JUDGMENT - SHARAD MANOHAR, J.:---The question involved in this Second Appeal is one of interaction between the provisions of Article 139 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and section 28 thereof. The question can be simplified and stated briefly as follows:--- 'A' leased certain lands to 'B' for a period of 10 years. After expiry of the lease, 'A' becomes entitled to possession of the land. But 'A' does nothing against 'B' and 'B' continue to be in possession without payment or rent to 'A'. After nearly 35 years 'A' sells the same land to 'C' . Question is as to whether 'A' had not lost his title to the lands by virtue of the provisions of section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 read with Article 139 thereof and whether 'B' had any subsisting title which he could convey to 'C'. This, in short, is question when reduced down to its bones. 2. Let me now state the facts of the present case:--- The suit lands admittedly belonged, originally, to Suryajirao Naik Nimbalkar. They were the Jagir lands governed by the Watan Act. On 23-7-1912 a sanad was executed in favour of Suryakirao Naik Nimbalkar in that behalf. On 18-8-1924, Suryajirao executed a lease for a period of 10 years in favour of defendant No. 1, the temple. The lease expired by the efflux of time on 18-8-1934. This is a finding of facts recorded by both the courts below and about that fact there exist no dispute at this stage. Further, there exists no dispute at least in this Court in this appeal that from 1934 till the year 1969 defendant No. 1 had not paid anything by way of rent to the Jahagirdar. In the meantime, in the year 1955, the Jagir came to be abolished and the lands were technically resumed by the Government. An order of regrant came to be passed in favour of the Jahagirdar on 1-8-1962. It is, however, common ground in this Court that the possession of the lands was not with the Jahagirdar on the date of the resumption and the possession continued to be with defendant No. 1, either actually or constructively all the time form 1934 after the determination of the lease. It is, however, common ground in this Court that the possession of the lands was not with the Jahagirdar on the date of the resumption and the possession continued to be with defendant No. 1, either actually or constructively all the time form 1934 after the determination of the lease. No doubt it was contended on behalf of the present appellant in the lower Court that rent was paid by defendant No. 1 to the Jahagirdar till the year 1962 and that after the abolition of the Jagir defendant No. 1 had paid rent to the Government. But all those contentions have been negatived by the lower Court and those findings are not called in question before me; which is the reason why I have mentioned above that there exists no dispute on the question that defendant No. 1 has been in possession of the suit lands all the time. It continue till the year 1969 and even thereafter without payment or rent either to Jahagirdar or to the present appellant/plaintiff, who claims through the Jahagirdar. On 17-3-1969 the Jahagirdar Shri Naik Nimbalkar sold the suit land to the plaintiff, who is the appellant before me, (he will be referred to hereinafter as the plaintiff' and respondent No. 1 will be referred to as defendant No. 1"). On 18-3-1969 the plaintiff gave notice to defendant No. 1 demanding rent in respect of the suit land. Defendant No. 1 refused to pay any rent to the plaintiff by denying his title and claiming title in itself. The plaintiff, therefore, filed an eviction suit against defendant No. 1 contending that he has terminated the defendant's tenancy and had become entitled to possession of the suit land, inter alia, on the ground of nonpayment of rent. That was Civil Suit No. 164/69. In that suit, defendant No. 1 came out with the consistent contention that the plaintiff had no title to the suit land and that there existed no landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. This contention was upheld by the trial Court. That was Civil Suit No. 164/69. In that suit, defendant No. 1 came out with the consistent contention that the plaintiff had no title to the suit land and that there existed no landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. This contention was upheld by the trial Court. On behalf of the plaintiff, it was sought to be pointed out that the lease deed executed by the Jahagirdar in favour of present defendant No. 1 on 18-8-1924 brought about the landlord-tenant relationship between the Jahagirdar, who was the predecessor-in title of the plaintiff, and defendant No. 1 and that the tenancy continued till the date of the suit. However, the trial Court came to the conclusion that a subsisting landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 was not established by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's suit for eviction was, therefore, dismissed by the trial Court. 3. In appeal, more or less, the same view has been taken by the Appeal Court. It appears that the certified copy of the lease deed was not taken on record because the loss of the original lease deed was not established and the Court came to the conclusion that a subsisting landlord tenant relationship with defendant No. 1 was not established by the plaintiff. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed by the Appeal Court. 4. The present suit is filed by the plaintiff for possession of the same property. But it purports to have been filed on plaintiff's title to the suit land. It was filed on 23-10-1972. (a) The contention of the plaintiff was that the land belonged to the plaintiff's predecessor-in-title Shivajirao Naik Nimbalkar, that the same was leased by Suryajirao Naik Nimbalkar to defendant No. 1 on 18-8-1924 for the period of 10 years, that deft. No. 1's title never came to an end because defendant No. 1 had been paying the rent to the Nimbalkar till the abolition of the Jagir and there after to the Government and that since defendant No. 1 denied the plaintiff's title the plaintiff was entitled to file the suit for possession by vindicating his title. No. 1's title never came to an end because defendant No. 1 had been paying the rent to the Nimbalkar till the abolition of the Jagir and there after to the Government and that since defendant No. 1 denied the plaintiff's title the plaintiff was entitled to file the suit for possession by vindicating his title. (b) The defence, which is relevant for the purpose of this appeal, was that after 18-8-1934 defendant No. 1 had remained in possession of the suit land openly and peacefully as also quite adversely as against the interest of the Jahagirdar, that the Jahagirdar had not filed any suit for possession from defendant No. 1 whose tenancy had come to an end by the efflux of time and that, hence, after the expiry of the period of 12 years, from the date when the lease came to an end that is to say as from 18-8-46 or 19-8-46, the title of the Jahagirdar in the suit land came to an end, having regard to the provisions of Article 139 for the Limitation Act, 1908 read with section 28 thereof. It was further contended that defendant No. 1 had been openly and peacefully and quite adversely in possession of the suit land for the period for exceeding 12 years and had thus acquired title to the suit land by adverse possession. Contention was that the plaintiff did not purchase any title form the Jahagirdar, because the Jahagirdar themselves did not have any subsisting title to the suit land and hence the plaintiff had no locus standi to file any suit against defendant No. 1. 5. Evidence was led by the parties. However, defendant No. 1 did not step into the witness-box to prove its adverse possession. The trial Court held that since there was no evidence relating to the adverse character of its possession form the year 1934 onwards, because defendant No. 1 had not stepped into the witness-box, defendant No. 1 must be deemed to have failed in establishing title by adverse possession. The trial Court does not appear to have addressed itself to or applied its mind to the question as to whether the Jahagirdar continued to have any subsisting title to the suit land which he could have conveyed to the present plaintiff or to the interaction of the provision of Article 139 and of section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The trial Court appears to have rested content by addressing itself only to the question whether defendant No. 1 proved acquisition of title by adverse possession. Finding that there was no evidence led by defendant No. 1 in that behalf, the trial Court held that the plaintiff had proved his title to the suit land and since defendant No. 1 did not plead any other kind of title, the plaintiff's suit for possession was decreed by the trial Court. 6. In appeal, the District Court has addressed itself firstly to the question as to whether the Jahagirdar could be said to be having any such subsisting title at all on the date of the Sale Deed dt. 17-3-1969, which title they could have conveyed to the purchaser under the said Sale Deed. The Appeal Court found that so far as the lease deed dated 18-8-1924 was concerned, it was sufficiently proved by the certified copy of the same, which was filed by the plaintiff. I may mention here that both the courts have allowed the production of the certified copy. The fact that defendant No. 1 was a tenant of the Jahagirdar during the period between 1924 and 1934 was, thus held established. Moreover, I may mention here that even according to Mr. Abhyankar, the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff before me, the fact that defendant No. 1 was the tenant of Jahagirdar in respect of the suit land for those 10 years, between 1924 and 1934, was a matter of common ground. In the earlier suit, there was a dispute about that fact and it could not be said that the fact was established in the earlier suit between the parties. But in the present suit the plaintiff has in fact asserted that defendant No. 1 was the tenant of Jahagirdar during those 10 years, between 1924 and 1934, and that fact was conclusively proved by the plaintiff by production of the certified copy of the lease deed in question. It appears that the loss of the original lease deed was proved to the satisfaction of the courts below, which was the reason why the production of the certified copy was allowed by the courts. It appears that the loss of the original lease deed was proved to the satisfaction of the courts below, which was the reason why the production of the certified copy was allowed by the courts. Whatever that may be, the position that emerges as the one fully established is that defendant No. 1 was the tenant of Jahagirdar from 18-8-1924 till 18-3-1934 and that the lease came to an end by the efflux of time and, further, that in spite of the expiration of lease defendant No. 1 continued to be in possession of the suit property even though its lease had come to an end. The further emergent position is that deft No. 1 had not paid any rent to the landlord, which fact rules out even the plea of tenancy holding over. The landlord Jahagirdar, therefore, had to file a suit against the tenant (deft. No. 1) if he wanted possession of the suit land and if such a suit was to be filed, holds the District Court, that suit would have been governed directly by the provisions of Article 139 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Admittedly no such suit was filed during that period or at any time thereafter by the Jahagirdar. This meant that if he was to filed the suit he had to file it within 12 years form the date of the expiration of the lease, because the article that would apply would be Article 139 and not the general Article 144. From the date of expiration of lease, therefore, the suit, if it was to be filed by the Jahagirdar, would be barred by limitation. Here, now, steps in the provision of section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908. That section provides that when the period of limitation for suit for recovery of possession of immovable property has expired, not only the procedural right to file the suit comes to an end, but even the substantive right of the title-holder comes to an end and his title to the property in question stands extinguished. According to the District Court, it followed that the Jahagirdar had been divested of his title in the suit land as early as in the year 1946 which meant that he had no subsisting title to the suit land which he could have conveyed to the present plaintiff in the year 1969. According to the District Court, it followed that the Jahagirdar had been divested of his title in the suit land as early as in the year 1946 which meant that he had no subsisting title to the suit land which he could have conveyed to the present plaintiff in the year 1969. For coming to this conclusion, the District Court has relied upon the Full Bench decision of this Court (Sidram Lachmaya v. Mallaya Lingaya Chilaka)1, in 51 Bom.L.R. p. 34, in which it is held hat a suit by an ex-land-lord against an ex-tenant (i.e. to say, a tenant whose lease has come to an end) for possession of the land is governed by Article 139 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The District Court further referred to section 28 of the Limitation Act and has held that the plaintiff purchased no subsisting title from the Jahagirdar and hence, his suit, even though purporting to be one on title was liable to be dismissed. The appeal has been, therefore, allowed and the plaintiff's suit has been dismissed by the Court. 7. In this Second Appeal, it was the contention of Mr. Abhyankar that the present suit is not a suit between the landlord and tenant. According to him, the suit is on title. He submitted that such a suit is very much saved by the provisions of section 29-A of the Bombay Rent Act. According to him, the present suit cannot be said to be governed by Article 139 at all. The suit is very much governed by Article 65 of the present Limitation Act and since that Article requires the defendant to prove his adverse possession and, further, since the defendant has not even stepped into the witness-box to prove his adverse possession, the view that the plaintiff had no subsisting title to the suit land was erroneous. To my mind, the submissions made by Mr. Abhyankar involve quite a few fallacies. In the first place, there need be no dispute on the question as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to file a suit on title having regard to the provisions of section 29-A of the Bombay Rent Act. Question is as to whether he has proved any title? He could file a suit for establishing his title, but if he has no evidence for establishing his title, the suit is futile. Question is as to whether he has proved any title? He could file a suit for establishing his title, but if he has no evidence for establishing his title, the suit is futile. Secondly, the question is not as to whether the present suit is barred by Article 65 or whether the defendant has established acquisition of title by himself by adverse possession. In the suit on title, the plaintiff must succeed on the basis of his own title; normally he cannot take advantage of the weakness of the title of the defendant. Before going into the question therefore whether the defendant had acquired title to the suit land by adverse possession or not, the question that the Court is required to consider is as to whether the plaintiff himself had established his title to the suit property or not. Point is that the plaintiff must be held to have miserably failed in doing so. That is so for the very simple reason that the Jahagirdar from whom he purchased the title himself must be held to have been completely divested of all his right, title and interest in the suit land as early as in the year 1946. That is so because his right to file suit against defendant No. 1 for recovery of possession of immoveable property, viz. the suit land, had been barred by virtue of the provisions of Article 139. Article 139 provides for a suit by a landlord to recover possession from a tenant and the suit has got to be filed within 12 years from the date when the tenancy is determined. From the very nature of things, the Article must be considered to be providing for a suit by an ex-landlord against his ex-tenant, because the Article contemplates a suit against a tenant whose tenancy is determined. From the very nature of things, after the determination of the tenancy there cannot subsist a landlord and tenant relationship between the two. Both of them are, vis-a-vis each other, ex-landlord ex-tenant. It was, therefore incumbent upon the Jahagirdar as an ex-landlord to file a suit against defendant No. 1 as his extent if he wanted to recover possession of the suit land from him. Both of them are, vis-a-vis each other, ex-landlord ex-tenant. It was, therefore incumbent upon the Jahagirdar as an ex-landlord to file a suit against defendant No. 1 as his extent if he wanted to recover possession of the suit land from him. If he did not file any such suit, his right to file suit for possession would be barred by limitation and once that right, which was a procedural right, was barred under Article 139, his very title in the suit land, which was a substantive right, stood extinguished having regard to the provisions of section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908. It, therefore, follows that latest by the end of 19/8/1946 the substantive right and title of the Jahagirdar in the suit land came to an end. It follows that the Jahagirdar had no subsisting title in the suit land which he could have conveyed to the plaintiff in the year 1969. 8. It was not argued before me that the re-grant of the land in favour of Jahagirdar created any title in his favour afresh on 1-8-1962 and rightly so. The order of re-grant postulated the right of the Jahagirdar for re-grant. It postulated that he had a title, which was for the present in abeyance by virtue of the provisions of the Jahagir Abolition Act and that the title was once again transferred by the Government in favour of Suryajirao Naik Nimbalkar by virtue of the re-grant. But if the Jahagirdar's title had come to an end long before the Abolition Act, the Government itself would get no title which it could transfer to the grantee by an order of re-grant. In this connection, it is significant to note the plea of the plaintiff in the suit, viz. that defendant No. 1 had been paying the rent to the Government after the resumption of the land. The plea was vociferated but never proved. There is nothing on record to show that defendant No. 1 paid rent even to the Government at any time. This means that not only the Jahagirdar but even the Government did not get any title to the suit land. That being the position, the order of re-grant passed by the Government was equally hollow and it could create no title in favour of the Jahagirdar. This means that not only the Jahagirdar but even the Government did not get any title to the suit land. That being the position, the order of re-grant passed by the Government was equally hollow and it could create no title in favour of the Jahagirdar. I may mention here, however, that the plaintiff has not claimed title to the suit land on basis of the order of re-grant. The plaintiff has based his title on the original Sanad dt. 23-7-1912. 9. I have mentioned about that the District Court relied upon the Full Bench judgment of the Court reported in 51, Bom.L.R. p. 34. The said decision was sought to be distinguished by Mr. Abhyankar by contending that a suit on title could not be governed by Article 139. To my mind, the judgment of the Full Bench applies on all fours to the facts of the case. In that case it was held that a suit by a landlord, even though based on title, to recover possession of the demised premises from his ex-tenant upon the extinction of the tenancy is governed not by Article 144 of the old Limitation Act but by Article 139 thereof. It, therefore, follows that if the suit was to be filed by Jahagirdar for recovery of possession from defendant No. 1, it would have to be governed by Article 139 of the Limitation Act and by no other Article. Question is not as to whether the present suit is governed by Article 139. The question is as to whether the Jahangir had any subsisting title to the suit land or not and if his title had come to an end by virtue of the fact that he had not filed a suit for possession against defendant No. 1 within limitation, as contemplated by Article 139, his suit would be barred and whether, consequently, his title would stand extinguished or not. In the facts of the case, it can hardly be contended that if he was to file the suit for possession, the suit would not be governed squarely by Article 139. The failure on his part to file any such suit within the period provided by that Article would meet with the inexorable result of extinguishment of his title as per section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 10. A caveat was put in by Mr. The failure on his part to file any such suit within the period provided by that Article would meet with the inexorable result of extinguishment of his title as per section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 10. A caveat was put in by Mr. Abhyankar that the Full Bench judgment applies not to a suit which would have been filed or would have to be filed, but to a suit which is actually filed. The case with which the Full Bench was dealing involved a suit which was itself governed by Article 139, contends the Counsel. To my mind, this makes no difference. The fact remains that if possession was to be taken of the Jagir from defendant No. 1, he had to file a suit for possession and if he wanted to file that suit it had to be governed by Article 139. If that was so, failure to file the suit would result in exhorable operation of section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and Jahagirdar's title came to an end by virtue of the said statutory provision. A similar question has arisen for my consideration in First Appeal No. 268 of 1972, decided on July 22/23, 1980. In the view of the matter, to my mind, there is nothing in the Judgement of the District Court which could be cavilled at. The question decided by the District Court is fully covered by the judgment of the Full Bench. 11. On the question of the interaction of section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and Articles 137, 139 and 142 thereof, it appears to be a matter of widespread belief that said section 28 did not come into operation unless the suit for possession contemplated by that section had been actually filed by the owner of the property and was dismissed by the Court on account of the bar of limitation. Belief is that only in that case the substantive title of the owner gets extinguished, not otherwise. Position might arise, just as it has arisen in the present case, that the plaintiff might not file the suit for possession of the immovable property and might just allow it to be barred under Article such as Article 139 of the Limitation Act. Position might arise, just as it has arisen in the present case, that the plaintiff might not file the suit for possession of the immovable property and might just allow it to be barred under Article such as Article 139 of the Limitation Act. Belief is that the suit if filed would be barred under the Article such as Article 139, the owner's title would not be extinguished under Article 28 because no suit as such was filed. I see no reason to subject said section 28 (corresponding section 27 of the Present Limitation Act) to any such interpretation. Section 28 run as follows:--- "At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property, shall be extinguished." It will be readily seen that the actual filing and actual dismissal of the same on the ground of bar of limitation is now where made a postulate or condition precedent for extinguishment of the title of the owner in question. As per the phraseology employed by the said section 28, whenever a suit is filed by a plaintiff on title for possession, the Court is under an obligation to consider whether the plaintiff has subsisting title in the suit property on the date of the suit or not and in that context the Court shall have to apply its mind to the question of the inter-action of Article such as 137, 139 and 142 of Limitation Act, 1908 on the one hand and section 28 thereof on the other. 12. A similar question had arisen for the consideration of this Court in First Appeal No. 268 of 1972 (Veershaiva Vidayavardhaka Sangh v. Mandakinibai w/o Neelkanthling Sharma)2, decided by this Court on July 22/23, 1980. One Sharma claimed to be and was assumed by this Court to be the owner of the suit property. According to said Sharma, one Vaijnath was in occupation of the same as Sharma's tenant. In 1937 or so Sharma obtained a consent decree against Vaijnath as per which Sharma was to get possession of the suit property on particular future date; in the meantime he was to pay rent to Sharma regularly and if default was committed in connection with any two instalments the entire decree for possession and arrears was to become executable immediately. The judgment-debtor never paid the rent or arrears of instalment with the result that the decree for possession become executable in any event in or before 1939 and the judgment-debtor became entitled to the possession of the suit property latest by that time. In the meantime the plaintiff in that suit had obtained a money decree against Sharma and in execution of that decree purchased the suit property in Court auction in 1957. Plaintiff also claimed to have become the assignee of the decree obtained by Sharma against Vaijnath. The possession of the suit property was, however, never received either by Sharma (who died in 1939 or so) or by his widow, defendant No. 1 (who was brought on record in the Darkhast proceedings against Vaijnath) nor by plaintiff who had purchased the suit property in Court auction. Suit for possession of the suit property was, however, filed by the plaintiff against defendant No. 1 (widow Sharma) and defendant No. 2 (who was in actual possession of the suit property and who also happened to be the brother of Vaijnath) for possession of the suit property on title more than 20 years after deft. No. 1 became entitled to possession form Vaijnath. Deft No. 1 did not resist the claim but deft No. 2 who was in actual possession resisted it contending that--- (a) the suit was barred by limitation; (b) deft. No. 2 had acquired title by adverse possession. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground of the bar of limitation. In this Court it was contended that the suit was on title and, hence, would be governed at the most by Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and that since defendant No. 2 had not even stopped into the witness-box for proving his adverse possession, the suit could not be held to be barred by limitation. This Court negatived that contention and held that the suit was against the heir and the legal representative of the judgement-debtor, that it was governed by the specific Article 137 and not by the residuary Article 144, that the judgment-debtor had become entitled to the possession of the property latest by 1939 and that , hence, as per Article 137 it was incumbent upon deft. No. 1 to file suit for possession against deft No. 2 for possession within 12 years from 1939, that after lapse of that period not only that deft. No. 1's right to file the suit had been barred but her title had extinguished by virtue of section 28 of the Limitation Act and that, hence, the plaintiff, purchased no title in the auction sale in the year 1957. The plaintiff's suit on title was therefore, held not to be maintainable. It was further held that since the plaintiff had no title to the suit property for claiming possession of the same and since was liable to be dismissed on that account, the question whether defendant No. 2 had proved hid title by adverse possession or not was of no relevance. 13. The legal position in the same in the instant case save and except that the suit of the present plaintiff for possession is barred not by Article 137 but by Article 139 of the Limitation Act, 1908. But that difference is immaterial because both the Article relate to a suit for possession of immovable property and section 28 of the Act has the same effect vis-a-vis both Articles. It follows that the plaintiff's processor-in title, the Jahagirdar had no title to convey to the plaintiff in 1969. His suit for possession is, therefore, rightly dismissed by the District Court. 14. The appeal, therefore, fails and the same is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. -----