JUDGMENT : A.P. Sen, J. Appellant A. Ramanathan has been held guilty of professional misconduct and debarred from practice for a period of one year by the State Bar Council of Tamil Nadu by its order dated August 29, 1979 passed under section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. He preferred an appeal to the Bar Council of India under section 37 of the Act. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India dismissed the appeal by its order dated July 25, 1981. Hence, this appeal to this Court under section 38 of the Act. 2. It appears that the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India fixed the appeal for hearing at Madras on May 23, 1981 and its Registrar accordingly addressed a letter dated May 5, 1981 to Miss Lily Thomas, learned counsel for the appellant intimating her of the date and place of hearing. The letter was received by her junior Shri S.K. Arora on May 8, 1981 as Miss Lily Thomas had gone to Europe as the Supreme Court had closed for vacation on May 6,1981. He accordingly by his letter dated May 9, 1981 addressed to the Registrar sought an adjournment of the hearing of the appeal to the first week of August i.e. after the reopening of the Supreme Court. On May 15, 1981 the appellant also moved an application for adjournment. When the appeal was called on for hearing on May 23, 1981, the appellant was present in person and renewed his prayer for adjournment till after vacation of the Supreme Court. The Disciplinary Committee however adjourned the hearing to the next day i.e. to May 24, 1981. On that day, arguments were partly heard and the appellant renewed his prayer for a short adjournment and the Committee adjourned the case to the day following. Hearing was concluded and the orders reserved. The Disciplinery Committee passed the order under appeal on July 25, 1981 upholding the order of the State Bar Council of Tamil Nadu. 3. Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned counsel for the appellant makes a grievance that the appellant was entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner of his choice, the charge of professional misconduct labelled against him being of a quasi-criminal nature, and contends that the procedure adopted by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India was not in consonance with the principles of natural justice. He says that nothing would have been lost if the Disciplinary Committee had adjourned the appeal to a date in the first week of August, 1981 as there were several other matters fixed for hearing at Madras. There is, in our opinion, considerable force in his submission. 4. Although the grant or refusal of adjournment was purely in the discretion of the learned members of the Disciplinary Committee, we feel that the refusal of adjournment in the facts and circumstances of the case has caused a miscarriage of justice. The hearing of the appeal at Madras was not at the behest of the appellant but under the directions of the learned members of the Disciplinary Committee. The mere circumstance that the Bar Council of India was put to unnecessary expenditure was not a valid ground for refusal of adjournment as evidently there were other appeals to be heard there. The appellant in his application had stated that all the papers pertaining to the appeal were with his counsel Miss Lily Thomas, who was away to Europe and that he was unable to proceed with the appeal without any papers, and that he was therefore constrained to seek an adjournment due to circumstances beyond his control. 5. We wish to mention that the appellant has sworn in affidavit alleging in paragraph 3 that when he appeared in person before the Disciplinary Committee at its hearing at Madras on May 23, 1981 and prayed for adjournment, the learned members told him that they were not prepared to adjourn and that if at all an adjournment was to be granted, his prayer would be considered in case he paid Rs. 10,000 said to be the expenses of the Committee for its sitting at Madras. We are not inclined to go into the truth or otherwise of this allegation since the fact alleged by the appellant as regards demand for payment of Rs. 10,000 as adjournment costs has been controverted by the Secretary of the Bar Council of India in his counter-affidavit although the appellant has filed a rejoinder reiterating his allegation. We rest our decision on the question whether the refusal Of adjournment by the Disciplinary Committee could be justified in the circumstances. 10,000 as adjournment costs has been controverted by the Secretary of the Bar Council of India in his counter-affidavit although the appellant has filed a rejoinder reiterating his allegation. We rest our decision on the question whether the refusal Of adjournment by the Disciplinary Committee could be justified in the circumstances. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are constrained to accept the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that nothing would have been lost if the hearing of the appeal was adjourned to the first week of August 1931 i.e. after the reopening of the Supreme Court, looking to the predicament of the appellant that his counsel had gone to Europe on vacation and he was left with no papers. 6. Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India is set aside and it is directed to hear the appeal afresh after notice to the parties. 7. There shall be no order as to costs. Allowing the appeal.