K. Lahiri, J. - We propose to dispose of the writ petitions by a common order as they involve common questions of law and fact. 2. THE CORE QUESTION IN THE WRIT PETITIONS : "Whether egg, live poultry and dressed poultry are 'meat' within the meaning of Item 11 of Schedule III to the Assam Sates Tax Act, 1947, as amended.” 3. THE RELEVANT FACTS NECESSARY FOR DISPO­SAL OF THE PETITIONS : At all relevant time the petitioner was a 'registered dealer' under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, for short 'the Act' and registered Army Contractor for supply of food stuff to the armed forces in the region on contract basis. The contracts in question Averse for supply of "food stuff" including potato, fish, vegetable eggs and poultry. The Superintendent of Taxes assessed fifed petitioner to sales tax on poultry and eggs for the period ending 31.3 1967, 30.9.67 and 31.3.1968 by his orders dated 15.9.67, 21.2.68 an 18.8.69 respectively. In all the cases the petitioner had claimed that poultry, live or dressed and eggs were exempt from the sales tax under Item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act". The contention raised was turned down by the Superintendent in all the cases. On appeal the Commissioner of Taxes rejected the said plea in all the three appeals but he ordered that appeals pertaining to the periods ending 31.3.67 and 30.9.67, wherein the petitioner had claimed that he was entitled to exemption under Item 34 of Schedule III to "the Act" to the effect that he had sold the edibles to the Defence Services Installations, and, there­fore, not liable to be taxed was not enquired into by the Sup­erintendent, Accordingly, 'the Commissioner' directed the Superin­tendent of Taxes to enquire into and determine the question. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the appellate orders, preferred three separate appeals before the Assam Board of Revenue which were registered as 34 STA/69, 35 STA/69 and 36 STA/69 : The Board of Revenue also rejected the plea of the petitioner that poultry am eggs were 'meat' in all the appeals. However, in Appeal Nos. 34 STA/69 and 35 STA/69 'the Board' directed the Superinten­dent of Taxes to examine the claim of the petitioner as to whe­ther the victuals were sold in Defence Services Installations in Lekhabali and Lekhapani, if so, whether Item 34 of the Schedule attracted in those cases. However, in Appeal Nos. 34 STA/69 and 35 STA/69 'the Board' directed the Superinten­dent of Taxes to examine the claim of the petitioner as to whe­ther the victuals were sold in Defence Services Installations in Lekhabali and Lekhapani, if so, whether Item 34 of the Schedule attracted in those cases. The Board disposed the appe­als by a common order. 4. The petitioner has questioned the validity of the orders of the taxing authorities claiming that the eatables are not exigent We to tax, yet the authorities below have made him liable in bre­ach of the Constitution and the Law. The petitioner claims that the food stuffs are exempt from tax as they fall under Item 11 of the Schedule III to "the Act''. The petitioner further claims that the authorities have acted without jurisdiction and made him liable on clear misconstruction of the term 'meat' in Item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act". The petitioner having exhausted all the statutory remedies provided under the Act' has come up be­fore this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for writs of certiorari and/or mandamus for quashing the impugned orders with the direction to the taxing authorities not to make him liable to sales tax in respect of the items in question. 5. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT IS COMPETENT TO ENTERTAIN APPLICATION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND DECIDE THE QUESTIONS POSED BY THE PETITIONER : Time out of number the Supreme Court has held that the question as to whether a particular commodity is subject to tax or it is covered by exemption can be determined in writ appli­cations. To cite but just a few decisions, we refer to State of V. P. v. Indian Pipe Company, AIR 1977 SC 1133; O. N. G. C. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1976 SC 2478 and India Carbon vs. Superintendent of Taxes, AIR 1972 SC 154 . Apart from the cases alluded to, the Supreme Court has in a train of decision held that the question whether an article falls within the exemption or not could be determined by the High Court in an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. On the authority of the deci­sion of the Supreme Court we hold that the petitioner is enti­tled to raise the question posed by him in the writ petitions. 6. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES : Mr. On the authority of the deci­sion of the Supreme Court we hold that the petitioner is enti­tled to raise the question posed by him in the writ petitions. 6. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES : Mr. J.P. Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate General, Nagaland, has contended that 'eggs' and 'poultry' whether dressed or live are 'meat' and fall under Item 11 of Schedule III. The victu­als are understood in the trade, i.e., in popular sense or common parlance, as 'meat', submits learned counsel and refers several decisions of the Supreme Court wherein the golden rules of inter­pretation of the entries of the sales tax statutes have been settled, explaining the steps in-aid to determine the true meaning of the words itemized in the schedules charging to or exempting from sales tax. In the course of submission learned counsel has refe­rred to the dictionary meaning of the terms 'eggs', 'poultry' and opiate'. TJVO decisions of the High Courts of Bombay and Calutta have been placed wherein the High Courts have held that stressed poultry falls under the ilk of edible termed as 'meat', itemized in the Sales Tax Acts. Mr. D. N. Choudhury, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam, appearing for the respon­dents has submitted that the victual- substance 'meat' according to all standard English dictionaries specifically excludes 'poultry' while defining the term 'meal'. Learned counsel submits that -even a school going child studying English is taught and knows that the term 'meat' specifically excludes poultry. It has further revue contended that no foundation has been laid by the petitioner either before the authorities below or in his writ petitions in support of the contention that in common parlance or in popu­lar sense the eatables 'poultry' and 'egg' fall within the meaning of the term 'meat'. 7. Before dealing with the questions as to whether egg (s), live poultry and dressed poultry are exempt from payment of sales tax under 'the Act' we extract below Item 11 of Sche­dule III to 'the Act' : "SCHEDULE - III 11. Fish, Ghee (but not vegetable ghee), Except when Dahi, Butter, Cream, Casein, Meat sold in sealed and Vegetables (but not Onior, hare containers. lie, Spices and Condiments) (Empasis supplied) The articles or commodities described in the Item are food Stuff or eatables. The contention is that eggs, poultry, live or dressed, are nothing but 'meat'. Fish, Ghee (but not vegetable ghee), Except when Dahi, Butter, Cream, Casein, Meat sold in sealed and Vegetables (but not Onior, hare containers. lie, Spices and Condiments) (Empasis supplied) The articles or commodities described in the Item are food Stuff or eatables. The contention is that eggs, poultry, live or dressed, are nothing but 'meat'. The base or the foundation of the argument is that the term 'meat' means flesh of animals and birds. On this foundation it has been claimed that the articles are 'meat'. 8. Let us take each edible and decide whether it is meat. A. WHETHER EGG IS MEAT WITHIN THE MEANING OF ITEM 11 OF SCHEDULE III ? An egg is spherical body produced by a female bird, reptile or insect containing germ of new individual especially that of domestic fowl for eating. In common parlance or in popular sense in the State of Assam or as a matter of that in India, egg is never considered as ' flesh '. Even if we ass­ume that flesh of domestic birds is meat we cannot accept that embryo enclosed in a shell produced by a hen, reptile or insect contains any flesh. It is the common knowledge that the fleshy substance between the skin and bones of animal bodies are known as flesh. Eggs do not contain any flesh. We cannot accept the proposition that an egg in due course of time shall turn out to be a bird, reptile or insect and as such it should be trea­ted as. a shell containing flesh to be. Before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana it was claimed that live animals, which is known in the Army vocabulary as 'meat on hoof', was ' preserved meat ', the preservation being the natural carton con­sisting of the skin of the animal. The contention was accepted by the High Court, but turned down by the Supreme Court Dafadar Bhagat Singh & Sens vs. Joint E & T Commissioner, (1976)37 STC 527 - AIR 1976 SC 2544 by observing thus : "that the skin cover covering the flesh of the animal preserves its life; to think that the skin is a carton for the flesh, which can be used for food after the ani­mal is slaughtered, goes against common sense ". We similarly hold that it goes against common sense and logic to conclude that an egg in due course might turn out to be a bird, reptile or insect and, therefore, it should be treated 'as ' flesh. We hold that the essential attribute of meat is absent in egg. There is no flesh content in egg. Learned counsel has failed to place before us any authority or decision show­ing that egg is meat for the purpose of the Sales Tax Acts. We find that in the Sales Tax Statutes of Andhra Pra­desh, Bihar, Delhi. Gujarat, Kerela and West Bengal, 'fresh eggs' have been expressly and specifically exempted from tax, along with other edibles like, meat, etc. As such, it is evident that not only in this State but throughout India egg is never consi­dered as meat or flesh. It connotes a different item. There is no material before us to show that in common parlance or in popular sense ' egg' is anywhere understood as flesh or meat. For the foregoing reasons we reject the contention. 9. B WHETHER LIVE POULTRY ARE MEAT ? In a sale transaction when live birds are sold and purcha­sed they are purchased as 'live birds'. The question of sale of flesh does not arise. The sale of 'Jive poultry' being sale of birds and not flesh or meat, cannot attract the item in question. At all relevant time 'live birds' or 'poultry' were not exempt from sales tax, only 'meat' was exempt. In Daffadar Bhagat Singh (Supra) a similar question came up as to whether sale of 'live poultry animals' was meat under the sales tax Act where­in the Supreme Court has held that sale of live animal or 'meat on hoof is not sale of 'meat'. 'Meat on hoof is an Army term for goat and sheep. Flesh of slaughtered animal is meat, and, as such if live animals are sold they are not sale of meat or flesh of animal. If what is sold and purchased is live animals or live birds it would be sale of live animals or birds. However, if the birds animals are slaughtered and price is paid for dressed meat animals it may attract Item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act", pro­vided flesh of birds is meat. In Pranesh Palit v. Supdt. If what is sold and purchased is live animals or live birds it would be sale of live animals or birds. However, if the birds animals are slaughtered and price is paid for dressed meat animals it may attract Item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act", pro­vided flesh of birds is meat. In Pranesh Palit v. Supdt. of Taxes, (1983) I GLR 434, the Full Bench of the Court has held, on the authority of Dafadar Bhagat Singh (Supra), that the sale of live animals or meat on hoof is not sale of meat to attract item 11 of Schedule III to 'the Act'. In Mranjit Lal v. State of Assam AIR 1985 SCJ3S7 the Supreme Court has held that if the tran­saction between the buyer and seller were for purchase and sale of meat and not for the sale of live animals Item 11 of Schedule III to 'the Act' would be attracted. Their Lordships have held that the 'meat on hoof becomes meat proper no sooner the goat is slaughtered, the skin is pulled off and the flesh is sold. We are, therefore, of the opinion, that if the transactions between the parties are for the meat content, that is, if what is purchased is 'dressed meat' but not 'live animal;,' and the price is paid for the meat of the animals it will attract Item 11 of Schedule III. We further hold that the sale of live ani­mals or live birds cannot be sale of flesh falling within the con­notation of the term 'meat'. On the authority of aforesaid Decisions and for the reasons set out above we hold that the sale or purchase of live birds or live poultry did not attract item 11. We hasten to add that by Notification dated September 13, 1985 issued r/w. 7(2) of 'the Act' and published in the Assam Gazette dated October 2, 1985. Part 11 A, page 16H, Item HA has been inserted in Schedule III, which we extract herein below; "1. After Item 11 of the Schedule, the following shall be inserted as Item 11A, namely : “11 A. Fresh eggs. Poultry". The notification brings to light that the edibles 'fresh eggs' and 'poultry' two distinct edibles have been added in the sche­dule. After Item 11 of the Schedule, the following shall be inserted as Item 11A, namely : “11 A. Fresh eggs. Poultry". The notification brings to light that the edibles 'fresh eggs' and 'poultry' two distinct edibles have been added in the sche­dule. There is no wrangle at the bar that the term 'poultry' means large domestic fowls like, hen, duck, geese, turkeys kept for eating or for egg laying". The inclusion of the items, fresh 'ggs and poultry in Item 11A bespeaks that the legislature were fully aware that the articles 'fresh eggs' and 'poultry' were distinct and different from edible described as 'meat' in Item 11. The notification also lays bare that the legislature while using the word 'meat' in the Schedule were fully aware that in co­mmon parlance it excluded 'fresh eggs' and 'poultry'. The fact that the legislature have used threes different and distinct items, i.e, meat in Item 11, fresh eggs' and 'poultry' in Item 11A is in­dicative of the legislative intent that in common parlance the edi­ble substance known as 'meat' did not include eggs and poultry. In our opinion, therefore, eggs and live poultry were not exempt from tax at all relevant time. The view that we have taken finds ample Import from the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramavatar Budhai Prasad (1961) 12 STC 286 wherein it was contended that 'betel leaves' fell within the meaning of the term 'vegetables'. In the Sales Tax Act 'vegetables' was in­cluded in Item 6 and betel leaves in Item 36. Later Item 36 was omitted. Their Lordships held that 'pans' were not food stuffs-and also considered the effect of the use of two distinct and different items in Item Nos. 6 and 36 and concluded that use of two distinct and different items had indicated the legislative-intent that betel leaves were not vegetables. We extract the relevant observations : "The intention of the legislature in regard to what is ve­getables is shown by its specifying vegetables and betel leaves as separate items in the Schedule exempting arti­cles from sales tax". For the foregoing reasons we hold that 'live poultry' do not come within the term 'meat' C. WHETHER DRESSED POULTRY, i.e., FLESH OF DOMESTIC 'FOWLS LIKE, HENS, DUCKS; ETCETRA ARE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION ? For the foregoing reasons we hold that 'live poultry' do not come within the term 'meat' C. WHETHER DRESSED POULTRY, i.e., FLESH OF DOMESTIC 'FOWLS LIKE, HENS, DUCKS; ETCETRA ARE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION ? It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the word 'meat' has not been defined in 'the Act' and as such, the word should be construed in the sense in which it is understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer who are concerned with it. It has been contended that the terra 'meat' is an edible substance which subsumes flesh of animals as well as birds or poultry. The substance or 'the meat of the con­tention' is that flesh of birds or poultry falls under the ilk of the edible subs a nee described as 'meat' in item 11 of the Sche­dule. The contention has been repelled by Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent who has contended that even a school child learning English knows that the current usage of the English word 'meat' specifically and clearly excludes 'fish' and 'poultry'. As such, the term could not gain the meaning sought to be applied in common parlance or in popular sense. The legislature could not have used the term 'meat' which spe­cifically excludes eggs and poultry according to the current mea­ning of the term to include eggs, poultry or flesh of birds The words 'meat', 'eggs' and 'poultry' being English words learned counsel for both the parties have placed a number of English dictionaries in support of their contention. Learned counsel for the parties have placed before us a number of decisions of the Supreme Court, the High Courts as well as some English, Ame­rican & Canadian decisions which are set out herein below. “1. Ramavatar Budhai Prasad vs. Asst. Sales Tax Officer, (1961) 12 STC (SC) 286. 2. Mis. Motipur Zaminaari Co. vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 660 - (1962)13 STC 13. 3. Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh (1967) 19 STC 469 . 4. Siren Chemical Laboratory vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax (1970) 26 STC 339 - AIR 1971 SC 65 . 5. S. T. Commissioner, U. P. vs. Ladha Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2221 . 6. India Carbon Ltd. vs, Supdt. of Taxes, Gauhati AIR 1972 SC 154 - 2S STC 603. 7. 4. Siren Chemical Laboratory vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax (1970) 26 STC 339 - AIR 1971 SC 65 . 5. S. T. Commissioner, U. P. vs. Ladha Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2221 . 6. India Carbon Ltd. vs, Supdt. of Taxes, Gauhati AIR 1972 SC 154 - 2S STC 603. 7. S. T. Commissioner vs. Tazmahal Hotel, AIR 1972 SC 168 82 ITR 44. 8. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. vs. S. N. Brothers (1973) 21 STC 302. 9. Mangalu Sahu Ram Hari Sahu vs. The Sales Tax Officer, (1973) 32 STC 494 - AIR 1914 SC 390. 10. Avadh Sugar Mills vs. S. T. Officer, Sitapur, AIR 1973 SC 2440 -31 STC 469. 11. Daffadar Bhagat Singh & Sons vs. Joint E&T Commissioner, (1976) 37 STC - AIR 1976 SC 2544 . 12. State of West Bengal vs. Wasi Ahmed, AIR 1977 SC 1638 - 39 STC 378. The asterism signify use of dictionaries, handbook or journals by their Lordships. 13. Purist and Spencer (Asia) Ltd vs. State of Hatiyana, AJR 1979 SC 300 - 42 STC 433 14. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Rajas-than, AIR (19SO) 46 STC 256 15. Two Hundred Chests of Tea - (1824)9 Wheat on 430 (438) (S) 16. Crawford vs. Spooner (1846) 4 Mil 179 (181) (PC). 17. Grenfell vs. Inland Pevn. Commissioner, ('876) I Ex. O.242" 34 LT 426. 18. Lion Insurance Asscn. vs. Tucker (1883-84) 12 CBD176. -19. Attorney General vs. Milney (1914 - 15) All E.R, Repnt. 1061 (1063) (HC). 20. Corporation of The City of Victoria vs. Bishop of Vancouver Island, AIR 1921 PC 240(242) 21. Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. vs. The King, (1952) 1 Dam. L. R. 385 (Canada). 22. Hardwick Game Farm vs. Suffolk etc. Asscn. Ltd, (1966) 1 All E.R. 309 (CA) (323,324, 334) 23. Nokes vs. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (1940) AC 1014; (1940) 3 All ER 549 (HL) 553. 24. Wilma Addition vs. I folly Hill Fruit Producers, 322 US 607 (618) : 88 Law Edn. 1488 (1496); 25. Observations of Holmes, J. ex traded in Purist & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. vs. State of Haryana (supra No. 13) The clippings or paper cuttings of : - 26. Chiranjit Lal vs. State of Assam, since reported in AIR 1985 SC 1387 . 27. P. A.Thillai Chidambara vs. Addl. 1488 (1496); 25. Observations of Holmes, J. ex traded in Purist & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. vs. State of Haryana (supra No. 13) The clippings or paper cuttings of : - 26. Chiranjit Lal vs. State of Assam, since reported in AIR 1985 SC 1387 . 27. P. A.Thillai Chidambara vs. Addl. A. A. C. Madurai, since reported in AIR 1985 SC 1644 28. lidian Aluninium Cables Ltd. vs. Union of India, since re­ported in UJ (SC) 1985 page 1070. AND Two decisions of the High Courts : 29. The Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay vs. Gourimal Mahajan & Sons, (1959) 10 STC 452 (Bombay) 30. Alok Chandra Mitra vs. State of West Bengal (1973) 31 STC 474 (Calcutta)” 9. There is no dispute at the bar that the words 'meat', "eggs' aid 'poultry' are edibles of everyday use and reference 40 the dictionaries is essential to grasp or take the meaning of the words Indeed to find out the general sense of English words we take resort to English dictionaries as they deal with the meaning of the words, their orthography, signification, use, derivation and history or at least some or most of these. Any standard English dictionary conveys the signification and the current usage of the words and expressions. The submissions find ample support in the binding decisions of the Supreme Court in I.T. Commissioner, W. B vs. Benoy Kumar Saha Roy, AIR 1951 SC 768 (772); Bhogilal Chunilal Pandya vs. State of Bombay AIR 1959 SC 356 (357); & Bolani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orisso AIR 1975 SC 17 (25-26) and the cases alluded to in the list of decisions wherein satiric marks have been put. These apart, we find that it is permissible to take resort to dictionary to resolve the point and make use of it under such circums­tances in R. V. Peters, (1886) 16 Q- B. D. 636(641) (per Lord Coleridge) and Camden (Marquis) vs. Island Revenue Commrs., (1914) I K.B. 641 (647) (per Cozens Hardy M. R.). In Crawford vs. Spooner (supra No. 16) it has been ruled that the words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases are understood according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absur­dity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. "The true way'', said Lord Brougham, is - "to take the words as the Legislature have given them, to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered "'. In Attorney General vs. Milne, (Supra No. 19) Lord Viscount Haldane, L. C. stated that if the word used - "has a natural meaning we cannot depart from that meaning unless, reading the statute as a whole, the con­text directs us to do so". "In the construction of statutes, their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur, or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense." Said Lord Atkinson in Corporation of The City of Victoria vs. Bishop of Vancouver Island (supra No. 20). The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning, said Viscount Haldane, L. C. in Nokes vs. Don caster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (supra No. 23). Indeed, the words of a statute must be understood 'in their natural, ordi­nary or popular sense, unless the context or object of the sta­tute suggest the contrary. In construing the items in the sales tax enactment their Lordships of the Supreme Court have used various dictionaries. In our opinion, the words used in the sta­tute should be given their usual, ordinary and natural meaning or signification according to the current use or usages of the words. In Porrits & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. vs. State of Haryana, (supra No. 13) P. N. Bhagwati, (as his Lordship then was) extracted a very pertinent observation of Holmes J. which we quote therein below : "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.'' (Emphasis added) Indeed, a word is a living thought which may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. The meaning of a word is enlarged or con­stricted or entirely changed within a few decades. The meaning of a word is enlarged or con­stricted or entirely changed within a few decades. It is, there­fore, necessary 'o take the current meaning of the word i.e, at the time when it was used by the legislature. We consider that the modern use and usages of the terms used in the 20th Century should be the definitive index of the legislative intention. The English language of the 10th Century was totally different from the modern English. The signification or meaning of many words became archaic and obsolete in the middle English period when French words became more popular in use and usages. The modern English language discarded the old currency and usages and the words became classifiable according to the sphere of their currency and usage. According to the old English usage the term 'meat' meant anything used as nourishment for men and animals, usually; solid food, in contradistinction to drink, it included the edible parts of fruits, nuts, eggs, etc. the pulp, kernel, yoke, etc. However, in due coarse the term 'meat' in English language came to be known exclu­sively at 'the flesh of animals used for food'. It is now used in modern English language in a narrower sense in contradistinction to fish and poultry. In all modern English dictionaries the current meaning of the word 'meat' is 'flesh of animals as opposed to fish & poultry. Now, in modern English the term 'meat', excludes the flesh of 'fish' and 'poultry'. The old meaning of the term 'meat', which included the flesh offish and poultry is now archaic. The obvious curr­ent meaning of the word 'meat' is gathered from the Oxford English dictionary, Vol. VI, (1933 Edn) Page 282. However, in America, the current meaning of 'meat' includes flesh of animals and birds. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary, the Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary, Fuuk and Wagnalls Standard Dic­tionary, Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Unabridged) (Second Edition), Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English - by A. S. Hornby and other standard English Dictionaries the current meaning of the word 'meat' is Ylesh' of animals or mammals as opposed to fish or poultry. The submission of Mr. Choudhury that the lear­ner of English language is taught in School this currency meaning of the term, has substance. The submission of Mr. Choudhury that the lear­ner of English language is taught in School this currency meaning of the term, has substance. However, this meaning of the term 'meat' vary greatly in colour and content According to the cir­cumstances as the idioms and phrases coined with the word 'meat' may have no connection with flesh of animal, fish or bird, say, 'sweet meat'. Similarly, the meaning of the expressions 'white meat' mean any article of food made with milk vide, the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VI, page 282. Similarly, the terms 'white meat' may be used in contradistinction to 'red meat'. The tech­nical expressions may be used by experts in coiner preparations to indicate the colour of the flesh. The flesh of animals is red whereas flesh offish and birds is white. In that sense an expert or connoisseur of food may indicate the colour of the flesh or food preparations by using expressions 'white meat', 'dark meat', or 'red meat'. Of course, in America the expressions 'dark meat' mean meat of chickens, turkeys, except the breast and wings which are called 'light meat'. In 'sweet meat' the word 'meat' to been used as food but it has nothing to do with the flesh of animal, fish or bird. In our opinion, these are relevant for considering the decisions in Collector of Sales Tax v. Gourimal Mahajan, (supra No. 29) and Alok Chandra Mitra v. State' of West-Bengal (supra No. 30). It in evident that the current meaning of the term 'meat' is understood by an ordinary English knowing person as the flesh of animals as distinguished from or opposed to poultry and fish. Should we construe the meaning of a common English word in its ordinary sense, i.e., in that sense which a ordinary educated Indian learner of English language would attach to the word or should we depart from ordinary sense of the word and accept the contention that the meaning of the word in common parlance or popular sense is converse or opposed to the ordinary meaning ? We are thus confronted with the pro­blem that the word 'meat' in the natural and ordinary sense means the flesh of animals as opposed to 'fish and poultry'. Can the ordinary meaning of a term gain a sense in common parlance or in popular sense which is totally opposed to the current meaning of the word ? We are thus confronted with the pro­blem that the word 'meat' in the natural and ordinary sense means the flesh of animals as opposed to 'fish and poultry'. Can the ordinary meaning of a term gain a sense in common parlance or in popular sense which is totally opposed to the current meaning of the word ? In none of the reported decisions of the Supreme Court their Lordships have resolved the problem and, there­fore, we do not get any light from the Apex Court. However a similar problem arose in Hardwick Farm v. Suffolk (supra No.22). The precise question posed was : "Are pheasants poultry'' ? The term 'poultry' was not defined in the Act. Diplock, L. J. dealt with the problem thus : ''Thus learned judge was referred to a number of other statutes in which the word 'poultry' is used. He deri­ved no assistance from them.......''Poultry'' is a common English word. There is nothing in the Statute to indicate that it should be construed in anything but its ordinary sense and this is for the Court to decide. I do not think that the ordinary educated Englishman would call phe­asants "poultry'. If he consulted the Oxford Dictionary as it is permissible for the Court to do, he would find this view confirmed by the express exclusion of pheasants from the term.. I do not think that in its ordinary sense the expression 'poultry' does include pheasants. I should so hold" (Emphasis added) In our case 'poultry', 'eggs' and 'meat' are common English words. There is nothing in 'the Act' that it should be constr­ued in anything but its ordinary sense. We think that the or­dinary educated Indian conversant with the English words would call 'poultry' or 'egg' as Sinead. If he consulted any standard English dictionary, he would fin i out view confirmed by the express exclusion of 'fish' and 'poultry' from the term 'meat'. We do not think that the ordinary educated Indian kno­wing elementary English would consider 'egg' and 'poultry' as 'meat'. We are, therefore, of the view that when in its natural ordinary or popular sense the word 'meat' specifically excludes 'flash' and 'poultry', anyone conversant with ordinary English words would ever consider that 'meat' includes 'poultry' and 'fish'. We do not think that the ordinary educated Indian kno­wing elementary English would consider 'egg' and 'poultry' as 'meat'. We are, therefore, of the view that when in its natural ordinary or popular sense the word 'meat' specifically excludes 'flash' and 'poultry', anyone conversant with ordinary English words would ever consider that 'meat' includes 'poultry' and 'fish'. The principles settled by the Supreme Court for inter­preting undefined words and expressions in the sales tax enact­ments cannot be better expressed than what is stated by Pathak J. in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.. (supra No. 11): "In determining the meaning or connotation of words & expressions describing an article or commodity the turn over of which is taxed in the sales tax enactment, if there is one principle fairly well settled, it is that the words or expressions must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer It is they who are concerned with it and it is the sense in which they understand it that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention when the statute was enacted" (Empasis added) It is the well settled rule which we find in Ramavatar Budhai Prasad (supra No. 7); Mis Molipur Zamindari Company (supra No. 2); Commissioner or Sales Tax, (supra No. 3): Sarin Chemi­cal Laboratory (supra No. 4): S. T. Commissioner, U.P. (supra No. 5) : India Carbon Ltd. (supra No. 6) : I. T. Commissioner, (supra No.1): Commissioner of Sales Tax, (supra No. 8): Mangalu Sahu Ram Hari Sahu, (supra No. 19): Avoid Sugar Mills (supra No. 10); Daffadur Bhagat Singh & Sons (supra No. 11): State of West Bengal vs. Wan Ahmed (supra No. 12): Porrits and Spencer (Ana) Ltd. (supra No. 13) Delhi Cloth And Gene­ral Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) NJ. 14); Chiranjit Lal (supra No. 26); P. A. Thillai Chidambara (supra NJ. 27) and Indian Alumi nium Cables Ltd. (supra No. 28). It is also well settled rule that it is for the assesse who claims exemption to adduce evidence or material that a particular article is an exempted item. 10. In the cases in hand no material has been placed before is to show that in common parlance flesh of birds or poultry is understood as 'meat'. Apart from the American dictionaries we do not find any support for the proposition. 10. In the cases in hand no material has been placed before is to show that in common parlance flesh of birds or poultry is understood as 'meat'. Apart from the American dictionaries we do not find any support for the proposition. In Wasi Ahmed (supra No. 12) the assessee placed material before the sales tax authorities that the railway authority has also treated ' green gin­ger' as vegetables, even the Corporation of Calcutta included ' green ginger' in the category of vegetables in the Market Bulle­tin. In Avadh Sugar Mills (supra No 10) commercial journals and news papers were placed and considered. In the decisions alluded to by us with satiric marks, we find that their Lord­ships considered the plain meaning of the disputed words from the dictionaries. In the instant cases there is absolutely no material to support the contention from any journals, bulletin, clippings or paper cuttings etc. to Indicate that in common parlance the flesh of poultry is also known as ' meat'. We are of the view that the onus or burden of the petitioner is onerous when the plain or the current use of the term 'meat' expressly excludes 'fish or poultry'. If we discard the natural, ordinary or popular meaning of the term and take the widest meaning to include flesh of 'fish' and 'poultry', which is now archaic, we find that we cannot take it. The term 'fish' is very much there in Item-11. As such the term was never used in the wider or archaic sense. It is, therefore, difficult for us to accept the contention that the legislature have taken the wider or discar­ded meaning of the term 'meat' to include 'fish' and 'poultry'. 11. It has been ruled by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred above that the words and expressions must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. The petitioner is the only dealer who cla­ims that the term 'meat' is understood in the trade as flesh of poultry as well, though the meaning is opposed to the ordinary or plain meaning of the term. Now let us consider what the purchaser and the consumer understood by the meaning of the term 'meat'. The consumers are the members of the armed forces. Now let us consider what the purchaser and the consumer understood by the meaning of the term 'meat'. The consumers are the members of the armed forces. We find that whenever the consumers required supply of the 'flesh of animals' they specifically ordered for 'flesh of meat on hoof or neat vide Daffadar Bhagat Singh (supra No. II Ciranjit Lal (supra No. 26) and Pranesh Palit vs. Sepdt. of Taxes (FB) (supra), The same purchasers requiring supply of eggs and poultry spe­cifically tender for these articles as they have done in these cases. As such, the purchasers clearly classified their requirements according to the sphere of currency or usage. The purchaser knew the specific current meaning of the term? 'poultry' as flesh of birds, 'agg' as egg and 'meat' as only the flesh of animals. The petitioner-dealer is a registered Army contractor and, as such, we have no doubt that he was fully aware that the term 'meat' was meat exclusively as the flesh of animals. The supply orders of the purchasers cla­ssified the vituals into three categories e.g., 'eggs', 'poultry' and 'meat' separately and as such, we are constrained to hold that the purchaser or the buyer knew that the term 'meat' did not inclu­de poultry and so did the suppliers. 12. Further, we find that the widest meaning of the term is not the criterion to determine the meaning of the word understood in common parlance. The term 'vegetable' is a term of the wid­est context to include all type or classes of vegetable but the term has been given a restricted meaning to include only the vegetables grown in kitchen garden or farm and are used for the table', vide - Ramavatara (supra No. 1), Mis Motipur Zamindari Co. (supn No. 2); Mangalu Sahu Ram Hari Sahu (supra No. 9) State of West Bengal vs. Washi Ahmed (supra No. 12) and P. A. Thillai Chidambara (supra No. 27). As such, the widest meaning of a term is not the popular meaning of the word used in the Sales tax statute. The scientific and technical meaning of the term 'vegetable' to include all kinds and classes was discarded and the limi­ted meaning was applied because the legislature are not to suppose our merchants to be naturalist, geologist or botanist. As such, the widest meaning of a term is not the popular meaning of the word used in the Sales tax statute. The scientific and technical meaning of the term 'vegetable' to include all kinds and classes was discarded and the limi­ted meaning was applied because the legislature are not to suppose our merchants to be naturalist, geologist or botanist. The sci­entific or technical meaning of the term was discarded by their Lordships and the limited or popular or ordinary meaning of the word was applied. Similarly, in Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, (supra No. 3) the scientific or technical meaning of the term 'coal' was discarded and construed according to their popular meaning, i.e, as they were understood in commerce. In Sarin Chemical Labo­ratory (supra No. 4) the expression tooth powder was considered to bi one of the toilet requisites or toilet, In India Carbon Ltd (supra No 6) Petroleum coke was considered to be included within the expression 'coal' because the term 'coal' was defined to incl­ude 'coke' "in all its form”. In the instant cases the plain and ordinary meaning of the term 'meat specifically excludes eggs and flesh of poultry and as such, in our opinion, the term cannot take the items expressly excluded. The three words 'meat', 'eggs', and -poultry' have been defined differently and classified accordingly in all English Dictionaries. Situated thus, we cannot assume that the legislature have taken the American meaning or the extended meaning of the term 'meat'. We are of the firm opinion that neither the dealer or the consumer nor the legislature understood that the common meaning of the term 'meat' includes flesh of poultry or eggs. 13. We, therefore, hold that in the instant cases the peti­tioner has failed to place before us any material to show that the edibles known as egg and poultry are understood in the trade, by the dealer and (he consumer as 'meat'. We also hold that in. its natural, ordinary or popular sense the term 'meat' means the flesh of animals as opposed to 'fish' or 'poultry'. We hold that the legislature by using the term 'fish' in Item I have cle­arly indicated that the word 'meat' was used in its natural ordi­nary and popular sense which specifically excludes fish and poul­try. We also hold that in. its natural, ordinary or popular sense the term 'meat' means the flesh of animals as opposed to 'fish' or 'poultry'. We hold that the legislature by using the term 'fish' in Item I have cle­arly indicated that the word 'meat' was used in its natural ordi­nary and popular sense which specifically excludes fish and poul­try. We also hold that the legislature by inserting 'fresh eggs' and 'Poultry' in Item 11A have clearly expressed that they never used the word 'meat' to include eggs and poultry. We further hold that when the obvious and current use of the term 'meat' is opposed to flesh of poultry or egg the term could not gain the extended meaning in common parlance or in the trade. We hold that nobody conversant in English words would ever call poultry or egg as 'meat' in view of the plain meaning of the words in the English dictionaries. We also hold that the pur­chasers used to tender for supply of 'meat', 'meat on hoof 'fish', 'eggs' and 'poultry' by calling for tenders and classifying specifically the items required by them. We also hold that the petitioner being a registered Army contractor was fully aware that the purchasers truant 'meat' i.e., flesh of animals specifica­lly stating so in the tenders and the suppliers including the peti­tioner were fully aware that when the purchasers desired to pur­chase eggs or flesh of poultry they called for tenders to supply eggs, live poultry or dressed poultry, and, as such, we hold that purchasers as well as suppliers were fully aware that 'meat' did not include eggs or flesh of poultry. We also hold that when the legislature have used 'fish', 'poultry', 'eggs' and 'meat' denoting four different and distinct items separately, the legislative intent is obvious. We also hold that the terms 'meat', 'eggs', 'poultry' and 'fish' have been defined differently and classified separately in all standard English dictionaries and the words convey diffe­rent meaning. We further hold that the legislature when they used the term 'meat' did not use the word as understood in Ame­rica but which is used in English Dictionaries. We are of the firm opinion that neither the dealer nor the consumer nor the legislature ever understood that the meaning of the common word 'meat' could include flesh of fish, poultry and eggs. 14. We are of the firm opinion that neither the dealer nor the consumer nor the legislature ever understood that the meaning of the common word 'meat' could include flesh of fish, poultry and eggs. 14. We are yet to deal with the two decisions of the High Courts wherein it has been held that the dressed poul­try or flesh of birds is 'meal'. In the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay vs. Gourimal Mahajan (Supra No. 29) their Lordships, considered the meaning of the expression 'meat' as defined in Webster's New International English Dictionary and found the meaning of the term as "flesh of animals used as food as distinguished from fish or fowl". Their Lordships held that - "undoubtedly in common parlance and even commer­cially meat means flesh of cattle, swine, sheep, goats, etc. and may not include dressed poultry but the expression meat in its wider connotation does include dressed poul­try". We respectfully agree with Shah, J. that in common parlance and even commercially 'meat' means flesh of animals or mammals and excludes 'poultry', whether live or dressed. However, with great respect we differ from the view that in departure to the meaning of a word in common parlance i.e. in trade and commerce, we can accept any other meaning. While cons­truing an item in Sales tax enactments, we respectfully differ from the view expressed that in departure to the meaning attri­buted to a word in common parlance we can take the mean­ing of the word defined in the wider sense in a dictionary. We respectfully differ from the view that the term ' meat' may in its wider connotation include dressed poultry and, therefore, the said meaning should be attributed to the word while cons­truing an item of the Sales tax enactments. In our opinion, the view expressed is opposed to the golden rule laid down by the Supreme Court. We are to take the meaning attributed to it in common parlance and the wider connotation of a word in a dictionary does not necessarily mean that it is so understood in common parlance. We are of the view that when the word 'meat' in common parlance or even commercially means flesh of animals or mammals and excludes poultry, the matter comes to an end and we must give that meaning to the word used in the sales tax legislation. We are of the view that when the word 'meat' in common parlance or even commercially means flesh of animals or mammals and excludes poultry, the matter comes to an end and we must give that meaning to the word used in the sales tax legislation. Wes therefore, cannot accept the reasoning and the conclusion reached by the Bombay High Court in Gourimal Mahajan (Supra No. 29). In Alok Chandra Mitra (supra No. 30), the moot question was whether the expressions 'dressed poultry' came within the meaning of the term 'meat' under the Sales tax Act. The Calcutta High Court answered the question in the affirmative relying on Gourimal Mahajan (supra No. 29). It appears on a bare perusal of the decision that Banerjee, J. accepted the view that in common parlance 'meat' means flesh of animals or mammals as distinguished from poultry. However, learned Judge has accepted the proposition that in its wider connotation the word 'meat' includes dressed poul­try, on the sole ground that chicken is sometimes called 'white meat'. In short, it has been held that though in common par­lance or popular sense the term 'meat' specifically excludes flesh of poultry and fish, yet when chiken is sometimes called 'white meat', so 'dressed chicken" fall within the connotation of the 4erm 'meat'. The basis of the finding is extracted below : "I have already said that chicken is sometimes called 'white meat' (Emphasis added). Shortly put, learned Judge reached the conclusion that chicken is sometimes called ' white meat' and, therefore, dressed chicken i.e. 'white meat' is 'meat' within the wider connotation of the word. We respectfully differ from the view expressed by his Lordship. If a word is sometimes used in a sense, the same cannot be said to be 'the popular' meaning of the term. The meaning of the term should be as it is understood in the trade, by the trader and the consumer. A stray use of the word some­where or sometimes, cannot lead to the conclusion that it is so understood in common parlance. The phrase 'white meat' is a technical word. Indeed an expert or connoisseur of food may call chicken or flesh of chicken as 'white meat' or in culinary sense 'the phrase' is technically understood as chicken but the said technical meaning of the word cannot be attributed as current in the trade. The phrase 'white meat' is a technical word. Indeed an expert or connoisseur of food may call chicken or flesh of chicken as 'white meat' or in culinary sense 'the phrase' is technically understood as chicken but the said technical meaning of the word cannot be attributed as current in the trade. The phrase or the collocation of the words white meat' is also known as 'any article of food made with milk' - vide Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VI, page 282. The phrases or the collocation of the words 'white meat', 'baked meat', 'milk meat' or 'sweet meat' denote some classified food preparations. 'Sweet meat does not contain any 'meat' at all 'Milk meat', 'baked meat' or 'white meat' may be preparations having nothing to do with flesh of animals or birds. In our opinion, the combination of words, idioms or phrases may not convey the correct meaning of a word contained in it. We are of the firm view that if chicken is sometimes called somewhere as 'white meat' we cannot take that it conveys the meaning as understood in common parlance. We are also of the view that learned Judge has used a technical expression and deduced there from the meaning of the word 'meat'. A phrase or com­bination of words or word used in technical sense may convey a totally different meaning to a particular word contained in it, say, 'the meat of the matter'. In our view technical words or phrases cannot be taken as guide to interpret a word of everyday use contained in them. We respectfully differ from the view taken by Banerjee J. in Alok Mitra (supra No. 30) for the reasons just alluded and the reasons set forth in the previous paragraph. 15. For the foregoing reasons we hold that 'eggs', 'live poultry' and 'dressed poultry' are not 'meat' within the mean­ing of the term used in Item 11 of Schedule III to "the Act". 16. In the result, the petitions are dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs. The records of the Appeal Nos. 34 STA/69 and 35 STA/69 maybe sent to the Supdt. of Taxes to examine the question referred to him by the appellate authority. 17. Before parting we acknowledge that there is some delay in delivery of the judgment. 16. In the result, the petitions are dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs. The records of the Appeal Nos. 34 STA/69 and 35 STA/69 maybe sent to the Supdt. of Taxes to examine the question referred to him by the appellate authority. 17. Before parting we acknowledge that there is some delay in delivery of the judgment. The reason is that in the course of the argument, clippings or newspaper cuttings and references of 3 (three) relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, Chiranjit Lal (supra. No. 26): P. A. Thillai Chidnmbara (supra No. 27) and Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. (supra No. 29) were placed and/or made and it was urged that the principles enunciated in those cases were relevant. No sooner had the decisions reported in the Law Journals was discussed and prepared the judg­ment. Hence the delay. B. L. Hansaria, J. - I respectfully agree with my learned Bro­ther in so far as the conclusion arrived at by him is concerned. Manisana, J. - I fully Breed with the leading judgment of my learned brother Lahiri, J.