JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS judgment shall also govern the disposal of Civil Revision No. 16s1 of 1981 which is between the same parties and involves a similar question of law. ( 2. ) THIS appeal, by the plaintiffs is directed against the judgment and decree dated 17. 8,81, passed by Sh. R. P. Tiwari, II Addl. District Judge, Durg in Civil Suit No. 19-A of 1978 dismissing the same as barred by res-judicata. This very question is involved in the connected Civil Revision where issue regarding res judicata has been decided against the appellants. ( 3. ) THE case has a chequered history starting from 1929 and involves property dispute between the family members of the two brothers viz. Jiwanlal and Bahoranlal. It appears to be the common ground that the suit property was jointly owned by Jiwanlal and Bahoranlal, who were admittedly Hindus. Jiwanlal died in the year 1921 leaving behind his widow, Gangabai and daughters Premabai, Rukmanibai and Rahibai, the present appellants. Gangabai also died in 1966. The other brother Bahoranlal died in 1944 leaving behind his son Narenderlal. Narenderlal sold the property to the present respondent Hukumchand Surana in the year 1966. The first litigation started before the Sub Judge, Class I, Durg between Bahoranlal and Gangabai in the year 1928 and was subject-matter of Civil Suit No. 117 of 1928. The said suit was decided on 30,8. 1929. Appeal against the said suit was decided on 21. 11. 1931 in Civil Appeal No. 4-A of 1930. In this case, which was decided in favour of Bahoranlal, it was held that there was no partition between Jiwanlal and Bahoranlal. The second appeal against the judgment before the Additional Judicial Commissioner also failed. ( 4. ) THE second litigation between the parties started in the year 1930 and was the subject-matter of Civil Suit No. 356 of 1930 in the Court of Sub Judge, Durg. It appears that Gangabai, the widow of Jiwanlal, had transferred some houses to Rajulal and Gangadeen alleging partition between her husband Jiwanlal and Bahoranlal. The Trial Court and the first appellate Court dismissed the suit and the appeal and hence Second Appeal No. 355 of 1933 was filed in this High Court at Nagpur and was decided on 11. 9. It appears that Gangabai, the widow of Jiwanlal, had transferred some houses to Rajulal and Gangadeen alleging partition between her husband Jiwanlal and Bahoranlal. The Trial Court and the first appellate Court dismissed the suit and the appeal and hence Second Appeal No. 355 of 1933 was filed in this High Court at Nagpur and was decided on 11. 9. 1936 by holding that earlier decision operated as res judicata and hence the finding that the property was separate could not be accepted. It was, therefore, held that Gangabai had no right to transfer the property. It appears that there was another Civil Suit, 218 of 1931 between Bahoranlal, Gangabai and Gangadeen which was also sent to the High Court in Civil Appeal No. 69 of 1935 and was decided on 23. 11. 1936 by holding that there was no partition between Jiwanlal and Bahoranlal. This judgment is reported in Gangadeen v, Bahoranlal, AIR 1937 Nag. 230. ( 5. ) BAHORANLAL died in the year 1944 leaving his son Narenderlal as his sole surviving heir. It appears that Gangabai felt difficulty in maintaining herself and therefore, filed Civil Suit No. 4-A of 1950 against Narenderlal claiming maintenance at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month with a charge of maintenance on the suit house. The said suit was compromised on 2. 4. 1952 and Narenderlal agreed to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month to Gangabai and this amount was charged on 3 houses of Narenderlal. It was also decreed that one room would be provided for residence of Gangabai with a maintenance of Rs. 30/- per month during her life time. As a consequence of this decree, Gangabai was put in possession of a part of the property in dispute and lived there upto her death in 1966. This portion is now in possession of the 3 daughters of Gangabai, the present appellants-plaintiffs. Narenderlal sold the suit house including the portion in occupation of the appellants-plaintiffs to the present respondent and one Sharda Charan Tiwari for Rs. 15,000/- by sale-deed dated 28. 4. 66. Later on 2. 5. 1967 the said Sh. Sharda Charan Tiwari transferred his half share in the suit house to the present respondent defendant. The present appellants filed this suit for possession of the suit house and declaration that sale of the same in favour of the respondent on 28. 4. 15,000/- by sale-deed dated 28. 4. 66. Later on 2. 5. 1967 the said Sh. Sharda Charan Tiwari transferred his half share in the suit house to the present respondent defendant. The present appellants filed this suit for possession of the suit house and declaration that sale of the same in favour of the respondent on 28. 4. 1966 was illegal. This suit had been dismissed on the ground that judgments in earlier suit operate as res judicata and, therefore, the appellants cannot claim any right or title to the suit house. Since the appellants were in possession of the house which was given to their mother Gangabai for residence respondent Hukumchand filed a separate suit for their ejectment from the same, claiming ownership based on sale-deed from Narenderlal, Civil Suit No. 20-A/78. The Trial Court decided issue No. 6 against the defendants holding that earlier judgments operated as res judicata. That is how the present appeal and civil revision have been filed in this Court. ( 6. ) THE submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that since earlier Courts could not have tried the present suit in view of their limited pecuniary jurisdiction, their judgments would not operate as res judicata. It is further submitted that appellants were not litigating under the same title as in earlier suits and hence earlier judgments would not operate as res judicata. It is submitted that Gangabai was only a limited owner but the appellants arc claiming as reversioners of their father, Jiwanlal and not as successors of their mother Gangabai. It is also submitted that Gangabai had become full owner of the house in her possession after coming into force of Hindu Seccession Act, 1956 and hence earlier judgments would lose their relevance and not operate as res judicata. The learned Counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and order and submitted that earlier judgments have been correctly held to be res judicata. As regards claim based on Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the learned Counsel submitted that since Gangabai was not in actual physical possession of the property, she could not become full owner thereof. ( 7. ) IN order to properly appreciate the submission aforesaid, actual possession of the property may first be ascertained. Both parties have filed their own maps of the property along with their plaint/written-statement. ( 7. ) IN order to properly appreciate the submission aforesaid, actual possession of the property may first be ascertained. Both parties have filed their own maps of the property along with their plaint/written-statement. A perusal of these maps indicates that the suit house is a double storeyed structure and the first floor of the same is in occupation of the appellants. From the map filed with the written-statement, it is clear that the first floor of the house has a tiled roof and was given to the appellants mother Gangabai for her residence. Though there is some difference in two maps about the actual constructed part on the first floor, there is no dispute that no one stayed on the first floor except the appellants mother and the appellants. From para II (b) of the written-statement, it appears that not only the first floor but a passage from a part of the ground floor was also given to Gangabai on 20. 7. 1959. The portion of the ground-floor which was put in possession of Gangabai is the portion described as Aangan and Parchhi. This portion has been marked by letters e, f, b, h, i, l, a, k. j, and e and is shown in yellow in the map filed with the written-statement. The suit filed by the respondent Hukumchand from which the Civil Revision arises, relates to ejectment of the appellants from these portions. Both the maps, however, similarly mark the portion of the house on the ground-floor which is the subject matter of the suit filed by the appellants and consists of two rooms and a Parchhi shown in red in both maps. ( 8. ) IN the context of the aforesaid factual position about the possession of the suit house by parties, it is clear that the portion marked in red in the plaint map was never in possession of either the appellants or their mother Gangabai and hence no question of applying Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would arise. In so far as this property was the subject matter of earlier suit, the decision in earlier suit would certainly operate as res judicata. In so far as this property was the subject matter of earlier suit, the decision in earlier suit would certainly operate as res judicata. The submission that the earlier Court had limited pecuniary jurisdiction and could not have tried the present suit because of its higher valuation seems to have lost all its vitality and vigour in view of Explanation VIII to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Otherwise what has happened is that value of the property since the first decision has appreciated necessity of higher valuation of the suit and filing the same before the Additional District Judge. In view of the admitted position that the property is the same in both the suits this should not matter. If appreciation in value of the property was by itself sufficient to do away with the principle of res judicata every matter could be re-agitated after the lapse of about 5 years, it is common knowledge that value of immovable property has been increasing year after year and has almost doubled every 5 years. This, however, has never been considered as sufficient to give a go by to the principle of res judicata. A plaintiff cannot get rid of the bar of res judicata only by the higher valuation of the property in subsequent suit. In Tekchand Kapurchand v. Birzabai, 1942 NLJ 423 == AIR 1942 Nag. 119, a Division Bench of this Court held that a party who has lost in one Court cannot add causes of action to the original causes of action in the earlier suit for the purpose of swelling the amount of valuation and then claim that the former Court is not competent to try the subsequent suit. Though this case is not similar to the present case on facts yet rationale behind the decision would apply with full force in the instant case. In Jeayantha v. Hanumantha, AIR 1954 SC 9 , it was held that, "in order to determine whether a Court which decided the former suit had jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit, regard must be had to the jurisdiction of that Court at the date of the former suit and not to its jurisdiction at the date of the subsequent suit. If at that time such a Court would have been competent to try the subsequent suit. If at that time such a Court would have been competent to try the subsequent suit. had it been then brought the decision of such Court would operate as res judicata although subsequently by a rise in the value of the property that Court had ceased to be a proper Court, so far as regards its pecuniary jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit relating to that very property. " This decision is directly on the point and should therefore, conclude the matter against the appellant. It is no doubt true that subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Gulab Bai v. Manphool Bai, AIR 1962 SC 214 , and P. M. Kavade v. A B. Bokil, AIR 1971 SC 2228 , seem to be suggesting that if the earlier Court was not competent, because of its limited pecuniary jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit of higher valuation, the earlier would not operate as res judicata. But in these cases there is no discussion whether the higher valuation in the subsequent suit was of the same property or was due to some other cause of action being included therein. Since Jiwanlals case is directly on the point this Court is not able to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants. Then decisions in earlier suits were challenged in this Court and the Court of Additional Judicial Commissioner and were decided against the deceased Gangabai. Judgment of the Trial Court had merged in the appellate judgment and decree of this Court. Since neither this Court nor the Court of Additional Judicial Commissioner was a Court of limited jurisdiction the judgments and decrees rendered by these Courts would operate as res judicata. ( 9. ) IT may therefore be considered if the appellants as reversioners of their father Jiwanlal have any right to claim the property as their own. The learned Counsel has not been able to dispute the broad proposition that if the appellants were litigating as heirs of their mother, they would be bound by earlier judgments. The underlying principle behind this rule is that if the proceeding originally instituted is right and proper, any decision obtained therein is binding on all persons on whom the right or interest be devolved. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff can legitimately avoid the rule of res judicata if they are not claiming as heirs of Gangabai. The underlying principle behind this rule is that if the proceeding originally instituted is right and proper, any decision obtained therein is binding on all persons on whom the right or interest be devolved. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff can legitimately avoid the rule of res judicata if they are not claiming as heirs of Gangabai. It is however not in dispute that the suit property was joint family property of Jiwanlal and Bahoranlal and that is why in earlier suits it has been held that the property passed on to Bahoranlal on the death of Jiwanlal in the years 1921 by survivorship. That the rule of survivorship would govern succession to the property in the absence of any surviving male heir of Jiwanlal is beyond doubt. The law as it stood in 1921, neither the daughters nor the widow could inherit the property or interest of a deceased Hindu male and the right of the widow if any, was right of maintenance alone. Gangabai had enforced this right of maintenance by filing the suit and obtaining a decree in the year 1952. It is. therefore, apparent that succession to the property or interest to Jiwanlal opened in 1921 and closed thereafter when Bahoranlal became the full owner of Jiwanlals share by survivorship. It therefore, cannot be accepted that inheritance to the property of Jiwanlal remained dormant or in abeyance and opened only after the death of his widow. The widow of Jiwanlal as has been noticed earlier, had not obtained possession of any property even by way of maintenance on the death of Jiwanlal and all property and interest of Jiwanlal had gone to Bahoranlal. Under the circumstances, the appellants could have no justifiable reason to either reopen the succession or otherwise claim any interest in the property of Jiwanlal now. Their claim as reversioners to Jiwanlal must, therefore, fail on merits. Apparently, the submission has been advanced only to make the bar of res judicata inoperative and it must, therefore, fail. Reliance to Supreme Court judgment in Ram Kristo v. Dhankisto, AIR 1969 SC 204 , is wholly misplaced as the said judgment docs not support the submissions of the appellant as aforesaid. ( 10. ) THE aforesaid discussion would be sufficient to hold that Civil Suit No. 19-A of 1981 has been rightly decided by the Trial Court. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. ( 10. ) THE aforesaid discussion would be sufficient to hold that Civil Suit No. 19-A of 1981 has been rightly decided by the Trial Court. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Since the appeal has failed only on a technical point, the parties must bear their own costs throughout. ( 11. ) POSITION of Civii Revision No. 1618 of J981 may now be considered. As already noticed, the suit from which this revision has arisen relates to that part of the property which was given to Gangabai for her residence in recognition of her claim to maintenance. That the said claim was recognized in the compromise decree dated 2. 4. 1952 passed in Civil Suit No. 4-A of 1950 is not in dispute. It is the respondents own case that Gangabai was put in possession of the property in satisfaction of her claim for maintenance, in the year 1959. It cannot be disputed that possession of the property by a Hindu widow in recognition of her claim for maintenance is the possession as a limited owner. Such a widow used to be called the limited owner because of certain restrictions on alienation and also because the property devolved upon the next heir of the last full owner upon her death. In spite of it, the whole estate for the time being vested in her and she represented it completely. The true nature and character of this right was described by the Privy Council in Janki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyar, AIR 1916 PC 117, as under: "her right is of the nature of a right of property, her position is that of owner, her powers in that character are, however limited but. . . so long as she is alive, no one has any vested interest in succession. " This law was recognized by the Supreme Court in Jaisri v. Rajdewan, AIR 1962 SC 83 and G. Gurumurthy v. R. Ayyappa, AIR 1974 SC 1702 . Clearly, therefore, Gangabai had a right over the property of her husband Jiwanlal though her said right was limited in nature. It is true that she was denied her right to possess her husbands property even as a limited owner in the beginning and was, therefore, compelled to file the suit Civil Suit No. 4-A of 1950. The compromise dated 2. 4. 1982 recognised her right, as aforesaid. It is true that she was denied her right to possess her husbands property even as a limited owner in the beginning and was, therefore, compelled to file the suit Civil Suit No. 4-A of 1950. The compromise dated 2. 4. 1982 recognised her right, as aforesaid. Since Gangabai was put in possession of the property in dispute in this Civil Suit as a limited owner, she possessed this property. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would come to her rescue and would convert her limited estate into her full ownership. This provision contains an explicit declaration of law that a female holds all property in her possession whether acquired by her before or after the commencement of the Act as absolute owner and not as limited owner. Decision of the Supreme Court in Vijia v. Thakorbhai, AIR 1979 SC 993 , brings out this change in law clearly and authoritatively and places the entire controversy beyond doubt. Clearly, therefore, right of Gangabai as limited owner because of her possession of the property got converted into her right of absolute owner of the property. Since she became absolute owner of the property, succession in relation to this property opened on her death and the appellants became entitled to succeed her in preference to Narenderlal. This position is also not in dispute and indeed cannot be disputed. It is, therefore, clear that right of Narenderlal if any, over the property in possession of Gangabai got extinguished because of the legislative change. None of the earlier decisions has said any thing about the full ownership acquired by Gangabai over the property handed over* to her in lieu of her maintenance. Indeed it would appear that Civil Suit No. 4-A of 1950 decided on 2. 4 -. 1952 was the last litigation between the parties dealing with their rights inter se. Since the law enacted subsequent to this decision has changed the entire relationship of the parties, none of the earlier decisions remained relevant to the dispute. In such a case there is no scope for application of rule of res judicata contained in Section 11, Civil Procedure Code or recognised otherwise. This legal position is also well-settled as would be clear from the Division Bench decision of this Court in State of M. P. v. Mulamchand, 1973 M. P. L. J. 832. In such a case there is no scope for application of rule of res judicata contained in Section 11, Civil Procedure Code or recognised otherwise. This legal position is also well-settled as would be clear from the Division Bench decision of this Court in State of M. P. v. Mulamchand, 1973 M. P. L. J. 832. Even some of the earlier decisions of this Court and other Courts take the similar view. (Daryanumal Totaram v. Sohanlal. 1961 MPLJ 1447. Ghasiram v. Kundanbai, AIR 1940 Nag. 163. Mangharam Chuharmal v. B. C. Patel, AIR 1972 Born. 46 and P. Bachubhai v. Lalita, AIR 1972 Guj 31 . Clearly, therefore, earlier decisions could not operate as res judicata in this Civil Suit which related to the property possessed by Gangabai during her life time and succeeded by appellants after her death. ( 12. ) THE upshot of the discussion is that claim of the appellants to the property not possessed by their mother and subject-matter of their suit i. e. Civil Suit No. I9-A of 1978 is, without any legal basis and, therefore, their suit was rightly dismissed. Similarly, the suit filed by the respondent Hukum Chand Surana against the appellants i. e. Civil Suit No. 20-A of 1978 for ejectment of the appellants from that portion of the house which was in possession of their mother, must also be held to be devoid of substance deserving dimissal. It is unfortunate that the entire Civil Suit No. 20-A of 1978 is not before this Court and hence this Court cannot dismissed the same. This Court would, however, hope that instead Of permitting the suit to be tried in normal manner by recording evidence etc. this legal position would be appreciated by the parties and the learned trial Judge and suit dismissed. ( 13. ) AS a necessary consequence of- the aforesaid. First Appeal No. 230 of 1981 fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal as also of the suit. Civil Revision No. 1618/81 is allowed and the impugned order is quashed by holding that earlier judgments do not operate as res judicata. The matter is, however, remanded to the Trial Court for passing the necessary final judgment in accordance with the decision as aforesaid. No orders as to the costs.