JUDGMENT - KOLSE B.G., J.: - These five appeals are filed by the original accused against the order dated March 25, 1982 of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mazagaon in five different cases. The complainant has also preferred a Criminal Revision Application for enhancement of sentence in this Court in each case. The said appeals were initially filed in the Bombay City Civil and Sessions Court Bombay and they were transferred to this Court in view of the order passed in each of the Revision Applications by this Court. All these Appeals and the Revision Applications involve a common point for the consideration of this Court and, therefore, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Crescent Tool Corporation, a registered firm having its registered office at 4, Raghunath Madhavji Street, Mandvi, Bombay, is a parent concern having its sister concerns in the named and styled as Asia Electric Co. at 13-F, Chakla Street, Mandvi, Bombay-3, M/s. Metal and Material Corporation, 1st Dhirubhai Parikh Marg, New Era Engineering Co., at 30 Old Hanuman Lane, 2nd floor, Kalbadevi, Bombay and M/s. Rajendra Trading Co. at 112 Veer Vithaldas Chandan Street, Vadgali, Bombay-4. All these firms were dealing in mills stores, hardware, machine tools, etc. They had separate current accounts with Indian Overseas Bank, Mandvi Branch with the bill discounting facilities. This facility was given on the application of all the partners of each of the firms coupled with letters of hypothecation given by them. Under the said facility the account-holder is paid in advance the value of the goods under sale and the bank realises the amount later. The nature of the transaction itself calls for faithful report from the account-holder as regards the quality, quantity and the value of the goods to be sold. The facility was available to the parent concern and all other associated concerns between 1975 and 1977. 3. In Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 1984, the accused Jaswant P. Mathuria had drawn Hundi No. 28 for Rs. 18,554.50 as per Invoice No. 382 against a consignment. However, subsequently the hundi was not honoured and was returned to the drawee bank. On taking inventory of the consignment it was found that though the bank had advanced the sum of Rs. 18,554.50 p., the consignment was worth only Rs. 2300/-. Similarly, Hundi No. 29 for Rs. 18,554.50 as per Invoice No. 382 against a consignment. However, subsequently the hundi was not honoured and was returned to the drawee bank. On taking inventory of the consignment it was found that though the bank had advanced the sum of Rs. 18,554.50 p., the consignment was worth only Rs. 2300/-. Similarly, Hundi No. 29 for Rs. 16,298/- as per Invoice No. 383 was drawn on 29th September, 1977 and on inventory, it was found that the goods in the consignments were worth Rs. 3000/- only. The accused had also drawn Hundi No. 30 as per invoice No. 384 of Rs. 14,891/- on 4-10-1977, and after inventory the goods worth only Rs. 2600/- were found in the consignment. Thus in all a total amount of Rs. 49,743.50 was advanced by the bank whereas good worth Rs. 7958/- only were sent as per the consignments. All the three hundies and the invoices were signed by the accused. The accused was therefore, convicted for the offence under section 420 I.P.C. and was directed to be released on his entering into a bond of Rs. 5000/- for good behaviour for a period of two years. 4. In Cri. Appeal No. 538 of 1984 Rajendra D. Shah had drawn the following hundis:- Hundi No. 14 Invoice No. 119 dated 29-8-1977 for Rs. 8,782/-; Hundi No. 17 Invoice No. 122 dated 8-9-1977 for Rs. 14,768/- and Hundi No. 16 Invoice No. 121 dated 8-9-1977 for Rs. 10,920/-. All these hundis were returned unhonoured. The consignments were called back by the drawee bank and on inventory the goods worth Rs. 6500/ were only found in the consignment as against the advance of Rs. 34470/- The accused was convicted under section 420 I.P.C. and sentenced to suffer S.I. till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- i.d. to suffer further R.I. for three months. 5. In Cri. Appeal No. 318 of 1984, the accused J.P. Mathuria and R.D. Kothari had drawn following hundis:- Hundi No. 78 for Rs. 14028/- dated October 5, 1977; Hundi No. 79 for Rs. 14847/- dated October 5, 1977; and Hundi No. 80 for Rs. 19158/- dated October 10, 1977. None of these hundies were accepted by the consignees. Therefore, the drawee bank called back the goods and an Inventory of the consignments wherein the goods worth of Rs. 9,000/- were found as against the advance of Rs. 14847/- dated October 5, 1977; and Hundi No. 80 for Rs. 19158/- dated October 10, 1977. None of these hundies were accepted by the consignees. Therefore, the drawee bank called back the goods and an Inventory of the consignments wherein the goods worth of Rs. 9,000/- were found as against the advance of Rs. 48,033/-. Both the accused were convicted under section 420 r.w. 34 of I.P.C. and they were released under section 360(1) of the Cri.P.C. on their executing a bond of Rs. 5,000/-. 6. In Appeal No. 319 of 1984, Dr. Shah and K.V. Lakhari had drawn the following hundis:- Hundi No. 3407 invoice No. 380 for Rs. 13,431/- dated September 2, 1977, Hundi No. 3112 invoice No. 372 for Rs. 19.760/- dated September 12, 1977 and Hundi No. 3410 invoice No. 373 for Rs. 16,348/- dated September 9, 1977. All these consignees refused to honour the hundis. The drawee bank, therefore, called back the consignments. On inventory, the goods worth of Rs. 7370/- were found as against the advance of Rs. 49,339/-. Accused D. Shah was convicted under section 420 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to suffer S.I. till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 7000/-, i.d. to suffer further R.I. for six months. 7. In Cri. Appeal No. 320 of 1984 Rasiklal Kothari and Rajendra Shah had drawn following hundis: Hundi No. 21, Invoice No. 220 for Rs. 17,126/-; Hundi No. 23, for Rs. 18,126/- dated 10th October, 1977; and Hundi No. 24 for Rs. 17,255/- dated October 10, 1977. None of the hundis were honoured by the consignees. The consignments were called back by the drawee bank. The inventory was taken and the goods worth of Rs. 10,025/- were found against the advance of Rs. 52,597/-. Accused Rasiklal Kothari and Rajendra Shah were convicted under section 420 r.w. 34 of the I.P.C. Rasiklal Kothari was released under section 360(1) of the Cri.P.C. on his executing a bond of good behaviour of Rs. 5000/- for a period of two years and Rajendra Shah was sentenced to suffer S.I. till the rising of the Court and to pay fine of Rs. 2,500/-, i.e. to suffer further R.I. for two months. 8. 5000/- for a period of two years and Rajendra Shah was sentenced to suffer S.I. till the rising of the Court and to pay fine of Rs. 2,500/-, i.e. to suffer further R.I. for two months. 8. The Bank contacted all the partners of all the firms and brought to their notice the fraud practised by them by submitting false hundis and invoices and asked them to make the payments thereunder forthwith. 9. All the accused approached the Bank and executed a composite deed of security on 15-12-1977 for all the amounts due from them including the amounts towards the dishonoured bills of exchange which are the subject-matter of the present Appeals. They also wrote letters which are at Exhs. 'M' and 'N' to the bank and admitted that the goods actually consigned were not of the quality and quantity as was described in original invoices and that they were not of the value mentioned in the invoices. The Bank served a legal notice on all the partners of all the firms and asked them to pay the dues towards the dishonoured bills of exchange, failing which they would be prosecuted. After giving a reasonable time, the bank filed separate Criminal Complaint against each of the firms under section 420 of the I.P.C. alleging that all of them had cheated the bank by producing false invoices with the intention of making wrongful gain. 10. During the trial, the accused in Cri. Appeals Nos. 317 of 1984 and 318 of 1984 paid all the amounts due towards the hundis drawn by them. In Appeal No. 320 of 1984, the accused Kothari paid 50% of the amount as his co-accused Rajendra Shah was liable to pay the balance 50% of the amount due towards the hundis. 11. During the hearing of these appeals, the remaining principal amounts in all the cases were paid by all the accused, except in Cri. Appeal No. 319 of 1984 as one of the accused in that case i.e. Mr. Shah has become insolvent and, therefore, he could not pay the amount and the other accused i.e. Kantilal Lakhari has been absconding from the beginning. 12. Appeal No. 319 of 1984 as one of the accused in that case i.e. Mr. Shah has become insolvent and, therefore, he could not pay the amount and the other accused i.e. Kantilal Lakhari has been absconding from the beginning. 12. All the accused denied the charge and in the trail Court contended that all the transactions were of civil nature for which a composite Civil Suit being Suit No. 87 of 1983 has been filed on the Original Side of this Court and the Bank loan was sufficiently secured by the composite deed of guarantee executed by all of them in favour of the Bank. It was also submitted on their behalf that the prosecution had failed to prove that they had signed the documents knowing them to be false or that they had made false representations to the Bank. 13. In all these cases, prosecution examined only the complainant Thangawel, Branch Manager of the Indian Overseas Bank, Mandvi Branch, who deposed about the procedure of the credit facility. His evidence shows that as soon as the invoices along with the bills of exchange are produced in the bank, the payments to the tune of the full value shown in the invoices is made. All the Hundies were drawn by the accused during the period August, 1977 and October, 1977. Within such a short span of time the Bank had advanced an amount of Rs. 2,25,000/- to accused under various bills of exchange. The complainant further says in his evidence that in these five cases, the Bank relied on the documents, i.e. hundis, invoices and transport receipts. The accused represented to the Bank by submitting the said documents, that the goods mentioned in the invoices were consigned to the places shown therein and that they would fetch the value as shown in the invoices. Relying on these documents and the representations made therein, the Bank credited the full amount of the bills to the current accounts of the firms of the accused. However, when these bills were sent to the collecting Banks, the same were not honoured and the documents were returned to the drawee bank. At the request of the accused, the Bank arranged for the retransport of the goods and an inventory of the consignments was taken in the presence of the accused. However, when these bills were sent to the collecting Banks, the same were not honoured and the documents were returned to the drawee bank. At the request of the accused, the Bank arranged for the retransport of the goods and an inventory of the consignments was taken in the presence of the accused. To the surprise of the Bank, it was found that the goods actually consigned were not in accordance with the description given in the original invoices and could not have fetch the price as mentioned in the invoices. The goods under sale were not of the same value, quality and quantity as mentioned in the relevant documents submitted to the bank. This fact was also admitted by all the appellants in their letters written to the bank vide Exhs. 'M' and 'N'. The prosecution has also relied on the documentary evidence which is at Extn. 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I' and 'J' to 'O' which are taken on record by consent of both the parties under section 294 of the Cri.P.C. Exhibit 'E' is an extract of the accounts which has been proved by the complainant. 14. Shri Sardar, the learned Counsel appearing for the accused in Appeal Nos. 317 of 1984, 318 of 1984 and 320 of 1984 took me through the cross-examination of the complainant who has stated that he had no personal knowledge as to who wrote the hundis and invoices and the transport receipts. He, therefore, submitted that the contents of the invoices and other documents such as hundi and transport receipts were not proved by the prosecution and there is also no evidence as to who wrote the documents. He further submitted that the deed of guarantee was executed by all the accused in favour of the Bank on December 15, 1977. He also invited my attention to the following recitals of Exts. 'B' and submitted that the dispute was that of a civil nature. He further submitted that the deed of guarantee was executed by all the accused in favour of the Bank on December 15, 1977. He also invited my attention to the following recitals of Exts. 'B' and submitted that the dispute was that of a civil nature. “In case the net proceeds of such goods and/or insurance policies shall be insufficient to pay the amount of my/our indebtedness to you (on any account whatsoever) including re-exchange and all charges I/we authorise you as aforesaid to draw on me/us at sight for the deficiency, without prejudice nevertheless to any claim against any parties to any Bill or Bills or their estates for recovery of the same; and I/we engage to honour such drafts on presentation......” 15. Shri Kanuga, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant accused in Cri. Appeals Nos. 538 of 1984, 319 of 1984 and 320 of 1984 adopted the submissions made by Shri Sardar. Mr. Kanuga and Sardar both relied on (Sukhdeo Jha Utpal v. State of Bihar)1, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 466; (State of Kerala v. A. Pareed Pillai)2, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 326 and unreported judgment of this Court in (Cri. Appeal No. 136 of 1957)3, to contend that the dispute was of a civil nature. 16. On the other hand, Shri Vashi, the learned Counsel appearing for the Bank submitted that all the documents produced by the prosecution under section 294 of Criminal Procedure Code were admitted by the accused and no formal proof thereof was required. He further submitted that all thee documents bear the signature of the respective accused. The Bank relied on the representations made by the accused and gave full credit to the tune of the value of the goods under sale. He strongly relied on the letters written by the accused to the Bank which are of Exhs. 'M' and 'N' wherein all accused have admitted that the goods consigned were not of the same quality, quantity and value as mentioned in the invoices. According to him, the prosecution has proved the offence against all the accused beyond doubt. 17. In view of the rival contentions, the only issues which arise for my consideration are as to whether the explanation of the accused that they signed the documents in question without any dishonest intention and whether the dispute is of a civil nature. 18. According to him, the prosecution has proved the offence against all the accused beyond doubt. 17. In view of the rival contentions, the only issues which arise for my consideration are as to whether the explanation of the accused that they signed the documents in question without any dishonest intention and whether the dispute is of a civil nature. 18. As far as the prosecution case is concerned, its case has been almost admitted by the accused. It is not disputed that the said five firms of which the accused are partners, enjoyed the bill discounting facility. It is further admitted that the concerns received the amount in advance towards the price of the goods under sale on the basis of the documents submitted by the accused to the Bank. The consignments did not contain the goods, of the value, quality and quantity shown in the papers submitted to the Bank by the accused. The said fact also has been accepted by the accused in their letters vide Exhs. 'M' and 'N' written by them to the Bank. But for the false representations oral as well as through the documents such as hundis, invoices and transport receipts the Bank would not have parted with the funds involved in these cases. However, the appellants contended that they were not personally liable or responsible for the false representations made to the Bank. It is pertinent to note that the prosecution has called upon the accused appellants to admit the documents which are at Exts. 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' and 'F' to 'O' without formal proof thereof under section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The accused admitted the said documents and also the execution thereof and the documents were accordingly taken on record and, therefore, the prosecution was relieved of the burden of proving the contents thereof. Hence, there is absolutely no force in the contention of Sarvashri Sardar and Kanuga that the prosecution has not proved the contents of the documents. 19. The alternative contention of the appellants that they had signed the said documents without any dishonest intention calls for a closer scrutiny. Hence, there is absolutely no force in the contention of Sarvashri Sardar and Kanuga that the prosecution has not proved the contents of the documents. 19. The alternative contention of the appellants that they had signed the said documents without any dishonest intention calls for a closer scrutiny. The learned Counsel for the appellants invited my attention to the admissions of the complainant in his cross-examination to the effect that he was unable to state as to who actually produced the various documents in the Bank and expressed his inability to state as to who wrote the concerned documents. From these two circumstances, it was submitted that the accused cannot be held responsible for the documents produced in the Bank and they might have signed them in the course of their business. In support of these contentions, Shri Sardar and Shri Kanuga, learned Counsel for the appellants have relied on A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 466. The appellants in the said case were required to sign various correspondence and a number of documents which were in fact prepared by the subordinate staff. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court accepted the explanation of the appellant before them, particularly on the background that no wrongful gain was made by him. In present case, no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming. No evidence has been led to prove the circumstances under which the accused signed the documents in question. Apart from the same, the accused had admitted, that all of them had signed the application for securing the bill discounting facility. They had not only signed the invoices, but also the hundis and transport receipts. The accused, therefore, were aware of the fact that they had signed the said documents for the purpose of getting the advances under the bill discount facility. There is further no evidence on record to show that the employees had prepared the documents without the instructions of their masters. It must, therefore, be presumed that the accused had intentionally singed the documents with a view to make a wrongful gain to themselves by causing a wrongful loss to the Bank. This itself is sufficient misrepresentation to bring home the charge of cheating. It is further not the case of the accused, as indeed it cannot be, that the documents were prepared and produced without their knowledge. I am, therefore, not inclined to accept the explanation put forth by the appellants. This itself is sufficient misrepresentation to bring home the charge of cheating. It is further not the case of the accused, as indeed it cannot be, that the documents were prepared and produced without their knowledge. I am, therefore, not inclined to accept the explanation put forth by the appellants. The ruling reported in A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 326 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Because it was observed by their Lordships there that it was not in pursuance of any representation regarding the consignment of oil tins to the railway that the Bank gave credit to the firm of the accused for the amounts of the D.D. 20. The contentions of the appellants that the dispute was purely of a civil nature is also without any force. It was contended that all the accused had executed a deed of composite guarantee and, therefore, all the transactions of hundis stood extinguished in view of the unreported judgment of this Court in Cri. Appeal No. 136 of 1957. The parties in the authority referred to above were related to each other and because of their relations the new arrangement arrived at by them had extinguished the criminal liability of the accused. I am not inclined to accept the submission that on account of the new arrangement, the criminal liability of the accused. I am not inclined to accept the submission that on account of the new arrangement, the criminal liability would be wiped out in this case. 21. In (Tusli Ram v. State of U.P.)4, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 666 their Lordships refused to accept a similar proposition. It was observed by their Lordships there as under:- “For a person to be convicted under section 420, I.P.C. it has to be established not only that he has cheated someone but also that by doing so he has dishonestly induced the person who was cheated to deliver any property etc. A person can be said to have done a thing dishonestly if he does so with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person. Wrongful loss by unlawful means of property to which a person is entitled while wrongful gain to a person means a gain to him by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled. Wrongful loss by unlawful means of property to which a person is entitled while wrongful gain to a person means a gain to him by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled. These are the two facets of the definition of dishonesty and it is enough to establish the existence of one of them. The law does not require that both should be established. “Where a consignor of goods draws a hundi for the price of the consignment on some firm and supports that hundi with the railway receipt obtained by him in respect of the consignment, the party in fact pledges the consignment to the bank discounting the hundi and, therefore, in such a transaction the railway receipt cannot be regarded as anything else than a security for that transaction. If that security turns out to be worthless or practically worthless because the value of the consignment is only a fraction of what it was represented to be the discounting of the hundi by the party drawing it must necessarily be regarded as unlawful. “The accused consigned small quantities of goods but subsequently tampered with the railway receipts by showing that the consignments were of large quantities. The accused then endorsed the railway receipts in favour of one of the firms belonging to them. Those firms drew large sums of money commensurate with the large quantities of goods specified in the forged receipts and on the security of those receipts drew demand drafts or hundis in favour of various banks. “Held, on the facts and circumstances of the case that the accused by obtaining credits for large amounts on the strength of hundis supported by forged railway receipts had made a wrongful gain and , therefore, was guilty under section 420, I.P.C.” In the case referred to above, the accused mortgaged their properties for the repayment of the dues and subsequently the amounts were paid by the accused. Even then the plea that the dispute was of a civil nature was not accepted and they were convicted. The view that when the remedy under the civil law is available, criminal remedy is not available, cannot be accepted, as the criminal prosecution is not barred merely because a civil remedy is also available. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but are co-extensive and essentially differ in their nature and consequences. The view that when the remedy under the civil law is available, criminal remedy is not available, cannot be accepted, as the criminal prosecution is not barred merely because a civil remedy is also available. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but are co-extensive and essentially differ in their nature and consequences. The object of the criminal law is to publish an offender and the object of the civil remedy is to recover the property. Hence, I see no merits in these Appeals. 22. Coming now to the Revision Applications for enhancements of sentences filed by the complainants, three out of the five Criminal Revision Applications are filed beyond time and the complainant has in them prayed for the condonation of delay. The accused initially filed their appeals in the City Civil and Sessions Court, Bombay. However, as per the orders passed in each of the Revision Applications, all the Appeals were transferred to this Court and, therefore, the accused had sufficient notice of the prayer of the enhancement of sentence in these Revisions. It was stated that the complainant was required to consult his Head Office at Madras after obtaining the certified copies for filing the Revisions. The complainant Bank is also a Public Undertaking. In the process, the time was lost and the complainant could not file the Revision application within the time prescribed by the statute. It is also pertinent to note that this point was raised by the learned Counsel only when I expressed my view that the accused were guilty of the offences and that the learned Magistrate was wrong in releasing them on bond. Several authorities were relied on by Shri Kanuga and he vehemently opposed the condonation of delay in the three Revisions referred to below. The facts and the circumstances of the case cited and the present cases are altogether different and the issues involved in the cases cited have no bearing on the issues involved in this case. I am, therefore, inclined to condone the delay in filing Criminal Revision Applications Nos. 479 of 1982, 481 of 1982 and 482 of 1982 in which the delay is of 10, 8 and 21 days respectively. Moreover the criminal appeal filed by the accused were also filed after the expiry of the prescribed period. The delay in filing the same was also condoned by the City Civil Sessions Court, Bombay. 23. 479 of 1982, 481 of 1982 and 482 of 1982 in which the delay is of 10, 8 and 21 days respectively. Moreover the criminal appeal filed by the accused were also filed after the expiry of the prescribed period. The delay in filing the same was also condoned by the City Civil Sessions Court, Bombay. 23. The learned Magistrate released some of the accused upon executing their bonds of good behaviour and some of the accused by sentencing them to suffer S.I. till the rising of the Court and/or fine. I have gone through the reasoning given by the learned Magistrate in his judgments carefully and heard the Counsel on both sides and at the end of this entire exercise, I have come to the conclusion that my interference with the order of sentence would not only be justified, but is necessary to prevent the miscarriage of justice. In my view, the reasoning of the learned Magistrate suffers from a legal error and is perverse. The grant of the benefit of probation to such accused is unwarranted. The learned Magistrate has also taken a too lenient view in awarding the sentence. A criminal cannot exonerate himself of his liability simply by repaying the amounts dishonestly obtained earlier nor can his crime be mitigated by the adverse circumstances in which he may be to-day. The accused who are responsible traders are guilty of a serious crime of cheating a public institution like the Bank. Many of the traders do not see anything wrong in making false representations to the financial institutions to obtain undue facilities. This trend is on the increase. The accused, therefore, deserve a severe punishment. The learned Counsel appearing for the State supported the order of sentence of the learned Magistrates. Both the Counsel for the accused pray for leniency on the ground of the long lapse of time since the commission of the offence, that this is the first offence of the accused and that the accused have repaid the amount. I am mindful of these facts while awarding the sentence. 24. However, those who paid in the trial Court will have to be dealt with leniently compared to those who paid the amounts in this Court and who have not paid the amount at all. Accordingly by ordering the sentence to them, I have made the necessary discrimination. 25. All the appeals viz. Appeals Nos. 24. However, those who paid in the trial Court will have to be dealt with leniently compared to those who paid the amounts in this Court and who have not paid the amount at all. Accordingly by ordering the sentence to them, I have made the necessary discrimination. 25. All the appeals viz. Appeals Nos. 317/84, 318/84, 319/84, 320/84 and 538/83 are dismissed. 26. Revision Application No. 483/82 is allowed. i) Order dated March 25, 1982 passed by the learned Magistrate releasing accused No. 1 Rasiklal Kothari on his executing a bond of Rs. 5000/- for his goods behaviour is set aside and he is sentenced to suffer R.I. for one year and to pay the fine of Rs. 2,500/- and in default to suffer S.I. for two months. The substantive sentence is to run concurrently with the sentence recorded against him in Cri. Revision Application No. 480 of 1982. ii) Accused No. 2 Rajendra D. Shah is sentenced to suffer R.I. for 18 months. The sentence of fine imposed upon him by the learned Magistrate is confirmed. The substantive sentence is to run concurrently with the sentence recorded against him in Criminal Revision Application No. 481/82. Both the accused to surrender to their bail bonds within three months from to-day. Accordingly, Rule is made absolute. 27. Revision Application No. 482/82 is allowed. The order dated 25-3-1982 passed by the learned Magistrate sentencing accused No. 1 Dhansukhlal Shah to suffer S.I. till the rising of the Court is set aside. He is sentenced to suffer R.I. for two years. The sentence of fine imposed on him by the learned Magistrate is confirmed. Accordingly, the Rule is made absolute. 28. Revision Application No. 480/82 is allowed. The order dated 25-3-1982 passed by the learned Magistrate releasing accused Nos. 3 and 4 on their executing a bond of Rs. 5000/- for their good behaviour is set aside and each of them is sentenced to suffer R.I. for one year. Accordingly, the Rule is made absolute. 29. Revision Application No. 481/82 is allowed. The order dated 25-3-1982 passed by the learned Magistrate sentencing accused Rajendra D. Shah to pay fine of Rs. 3000/- is confirmed. He is further sentenced to suffer R.I. for 18 months. Accordingly, the Rule is made absolute. 30. Revision Application No. 479/82 is allowed. Accordingly, the Rule is made absolute. 29. Revision Application No. 481/82 is allowed. The order dated 25-3-1982 passed by the learned Magistrate sentencing accused Rajendra D. Shah to pay fine of Rs. 3000/- is confirmed. He is further sentenced to suffer R.I. for 18 months. Accordingly, the Rule is made absolute. 30. Revision Application No. 479/82 is allowed. The order dated 25-3-1982 passed by the learned Magistrate releasing the accused J.P. Mathuria on his executing a bond of Rs. 5,000/- is set aside. He is sentenced to suffer R.I. for one year. Accordingly, the Rule is made absolute. All the accused to surrender within three months from to-day to receive sentence. All the accused to surrender within three months from to-day to receive sentence. Warrant to issue after a period of three months from to-day. Substantive sentences to run concurrently. No order as to costs. Order accordingly. -----