JUDGMENT - S.P. BHARUCHA, J.:---This appeal is directed against an order of Pendse, J., allowing a Chamber Summons for amendment of a plaint ''subject to the contention of limitation to be raised by defendants''. The appellant is one of the 5 defendants to the suit. 2. The plaintiffs ( the 1st respondents to the appeal) are a nationalised bank. Defendant 1 is a public limited company of which defendants 2, 3 and 4 were, at the relevant time, directors. On 21st August, 1973 defendant 1 asked the plaintiffs for a packing credit loan for the export of diamonds. On the 24th August, 1973 the plaintiffs sanctioned the loan, for Rs. 7,25,000/-. In connection therewith defendant 1 executed certain documents. On 28th September, 1973 defendant 4, who is the appellant, resigned as a director of defendant 1. His resignation was accepted on 27th October, 1973 and this was communicated to the Registrar of Companies. On 22nd November, 1973 certain further documents were executed. According to the plaintiff's these included an individual deed of guarantee in the sum of Rs. 2,30,000/- by defendant 4. On 19th August, 1976 the plaintiffs issued a notice of demand to each of the defendants. The notice recorded, inter alia, that by three separate deeds of guarantee all dated 22nd November, 1973, defendants 2, 3 and 4 had jointly and severally guaranteed repayment of the loan advanced to defendant 1 to the extent of Rs. 2,30,000/- together with interest thereon. The notice called upon defendants 2, 3 and 4 to make payment of the amounts so guaranteed. 3. On 21st August, 1976 the plaintiffs filed this suit. The plaint recited that defendants 2, 3 and 4 were liable under their guarantee dated 22nd November, 1973, copies whereof were annexed. On 21st February, 1977 defendant 4 filed a written-statement contending inter alia, that he had not signed any deed of guarantee dated 22nd November, 1973 and that the document relied upon by the plaintiffs was fabricated. 4. On 13th November, 1981 the plaintiffs took out a Chamber Summons for amendant of the plaint in terms of the draft annexed as a scheduled thereto. The sum and substance of the amendment was that defendant 4 had, on 24th January, 1972, executed a deed of guarantee in favour of the plaintiffs guaranteeing repayment of all present and future advances, liabilities, bills and promissory notes through or for defendant 1. The sum and substance of the amendment was that defendant 4 had, on 24th January, 1972, executed a deed of guarantee in favour of the plaintiffs guaranteeing repayment of all present and future advances, liabilities, bills and promissory notes through or for defendant 1. In the affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons it was stated that since defendant 4 had challenged the guarantee dated 22nd November, 1973 on the ground that the signature thereon was not his, the plaintiffs had made searches in their records and had found the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972 executed by defendants 2, 3 and 4. In the affidavit filed by defendant 4 in reply to the Chamber Summons it was contended that the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972 was also not signed by him and that the amendment should not be granted as it was barred by the law of limitation. 5. The order passed on that Chamber Summons is under challenge. Thereunder, the amendment was allowed, subject, as has been quoted above, to the defendants' contention in respect of limitation. 6. By reason of the order on the Chamber Summons defendant 4 can only urge at the hearing of the suit that the claim on the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972 could not have been laid on the date of the filing of the suit, namely, 21th August, 1976, being barred by the law of limitation. It will not be open to him to urge that the claim on it was barred on the date of the Chamber Summons, namely, 13th November, 1981. This is because the amendment when granted related back to the date of filing of the suit. That this is the correct interpretation of the order is not in dispute. 7. Mr. Chagla, learned Counsel, for the appellant (defendant 4), submitted that a suit on the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972 could not have been filed on 13th November, 1981 and that, therefore, a valuable right that had accrued to defendant 4 had been taken away by reason of the impugned order. In his submission, there was no special circumstances disclosed in the affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons which enabled the Court to permit an amendment barred by limitation. 8. The real question, therefore, that arise is : was the cause of action on the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972 barred on 13th November, 1981. Mr. In his submission, there was no special circumstances disclosed in the affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons which enabled the Court to permit an amendment barred by limitation. 8. The real question, therefore, that arise is : was the cause of action on the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972 barred on 13th November, 1981. Mr. Mehta, learned Counsel, for respondent 1 (the plaintiffs) submitted that the cause of action on the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972, was not barred by the law of limitation on 13th November, 1981. By this guarantee defendant 4 had agreed to pay to the plaintiffs "on demand such sums and moneys as were then or would at any time be owing" to them on any according whatsoever from the 1st defendant. The emphasis was that the amount under the guarantee was payable by defendant 4 on demand and no demand under the guarantee had been made upon defendant 4 at any time prior to 13th November, 1981. 9. In (J. Brown's Estate Brosn v. Brown)1, (1893)2 Chancery 300, Chitty, J., held that there was a distinction in law between a present debt and a promise to pay on demand on the one hand and a promise to pay a collateral sum on request on the other hand. Where there was a present debt and a promise to pay on demand, a demand was not considered a condition precedent to the bringing of an action. Where there was a promise to pay a collateral sum on request, the request had to be made before the action was brought. This is also the view taken by the Court of Appeal in (Bradford Old Bank Ltd. v. Sutcliffe)2, (1918)2 K.B. 833. The guarantee which was there considered was a guarantee to pay on demand. It was held that a demand before the action was an essential part of the cause of action against the guarantor and that the statute would not commence to run until the necessary demand was made. We may mention that this position in law is also set out in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition (para 159, Volume 20) and in Rowlatt on Principal and Surety, 4th Edition. (Page 115). 10. The guarantee dated 24th January, 1972, is a guarantee to pay on demand. The notice of demand dated 19th August, 1976 refers only to the guarantee dated 22nd November, 1973. (Page 115). 10. The guarantee dated 24th January, 1972, is a guarantee to pay on demand. The notice of demand dated 19th August, 1976 refers only to the guarantee dated 22nd November, 1973. So does the plaint. There was, therefore, no invocation of the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972, at any time prior to 13th January, 1981. We are therefore, unable to hold that the cause of action on the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972 did not survive on 13th January, 1981. 11. Mr. Chagla submitted that the notice of demand dated 19th August, 1976, ought to be read reasonably. It made a demand for moneys that were guaranteed not only by the guarantee dated 22nd November, 1973, but also by the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972. The notice of demand ought, therefore, to be read as claiming the moneys due under the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972. 12. We find it difficult to accept Mr. Chagla's submission. The demand that must be made is, for the amount covered by the particular guarantee. Where the same amount is covered by more than one guarantee, though given by the same guarantor, each such guarantee must be invoked in the demand. Until each guarantee is invoked, the bar of limitation there against does not begin to run. The guarantee dated 22nd January, 1972 not having been invoked until 13th November ,1981, we are unable to hold that no suit thereon could have been filed on that date. 13. Mr. Chagla referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Mrs. Margaret Lalita Samuel v. Indo-Commercial Bank Ltd.)3, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 102. It was there held in the case of a continuing guarantee that so long as the account of the principal debtor was a live account, in the sense that it was not settled, and there was no refusal on the part of the guarantor to carry out his obligation, the period of limitation could not be said to have commence running; limitation would run only from the date of his breach. Mr. Chagla submitted that defendant 1st is account with the plaintiffs was not a live account when the suit was filed and, therefore, the period of limitation in respect of the guarantee dated 22nd January, 1972, commenced to run from the date of the suit. Mr. Chagla submitted that defendant 1st is account with the plaintiffs was not a live account when the suit was filed and, therefore, the period of limitation in respect of the guarantee dated 22nd January, 1972, commenced to run from the date of the suit. This argument does not take into account the dual requirement that the Supreme Court has set out, namely, that the principal debtor's account must have ceased to be a live account and there must be a refusal on the part of the guarantor to carry out his obligation. Only after a demand has been made can there be a refusal. Upon refusal there is a breach and limitation begins to run. 14. Lastly, Mr. Chagla submitted that if no demand had been made on the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972, no cause of action had arisen thereon, the amendment was without value and ought, therefore, not to have been allowed. It is not possible to hold that the amendment is wholly worthless and reject it on the ground. It will be open to defendant 4 to contend, if so advised at the hearing of the suit, that the cause of action on the guarantee dated 24th January, 1972 had not arisen. 15. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -----