Judgment :- These appeals at the instance of the tenant have beers preferred against the common judgment in A.S.Nos.108 of 1981 and 129 of 1981, District Court, South Arcot at Cuddalore. The Respondent in these Appeals (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) is the owner of the building bearing No.158, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru Road, Villupuram. The first floor of this building comprising of 24 rooms was leased to the tenant originally in 1967 and the lease was subsequently renewed and finally, on 1.7.1979, a lease deed was executed. That lease deed mentions that in addition to the first floor of the building, the cots, electric fans, chairs, tables and other items of furniture and some utensils, a three horse power electric pumpset and certain other articles also formed part of the tease and that the premises was to be used for the purpose of running a lodging house by the tenant. The period of the lease as finally renewed was from 3.7.1979 to 31.3.1980. After the expiry of the said period, the landlord declined to accept the rent from the tenant and demanded by a notice, delivery of possession. Thereupon, the tenant filed O.S.No.5 of 1981, Sub Court, Cuddalore, for a declaration that he is a statutory tenant under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and, therefore, he is entitled to remain in possession till he is evicted in accordance with due process of law and for a consequential injunction restraining the landlord from interfering with his possession. In turn, the landlord filed O.S.No.7 of 1981, Sub Court Cuddalore, praying for recovery of possession of the demised premises and for a permanent injunction restraining the tenant from running the business and lodging house and for damages for use and occupation, past and future. The suits were tried together and the trial Court found that as the building was leased to the tenant together with fixtures, furniture and other articles for the purpose of running a lodging house, section 30(iii) of the Act would apply to exempt the building from the provisions of the Act and that the tenant cannot be considered to be a statutory tenant under the Act and, therefore, the landlord is entitled to recover possession with past and future damages for use and occupation. Consequently, the suit instituted by the tenant in O.S.No.5 of 1981 was dismissed and a decree directing delivery of possession of the suit property to the landlord was granted in O.S.No.7 of 1981 and the relief of injunction was negatived. The quantum of damages recoverable by the landlord was relegated to be decided in separate proceedings under Order 20, rule 12, C.P.C. Aggrieved by this, the tenant preferred A.S.Nos.108 of 1981 and 129 of 1981, District Court, South Arcot at Cuddalore. The appellate Court found that the tenant had taken the premises on lease for the purpose of running a lodging house with the building and the materials of the landlord situate in the building demised to him and that would be exempt under section 30(iii) of the Act rendering inapplicable the provisions of the Act. In that view, the lower appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of O.S.No.5 of 1981 and the decree in O.S.No.7 of 1981 and dismissed the appeals. It is the correctness of this that is challenged by the tenant in these appeals. 2. The learned Counsel for the tenant frist contended that having regard to the terms of the lease deed Ex.B-1, the courts below were in error in concluding that the building in question would be exempt under section 30(iii) of the Act from the provisions of the Act. Elaborating this contention, the learned Counsel drew attention to Illustration (3) occurring under section 30(iii) of the Act and submitted that the exemption would apply only in cases where there is a lease of a business actually carried on by the landlord and not to a case like this where the landlord had merely demised the building to enable the tenant to carry on lodging business in the premises with the furniture and other accessories provided by the landlord. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the landlord contended that on the terms of the lease deed, the object of the demise is to enable the tenant to run the lodging business with the furniture and other accessories belonging to the landlord and situate in the building and that would suffice to attract the applicability of section 30(iii) of the Act rendering inapplicable the other provisions of the Act. It was also further pointed out that the Illustration relied on cannot have the effect of supplanting the substantial statutory provision and to cut down the width and amplitude of the scope of exemption. Reference in this connection was made to the decision in Bombay Bur-mah Trading Corporation Ltd. Pollachi Coimbatore District v. A.T.Narayanaswami Pillai, (1981)1 M.L.J.433= (1981) 94 L.W. 334. 3. In order to appreciate the contention thus raised, it would be necessary to refer to the relevant terms of the lease agreement Ex.B-1 dated 1.7.1979. The terms are as under: From the description of the property appended to Fx.B-1, it is seen that in the ground floor, there is a hotel and in the first floor demised in favour of the tenant, there are 24 rooms, in all, consisting of 17 single rooms, 5 double rooms and 2 office rooms. The existence of a three horse power electric motor is also mentioned. There is also a reference to a name board showing the name of the lodge as "Nataraja Lodge." The particulars of the furniture and other articles have been given. Amongst the articles are mentioned cots, fans, tables, chairs, utensils, water heater etc., Finally, it is set out that lodging business under the name and style of "Nataraja Lodge" should be carried on. Whether on the aforesaid terms of the lease of the building, the exemption provided under section 30(iii) of the Act would stand attracted, is the main question that arises for consideration and decision. The lease is styled as Lodge Rental Agreement. The demised property belonging to the landlord is described as a lodge. This is clearly made out by the recitals stating that The purpose of the letting out as could be gathered from the recitals in Ex.R-1 is to enable the tenant to run a lodge. This is made out by the expression The rent stipulated is Rs.450 per month. It has been apportioned as rent for the building (Rs.300) and towards furniture and other accessories (Rs.150). The period is stated to be from 1.7.1979 to 31.3.1980. Again, the purpose for which the demised premise has been let out viz., for running a lodging house, is reiterated. It has been apportioned as rent for the building (Rs.300) and towards furniture and other accessories (Rs.150). The period is stated to be from 1.7.1979 to 31.3.1980. Again, the purpose for which the demised premise has been let out viz., for running a lodging house, is reiterated. Under section 30(iii) of the Act, nothing contained in the Act shall apply to any lease to run the business or industry with the fixtures, machinery, furniture or other articles belonging to the landlord and situate in such building. There are three Illustrations to that sub-section. Illustrations (1) and (2) deal with the running of dhall mill business and cinema house with the machinery in the building in which the dhall mill is housed and the land and the building together with the fixtures, fittings, talkie equipments etc, with reference to the cinema. Illustration (3) runs as under: Where a hotel building together with the furniture, machinery and other articles necessary for the running of hotel business is leased and the tenant is to run the hotel business in such building, the Act does not apply to such building." While section 30(iii) exempts from the Act a building leased with the object of the tenant running the business or Industry with the machinery and accessories belonging to the landlord and situate in the building, illustration (3) thereunder refers only to one such business viz., hotel building. A lodge is primarily intended to provide accommodation for these who resort to it during the time of their stay there. A hotel, on the other hand, would ordinarily take in the twin aspects of boarding as well as lodging, though it need not necessarily be so in all cases. There are numerous instances where hotels confine their business activities to boarding only. Equally, there are hotels whose activities are restricted to lodging alone. Therefore, it is conceivable that the running of a lodging house may also be considered as hotel business falling within the scope of Illustration (3) referred to above. However, for the applicability of either section 30(iii) of the Act or even Illustration (3) thereunder, it is not necessary that the landlord should be actually running the hotel business. Therefore, it is conceivable that the running of a lodging house may also be considered as hotel business falling within the scope of Illustration (3) referred to above. However, for the applicability of either section 30(iii) of the Act or even Illustration (3) thereunder, it is not necessary that the landlord should be actually running the hotel business. There is nothing in the language of section 30(iii) of the Act or even Illustration (3) thereunder that only a demise by a landlord who is actually carrying on a hotel business to the tenant for the purpose of enabling him either to continue or carry on the same business is exempt from the provisions of the Act. To accept the construction of section 30(iii) of the Act or Illustration (3) thereunder in the manner contended for by the learned Counsel for the appellant would be to read into them words and expressions, which are not there. Even otherwise, Illustration (3) having been incorporated only for the purpose of elucidating the scope of the exemption under section 30(iii) of the Act cannot in any manner curtail or cut down the amplitude of the exemption provided for under section 30(iii) of the Act. In order to qualify for the exemption under section 30(iii) of the Act, the following requirements have to be fulfilled: 1) There should be a lease of a building; 2) Under that lease, the object of the tenant is to run the business or industry; and 3) such a business or industry should be run with the fixtures, machinery, furniture or other articles, the ownership of which is in the landlord and which are situate in the building demised. It is not the requirement that the landlord should have been actually carrying on the business in the premises prior to the demise in favour of the tenant. In this case, there is no dispute that under Ex.B-1, the landlord had granted to the tenant a lease of the first floor of his building. The purpose of the demise was to enable the tenant to run a lodging business. Such lodging business was to be run by the tenant with the fixtures, machinery, furniture and other articles belonging to the landlord and situate and available in the premises demised to the tenant. The purpose of the demise was to enable the tenant to run a lodging business. Such lodging business was to be run by the tenant with the fixtures, machinery, furniture and other articles belonging to the landlord and situate and available in the premises demised to the tenant. The splitting up of the rent, which is only notional, has really no bearing upon the availability of the exemption. Such apportionment or splitting up is resorted to for a variety of reasons like, for instance, payment of lower municipal taxes and other taxes. But that cannot, in any manner, either alter the purpose of the demise or the availability of the exemption under section 30(iii) of the Act, if the conditions enumerated therein are satisfied. Thus, on the terms of Ex.B-1, it is clear that his case would squarely fall under section 30(iii) of the Act. That an illustration cannot curtail or cut down the amplitude of the exemption is clearly laid down in the decision in Bombay Burmab Trading Corporation Ltd. Pollachi Coimbatore District v. A.T. Narayanaswami Pillai, (1981)1 M.L.J.433= 94 L.W.334 relied on by the learned Counsel for the landlord. Balasub-rahmanyan, J. with his characteristic felicity of expression, observed at page 336 as under: “...Illustrations to statutory provisions are a rare commodity in modern drafting techniques. Even in their heyday, illustrations were usually put in by the legislative draftsmen merely as internal aids to the construction of substantive provisions, which they were avowedly meant to illustrate. It follows that illustrations can by no means be allowed to cut down or limit the scope and effect of the substantive provisions, much less to supplant them. Nor can illustrations be upgraded and construed as independent provisions in themselves. In matters of statutory construction, illustrations must be put in their place and must be viewed from the proper perspective. Otherwise, we would be mistaking the trees for the wood Referring to the scope of exemption under section 30(iii) of the Act, the learned Judge pointed out that the exemption was intended to cover cases of leases comprising not only of building, but also fixtures, machinery, furniture or other articles belonging to the landlord and which are situate in the building and which would aid the tenant in carrying on that particular business or industry, for the carrying on of which the tenancy has been entered into. It was also laid down that it is not necessary that the business part of the lease must be complete in every respect leaving nothing to be desired and nothing to be supplemented by the tenant himself and that it is not the requirement of section 30 (iii) of the Act that the lease must be of a business or industrial undertaking as a going concern, but even a lease of a business in “as is or where is†condition, might still qualify for exemption, even though the equipment required to be supplemented to be made operational. In my view, the principles laid down in the decision referred to above would be applicable to the tenancy under Fx.B-1 as to qualify for the benefit of exemption under section 30(iii) of the Act. The courts below were, therefore, quite right in concluding that the tenant cannot seek the protection of the Act, having regard to the nature of the lease and the availability of the benefit of exemption under section 30(iii) of the Act. 4. The learned Counsel for the tenant next contended that as the tenancy agreement under Ex.P>-l became operative and effective only on the payment of stamp duty and penalty by the landlord and not before, the notice issued under Ex.A-37 is not a valid notice to quit. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the landlord submitted that the payment of stamp duty and penalty was made only with a view to mark Ex.B-1 in evidence and it cannot, therefore, be claimed that the lease became operative and effective only from then and not from the date of execution. It was further pointed out that no objection at all had been raised by the tenant in the written statement or before the* trial court or even before the appellate court that the notice is defective. 5. It is seen that Ex.B-1 at the time of its production into Court was an unregistered and unstamped lease deed and that the landlord had paid the stamp duty as well as penalty thereon. That was done only with a view to enable the marking of Fx.R-1 in evidence. Having regard to the terms of Fx.B-1 the lease deed, it was unnecessary to register the sane. That was done only with a view to enable the marking of Fx.R-1 in evidence. Having regard to the terms of Fx.B-1 the lease deed, it was unnecessary to register the sane. Even so, the tenant cannot be heard to claim that the lease became operational not from the date it was executed, but only from the date of payment of penalty and stamp duty which was for the purpose of enabling the court to admit an unstamped document in evidence in accordance with section 35 of the Stamp Act. Besides, it is seen that at no stage of the proceedings, the tenant had raised an objection regarding the validity of the notice to quit. The tenant must therefore be deemed to have waived the irregularities in the notice if any and accepted the same to be in accordance with law. There is, therefore, no substance in this contention. No other point was urged. 6. Thus, on a careful consideration of the terms of the lease and the scope of the exemption under section 30(iii) of the Act, it has to be held that the courts below were quite right in holding that the tenant is not entitled to the benefits of the Act and that he is liable to be ejected. Consequently, these Second Appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. One set.