JUDGMENT K.M. Natarajan, J. 1. This petition is filed by the petitioning creditor under Sections 9(d)(ii) and (iii), 9(g), 10, 11(b), 12 and 13 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act to adjudicate the debtors as insolvents. 2. The facts which led to the filing of this petition may be briefly summarized as follows:- The 1st respondent-firm, Geo Pictures, represented by its partner, the 2nd respondent, borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 from the petitioning creditor by discounting three cheques for Rs. 50,000 each, dated 14th August, 1983, 18th August, 1983 and 9th September, 1983, drawn on the South Indian Bank Limited, Madras-2. The above three cheques were discounted by the firm represented by the Managing partner Mr. N.G. John. The said N.G. John got himself adjudicated as insolvent on his own petition in I.P. No. 61 of 1984. The other partner of the firm namely, Alayamma and two other minor partners are not adjudicated as insolvents. It is further alleged that the 1st respondent firm was postponing payment and requesting the petitioning creditors not to present the cheques for payment and paying interest up to September, 1984. The amounts due under those cheques are due from the 1st respondent firm. It is further alleged that the debtors have borrowed heavily from various other persons and that they are not in a position to pay those debts. They gave notice of suspension of payment to the creditors through its Manager Jacob orally with 'intent to delay and defeat the creditors and the 2nd respondent is making herself scarce from the business premises since 16th November, 1984. Hence they committed acts of insolvency within the meaning of Sections 9(g) and 9(d) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. 3. The 2nd respondent filed a counter affidavit, wherein she denied all the allegations. She would contend that she did not participate in the management of the business of the firm and that the business was being carried on by the Managing Partner N.G. John at No. 8, Scheme Road, Mahalingapuram, Madras-34 and not at No. 42, College Road, Nungam-bakkam, Madras-6. She further stated that subsequent to the adjudication of her son N.G. John as insolvent in I.P. No. 61 of 1984, she has given her consent for the Official Assignee to take over all the assets of the firm, realise the same and distribute the same to the general body of creditors. She further stated that subsequent to the adjudication of her son N.G. John as insolvent in I.P. No. 61 of 1984, she has given her consent for the Official Assignee to take over all the assets of the firm, realise the same and distribute the same to the general body of creditors. She does not own any property of her own and she is residing with her son Thomas George and has undergone operation in her eyes and that the assets of the firm have, also been taken over by the Official Assignee, Madras. She denied the allegation that she has made herself scarce in the business promises, that notice of suspension of payment to the creditors on 16th November, 1984 was made through Jacob to the creditors and that those allegations were invented only for the filing of petition for adjudication and to harass her, hence she prayed for dismissal of this petition against both the respondents. 4. On the side of the petitioning creditor, two witnesses were examined as P.Ws. 1 and 2 to establish the acts of insolvency and Exs. P1 to P4 were marked. P.W. 1 is a clerk of the petitioning creditor. He has stated that he knew the transaction between the petitioner and the respondents and that the respondents borrowed Rs. 1,50,000 under promissory note, that the respondents issued three cheques, that the Manager Jacob told him that they suspended payment and that they would receive notice. He has also stated that the 2nd respondent went to the village since the creditors were pressing. P.W. 2, a financier, was examined and he deposed that he had dealings with the Geo Pictures, namely, the 1st respondent firm and they have to pay him a sum of Rs. 1,00,000. According to him, his wife T. Meenakshi filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 25,000 and interest against the 1st respondent firm. He has stated that he used to talk to the 2nd respondent over phone and he had not seen her in person and that the Manager of the second respondent Mr. Jacob and Mr. N.G. John told him about the suspension of payment to the creditors and that even then the business is being carried on by Jacob under instructions from John. On the side of the respondents, R.V.V. 1 Jacob, was examined and Exs. R1 and R2 were marked. Jacob and Mr. N.G. John told him about the suspension of payment to the creditors and that even then the business is being carried on by Jacob under instructions from John. On the side of the respondents, R.V.V. 1 Jacob, was examined and Exs. R1 and R2 were marked. It is the evidence of R.W. 1 that he was employed during November, 1984 undeivGeo Movie Productions (P) Ltd., at No. 1, Ghuhan Street, Madras and that he was never under the employment of the 1st respondent or any other company during that period. He further stated that he does not know Alamelu, the petitioning creditor and on 16th November, 1984, he was not in Madras, since he left for Kerala on the 15th evening. He denied having made any statement to the petitioning creditor that the 1st respondent firm is unable to pay any amount to the creditors. 5. Now the point for consideration in this petition is whether the 2nd respondent departed from her usual place of business and absented herself and secluded herself so as to deprive her creditors of the means of communicating with her and whether the respondents-debtors gave notice to the petitioning creditor or any other creditor that they have suspended payment of their debts. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioning creditor Mr. N. Palaniappan mainly relied on the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and submitted that the petitioning creditor has established both the grounds. He argued that the non-examination of the 2nd respondent debtor is fatal and the respondents have not rebutted the evidence on the side of the petitioner. Further, the 2nd respondent herself admitted that she does not own any assets and that the assets of the firm had been taken over by the Official Assognee in pursuance of the order of adjudication of the Managing Partner as insolvent and as such, both the respondents are to be adjudged as insolvents by holding that they have committed acts of insolvency under both the grounds. Learned Counsel for the respondents then submitted that Sections 10,11(b),(12) and 13 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act are only procedural sections and that the relevant sections under which acts of insolvency alleged are only Section 9(d)(ii) and (iii) and 9(g) of the Act. Learned Counsel for the respondents then submitted that Sections 10,11(b),(12) and 13 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act are only procedural sections and that the relevant sections under which acts of insolvency alleged are only Section 9(d)(ii) and (iii) and 9(g) of the Act. It is further contended by the Learned Counsel for the respondents that in paras 4 and 5 of the petition, the petitioning creditor has simply alleged that the debtor gave notice of suspension of payment to the creditors, through their manager Jacob, that the 2nd respondent has made herself scarce in the business premises with intent to delay and defeat the creditors and that they have not given any particulars or details as to how they have committed the said act. It is further contended by the respondents that the debt itself is disputed and the petitioning creditor has miserably failed to establish the same. Further, the petitioner has not established the alleged acts of insolvency through the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and that the petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. Let us consider the respective contentions seriatim. The first question to be considered is, whether the petitioning creditor has proved the debt clue from the respondents. It is alleged in the petition that the 1st respondent firm borrowed the amount of Rs. 1,50,000 by discounting three cheques dated 14th August, 1983 18th August, 1983 and 9th September, 1983, each for Rs. 50,000 and that they were discounted by the firm represented by the Managing Partner N.G. John. Exs. P1 to P3 are three cheques. They were returned by the Bank with the endorsement Cheque is out of date (sale) and hence refer to Drawer. Dated 22nd April, 1985. According to the petition, the 1st respondent Was postponding payment requesting the petitioning creditor not to present the cheques and subsequently they failed and neglected to pay the amount, though they paid interest upto September, 1984 at the rate of ,24 per cent per annum. The petitioning creditor did not get into the witness box, but a clerk was examined as P.W. 1. Even in chief-examination, when he was questioned as to how the Geo Pictures, the 1st respondent borrowed the money, he replied that they borrowed the money, under three promissory notes. He has also stated that three cheques were issued by the 1st respondent firm. Even in chief-examination, when he was questioned as to how the Geo Pictures, the 1st respondent borrowed the money, he replied that they borrowed the money, under three promissory notes. He has also stated that three cheques were issued by the 1st respondent firm. In cross examination, when he was questioned as to what are the documents that were executed for the lending, he answered that promissory notes were executed. To another question as to where is the promissory note now, he replied that it is with Alamelu's Advocate. When the counsel put a question: "can you assign any reason for not exhibiting the promissory note in Court" he replied: "Only the advocate has to be asked". Again when he was asked as to on what date the transaction took place, he replied that the money was lent on three different dates by different cheques and those dates are 14.8.1983, 18.8.1983 and 9.9.1983. He has also stated that three promissory notes, dated 14.6.1983, 18.7.1983 and 9.9.1983 were executed. Relying on the above answers, the Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the case of the petitioner is that the amount was advanced by discounting three cheques, while that of the evidence of P.W. 1 is that by executing promissory notes, the amount was advanced and that those promissory notes were not produced. As such, the lending itself has not been proved. It is to be noted that even though P.W. 1 has stated that three promissory notes were executed to evidence the transaction, he has stated that money was lent on three different dates by three different cheques under Exs. P1 to P3. He has also stated that in the insolvency petition filed by the Managing Partner N.G. John in I.P. No. 61 of 1984, he has also disclosed the debt of Rs. 1,50,000 to the petitioner. Even the 2nd respondent who filed the counter - affadavit has only stated that she is not personally aware of the debt; but only her son N.G. John was managing the affairs and three cheques were also admittedly issued by the said John on behalf of the 1st respondent firm. It is also in the evidence of R.W.1 that only John brought him to the Court to give evidence and that he is also sitting in Court. Mr. John did not get into witness box to deny the liability. It is also in the evidence of R.W.1 that only John brought him to the Court to give evidence and that he is also sitting in Court. Mr. John did not get into witness box to deny the liability. From the mere fact that P.W.I has stated that apart from cheques, promissory notes were also executed by the 1st respondent firm, it cannot be said that the petitioning creditor did not advance any money to the 1st respondent firm. It is the positive evidence of P.W. 1 that money was advanced under these three cheques. Exs. P1 to P.3, which were later dishonoured. Except the fact that the 2nd respondent has averred in the counter "that she is not aware of the debt personally, no evidence was adduced in support of the same or in any way to rebut the evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner. Even R.W. 1 who was examined on the side of the respondents did not speak anything about the debt due to the petitioning creditor. As such, I am of the opinion that in view of the evidence of P.W. 1 which is supported by Exs. P1 to P3, the petitioning creditor has established satisfactorily that he has advanced a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 under Exs. P1 to P3 to the 1st respondent firm and that the said amount is due from the 1st respondent firm as claimed by the petitioning creditor. 8. Next we have to see whether the petitioning creditor has established that the 2nd respondent has left Madras to her village, has thereby departed from her usual place of business and absconded herself from 16th November, 1984 from the business place with intent to defeat and delay the payment to the creditors. Section 9 reads as follows: 9. A debtor commits an act of insolvency in each of the following cases, sic: (a) to (c).... (d) if with intent to defeat or delay his creditors (i).... (ii) he departs from his dwelling house or usual place of business or otherwise absents himself; (iii) he secludes himself so as to deprive his creditors of the means of communicating with him; The petitioning creditor relied on the evidence of P.W. 1 in this regard. (d) if with intent to defeat or delay his creditors (i).... (ii) he departs from his dwelling house or usual place of business or otherwise absents himself; (iii) he secludes himself so as to deprive his creditors of the means of communicating with him; The petitioning creditor relied on the evidence of P.W. 1 in this regard. Even in chief-examination, he has stated that four days prior to the filing of the insolvency petition, the Manager Jacob told him that they were filing insolvency petition and they would receive notice. He further told him that they suspended all payment and that they would receive notice. When a question was put: "Did you meet Alayamma George thereafter?", he stated, "Yes. I met her. But sometime thereafter she went to the village". Again, another question was put: "Do you know the reason for her absence?". The answer is that he does not know the reason for her leaving the place. Again, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner put a question in chief-examination: "Do you know the exact reason as to why she left Madras?" and the answer is "Since the creditors were pressurizing, she left Madras." Further, he has stated that even now Geo Pictures is doing film distributing business at Ernakulam. In cross-examination, the Learned Counsel for the respondents put a question as follows: You said that Alayamma George left Madras, because there was pressure on her from the creditors. How do you say? You say it on your own knowledge or surmises and conjectures. The answer is: It is my conjecture. Again, the Learned Counsel for the respondents put a question to P.W. 1 as to whether he knew the reply affidavit filed by the petitioning creditor and in the reply affidavit, the statement that Alayamma George is permanently residing at Ernakulam, is admitted by the petitioner and he replied that he did not know. It is seen from para 2 of the reply affidavit of the petitioner, filed in Application No. 393 of 1984 in I.P. No. 69 of 1984, that it is alleged by the petitioner that even though the 2nd respondent was residing in Kerala, the activities of the firm were all in Madras and as such she is liable. It is seen from para 2 of the reply affidavit of the petitioner, filed in Application No. 393 of 1984 in I.P. No. 69 of 1984, that it is alleged by the petitioner that even though the 2nd respondent was residing in Kerala, the activities of the firm were all in Madras and as such she is liable. In another place, in para 1, it is stated that even though she was residing in Kerala, the Managing Partner was in Madras and all the transactions were taking place in Madras and that the Managing Partner is N.G. John. P.W. 2 has stated that he has not seen the 2nd respondent personally and he talked with her only through phone. He did not speak anything about her absence from the usual place of business and secluding herself from the communication of the creditors. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that it is the case of the petitioning creditor that the notice of suspension of payment through Manager as well as the 2nd respondent making herself scarce in the business premises happened only on 16th November, 1984 and both are inconsistent. It cannot be said that the debtor, who represented through her manager gave notice of suspension of payment to the creditors on one day and on the same day, she made herself scarce from the creditors. Under the Explanation to Section 9, it is stated that for the purpose of this section, the act of agent, may be the act of principal even though the agent has no specific authority to commit an act. Hence, if she acts through her agent, there is proper representation on her part. If the agent gave notice of suspension on 16th November, 1984, it is one made on behalf of the debtor, and in that event, it cannot be said that the respondent-debtor secluded herself from the creditors. Further, from the very answer given by P.W. 1 himself, it is not established that she had left Madras to her native place with intent to defeat and delay the payment to the creditors. P.W. 2 has also stated that the 1st respondent-firm is still continuing to do business. 9. Further, from the very answer given by P.W. 1 himself, it is not established that she had left Madras to her native place with intent to defeat and delay the payment to the creditors. P.W. 2 has also stated that the 1st respondent-firm is still continuing to do business. 9. In this connection, my attention was drawn to the decision of this Court reported in Khiaram v. Kamadhenu Drinks, wherein relying on the earlier Bench decision of this Court in M. Ratchaganadan v. Kishindas Shamala Sunder , it was held: From the language of Section 9(d)(ii) itself it is clear that the act of insolveny is contemplated only where a person departs from his dwelling house or usual place of business or otherwise absents himself with intent to defeat or delay his creditors. Absenting oneself is no act of insolvency unless it be with intent to defeat or delay creditors. Whether that intention exists is a question of fact. If a trader shuts up his shop during business hours without leaving instructions where he is to be found if creditors call, or without making arrangements for carrying on his business, he must be presumed to have left to avoid his creditors; but the absence may be satisfactorily-accounted for. and the presumption may be rebutted. No such presumption, however arises where the debtor has left a representative behind or has left a direction that letters are to be addressed to him at a particular place. In the context of the appropriate instructions having been left for the purpose of communications reaching the debtor it cannot be said that he was making himself scarce with any intent to defeat or delay the creditors. In M.Ratchaganadan v. Kishindas Shamada Sunder, it was held: We need not stress that insolvency is a status to which no person should be reduced, unless an act of insolvency is fully established to the satisfaction of the Court. A creditor, is particular, ought not to be permitted to utilise this mode of obtaining an adjudication as insolvent, as a kind of pressure, in order to realise a debt more economically or by swifter means. It was observed in the said case: Even P.W. 2 found the factory and the place of business in fact and working, and there were representatives of the absent debtor. 10. It was observed in the said case: Even P.W. 2 found the factory and the place of business in fact and working, and there were representatives of the absent debtor. 10. Applying the ratio laid down in the above decisions, it is clear that the petitioner has not established that the 2nd respondent absented herself from the place of business with intent to defeat and delay the creditors. It is also admitted by the petitioning creditor that no notice was issued to the 2nd respondent or the 1st respondent by the petitioning creditor in respect of the amount due to her and that the petitioner tried to contact her and she could not do so. In view of the admission by P.Ws. 1 and 2 that the 1st respondent-firm is carrying on business even now, there is absolutely nothing to show that the 2nd respondent has absented herself from the business firm. Thus, the petitioner has not made out a case under Section 9(d)(ii) or (iii) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. 11. Lastly, we have to see whether the petitioner has proved that the respondents - debtors gave notice of suspension of payment of the debts to the creditors through their Manager Jacob on 16th November, 1984 so as to attract the provisions of Section 9(g). It is the case of the petitioning creditor in the petition that the debtors informed through their Manager Jacob that they are not in a position to honour the commitments, orally on 16th November, 1984. It is the contention of the respondents that Jacob is not the manager of the 1st respondent-firm, that they never gave notice of suspension of payment through the said Jacob and that the said allegation is made only with a view to file this petition and harass the respondents. They examined Jacob as a witness on their side and he emphatically denied having made any such statement. He would further state that he was not the manager of the said firm in November, 1984. It is not the case of. the petitioner that notice of suspension of payment of debts was given by R.W. 1 Jacob to P.W. 1. They examined Jacob as a witness on their side and he emphatically denied having made any such statement. He would further state that he was not the manager of the said firm in November, 1984. It is not the case of. the petitioner that notice of suspension of payment of debts was given by R.W. 1 Jacob to P.W. 1. When P.W. 1 was confronted in cross-examination that Jacob was not in Madras on 16th November, 1984 and that he left for Ernakulam on 15th November, 1984 in Trivandrum Mail, P.W. 1 replied that he cannot say whether it was on 16th November, 1984 he met him. Even though in chief examination and cross examination he has stated that the exact date of meeting Jacob was only on 16th November, 1984 and that on that date the notice of suspension was made by him he has categorically stated that neither the Managing Partner John nor Alayainnia ever represented that they were unable to pay the debt, that during that period he met John once and that he promised to see him personally. He has also stated that he had not given any notice stating that the 2nd respondent suspended payment. According to P.W. 2, Jacob met him in the month of November personally and represented to him that he could not make any payment. Rut in cross-examination, he stated that throughout the month of November, 1984 Jacob had been telling that he would get money within a short period and that he would make payment and therefore he would suspend the payment for that period. It is not the case of the petitioner that the respondents suspended payment for a period temporarily. It is not the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 that they went together and notice of suspension of payment was made in their presence. According to the Learned Counsel for the petitioner the Explanation to Section 9 is applicable only to the debtor and not to the creditor and in the instant case, it is not established that Jacob was the Manager and even then any representation made by him cannot be taken as one made by the debtors, namely, the respondents and the act of insolvency was committed by them. According to the Learned Counsel for the respondents, even a mere expression of postponement of debt is not sufficient to hold that the respondents have committed acts or insolvency under Section 9. 12. In this connection, my attention was drawn to the decision of this Court reported in Audilakshmi Venkateswara Iron Traders v. Mayavanthi Jhamandas Sole Proprietor, Seth Jhamandas Co. (1978) 2 M.L.J. 356 : 91 L.W. 336, wherein a Division Bench of this Court, relying on the earlier Division - Bench decision of this Court, held: A mere expression of a desire to postpone the payment of debts because of circumstances connected with their business by itself would not be an act of insolvency within the meaning of Section 9(g) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act... The Court will not be lightly guided by the tall stories of petitioning creditors in the witness box when they swear that they inter-viewed the debtor and that as the debtor represented to them that he was postponing payment of debt and that on that basis should adjudicate the concerned debtor as an insolvent and imprint the stigma of insolvency on him. The march of law and the progress made by the Society all round after our independence do not prompt us to accept such bare statements of petitioning creditors and act upon it so as to adjudicate persons as insolvents. In our view some more evidence of an acceptable nature is necessary for a Court of law to imprint such a badge of insolvency over a common person. It is further held: In such cases the petitioning creditor should take the elementary precaution of having his conduct and act corroborated by the testimony of independent witnesses, and for this purpose he should also take additional precaution of taking such witnesses along with him so that matters may not be doubted at a later stage when it comes up for scrutiny in Courts of law. 13. In Khiaram v. Kamadhenu Drinks, it was held: The essence of an act of insolvency under Section 6(g) is that the debtor must give sufficient indication to show that he had suspended payment of all the debts. No particular form of expression is necessary. 13. In Khiaram v. Kamadhenu Drinks, it was held: The essence of an act of insolvency under Section 6(g) is that the debtor must give sufficient indication to show that he had suspended payment of all the debts. No particular form of expression is necessary. What is necessary is that the words should unmistakably leave the impression in the mind of the creditor that the debtor has actually suspended or is about to suspend payment of all his debts. The words used by the debtor must be reasonably construed. A creditor cannot approach the Court with a petition for insolvency by merely misunderstanding what was stated by the debtor. 14. It is clear from the above decisions that a mere statement of a debtor that he is unable to pay the debt, however insolvent he may be, is not a notice within the meaning of the Act, that he is suspending or about to suspend payment. Similarly, a desire to postpone the payment of debt because of circumstances would not be an act of insolvency. Thus, having given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on behalf of the parties, I am not at all satisfied that the respondents have committed act of insolvency under Section 9(g) of the Act. It is also argued by the Learned Counsel for the petitioning creditor that the 2nd respondent has admitted in the counter that she is not possessed of any property and that the assets were taken over by the Official Assignee and as such, it is clear that the respondents have not satisfied that she is possessed of sufficient assets to discharge the debt and in view of Section 13(a) and (6) she is liable to be adjudged as insolvent. On the other hand, the Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that it is only a procedural law and as per the said provisions, if the respondent appears and satisfies the Court that he is able to discharge debts, the Court can dismiss the petition. Further, the non-examination of 2nd respondent who is an old woman is not fatal in the circumstances of the case and in view of the rebuttal evidence adduced through R.W. 1. Hence, I see no force in the said contention of the petitioner. Further, the non-examination of 2nd respondent who is an old woman is not fatal in the circumstances of the case and in view of the rebuttal evidence adduced through R.W. 1. Hence, I see no force in the said contention of the petitioner. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the petitioner has not proved any of the grounds urged against the respondents and the petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.