JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---The petitioner who was at the relevant time officiating as Registrar of the Marathwada University is seeking a writ of Ceriorari for quashing the appointment of the Enquiry Committee under the Conduct Rules and the resultant order culminating into the termination of his services issued on 2nd of January, 1980. 2. A statement of few facts will be necessary for appreciating the real controversy in this litigation : The petitioner Sheshrao Balwantrao Chavan was appointed as Assistant Registrar of the Marathwada University some time in 1966. During the course of time, he was promoted as Deputy Registrar on or about 3rd October, 1967. Mr. Yelikar was working as controller of Examinations in the said University from 1974 onwards. In or about April, 1975. Mr. Yelikar proceeded on leave and the present petitioner was directed to discharge the duties of the Controller of Examinations. Accordingly he joined his new post some time on 6th April, 1975 and continued to hold that post when the controversy arose. 3. For the annual examinations held in March/April, 1974, supplementary examinations held in October/November, 1974 and the subsequent annual Examinations held in March/April , 1975, the printing work was entrusted to one Mr. Swaminathan from Madras. Mr. Swaminathan submitted his bills amounting to Rs 6,00,000/- and odd for the work that he had done. These bills remained pending with the University since April, 1975. It is alleged that there was some irregularities in granting the contract and therefore, these bills could not be cleared of. Mr. Swaminathan naturally interested in the clearance of his bills, continued to write to the university officials for the clearance . Ultimately, he wrote to the Chancellor with a copy forwarded to the Prime Minister of India. This was some time at the end of 1976. The office of the Prime Minister promptly despatched this application to the Chancellor, for further necessary action and the Chancellor in his turn, forwarded it to the Vice-Chancellor of the Marathwada University with a request to expedite the matter. 4. The University was conscious that the bills were pending for a pretty long time and therefore, the Executive Council appointed a four-member committee inclusive of respondent No. 1 who was the then Vice-Chancellor of this University. The committee submitted its report to the Executive Council in October/November, 1977. One Mr. 4. The University was conscious that the bills were pending for a pretty long time and therefore, the Executive Council appointed a four-member committee inclusive of respondent No. 1 who was the then Vice-Chancellor of this University. The committee submitted its report to the Executive Council in October/November, 1977. One Mr. Patodekar who was the Principal of the affiliated college had submitted his separate note on or about 21-5-1978. It appears that the Committee made some observations regarding the present petitioner. Mr. Patodekar, however, submitted a dissenting report. This report was put up before the Executive Council. The Executive Council considered this report and then appointed a one member Committee head by Mr. N.B. Chavan to enquire into the whole episode. Mr. Chavan submitted his report on 23-12-1978. Mr. Chavan was of the opinion that there was no unavoidable delay in clearing the bills. On the other hand, according to him, the delay was justifiable, inasmuch as it gave an opportunity to the University authorities to direct internal audit which obviously found the claim preferred by Mr. Swaminathan to be excessive at least to the tune of Rs. 48,000/- and odd. Needless to say, Mr. Chavan did not find fault with the conduct of the present petitioner during the discharge of his duties as the Controller of Examinations or in any other capacity. 5. This report of Mr. Chavan came to be placed before the Executive Council. The Executive Council passed a resolution directing the matter to be entrusted to the Vice-Chancellor, Mr. Bhonsle, for taking the decision on the question. It will be proper and necessary at this stage to re-produce the whole resolution which can be found at Exhibit E because the whole controversy centres around the interpretation of this resolution reads as follows:- "Full powers be given to the Vice-Chancellor to take a decision on this question and the Vice-Chancellor informed the Executive Council that he will take decision in about a month. On this decision Shri Gangadhar Pathrikar gave his opinion that the Executive Council should take a decision on the note dated 16-1-1979 submitted by him and other two members and since it was not accepted , he does not agree with the above decision." This resolution appears to have been passed on 22-3-1979. 6. The Vice-Chancellor Mr. On this decision Shri Gangadhar Pathrikar gave his opinion that the Executive Council should take a decision on the note dated 16-1-1979 submitted by him and other two members and since it was not accepted , he does not agree with the above decision." This resolution appears to have been passed on 22-3-1979. 6. The Vice-Chancellor Mr. Bhonsle (present respondent No. 1) purporting to act under the authority vested in him by the above resolution, finding that a prima facie case existed for enquiry against the present petitioner, directed the departmental enquiry to be held against him. One Mr. Motale, Advocate, was appointed as an Enquiry Officer. This is the commencement of the proceedings which have been impugned in this writ petition. A statement of allegations was also enclosed alongwith Exhibit F. 7. In pursuance of this direction of the Vice-Chancellor, Mr. Motale framed three charges against the present petitioner.. The first charge impeached the petitioner of intentionally delaying the clearance of the bills of Mr. Swaminathan and thus making the image of the University tarnished. The second charge consisted of non-putting before the Executive Council, the letters addressed by the Chancellor of the University on 23-7-1976 and 19-8-1976. The third charge consisted of not making all the papers available to the one man committee headed by Mr. Lawale. 8. The enquiry proceeded further. The evidence was recorded and ultimately, Mr. Motale submitted his report (Exhibit H) to the Vice-Chancellor on 26th October, 1979. In pursuance of this report, notice was issued on 15th November, 1979, directing the petitioner to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated. This notice was obviously issued on the Vice-Chancellor agreed with the findings of Mr. Motale. The petitioner submitted his reply to the notice. On considering the whole material, the final order came to be passed 2-1-1980, directing the termination of services of the petitioner with effect from the afternoon of 2-1-1980 vide Exh. J. 9. The petitioner applied for a copy which he was entitled to under the Rules, as he wanted to prefer appeal against this order of termination before the Chancellor. However, instead of preferring this appeal, the petitioner moved this Court by the present petition. 10. J. 9. The petitioner applied for a copy which he was entitled to under the Rules, as he wanted to prefer appeal against this order of termination before the Chancellor. However, instead of preferring this appeal, the petitioner moved this Court by the present petition. 10. It may be pointed out at this stage that before instituting the present petition, the present petitioner had filed another petition before this very Court vide Writ Petition No. 2181/79 on or about 27th November, 1979. The petitioner challenged the order of the Vice-Chancellor to appoint the Enquiry Committee and also challenged the subsequent enquiry. However no final orders were passed then. This petition came up before the Division Bench of this Court on 28th November, 1979, when the following order were passed: "The enquiry is yet to be completed. The petition is premature and is rejected as such." As far as the factual aspects are concerned, the respondents in their affidavits have admitted them substantially. The only dispute is regarding the interpretation of the facts and inferences arising therefrom. 11. Mr. P.R. Deshmukh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, raised the following points for our consideration: "(1) That the powers to initiate disciplinary action are vested exclusively in the Executive Council of the University and not in the Vice-Chancellor and therefore, the action of the Vice-Chancellor in appointing Mr. Motale as Enquiry Officer and the subsequent enquiry made by Mr. Motale in pursuance of this appointment are all ultras vires; (2) The appointment of Mr. Motale himself is arbitrary, capricious, unwarranted and mala fide; (3) The enquire was bad, inasmuch as, no proper opportunity was given to the present petitioner to lead his defence, that report of Mr. Motale is perverse and mala fide: (4) The show cause notice is also bad, inasmuch, as it was issued by the Registrar and not by the Vice-Chancellor, and (5) Personal hearing was not given and this amounts to the infringement of the rule of natural justice." 12. Before going to the merit of this case, it would be necessary to dispose of the preliminary objections raised by the respondents in the reply. It was urged that this Court should be reluctant to exercise the special powers because the petitioner has filed to resort to the remedies which was available to him under law. Before going to the merit of this case, it would be necessary to dispose of the preliminary objections raised by the respondents in the reply. It was urged that this Court should be reluctant to exercise the special powers because the petitioner has filed to resort to the remedies which was available to him under law. It was not disputed before us that there was a right of appeal before the Chancellor which remedy the petitioner has not pursued. It is true that the petitioner has not pursued the remedy which was available to him under the Statute. The remedy was by way of appeal to the Chancellor and it was only against the order of termination passed which means that the Chancellor could only, at the most, decided as to whether the order was correct or wrong. However, this dispute is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of that order. The petitioner has challenged the vary vires of the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor. The remedy of appeal was, not therefore, an effacious remedy which could effectively decide the controversy raised in this litigation. From this point of view, we do not consider that non-available of that remedy would bar the present petition. 13. It was next contented that the present petition is barred by principle of constructive res judicata, inasmuch as, the pervious writ petition has been dismissed by this very High Court. We do not find any substance in this contention also because, as already pointed out, that petition was dismissed as premature because no final orders were passed till then. We do not find any substance in either of this preliminary objections. 14. With these observations, we proceed with the consideration of the real controversy. It may not be necessary to repeat the facts that have led to the filing of this petition. Admittedly, prior to April, 1975 , the petitioner was officiating as Deputy Registrar of this University and from April, 1975, onwards the petitioner was officiating as Controller of Examinations. Admittedly, the bills of Mr. Swaminathan were pending with the office of University and these bills pertain to the annual examinations held in March/April, 1974, Supplementary examinations held in October/November, 1974 and annual examinations head in April/March, 1975. There is no dispute that Mr. Admittedly, the bills of Mr. Swaminathan were pending with the office of University and these bills pertain to the annual examinations held in March/April, 1974, Supplementary examinations held in October/November, 1974 and annual examinations head in April/March, 1975. There is no dispute that Mr. Swaminathan was writing to the authorities from time to time for that clearance of his bills and he did not even hesitate to write to the Prime Minister of India regarding the delay caused by the University authorities. The Prime Minister in the ordinary course forwarded this application to the Chancellor and the Chancellor as Head of the university forwarded this application to the University. Naturally, the University was required to enquire into the factual aspect. 15. Accordingly, the Executive Council appointed a committee consisting of A.R. Waghmare, B.R. Bhonsle (the then Vice-Chancellor) and present respondent No. 1 Mr. V.N. Kshirsagar and Dr. C.N. Sharma. The meeting of this committee was held on October 6, 1977. Exhibit A which is the minute of this committee shows that the purpose for which it was appointed. The purpose was two-fold namely: (1) to report on the reason why the bills pertaining huge amount were kept pending; and (2) to report as to whether there has been any irregularities in the printing of the question papers and if so, who are responsible for this. The Committee after its deliberations, submitted its report which can be found at Exhibit-A. Suffice it to say that the committee found all the pervious Vice-Chancellors negligent in their duties. They are also contemplated disciplinary action against the Controller of the Examinations since his negligence has tarnished the image of the University. It may be pointed out that one Mr. Patodekar submitted dissenting report. 16. This report was kept before the Executive Counsel and it appears From Exh. B that Mr. Patodekar was not at all satisfied with this report. He submitted a note for consideration of the University on 21-5-1978. It is, however, not clear whether the Executive Council took any decision in the matter. What appear from the record is that the Executive Council appointed a one - man committee headed by Mr. N.B. Chavan and the terms of reference were as follows: "(i) Was there any agreement bond entered into by the Printer Shri Swaminathan with the University while undertaking the printing work of the University. What appear from the record is that the Executive Council appointed a one - man committee headed by Mr. N.B. Chavan and the terms of reference were as follows: "(i) Was there any agreement bond entered into by the Printer Shri Swaminathan with the University while undertaking the printing work of the University. (ii) Was the letter marked as "G" containing the rates quoted by Shri. M. Swaminathan received in response to the letter issued by the Controller of Examinations 27-2-1974 inviting quotations from the printing agencies; (iii) Was the upper portion of the original letter marked as "G" from Shri Swaminathan removed intentionally? (iv) Did the rates mention in the letter, said to be that of Shri M. Swaminathan (marked as 'G') and those mention in the comparative statement placed before the Executive Council differ? (v) Was there any justification for delaying the payment of Shri M. Swaminathan?. If not, is it possible to fix the responsibility of keeping such huge amounts unsettled, as a result of which the printer had to take up the matter not only to the Chancellor but even to the Prime Minister of India." We are not much concerned with these points. However, I have re-produced these issues only with a view to find out as to what was the real dispute before the Executive Council and what they were required to decide. It is enough to point out at this stage that Mr. Chavan submitted a detailed report running into 87 pages and this report can be found at Exhibit D. The sum and substance of the report submitted by Mr. Chavan was that the delay in the settlement of the bills of Mr. Swaminathan was unavoidable and justifiable. Another finding of Mr. Chavan was that nobody could be held responsible for the delay. Mr. Chavan also observed that the delay has resulted in substantial saving of Rs. 48,686/10 paise to the University. This report was submitted on 23rd of December, 1978. 17. As already pointed out this report was put forward before the Executive Council and it authorised the Vice-Chancellor to take a decision on the question and to report about his decision within a month. 48,686/10 paise to the University. This report was submitted on 23rd of December, 1978. 17. As already pointed out this report was put forward before the Executive Council and it authorised the Vice-Chancellor to take a decision on the question and to report about his decision within a month. To repeat, it is only on the basis of this resolution that the Vice-Chancellor thought himself clothed with all the disciplinary powers vested in the Executive Council and it is only under the blanket of these powers that he proceeded to appoint Mr. Motale as the Enquiry Officer to act on the report of Mr. Motale culminating into the passing of the impugned order of termination. 18. It was strenuously urged by Mr. P.R. Deshmukh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the powers to take disciplinary action are vested exclusively in the Executive Council and not in the Vice-Chancellor and therefore, the Vice-Chancellor could not appoint and Enquiry Committee without seeking any specific mandate or authorisation from the Executive Council. On the other hand, it was urged by Mr. Navander, learned Counsel for the University, that the Vice-Chancellor being the Executive and administrative head of the University has inherent powers to take disciplinary action against the erring staff and he invited our attention to section 11(6)(a) of the Marathwada University Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') which reads as follows:- "It shall be lawful for the Vice-Chancellor, as the principal executive and academic officer to regulate the work and conduct of the officers, and of the teaching, academic and other employees of the University in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations." Relying upon this provision it was urged by Mr. Navander that the Vice-Chancellor has all the powers to take disciplinary action. The argument of Mr. Navander that section 11(6)(a) vests absolute disciplinary powers in the Vice-Chancellor contains inherent defect, inasmuch as, the section itself makes the obligatory on the Vice-Chancellor to exercise these powers only in accordance with the provisions of this Act. It will, therefore, be necessary to consider other provisions of this Act which operate as a restriction on the powers of the Vice-Chancellor. 19. Section 23 of the Act speaks about the constitution of the Executive Council and section 24 speaks about the powers and duties of the Executive Counsel. It will, therefore, be necessary to consider other provisions of this Act which operate as a restriction on the powers of the Vice-Chancellor. 19. Section 23 of the Act speaks about the constitution of the Executive Council and section 24 speaks about the powers and duties of the Executive Counsel. Sub-clause (xxix) of section 24(1) reads as follows:- "Appoint officers and other employees of the University, prescribe their qualifications, fix their emoluments, define the terms and conditions of their service and discipline, and, where necessary, their duties." Sub-clause (xi) of that section speaks about the residuary powers of the Executive Council and it reads as follows:- "Exercise all the powers of the University, not otherwise provided for in this Act or the Statutes, and all other powers which are required, to give effect to this Act, or to the Statutes, Ordinance and Regulations." Then comes sub-clause (xli) which permits the delegation of the powers by the Executive Council to its officials or authorities and its reads as follows:- "delegate, subject to the approval of the Chancellor, any of its powers (expect the power to make Ordinances), to the Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar or the Finance Officer, or such other officer or authority of the University or a committee appointed by it, as it thinks fit." The scheme thus makes everything clear. The initial powers of the appointments and the consequential powers of disciplinary actions exclusively vest in the Executive Council by virtue of Clause (xxix) of section 24(1) of the Act but according to sub-clause (xli) the delegation is permissible and such delegation can be only subject to the approval of the Chancellor. The powers of delegation are thus necessarily restricted and not absolute. The powers of delegation are thus necessarily restricted and not absolute. It will be relevant at this stage to refer to section 84 of the Act which speaks about the delegation of powers and it reads as follows:- "Subject to the provisions of this Act, and the Statutes, any officer or the authority of the University, may, by order, delegate his or its power expect the powers to make Statute, Ordinances and Regulations, to any other officer or authority under his or its control and subject to the conditions that the ultimate responsibility for the exercise of the powers so delegated shall continue to vest in the officer or authority delegating them." The section thus shows that the powers of delegation are not absolute but they are restricted by the provisions of the very Act. The scheme of all these sections taken together throws a considerable light. It shows that the disciplinary powers are vested exclusively in the Executive Council and it is only the competent authority to take action in the matter. However, these powers can be delegated under the provisions of section 84 and also sub-clause (xli) of section 24(1) of the Act. But both these provisions do not permit blanket delegation. They permit the delegation subject to the provisions of the Act, statutes and subject to the approval of the Chancellor, respectively. 20. It is on this background that we have to consider the vires of the Resolution which can be found at Exhibit E. As already pointed out, the report of the commission headed by Mr. Chavan came to be placed before the Executive Council and alongwith this report, the report of four member committee and some other documents were also placed before the Executive Council. The matter placed before the Executive Council was very specific. The twin purpose for which the four member committee came to be appointed previously and the five issues which were before Mr. Chavan for enquiry and report was the question before the Executive Council and it was required to take decision in this matter. In short, the question before the Executive Council was whether there was any inexcusable delay in clearance of the bill of Mr. Swaminathan and if so, who was responsible for the delay and the Execute Council was required to take decision on this point. In short, the question before the Executive Council was whether there was any inexcusable delay in clearance of the bill of Mr. Swaminathan and if so, who was responsible for the delay and the Execute Council was required to take decision on this point. It was the only purpose for which the Executive Council was summoned and there was no other matter except these points which were to be considered by the Executive Council. On this background, the Executive Council resolved as follows:- "Full powers be given to the Vice-Chancellor to take decision on this question and the Vice-Chancellor informed the Executive Council that he will take the decision in about a month....." We have not re-produced other portion of the resolution which speaks about the dissenting view of Mr. Pathrikar as it is not relevant for the purposes of this controversy. It was strenuously argued by Mr. Navander that this resolution itself amounts to delegation of powers by the Executive Council to the Vice-Chancellor and the delegation, according to Mr. Navander, was not only in respect of accepting or rejecting the report but it was in respect of the consequential actions following the acceptance of the report. We doubt the propriety and validity of such blanket delegation. There were two or three reports before the Executive Council and it had to deliberate on the outcome of these reports. One was the report of the four member committee, other was the report of Mr. Lawale Committee (which is not so relevant for the present purpose) and the third was the report of committee headed by Mr. Chavan. The crucial point that is to be decided by the Executive Council in the meeting was whether to accept or to reject the report. It was required to decide as to whether there was un excusable delay or not. Other point for decision was if there was un-excusable delay, who was responsible for that. With this decision, the proceedings were come to an end as far as that meeting was concerned and it is, if at all, in this compass that the delegation was permissible. What we find surprisingly enough, in this case in that delegation far exceeded beyond the scope of the limited compass. In fact, the Executive Council was not aware on this day whether there was un-excusable delay. What we find surprisingly enough, in this case in that delegation far exceeded beyond the scope of the limited compass. In fact, the Executive Council was not aware on this day whether there was un-excusable delay. It could not, even by any stretch of imagination, be said that the Executive Council was seized of a problem of punishing a defaulter on that day because the Executive Council was not aware whether there was a default-not to speak of a defaulter. A small question that arises at this stage is whether there could be any delegation of those powers which were not even thought of by the Executive Council in that meeting. What the Executive Council authorised the Vice-Chancellor on that day was to take decision on this question. The question was very specific. The question was to decide whether there was un-excusable delay and if so, who was responsible for this. The question does not pass beyond this limited compass. 21. This being the state of affairs, it cannot now be permissible for Mr. Navander to contented that this resolution delegated the powers to the Vice-Chancellor to take even the consequential steps which were never imagined or foreseen by the Executive Council. Had the Vice-Chancellor restricted this action only to accepting or rejecting the reports and finding the defaulter, the matter would have been quite different and from that point of view, the delegation could have been proper and the action of the Vice-Chancellor within the limits of delegation would have been perfectly valid. What we find is otherwise. The Vice-Chancellor did not stop where he was expected to stop. He entered into the arena where he had no powers to enter. He could have only stopped with the findings and asked for further delegation from the Executive Council for further taking action in the matter. 22. This is in regard to the area of delegation. There is another defect from which the action of the Vice-Chancellor suffers. Even assuming for the time being that the Executive Council could delegate its powers, this delegation was subject to the provisions of the Act and unless and until those requirements were fulfilled, the Vice-Chancellor could not take any action under the grab of Delegated Authority. To repeat it once again, that delegation permissible under section 84 of the Act is always subject to other provisions of the Act. To repeat it once again, that delegation permissible under section 84 of the Act is always subject to other provisions of the Act. Sub-clause (xli) of the section 24(1) of the Act which is part and parcel of the Act itself shows that this delegation is subject to the approval of the Chancellor. There is nothing to show that this resolution was ever approved by the Chancellor. The so called delegation, if at all, suffers from this defect also. 23. The controversy thus stands crystalised. The authority had tremendous doubt in their mind regarding the causes of delay in clearing the bills. Factually there was no doubt a delay. But the authorities could not make up their mind as to what was the cause of delay and who was responsible for this delay. It is for this purpose that the authorities borrowed the wisdom of two Committees namely; the four member committee and of Mr. Chavan committee. Both this committees put up their respective view before the Executive Council. It was for the Executive Council to make up its mind as to whether there was un- excusable delay and if so, who was responsible for this delay. Sufficient material was placed before the Executive Council. Unfortunately, the Executive Council inspite of this material found itself unable to take any decision in the matter and Vice-Chancellor was asked to take decision in the matter. The interpretation of this resolution according to us, is very simple. Whatever the Executive Council was required to decide but it could not decide was referred for decision to the Vice-Chancellor. The limitations of the Vice-Chancellor as a delegate did not permit him to cross his compass and to enter into the field which was not even imagined by the Executive Council when it passed the resolution. We have absolutely no doubt in our mind that the delegation if at all has its limitations and the matter left with the delegate was to find out whether there was unexcusable delay and if so who was responsible for this delay. The delegate was expected only to decide this point. The Vice-Chancellor, on the other hand, exceeded his limits and that too obviously without any authority because the Executive Council had never delegated its powers to take disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner by its resolution. 24. The delegate was expected only to decide this point. The Vice-Chancellor, on the other hand, exceeded his limits and that too obviously without any authority because the Executive Council had never delegated its powers to take disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner by its resolution. 24. In these circumstances it was permissible for the Vice-Chancellor to record his decision only on these points and then refer the matter to the Executive Council which could have considered the further delegation, if any and if it so desired. What we find in the present case is that the delegate did not stop at where he was required to stop. He troded his path through the arena where he was not permitted to trod. He took the decision of initiating the departmental enquiry against the petitioner which under the Statute he was not entitled to. The Executive Council which was entitled to take this action and which was also entitled to delegate its powers did not in fact delegate these powers to the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor throughout acted without any powers. The theory that the Vice-Chancellor being the administrative and executive head of the University is empowered to take all these actions cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the Vice-Chancellor, like all the other officials of the University, is the creation of law and as such public authority has no powers except those vested by the statute. The matter became crystalised at this stage and no expert is required to say that the steps which the Vice-Chancellor took in appointing the Enquiry Officer, directing him to conduct the departmental enquiry further directing him to submit his report, issuing show cause notice and ultimately passing impugned order of termination are all void and without jurisdiction. 25. There is another point which was stressed by Mr. P.R. Deshmukh. He has no doubt, challenged the enquiry on the point that no reasonable opportunity was granted to his client that the charge was vague and so on and so. However, it is not necessary for us to consider the procedural aspects of the enquiry because we, positively, think that all these actions taken by the Vice-Chancellor are ultra vires. Mr. Deshmukh further urged that the very notice of termination issued by the Vice-Chancellor is bad in law and we do find a considerable force in this argument. However, it is not necessary for us to consider the procedural aspects of the enquiry because we, positively, think that all these actions taken by the Vice-Chancellor are ultra vires. Mr. Deshmukh further urged that the very notice of termination issued by the Vice-Chancellor is bad in law and we do find a considerable force in this argument. The notice of termination can be found at Exhibit J. It is dated 2nd January, 1980. To appreciate the argument of Mr. Deshmukh it will be proper at this stage to re-produce the order of termination and it runs as follows:- "The Explanation dated 13-12-1979 submitted by you in response to the show cause notice issued to you, we submitted to the Vice-Chancellor for his consideration and he has directed me to terminate your services from the University. You are hereby informed that your services are terminated from the university with effect from January 2, 1980 (afternoon). You should hand over the charge of your post to Shri S.B. Patil, Deputy Registrar, (Examination), on January 2, 1980 afternoon". This notice obviously is the final straw on the back of the animal who troded all his way without any justification or jurisdiction. As we have already pointed out that the powers of appointments to the specified cadre (of which the petitioner was the incumbent) vested exclusively in the Executive Council. The Vice-Chancellor was not the appointed authority. Even assuming for the time being that the Vice-Chancellor was the appointed authority, the matter does not change. A simple reading of this order would show that the Vice-Chancellor has directed the Registrar to terminate the services of the petitioner and accordingly, the Registrar informed the petitioner. The very language of this document shows that the Vice-Chancellor himself did not terminate the services. He merely directed his subordinate namely; the Registrar to terminate the service, of the Deputy Registrar or the Controller of the Examinations, whatever it may be. It is a well recognised principle that it is only the appointing authority who can terminate the services of the officers and no authority inferior to the appointing authority can terminate the services. Can we say in these circumstances that it is the appointing authority which has terminated the services of the petitioner? As the document stands we cannot read anything in it supporting the argument of Mr. Navander. The substance of argument of Mr. Can we say in these circumstances that it is the appointing authority which has terminated the services of the petitioner? As the document stands we cannot read anything in it supporting the argument of Mr. Navander. The substance of argument of Mr. Navander was that it was the Vice-Chancellor who terminated the services of the petitioner and it was the registrar who merely communicated the decision. We find ourselves unable to accept this argument for the simple reason that Exhibit J. nowhere says that the Vice-Chancellor has terminated the service of the petitioner. It must, therefore, be said in these circumstances that even the factual termination has not been made by the authority competent to terminate the services of the petitioner. The Supreme Court in (Baradakanta Mishra v. High Court of Orissa and another)1, 1975 S.L.J. 529 has observed in similar circumstances that the termination is not proper. In that case subordinate Judge was found guilty of some charges during the enquiry conducted by the High court. The High Court held him guilty of the charges and passed the order of termination. The delinquent appealed to the Governor who rejected the appeal and confirmed the order of dismissal passed by the High Court. When this dismissal was challenged in the competent Court, it was urged that the dismissal order was passed by the authority who was not being an appointing authority could not dismiss him. The reply to this argument was that even assuming that the Government was the appointing authority, the Governor in appeal confirmed the order of the High Court and dismissed the appeal which means that the order passed by the High Court merged into the order passed by the Governor and which consequentially means that the ultimate order was passed by the Governor. The Supreme Court did not agree with this argument. On the other hand, it positively held that the initial order of dismissal passed by the High Court was itself void and what was void could not be validated subsequently by the superior authority. The Supreme Court did not agree with this argument. On the other hand, it positively held that the initial order of dismissal passed by the High Court was itself void and what was void could not be validated subsequently by the superior authority. Similar view was taken in (Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirza Khasim Ali Beg and another)2, A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 747 where it was observed : "The second contention urged on behalf of the appellants that as the General Manager of the Mysore Government Road Transport Department confirmed on appeal the orders of dismissal of the first respondent that should be considered as substantial compliance with the provisions of the Article 311(1) of the Constitution, in our judgment, devoid of substance. The original order of the first respondents being without jurisdiction and as such void and in operative having been passed in contravention of the provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution, the order passed on appeal by the General Manager could not be cure the initial defect." Similar view was also taken in (Krishna Kumar v. The Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, Central Railways and others)3, A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 1912. 26. Thus, apart from the fact that the initiation of the departmental enquiry against the petitioner is void, the final order passed culminating into the termination of services of the petitioner is equally bad and in law there cannot be any termination emanating from such order. 27. We thus find that the initiation of the departmental proceedings against the petitioner was itself incompetent, inasmush as, the Vice-Chancellor had no inherent powers to take disciplinary proceedings. The Executive Council which was competent to initiate the departmental proceedings and which was also competent to delegate if powers to the Vice-Chancellor, in fact, did not delegate these specific powers. In view of non-delegation, the inescapable conclusion would be that the Vice-Chancellor has taken these proceedings without ant authority of law. All these subsequent acts including the act of appointment of Mr. Motale, the act of conducting the enquiry, the act of issuing the show cause notice and ultimately the act of termination of all void and they could not be cured subsequently. All these subsequent acts including the act of appointment of Mr. Motale, the act of conducting the enquiry, the act of issuing the show cause notice and ultimately the act of termination of all void and they could not be cured subsequently. In view of there findings, we need not go into the procedural defects on which the enquiry and the findings culminating therefrom is challenged because it is not at all necessary for the decision of the controversy particularly in view our positive findings on the first point. 28. One circumstance needs a mention at this stage. When this petition was riped for hearing and when it came on the Board in November, 1985, the Division Bench of this Court observed that the matter be put up before the Executive Council so that it will have an opportunity to examine this matter and take the decision in the matter. All concerned papers were put before the Executive Council at its meeting held on 26/27th December, 1985. The Executive Council passed the following Resolution : "1. The Executive Council at its meeting held on March 22, 1979, had by a resolution given full authority to the Vice-Chancellor for taking further proceedings and decision in both the cases of defaulting officers; 2. In exercise of above authority, the Vice-Chancellor appointed an Enquiry Officer and as suggested by the Enquiry Officer issued show cause Notices, obtained replies from the officers and lastly issued order for terminating their services; 3. The Vice-Chancellor reported the action taken against the said officers and also the fact that both the officers had filled the writs before the High Court and obtained orders staying action against them. As the matter was before the High Court, the executive Council did not take any decision. 4. The Vice Chancellor had also reported the action taken against both the officers to the Chancellor of the University to which the Chancellor has not communicated any objection; 5. The Executive Council further took a view that in addition to the authority given to him as at (1) above, the Vice-Chancellor himself is also a disciplinary authority under section 13(3) of Marathwada University Act, 1974 and under section 11(6)(a) of the Marathwada University Act, 1974; 6. The Executive Council further took a view that in addition to the authority given to him as at (1) above, the Vice-Chancellor himself is also a disciplinary authority under section 13(3) of Marathwada University Act, 1974 and under section 11(6)(a) of the Marathwada University Act, 1974; 6. The Council further observed that the High Court Bench at Aurangabad also recorded that the petitioners are at liberty to address representations to the Executive Council in the next meeting and it was found that no representation was received in the University either from Shri D.S. Yelikar of Shri S.B. Chavan." We are at a loss to understand and appreciate what this resolution means. It the Executive Council considers this as a judgement, we have nothing to say. But we have to pass our own judgement in accordance with law. A simple reading of the resolution as its stand shows that it is nothing but a ratification of the acts performed by the Vice-Chancellor. The ratification by itself does not clothe the authority with the powers. The ratification only means the acceptance of the acts and the consequences flowing therefrom. It does not imbibe powers into the authority which had no powers. In our opinion, therefore, this resolution which amounts only to ratification of the act done by Mr. Bhonsle cannot vest Mr. Bhonsle with the power to do these acts. The acts done by Mr. Bhonsle remains the acts without any authority or powers and that defect cannot be cured by the subsequent resolution. 29. These were the only points which were canvassed before us. We have absolutely no hesitation that the initiation of the departmental enquiry, the conduct of the enquiry and the resultant termination of services of the petitioner are all without jurisdiction and as such, the petitioner deserves success on all the counts. 30. The petition has to be allowed. The departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner and the resultant order issued on 2-1-1980 purporting to terminate the services of the petitioner is hereby quashed. The petitioner has also claimed the relief of declaration that he is deemed to continue in service. 30. The petition has to be allowed. The departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner and the resultant order issued on 2-1-1980 purporting to terminate the services of the petitioner is hereby quashed. The petitioner has also claimed the relief of declaration that he is deemed to continue in service. In view of the finding that the initiation of departmental proceedings itself is ultra vires and without jurisdiction, this relief is granted, legally once this obstacle is removed, the law would take its own course and in that case the petitioner would be deemed to continue in the post which he was holding then. The petition is allowed with costs. Respondent No. 2 shall bear the costs of the petitioner in addition to its own. Other respondents to bear their own costs. Rule made absolute in these terms. Petition allowed. -----