkat Dharmaji Gontalwars case (supra) dissented from the view taken by the Madras High Court in Krishna Moorthy Koundars case (supra). The case of the plaintiff is that it has been put in possession of the suit land under an agreement of sale. Ordinarily his rights should be protected. There is no bar under C.P.C. which can be invoked in support of the preposition that the plaintiff suing for specific performance cannot obtain any injunction whatsoever and since there is no bar in the C.P.C., an application for grant of temporary injunction is solely governed either by Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. or by the inherent powers u/s 151 C.P.C. Injunction is a preventive relief and if the respondent is permitted to sell the plot of land to third party during the pendency of the suit and the third party may make constructions, it will obviously cause further litigation and complication and as such, I am not inclined to follow the view taken by the Madras High Court in Krishna Moorthy Koundars case (supra). 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the plaintiff had neither, the prima facie case nor the balance of convenience was in its favour nor it was likely to suffer irreparable injury and that since there was no averment in the plaint that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform its part of the contract, the suit cannot succeed. He has further submitted that the identity of the property has not been established. The agreement was only in relation to Khasra No. 1111 whereas the main dispute between the parties is with regard to Khasra No. 1112. He has further submitted that the defendant appellants have no objection if the injunction is maintained with regard to Khasra No. 1111. He has then submitted that the trial court has not considered the various objections taken by the defendants in their written statement like that of limitation and payment of court fees etc. and without deciding or coming to the conclusion that it has some prima facie case, injunction has been granted. In this connection, he has placed reliance on Banshilal v. Noor Mohd. and without deciding or coming to the conclusion that it has some prima facie case, injunction has been granted. In this connection, he has placed reliance on Banshilal v. Noor Mohd. (4) and has submitted that merely the execution of the agreement to sell the property, no interest is vested in the plaintiff and it is not entitled to claim any injunction against the defendant appellants. He has also placed reliance on Smt. Dhaunbai vs. Pherozshah(5). Rajendra Prasad Rai vs. Rajdeva Rai (6) Manohar Lal vs. Smt. Rajeshwari (7) and Gurpaddayye Shiveppa Heraemath vs. Shivappa Basappa (8) wherein it has been held that if the plaint does not disclose that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part, the plaint does not disclose any cause of action and the suit for specific performance should be dismissed. 8 On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently submitted that granting of an injunction is a discretionary relief and the appellate court should not interfere in appeal with the exercise of discretion by the trial court and substitute for it, its own discretion, unless the judgment of the trial court is vitiated being arbitrary or perverse or that the lower court has not followed the sound legal principles or has failed to consider all the relevant record. Mere possibility of the appellate court coming to a different conclusion on the same facts and evidence, will not justify interference and has placed reliance on Smt. Vimla Devi Vs. Jang Bahadur (9). He has further drawn my attention to the plaint and has submitted that there is a specific mention regarding the fact that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform its part of the contract and has placed reliance on Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act as also Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act. He has further stated that the plaintiff has stated in the plaint that a sum of Rs. 1.29,950/- has been paid to the defendants and as such, they are bound to perform their part of the contract It cannot be disputed that the possession of the land marked in the site plan was handed over to the plaintiff after the receipt of amount He has also placed reliance on Durga Prasad vs. Kanhaiya Lal (SO) and Gangubai Beblya Chaudhary vs. Sitaram Bhalchandra Sukhtankar (11). 9. 9. I have considered the various submissions made at the bar and have also gone through the various authorities cited before me and in my opinion, this appeal deserves to be dismissed. Grant of an injunction on particular facts and circumstances of the case, is a discretionary matter and once the trial court has exercised its discretion while granting and injunction the appellate court ordinarily should not interfere with such discretionary order, unless of course the lower court acts arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles and without considering all the relevant records. In the present case, none of these conditions are fulfilled. It is an admitted fact that the defendants received a sum of Rs. 1,29,950/-and that the possession of the land shown in the site plan including land of Khasra No. 1112 has been handed over to the plaintiff and therefore. I am of the view that the plaintiff has got a prima facie case and will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted in his favour. As such the conditions for granting an injunction are satisfied and the trial court was justified in granting the injunction in favour of the plaintiff respondent. I am not making any observations with regard to the merits of the case as it may prejudice either party when the case comes up for decision before the trial court. 10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the parties are left to bear their own cost.