B. N. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant has been convicted under Section 302 I. P. C. and sentenced to imprisonment for life for having committed murder by intentionally causing the death of his wife. Duti. ( 2 ) PROSECUTION case may be briefly stated. In the year 1979 appellant married the deceased, second daughter of P. W. 1 of village Puruna Balanga, at his ancestral home in village Chandan pur. Though the appellant had made no demand for dowry, P. W. 1 had paid him Rs. 1,200/- at the marriage alcar and had promised to pay Rs 300/- more later. About six months prior to the deceaseds death in April, 1981, the appellant and the deceased bad shifted to a house at Sadis Patna within a kilometre from Chandan pur and lived there. The house at Sadis Patna was the subject matter of litigation between the appellant and his brother Baidhar on one side and their uncle Banambar, P. W. 11, on the other. About three months prior to the deceaseds death, the deceased had complained to P. W. 13, her cousin sister, about the torture meted out to her by the appellant because of non-payment of the balance sum of Rs. 300/- promised by P. W. 1. Sometime thereafter Duti left for her fathers house in the company of P. W. 13. The deceased informed P. W. 1 that she had come to collect the money without which she was being rebuked and beaten up by the appellant. On the following day the appellant came to P. W. ITS house and demanded payment of Rs. 300/- on the ground that he was in urgent need of money. P. W. 1 pledged a brass utensil with P. W 3 and collected Rs. 200/- which he paid to the appellant who thereafter left for his house. In the evening of 6. 4. 81, P. Ws. 4 and 8 of village Sadis Patna saw the appellant assaulting the deceased in his single-room house in the presence of Baidhar. On 7-4-81 the door of the appellant's house was found closed from inside and as no one came out of the house during the day, the villagers began to suspect foul-play. At about 5. 00 p. m. , P. W. 11 verified and found that the door of the appellants house was still closed from inside. At 7. On 7-4-81 the door of the appellant's house was found closed from inside and as no one came out of the house during the day, the villagers began to suspect foul-play. At about 5. 00 p. m. , P. W. 11 verified and found that the door of the appellants house was still closed from inside. At 7. 30 p. m. P. W. 11 lodged the written report Ext. 9, with P. W. 14, Officer-in-Charge, Sadar P. S. , Pun. P. W. 14 made station diary entry, Ext. 9/1. and proceeded to the spot. He found that both the doors of the appellants house were bolted from inside and there was no response to call. He flashed a torchlight through a hole in the door-leaf and found a female lying dead inside. He got the front door broken open in the presence of witnesses. On entering inside he found that a woman was lying dead. The appellant and his brother identified the woman to be Duti. In the meanwhile P. W. 1 had arrived at the appellants house and lodged F. I. R. , Ext. 1 with P. W. 14 who registered the present case and took up in investigation. As it was late in the night, P. W. 14 closed both the doors and posted guards at the house. On 8-4-81 P. W. 14 held inquest over the dead body, vide Ext. 2, the inquest report. The inquest was witnessed by two doctors, P. Ws. 2 and 6. P. W. 14 seized a mat and a Gamuchha under seizure list, Ext. 6, a Lathi, Katari, grinder, grinding-stone and seized wood under seizure list, Ext. 7, and a Dhoti and sample earth from the room under seizure list, Ext. 8. He sent the dead body to P. W. 5 for post-mortem examination vide dead body challan, Ext. 16, and command certificate, Ext. 17. He had sent the seized articles for chemical examination. On completion of investigation charge sheet was submitted against the appellant who was then committed to the Court of Sessions. ( 3 ) THE appellant was charged under section 302 I. P. C. and put on trial. Fourteen witnesses have been examined on behalf of the prosecution and none on behalf of the defence. The defence plea is one of denial. In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr. ( 3 ) THE appellant was charged under section 302 I. P. C. and put on trial. Fourteen witnesses have been examined on behalf of the prosecution and none on behalf of the defence. The defence plea is one of denial. In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr. P. C. , the appellant has stated that all the allegations made against him are false and that he had no knowledge about his wifes death until he returned to the village by the time the doors were opened by the police. He has further stated that P. W. 11 is inimically disposed towards him and his brother and that the present case has been falsely foisted against him at the instance of P. W. 11. The learned Sessions Judge who tried the case found the appellant guilty under Section 302 I. P. C. Convicted and sentenced him there under to imprisonment for life. ( 4 ) P. W. 5 had conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of Duti on police requisition on 8. 4. 81. She had found that the dead body was decomposed and the tongue and eyes were protruded. The face, lips and nails were bluish in colour. The abdomen was protruded and there were blisters over the lips and ant bite marks were present on different parts of the body. Duti was pregnant for fourteen weeks at the time of her death. P. W. 5 did not find any external injuries on the dead body. On dissection she did not find any internal injuries either. Externally, some brownish liquid had come out from both the nostrils. She did not find any evidence of sexual assault or assault in different form at the vaginal region. She was unable to give a positive opinion as to the probable cause of death as according to her, it would depend upon the history of any disease, which Duti might have been suffering from. In case there was no history of any such disease. P. W. Ss opinion is that Duti had met a natural death. Ext. 4 is the post-mortem report. While conducting post-mortem examination. P. W. 5. had kept in view the contents of the inquest report, Ext. 2, showing the presence of injuries, but she is definite that she had not found any injuries on the dead body. P. W. Ss opinion is that Duti had met a natural death. Ext. 4 is the post-mortem report. While conducting post-mortem examination. P. W. 5. had kept in view the contents of the inquest report, Ext. 2, showing the presence of injuries, but she is definite that she had not found any injuries on the dead body. To the query from P. W. 14 she had replied that depression at the left eyebrow and clotted blood might have been present on the dead body, but the same could not be detected due to the advanced state of decomposition and peeling of the skin, vide Ext. 5. In cross- examination P. W. 5 reiterated that she had not found any injuries on the dead body. She ruled out the possibility of any head injury over the left eye-brow being the cause of depression of the skull as, according to her, there should have been internal hemorrhage and damage to the internal membrane which she had not found. P. W. 5 was assisted in the post-mortem examination by the sweeper, P. W. 7. However, no importance should be attached to the evidence of P. W. 7 regarding absence of injuries on the dead body in view of his total incompetence in the science of medical jurisprudence: Thus, according to the evidence of P. W. 5, the death of Duti was natural and not homicidal. ( 5 ) AS already noted P. Ws 2 and 6 are both doctors who were present at the inquest held by P. W. 14. After the inquest P. W. 2 had returned home and prepared a note, Ext. 3. According to P. W. 2. there was a marked depression just over the left eye brow besides a number of other injuries and his inference is that there was a depressed fracture with internal head injuries. P. W. 2 had also seen multiple ecchymosis marks on the abdominal wall indicating severe assault by a hard blunt weapon like the lathi, M. O. I, found in the room. P. W. 2 was confronted with his previous statement recorde under section 164 Cr. P. C. wherein he had not mentioned about any swelling on the right side of the face and on the right eyelid as well as the injuries on the abdominal wall. P. W. 2g finding of ecchymosis is not noted in the inquest report, Ext. 2. P. W. 2 was confronted with his previous statement recorde under section 164 Cr. P. C. wherein he had not mentioned about any swelling on the right side of the face and on the right eyelid as well as the injuries on the abdominal wall. P. W. 2g finding of ecchymosis is not noted in the inquest report, Ext. 2. P. W. 6 has supported the evidence of P. W. 2 and according to P. Ws. 2 and 6 the death was homicidal in nature. It is worthy of note that according to P. W. 14 (paragraph-is of the cross-examination), the statements of P. Ws. 2 and 6 which he recorded were identical and that the statement was dictated by P. W. 2 and on seeing it P. W. 6 completely agreed with it. On scrutiny we find that the learned Sessions Judge has ignored the evidence of both P. Ws. 1. and 6 insofar as it relates to the presence of injuries in the stomach region and vaginal region, but bas accepted the said evidence insofar as it relates to the bead injury. As already noted, there are discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of P. Ws. 2 and 6. In our view, undue importance should not have been given to the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 6 as P. W. 6 his stated that their conclusion was only their suspicion and P. W. 2 has admitted that both of them had not at all touched the dead body. In view of this perfunctory and unscientific examination by P. Ws. 2 and 6, their evidence as inquest witnesses cannot prevail over the evidence of P. W. 5 who had actually conducted the postmortem examination. In this context, reference may be made to a decision of this Court reported in Chudiamal Jam and another v. State of Orissa wherein it was held: Notice had been taken by the learned Sessions Judge that at the time of inquest, P. W. 15 had noticed a mark of injury on the neck of the deceased. But the evidence of P. W. 7 would negative this theory. As has been held in Surjan and others v. State of Rajasthan2, a statement in the inquest report is not evidence by itself and it certainly cannot be pitted against the evidence of the medical witness given in the court. But the evidence of P. W. 7 would negative this theory. As has been held in Surjan and others v. State of Rajasthan2, a statement in the inquest report is not evidence by itself and it certainly cannot be pitted against the evidence of the medical witness given in the court. In Maula Bux and others v. State of Rajasthan3, the Supreme Court, while dealing with conflict between medical evidence and the contents of the inquest report, has observed and held: TI the learned Trial Judge held that the bruise marks on scapular region and waist of the dead body noted in the Inquest Panchanama by the Investigating Police Officer, were nothing but the marks of post-mortem staining. This view of the evidence taken by the trial court could not be said to be palpably wrong. Nor was the High Court fair enough to the medical officer, Dr. Sati Punjabi inasmuch as it held that she had failed to note some contusion marks mentioned in the Inquest Panchanama, through sheer inadvertence or by design. The Police Officer who prepared the Inquest Panchanama was not an expert in medical jurisprudence. The possibility of his having mistaken the post-mortem staining marks on the waist and shoulder of the deceased, for ante- mortem bruises, could not be ruled out. In any case, in such a situation, as a matter of judicial caution, the benefit of this discrepancy between medical evidence and the inquest report, on this point in issue, ought to have been given to the appellants,. As P. W. 7 had not noticed any injury on the neck portion of the deceased the evidence of P. W. 15 and that of the other witnesses about the presence of an injury or a black mark on the neck of the deceased is not to be accepted and in such a situation, the medical evidence should normally prevail. In the present case also the evidence of P. W. 5 who conducted the regular post-mortem examination must prevail over the perfunctory examination by P. Ws. 2 and 6 at the time of inquest and the benefit of the discrepancy between the medical evidence and. the inquest report should go to the appellant. ( 6 ) P. WS. 4 and 8 have stated in court that on 6-4-81 at about 9. 00 p. m. they had seen the appellant assaulting the deceased. 2 and 6 at the time of inquest and the benefit of the discrepancy between the medical evidence and. the inquest report should go to the appellant. ( 6 ) P. WS. 4 and 8 have stated in court that on 6-4-81 at about 9. 00 p. m. they had seen the appellant assaulting the deceased. According to P. W. 4, the appellant had used an iron rod or something looking like that for the purpose of assaulting the deceased, but according to P. W. 8, the appellant had used a stick. The evidence of these two witnesses has been discussed by the learned Sessions Judge in paragraphs 42 to 44 of the judgment. The discrepancies and contradictions and the prevaricating statements of these two witnesses have been duly taken note of by the learned Sessions Judge arid we agree with the conclusion of the learned Judge that their evidence must be rejected. ( 7 ) PROSECUTION case now solely on circumstantial evidence. The law on the subject of circumstantial evidence is now well settled. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra4 it has been held: A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between may be proved and must be or should be proved as has held by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra5, where the following observations were made: Certainly it is primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between may be and must be is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence. Bearing in mind the principles of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down in the decision referred to above, the nature and character of the circumstantial evidence adduced in this case may now be examined. ( 8 ) THE allegation of demand for payment of money made by the appellant to P. W. 1 as providing the motive for the crime is based on the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 3 and 13. It may be noted that P. W. 13 was not examined as a prosecution witness during investigation. She was examined for the first time in the trial court. P. W. 1 has categorically stated that the appellant had made no demand for dowry at the time of his marriage. P W. 1 had himself voluntarily paid Rs. 1,200/- to the appellant and bad promised to pay Rs. 300/- later. P. W. 13 bas stated that during her visits to the deceased, on two occasions the deceased had complained that she was being assaulted by the appellant because of non-payment of Rs. 300/ -. P. Ws. 1 and 3 have stated that about a fortnight before Dutis death P. W. 1 had pledged a brass utensil with P. W. 3 and raised a loan of Rs. 200/- which he had paid to the appellant. According to P. W. 1, thereafter the appellant mother had come to his house and taken back Duti to the appellants house. Thus a paltry sum of Rs. 100/- only remained to be paid by P. W. 1. It does not appear reasonable that the fact of non-payment of Rs. 100/could be the motive for the appellant to kill Duti. particularly when P W. 1 has himself stated that at the time of marriage which had taken place about two years before the occurrence, the appellant had never raised any demand for dowry. It does not appear reasonable that the fact of non-payment of Rs. 100/could be the motive for the appellant to kill Duti. particularly when P W. 1 has himself stated that at the time of marriage which had taken place about two years before the occurrence, the appellant had never raised any demand for dowry. ( 9 ) AS the dead body of Duti was found inside the room with both the front and rear doors closed from inside, the learned Sessions Judge considered the question whether the appellant killed the deceased inside the room and then escaped through some passage without opening the doors. This matter has been considered in paragraphs 31 to 35 of the trial court judgment. It is in evidence that on the western side of the appellant's house is the house of one Gopal Chandra Roy, but the latter has not been examined in this case. P. Ws. 4 and 8 have stated that the intervening brick wall between the two houses rises only up to the height of the side was and the upper triangular portion was open. This evidence of P. Ws. 4 and 8 was challenged by the defence and therefore the learned Sessions Judge made a local inspection in the presence of counsels on both sides on 24-7-82. The memorandum of local inspection has been placed on record. The learned Sessions Judge has recorded his findings on the basis of the local inspection in paragraphs 32 to 35 of the judgment. The learned Judge has noted his own observations and findings on examining the intervening brick wall and the construction made over it, which appeared to the learned Judge to have been recently made. The learned Judge further found that the bamboo work on the wall had been tampered with recently and that too in connivance with Gopal Chandra Roy. In course of his local inspection the learned Sessions Judge appears to have traversed beyond the limits of Section 310, Cr. P. C. The object of this Section is to understand the evidence adduced in the case and also to 1st the veracity of witnesses, but a Judge making a local inspection cannot import into the case any facts which he has himself observed as that would be introducing evidence not tested by cross- examination. P. C. The object of this Section is to understand the evidence adduced in the case and also to 1st the veracity of witnesses, but a Judge making a local inspection cannot import into the case any facts which he has himself observed as that would be introducing evidence not tested by cross- examination. In a recent case reported in Keisam Kumar Singh and another v. State of Manipur6 the Supreme Court observed: Lastly, the learned Sessions Judge relied on the local inspection made by him. Here, the High Court rightly pointed out that the learned Sessions Judge had committed a serious error of law. Normally, a court is not entitled to make a local inspection and even if such an inspection is made, it can never take the place of evidence or proof but is really meant nor appreciating the. position at the spot. The Sessions Judge seems to have converted himself into a witness in order to draw full support to the defence case by what he may have seen. This Court in Pritam Singh and another v. State of Punjab observed thus: A Magistrate is certainly not entitled to allow his view or observation to take the place of evidence because such view or observation of his cannot be tested by cross-examination and the accused would certainly not be in a position to furnish any explanation in regard to the same. We are satisfied that in the instant case the learned Sessions Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction in making a local inspection. In the present case the learned Sessions Judge bas allowed his views and observations to take the place of evidence and in doing so exceeded his jurisdiction in making a local inspection. Accordingly, the memorandum of local inspection is, ruled out of consideration and the findings of the learned Judge based on the local inspection are set aside. ( 10 ) AS already discussed, the evidence of P. Ws. 4 and 8 regarding the allegation of assault by the appellant on the deceased on 6-4-81 has already been rejected in view of the infirmities and discrepancies in their evidence. Even if their evidence is accepted as regards the opening available on top of the intervening brick wall between the house of the appellant and Gopal Chandra Roy, there is no evidence that anyone had entered or left the appellant's house through that opening on 6-4-81. Even if their evidence is accepted as regards the opening available on top of the intervening brick wall between the house of the appellant and Gopal Chandra Roy, there is no evidence that anyone had entered or left the appellant's house through that opening on 6-4-81. Unfortunately, Gopal Chandra Roy has not been examined in this case. ( 11 ) P. W. 8 has stated that on the night of occurrence at about 2. 00 a. m. he was returning from a Jatra from a neighbouring village, when he observed the appellant fiddling with the lock in front of Gopal Chandra Roys house. P. W. 9 is a daily wage-earner and belongs to village Chandanpur. According to him, the Jatra had taken place at village Apila and admittedly there is a shorter route from Apila to Chandan pur. There was no reason why P. W. 9 instead of taking the usual shorter route would choose to take a longer route via the appellant's house in village Sadis Patna at about 2. 00 a. m. In court P. W. 9 has stated that with the help of a torchlight he had spotted the appellant in front of Gopal Chandra Roys house and had accosted the appellant who had kept mum. However, in his statement recorded by P W. 14 under Section 161, Cr. P. C. , he had not stated that he had any torchlight with him or that he had accosted the appellant. The learned Sessions Judge has discussed the evidence of P. W. 9 and without hesitation rejected his evidence. We are of opinion that the evidence of PW. 9 has been rightly rejected. Thus there is no evidence before the court that the appellant had escaped through the top of the intervening brick wall on the night of occurrence after committing the crime. ( 12 ) THE presence of human blood on the mat and the Dhoti recovered from inside the room cannot by itself implicate the appellant with the crime. ( 13 ) ALL the circumstances discussed above do not satisfy the tests laid down in the case of Sharad v. State of Maharashtra (supra ). The circumstances have neither been fully established nor have they been proved to be of such a conclusive nature and tendency so as to exclude every hypothesis but the one that the appellant had committed the crime. The circumstances have neither been fully established nor have they been proved to be of such a conclusive nature and tendency so as to exclude every hypothesis but the one that the appellant had committed the crime. ( 14 ) FOR the reasons stated above, we hold that prosecution has failed to bring home the charge under Section 302, I. P. C. against the appellant. This appeal is accordingly allowed and the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are set aside, the appellant is held not guilty and acquitted of the charge. He be set at liberty forthwith. .