JUDGMENT - Bharucha S.P., J.: - The appellant (the original petitioner) is a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. According to the appellant, employees of an undertaking called M/s. Tata Textiles enrolled themselves as members of the appellant in September 1977. In 1979 the appellant made an application to the Industrial Court at Bombay under section 11 of the Maharahstra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, (now called “the Act”) seeking the grant of recognition in respect of the undertaking of M/s. Tata Textiles. The application referred to “M/s. Tata Textiles” and called it a company incorporated under the Companies Act. It also stated that this undertaking was owned by Naval H. Tata. 2. A written-statement was filed on behalf of respondents 1, 2, 3 and 4. It stated that Tata Textiles had no separate or independent legal existence. The employees working therein were employed by respondents 1 to 4 jointly and severally and they worked exclusively for one or other or all of these mills. Tata Textiles was a kind of liaison and service group acting as a conduit or convenient clearing centre for the various basic activities of respondents 1 to 4. The employees working in Tata Textiles were in reality employed in the cotton textile industry and were, as such, governed by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. 3. On 8th September, 1980 an application was made by the appellant to the Industrial Court for an amendment of its application. The amendment sought to remove the appellation “Messrs” from the description of Tata Textiles. It sought to describe Tata Textiles as a commercial establishment registered under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. It stated that in the certificate of its registration under this Act Naval H. Tata was shown as the employer. 4. On 5th December, 1980 the Industrial Court considered the application for grant of recognition and the application for amendment thereof. Its judgment and order noted that the parties had proceeded to the hearing of the application on the preliminary jurisdictional issue raised on behalf of respondents 1 to 4. Evidence had been led on behalf of respondents 1 to 4 and arguments had been advanced. During the course of the arguments it was suggested to the appellant's Advocate that he should withdraw the application and make a fresh application. Evidence had been led on behalf of respondents 1 to 4 and arguments had been advanced. During the course of the arguments it was suggested to the appellant's Advocate that he should withdraw the application and make a fresh application. The Advocate, having taken time to consider this proposal, had on 8th September, 1980 made the application for amendment. There had been delay in making the application for amendment. If the amendment was allowed it would amount to permitting the appellant to seek recognition in respect of totally different undertaking which was not mad a party to the original application. It was not possible to accept the ground that the description of Tata Textiles had been wrongly and inadvertently made because there was evidence, either oral or in the form of an affidavit, in respect thereof. The appellant ought to have been well-advised to withdraw the application that had been made and make a fresh application. The Industrial Court, therefore, rejected the amendment application. It also came to the conclusion that the application was not maintainable and dismissed it. 5. The appellant thereupon filed a writ petition in this Court. It prayed that the order of the Industrial Court be quashed; that its amendment application dated 8th September, 1980 be allowed; and that the Industrial Court be directed to hear its application on merits. The writ petition was heard and disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 12th July, 1985. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the Industrial Court had, on an appreciation of the factors set out in its judgement, rejected the application for amendment. The order was basically discretionary and well supported by reasons and should be allowed to prevail. The learned Judge, therefore, dismissed the petition. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 12th July, 1985. 6. Mr. Cama, learned Counsel for the appellant, drew our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Jail Ram Manohar Jailal v. National Building Material Suppy)1, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1267. The Supreme Court held that there was no rule that unless in an application for amendment of the plain it was expressly averred that the error, omission or misdescription therein was due to a bona fide mistake, the Court had no power to grant leave to amend. The Supreme Court held that there was no rule that unless in an application for amendment of the plain it was expressly averred that the error, omission or misdescription therein was due to a bona fide mistake, the Court had no power to grant leave to amend. The power to grant an amendment was intended to serve the ends of justice and was not governed by such narrow or technical limitations. The Court always gave leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that, by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which could not be compensated for by an order of costs. However negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed if it caused no injustice to the other side. 7. In our view, the amendment that was sought by the appellant was basically innocuous. The party against whom the appellant's application was directed was known. It was Tata Textiles. Tata Textiles had merely been misdescribed. The misdescription was sought to be corrected. The amendment did not result, as the Industrial Court erroneously found, in the application being directed, by reason of the amendment, against a different undertaking. The misdescription was patently the result of inadvertence and no evidence, either oral or by way of affidavit, was necessary in support of the application for amendment. Reliance upon so technical a requirement is not to be insisted upon, particularly in labour matters. It was nobody's case that there were any mala fides or that injustice which was irreparable was likely to be the result of granting the amendment. The amendment, as we have stated, was basically innocuous and ought in the interests of justice to have been allowed. 8. Mr. Vimadalal, learned Counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 4, relied upon the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 10 of the Act. By reason of sub-section (1) the provisions of the Act in regard to the recognition of unions apply to every undertaking wherein fifty or more employees are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding 12 months. 1 to 4, relied upon the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 10 of the Act. By reason of sub-section (1) the provisions of the Act in regard to the recognition of unions apply to every undertaking wherein fifty or more employees are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding 12 months. By reason of sub-section (3), if the number of employees employed in any undertaking to which the provisions in regard to the recognition of unions apply at any time falls below fifty continuously for a period of one year, those provisions would cease to apply to such undertaking. Mr. Vimadalal drew our attention to an affidavit filed in the appeal on 13th September, 1985 by Rohinton Dinshaw Mobedji on behalf of respondents 1, 2 and 3. It is therein alleged that, under the Act, the appellant must necessarily proceed, if at all, against each of these respondents and that at no time, that is, neither in 1979 nor 1985, could this be successfully done as none of these respondents had or has now anything approaching 50 employees located at the Tata Textiles unit. The argument presuppose that the Tata Textiles unit is, by itself, not an undertaking to which the provisions of the Act. In the event, what is averred in that affidavit and submitted by Mr. Vimadalal is based on questions of fact into which this Court cannot go. 9. In our view, the judgment and order of the Industrial Court must be set aside. The amendment sought by the appellant's application dated 8th September, 1980 must be allowed. Each of respondents 1 to 4 shall be free to file further pleadings in reply to the amended application. The Industrial court shall proceed to hear the application afresh on merits and shall permit the filing of all relevant documents and the leading of all evidence. Each of respondents 1 to 4 shall be free to contend that even if the appellant was entitled to recognition under the terms of section 10(1) of the Act at the time of the application it is bound to be derecognised because of the provisions of section 10(3). In the event that respondents 1 to 4 or any of them to contend by separate proceedings, such proceedings shall be heard and disposed of along with the application filed by the appellant. In the event that respondents 1 to 4 or any of them to contend by separate proceedings, such proceedings shall be heard and disposed of along with the application filed by the appellant. The Industrial Court shall reach its conclusions uninfluenced by its earlier decision, the judgment of the learned Single Judge and this judgment in so far as they may reflect upon the merits of the appellant's application. 10. In the result, the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 12th July, 1985 is set aside. The petition is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). No order as to costs. Order accordingly. -----