JUDGMENT H. S. Thakur, A. C. J.—This revision petition is directed against the order of the learned Sub-Judge 1st Class (3), Simla, dated March 17, 1986, whereby the document marked *X has been held to be inadmissible in evidence. 2. A few facts relevant to decide this revision petition may be stated. The petitioner/plaintiff (hereinafter to be referred to as the plaintiff) filed a suit against respondents/defendants (hereinafter to be referred to as the defendants and during the course of the examination of the plaintiff as a witness he produced the document marked X claiming it as a memorandum of partition. The defendants, however, challenged the admissibility of this document and filed an application under sections 17 (1) (b) and 49 of the Registration Act read with Order 13, Rules 3 and 6 and sections 94 and 151, C. P. C, as also under section 35 of the Stamp Act, alleging that the said document was not admissible in evidence. It was contended that the said document was in fact an instrument of partition and could not be admitted in evidence. The trial Court after examining the contents of the document, came to the conclusion that the s me was an instrument of partition and could not be admitted in evidence in view of the aforesaid provisions of law. 3. In the revision petition, the substantial contention that has been raised by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff is that the document is a memorandum of partition and did not require to be stamped or registered. The trial Court as mentioned above, after examining the contents of the document marked X, has come to the conclusion that the said document is an instrument of partition and since it was not stamped and registered as required under the law, the same could not be admitted in evidence. The contents of the said document have been also read before me by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff. I have perused the document as well, and am of the view that the same is the instrument of partition and not a memorandum of partition as contended by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff. 4. The learned Counsel has referred to certain decisions of a learned Single Judge of this Court. I have perused the document as well, and am of the view that the same is the instrument of partition and not a memorandum of partition as contended by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff. 4. The learned Counsel has referred to certain decisions of a learned Single Judge of this Court. It is, however, not necessary to refer to all of them but I may advert to the decision in Saran Dass and others v. Situ and others, 1985 ILR Himachal Series 281. The relevant observations may be extracted for a ready reference: "....,......It is thus obvious that the bar against admittance in evidence of an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument of the nature like the document mark X as placed by section 35 of the Stamp Act is not absolute and the same would stand removed as soon as the duty chargeable on the instrument or the deficiency in such duty along with the prescribed penalty is paid. The person producing an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument of this nature has, therefore, the right to claim that the instrument be admitted into evidence on payment of the deficient stamp duty and the penalty which right is, of course, subject to all just exceptions. Again it is not disputed before me on either side that the document mark X which purports to be deed of relinquishment of tenancy rights required compulsory registrations under section 17 of the Registration Act. This fact by itself, however, would not mean that this document was inadmissible in evidence for all purposes as has been found by the trial Court. Section 49 of the Registration Act does, of course, enjoin that no document which requires compulsory registration either under section 17 of that Act or under any provision of Transfer of property Act shall affect any immovable property comprised therein, or confer any power to adopt, or be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered. But at the same time the proviso appended to this section lays down in no ambiguous terms that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and requiring compulsory registration may be received in evidence to prove any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument. 5. But at the same time the proviso appended to this section lays down in no ambiguous terms that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and requiring compulsory registration may be received in evidence to prove any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument. 5. It may be pointed out at this stage that at that time when the document marked X was intended to be exhibited by the plaintiff, he asserted that the same did not require any stamp duty or registration since the said document was only a memorandum of partition. This plea is again repeated by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff. 6. I am of the view that the only point that survives in this revision petition is whether the document marked X is a deed of partition or only a memorandum of partition. Shri Kailash Chand, learned Counsel for the defendants, has referred to a decision in Raton Lai and others v. Hari Shankar and others, AIR 1980 All 180. The relevant observations may be reproduced for a ready reference: "4. The second contention was that the partition deed, even if it was not registered, could certainly be looked into for a collateral purpose. This proposition is correct that if a document is compulsorily registerable and has not been registered, it will be admissible in evidence only for a collateral purpose, but collateral purpose has a limited scope and meaning. It cannot be used for the purpose of saying that the deed created or declared or assigned or limited or extinguished a right to immovable property. If these could not be established by the collateral purpose, then in that event how could the document be used for showing that the property was partitioned or that particular properties were given to the various parties in the partition. If the document was unregistered then it could not be used for showing that is created, declared, assigned, limited or extinguished a right to immovable property. The term collateral purpose would not permit the party to establish any of these acts from the deed. In my opinion, the contention that it would be used for collateral purpose does not advance the case of the plaintiffs at all. It still falls short in proving that there was a partition between the parties. 5. The term collateral purpose would not permit the party to establish any of these acts from the deed. In my opinion, the contention that it would be used for collateral purpose does not advance the case of the plaintiffs at all. It still falls short in proving that there was a partition between the parties. 5. Learned Counsel then contended that the deed could be treated to be a family arrangement and a family arrangement was not compulsorily registerable. This contention, in my opinion, is not correct. The Supreme Court in the case of Kale v. by. Director of Consolidation, AIR 1976 SC 807, held that a family arrangement in case it is oral needs no registration, but if the terms thereof were reduced into writing, it became imperative to have the document registered and unless it was registered, it could not be looked into. The plea of family arrangement is sought to be derived from Exhibit 1. That document is in writing. Even if it was treated to be a family arrangement, it required registration, and having not been registered, it could not be looked into for the purpose of showing it to be a family arrangement. 6. The oral evidence regarding partition on the basis of this document, Ex. 1, could not be led, as it was barred by section 91 of the Evidence Act. For the reasons indicated above, it is clear that the lower appellate Court has rightly recorded that the document Ex. 1 was inadmissible in evidence.......” 7. The learned trial Court has referred to numerous other relevant decisions as well to decide the point in issue. It is not necessary to extract the relevant observations in these decisions as the trial Court has reproduced the same but they be enumerated and they are : Kora Mai Gurdial v. Fazal AH and others, AIR 1934 Lahore 759 ; Siromani v. Hem Kumar and others, AIR 1968 SC 1299 ; Ram Prasad Mondal v. Smt. Snehalata Ghosh, AIR 1967 Cal 369, and Sadhu Madho Das and others v. Mukand Ram and another, AIR 1955 SC 481. 8. It may be noticed that the document in question was executed on March 26, 1980. 8. It may be noticed that the document in question was executed on March 26, 1980. In para 7 of the amended plaint, the plaintiff has stated as under: "That on 26-3-1980, a private partition took place amongst the plaintiff and defendants and in this private partition, this building fell in the share of plaintiff and by virtue of this private partition the plaintiff is absoulte owner of this property. The other ancestral property situated at Jagadhari fell in the shere of defendants. Therefore, after 26-3-1980, the defendants have got no right title or interest of any kind over this building." 9. The learned trial Court in its order has referred to certain decisions relevant to the points in dispute, as mentioned above. He has placed reliance on the decision in Javed Chand and others v. Pukhraj Surana, AIR 1961 SC 1655. The relevant observations have been reproduced in the order that may be extracted for a ready reference: ".........Where a question as to t e admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped, or has not been properly stamped, it has to be decided then and there when the document is tendered in evidence. Once the Court, rightly or wrongly, decides to admit the document in evidence, so far as the parties are concerned, the matter is closed. Section 35 is in the nature of penal provision and has far-reaching effects. Parties to a litigation, where such a controversy is raised, have to be circumspect and the party challenging the admissibility of the document has to be alert to see that the document is not admitted in evidence by the Court. The Court has to judicially determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case" 10. Mr. Kailash Chand, learned Counsel for the respondents No. 5 and 6, has drawan my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, AIR 1973 SC 76 and has urged that this Court in the exercise of its re visional jurisdiction would not normally interfere in an order passed by the trial Court. The relevant observations from the said judgment may be reproduced: ".........In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate Court. It is not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate Court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it trade. The order of the first appellate Court may be right or wrong, may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law ; but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is not the case that first appellate Court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code." 11. In view of the decisions referred to above and after perusing the entire record, I find no merit in this revision petition and the same is summarily dismissed. 12. It may be noticed that the suit of which this revision petition has arisen was filed during the year 1980. In the suit, the evidence has not been recorded except for the partly recorded statement of the plaintiff. As such, it is desirable that the suit is expeditiously disposed of. The parties are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on April 11, 1986. The trial Court will fix a date for recording the evidence of the parties. Petition allowed.